NAIMUDDIN, J.-This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,,, calls in question the order dated 2-4-1980, passed by the District & Sessions Judge, Sanghar and Election Tribunal, whereby he set aside the election of the petitioner to the Union Council, Lundo Seat No. 1, Taluka Shahdadpur, District Sanghar, on the ground that the petitioner at the relevant time, being a government servant, was not qualified under section 37(2)(d) of the Sind Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (here--inafter called the Ordinance) to be elected as and to be a member, of the Union Council.
2. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the impugned order is without lawful authority on the ground that on 12-9-1979, when the nomination papers of the petitioner was accepted he was not a government servant as he has already resigned on 28-3-1980 and, therefore he was qualified to contest the election to the said seat. Before we examine this contention It is necessary to briefly state the relevant admitted facts.
3. The petitioner was in the service of Agricultural Department as Crop Reporter under the Agricultural Officer, Neoabad as a salarised person. On 28-3-1979, he sent a letter to the Extra Assistant Director, Sanghar, through the Agricultural Officer. Neoabad. Tando Adam, requesting that his resignation may be accepted. The reason stated in letter for resigning was that the petitioner had lot of engagements at home, therefore, could not serve the Government. On 29-3-1979, this letter was forwarded to the Assistant Director of Agricultural, Sanghar for information and necessary action. Thereafter, it appears from the record, the petitioner was relieved of his post of Crop Reporter from District Sanghar and was posted at Thatta vide Office Order No. Estt. 570, Sanghar dated 4-4-1979.
4. Before any action could be taken on the letter of resignation the petitioner, on 8-9-1979, submitted his nomination paper for election to the aforementioned Union Council. The nomination paper was accepted on 12- 9-1979. However, on 17-0-1979, respondent No. 1 filed an application (appeal) before the District & Sessions Judge, Sanghar, for rejection of the nomination paper of the petitioner, which application (appeal) was rejected - on the ground that the same was not maintainable for the reason that no appeal lay against the acceptance of nomination paper. Thereafter, the petitioner contested the election and was declared successful having secured the highest number of votes at the election, Aggrieved by the declaration of the petitioner as successful, respondent No. 1 again filed an appeal under rule 65 of the Sind Local Council (Election) Rules, 1979, and succeeded by the order dated 2-4-1980, now impugned before us.
5. We have heard Mr. Nasrullah Awan, Advocate for the petitioner and Mr. S. Nasiruddin, Advocate for respondent No. 1. No one has appeared on behalf of the other respondents including the Election Tribunal.
6. In order to appreciate the contention of Mr. Nasrullah Awan, Advocate that the petitioner was not disqualified to be elected as and to be a member to the Union Council under section 37 of the Ordinance it may be convenient, if, we reproduce herein below the relevant provisions thereof :- "37.-(1) A person shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be qualified to be elected as, and to be member if - (a)------------------------..
(b)------------------------------.
(c) ---------------------------..
(2) A person shall be disqualified from being elected as, and from being, a member if, (a)------------.
(b)------------------------------------------------.
(c)---------------------------------------------------.
(d) he is a Salaried person in the service of Pakistan or in the service of a statutory body or two years have not elapsed since his retirement or removal from such service,
(e) ---------------------..
(f)
It is contended before us by Mr. Nasrullah Awan, the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner having resigned on 28-3-1979, from the Government service and his resignation having been accepted with effect from 31-3-1980, he was no more in Government service on the dates when he filed his nomination paper or the same was accepted. It is further contended that period of two years provided in second part of clause (d) would not apply to the petitioner nor would it disqualify him from being elected as a member and being a member of the Union Council as he was not retired or removed from the service.
7. In our view both the contentions are without any force. A perusal of the letter dated 28-3-1979, whereby the petitioner tendered his resignation shows that he had not specified any date from which he intended to resign.
He had simply requested for acceptance of his resignation. Therefore, he continued in the service of the Government until his resignation was accepted. No rules of service have been brought to our notice which provide that a Government servant is considered to have resigned from the date when he tendered his resignation. Ordinary rule is that a person is considered to have resigned from his office only when his resignation is accepted, unless other--wise provided by the rule of service or the law. In support of this rule Mr. S. Nasiruddin, the learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 referred us to a Division Bench case of our own Court. Namely, Muhammad Khan v. Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Interior, Karachi (1) wherein Waheeduddin, J. Who wrote the opinion observed as follows :- "It is a well established rule of law that a resignation can be withdrawn or recalled before its acceptance by a competent authority."
Reliance was placed on the following observations of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Jai Ram v.
Union of India (2) :- "It may be conceded that it is open to a servant, who has expressed a desire to retire from service and applied to his superior officer to give him the requisite permission, to change his mind subsequently and ask for cancellation of the permission thus obtained, but he can be allowed to do so long as he continues in service and not after it has terminated."
(1) PLD 1958 Kar. 75(2) AIR 1954 SC 584 Reference may also be made to another case from Indian jurisdiction namely, Shanker Dutt Shukla v. President, Municipal Board, Auriaya and another (1). In this case a municipal servant has sent an application for resignation to the President of Municipal Board which was to come into existence from 1-4-1955. But before the date he wrote to the President not to consider the resignation. On these facts it was observed by the learned Judge that till the date mentioned above there was no resignation at all and the applicant had a right to intimate to the President before that date that he no longer wished that his application should be considered as effective.
Reference may also be had to Reichel v. Bishop of Oxford (2) wherein Cotton, L. J., while considering a case of resignation at page 546 of the report observed :- "Undoubtedly no resignation is effectual until it has been assented to approved by the Bishop."
It was further observed at page 547 of the report :.
"As long as the resignation has not become binding by the assent of the Bishop or ordinary, so long can there be a revocation of the complete act but, as soon as the resignation is complete by the assent of the Bishop, then there is no locus poenitentlae ; there is power to recall".
"Speaking generally, a resignation is revocable until it has been accepted by the Bishop, and when it is accepted by him the living becomes void."
Thus it is clear that the petitioner's resignation became effective only when it was accepted on 12-9-1979, for it was open to the petitioner to withdraw his resignation at any time until it ways accepted. Mr. Nasarullah Awan, however, submitted that the resignation eras accepted .With effect from 31-3-1979, therefore, the petitioner is deemed to have resigned on that date. It is already stated that resignation became effective, in the absence of any rule or law, only when it is accepted. The fact that the petitioner was in service of Government and was in fact was posted at Thatta District by the order dated 2-4-1979, cannot be oblitrated by the retrospective acceptance of the resignation. The acceptance of the resignation with effect from 31-3-1979, was obviously for the purposes of payment of emoluments up to that date It was open to the Government to accept the resignation even with effect from the date when it was tendered that is 28-3-1979 or even from a latter date or not to accept it at all. But the acceptance of the resignation with retrospect effect could not remove disability under section 37(2) (d) of the Ordinance under which the petitioner was. Therefore, on the first ground alone the petitioner was rightly held not qualified to be elected as and to be a member of the Union Council. Assuming for the sake of the argument that the petitioner is deemed to have resigned on 31-3-1979, still under second pa of clause (d) of subsection (2) of section 37 of the Ordinance he was disqualified from being elected as, and being, a member of the Union Council as two years period provided therein had not expired from the date the petitioner ceased to be a Government servant.
(1) AIR 1956 A 70(2) 56 L T R (N S) 539 However, it is contended that the petitioner was neither retired nor removed from service, and, therefore, two years bar would not have applied to him. It is submitted that the petitioner had voluntarily resigned. It is further submitted that he could be retired on superannuation or removed for misconduct only.
The words retirement or removal are not defined and they have not been used in the Ordinance in any technical sense. They have to be understood in their ordinary meanings, for it is the first and most elementary rule of construction that it is to be assumed that the words and phrases of technical legislation are based in their technical meaning if they have acquired one, B otherwise they have to be construed in their ordinary meaning, as given in the dictionaries. (See : Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, Twelfth Edition, page 28).
We would, therefore consider the meanings of the words "retirement". "resignation" as given in t1se dictionaries.
According to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77, pages 329 and 330, the word `retire' means to separate, or withdraw. Reliance is placed therein on State ex rel Herman v. City of Grand Island (1), State v. Love (2) . It also means to withdraw from office, public station, business or the like ; to withdraw from active service. `Retirement' means; the act of retiring, or state of being retired, Mass Fenny v. Metropolitan Life Inc. Co. (3), volun--tary withdrawal", (underlining' is ours for emphasis). Mass Brown v. Little Brown & Co. Inc. (4). The word `withdraw' is synonym with the word `resign'. Reliance is placed therein on N. Y. People v. Metropolitan District Police Board (5). According to the Words and Phrases (Permanent Edition), Vol. 37-A, page 204, the words, "Quit", "resign". "separate" or "withdraw" and "retire" as synonymous with "elect to retire" as used in firemen's pension law, State ex rel. Herman v. City of Grand Island According to the same dictionary p. 473, the word "resign" means to give up, surrender by formal Act, yield, relinquish, give up one's office or position, or withdraw from (under- . Lining is our for emphasis). Renounce". Reliance is placed therein on Bigger v. Unemployment Compensation Commission.
According to the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd (1975) Edition, Vol-II, page 1815, the word `retirort' means "to withdraw from an office or official position, to give up one's business or occupation in order to enjoy". According to this dictionary the word 'resign' means to give up an office or position ; to retire (underlining* is our for emphasis), to abdicate, to submit or yield, to a person or thing.
It is, therefore, clear that a person could retire from service by voluntarily submitting his resignation and it is not necessary that a person could retire or be retired on superannuation only. The second contention , therefore, also fails, Accordingly, the petitioner was not qualified to participate in the election.
(1) 15 N W 2d 341 348, 145, Neb. 150(2) 145 N W 1020
(3) 159 N E 608, 610, 262, Mass. 238
(4) 168 N E 521, 526, 269 Mass. 102 (5) 26 Barb. 487. 500, 501
(6) 46 A 2d. 137 143, Terry 274 We, therefore, find no substance in this petition which is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs as Mr. Nasiruddin does not press for the same.