' AJMAL MIAN, J.---The petitioners/tenants seek leave to appeal against the judgment dated 31-5- 1990 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Sindh in F.RA.No, 65 of 1990, maintaining the order of ejectment dated 18-12-1989 passed under section 14 of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, in favour of the respondent/landlord, a retired civil servant, in respect of a shop situated on Plot No,715/716, Central Commercial Area, PECHS, Karachi, hereinafter referred to as the shop.
2. The facts to be noted are that the respondent, after retirement on attaining the age of superannuation on 10-6-1985, filed Rent. Case No,387 of 1987 on 26-4-1987 under section 14 of the Ordinance for ejectment against the petitioners on the ground of his personal requirement. The above application was resisted by the petitioners inter alia on the ground that the same was not maintainable under the law as the respondent was already in possession of two commercial premises in the same building and a factory at Malir and hence the case was not covered by the above section 14 of the Ordinance. However, the learned Rent Controller, after recording the evidence and hearing of the parties, by his aforesaid order dated 18-12-1989 granted the order of ejectment in favour of the respondent. Thereupon, the petitioners filed aforesaid F.R.A. Which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court by the impugned judgment. The petitioners have, therefore, filed the present petition for leave to appeal.
3. In support of the above petition Mr. N.C. Motiani, learned A.O.R. Appearing for the petitioners, has vehemently urged that the respondent's aforesaid application was not maintainable in view of proviso 1 to subsection (1) and subsection (2) of aforesaid section 14 of the Ordinance. To reinforce the above argument he has invited our attention to the respondent's following admission in his cross-examination:- " It is correct to suggest that when Mr. Shab-ud-Din vacated his flat I rented out the same on Rs,1,400 per month to Mr. Khateeb, thereafter in July, 1985, Mr. Khateeb vacated the flat under the Court order. When Mr. Khateeb vacated the flat it remained in my possession till 6-5-1986. It is incorrect to suggest that I have established my office in the said flat for supplying of Telephone sets. It is also incorrect to suggest that I was supplying the leader from the said flat. I have rented out said flat to Pak Ceiling Company on rent of Rs, 2,000 per month. The said flat was vacated in 1985 and remained vacant till 6th May, 1986. The other flat was vacated in the end of December, 1984. This flat remained in my possession till 15-4-1985. I had rented out said flat on 15-4-1985 at the rent of Rs,1,000 per month?
"I cannot produce certificate of registration of company. The Pak Ceiling. Company was registered in late 1985. It is incorrect to suggest that Pak Ceiling Company that it was not a company. In the beginning I was having 10% share in the company. It was increased to 20% and then again reduced to 10%. I am not sure about the exact share of my son in the said company, but he had a share in the company. In the beginning my wife was not having any share in the company but later on she became one of the sharers having about 2% share in the company. Pak Ceiling Company was registered with the Registrar."
' On the other hand, Mr. Imtiaz Muhammad Khan, learned A.O.R. Appearing for the respondent/caveator, has invited our attention to the following admission of petitioner No,1 in his cross-examination:- " It is correct that in one flat Mr. Shab-ud-Din was residing. When Mr. Shab-ud-Din vacated the said flat Mr. Khatib became tenant of said flat. It is correct to suggest that in second flat Mr. Hafeez was residing, now there other tenant is residing. It is correct to suggest that both said flats are for residential purpose. It is correct to suggest that all four tenants of the shops are old tenants. It is correct to suggest that after 1986 when applicant retired from the service no shop was vacated, all the tenants of shops are old tenants."
4. In order to appreciate the above contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it may be pertinent to reproduce section 14 of the Ordinance, which reads as follows:- "14. Delivery of vacant possession.---(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, the landlord of a building who is a widow, or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within the next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, may, by notice in writing inform the tenant that he or she needs the building for personal use and require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice, not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof: ' Provided that nothing in this subsection shall apply where the landlord has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or, as the case may be, has become widow or orphan.
(2) The landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of sub-section (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality.
(3) Where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building under subsection (1), the Controller shall, on application by the landlord in this behalf, order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner, by using such force as may be necessary."
5. A plain reading of the above-quoted section 14 indicates that the provisions of the same override the other provisions of the Ordinance and any other law for the time being in force. It further indicates that a right has been conferred on a landlord of a building who is a widow or a minor whose both parents are dead or a salaried employee due to retire within next six months or has retired or a person who is due to attain the age of sixty years within the next six months or has attained the age of sixty years, to inform the tenant by a notice in writing that he or she needs the building for personal use and may require him to deliver vacant possession of the building within such time as may be specified in the notice not being earlier than two months from the receipt thereof.
' It may also be noticed that proviso to subsection (1) takes away the above right from the above specified person if he or she has rented out the building after he has retired or attained the age of sixty years or as the case may be, become widow or orphan. It may also be pointed out that subsection (2) further imposes embargo on the above right by providing that the landlord shall not be entitled to avail the benefit of above subsection (1) if he is in occupation of a building owned by him in any locality.
' It may further be pointed out that subsection (3) of the above section 14 lays down that where the tenant has failed to deliver the possession of the building unde subsection (1), the Controller shall on application by the landlord in this behalf order eviction of the tenant from the building in a summary manner by using such force as may be necessary.
6. It may be pertinent to observe that the above-quoted section 14 in contradistinction to clause
(viii) of subsection (2) of section 15 of the Ordinance (which entitles the landlord to apply for eviction of his tenant from the premises let out by him in case he requires the same in good faith for his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his spouse or any of his children) omits the use of the words "in good faith" which are employed in the above clause (viii) of subsection (2) of section 15. From the above deliberate omission, it is evident that the intention of the law-makers was that the persons specified in subsection (1) of section 14 should be able to get the possession of the building owned by them without entering into controversial issue like the question of good faith or the regular trial of an ejectment case. To put it differently, it is a beneficial provision for the aforesaid specified persons. It is, therefore, to be construed in a manner which would advance the above objective instead of frustrating the same.
7. Keeping in view the above factum, we are of the view that a flat which may be used for residential or commercial purpose and which may be part of the building where the suit shop may be situated cannot be equated with a shop nor it can be equated with a factory which may be situated 8 or 10 miles away from the suit shop. We are inclined to hold that in order to press into service the bar contained in the above proviso to subsection (1) and subsection (2) of section 14 of the Ordinance, the person specified in above subsection (1) must have either rented out a building or must be in occupation of a building of the nature or the character of which he has sought the ejectment under above section 14. The building includes a part thereof in terms of tlause (a) of section 2 of the Ordinance. In other words, if he or she seeks the ejectment of a shop, he or she must have rented out a shop or must be in possession of a shop in any locality irrespective of the fact, whether it was suitable or not suitable for his purpose. If the respondent would have let out the shop after he had retired from service or would have been in occupation of a shop owned by him in any locality of Karachi, he would not have been entitled to invoke the aid of the above section 14.
8. We may also observe that according to Mr. Imtiaz Muhammad Khan, the factory referred to by Mr. Motiani, learned A.O.R. For the petitioners, was not owned by the respondent and, therefore, even otherwise sub-section (2) of section 14 was not attracted to. The above contention seems to be correct as there is no material on record to prove the factum that the factory premises were owned by the respondent.
9. Then it was contended by Mr. Motiani that the respondent had filed an application under section 15 of the Ordinance against another tenant Muhammad Anwar on the ground of personal requirement and which application was compromised and under which the respondent obtained the possession of the shop situated in the same building and hence the bar contained in subsection (2) of section 14 is attracted to. However, he has candidly conceded that the aforesaid rent case was filed by the respondent against Muhammad Anwar in July, 1986, on the ground of pesonal requirement of his son, whereas the present rent case under section 14 was filed in April, 1987. He has not been able to controvert the factum that the aforesaid shop is in possession of the respondent's son and not the respondent.
10. We are, therefore, of the view that the above petition has no merits. Leave is accordingly refused.
However, with the consent of the respondent and his Advocate-on-Record, Mr. Imtiaz Muhammad Khan, we allow four months time on the petitioners' undertaking that they would hand over the vacant possession of the shop voluntarily to the respondent upon the expiry of the above four months without waiting for any ejectment notice from the Court and would pay rent of the shop for the above period monthly regularly, failing which, the Rent Controller shall issue a writ of ejectment without notice to the petitioners.