Sheikh Manzoor Ahmad and eight others (hereinafter called the landlords) are owners of a building bearing No. 1813/9 situated in Kid Afghanan outside Lohari Gate, Multan. In this building there are separate portions or godown which are let to various persons,, One of the portions which is situated towards the eastern corner of this building is known as godown No. 2397. Another godown in this building bears No. 2396, but we are not concerned with the same and the dispute in the instant case is confined to the portion godown bearing No. 2397, which consists of six rooms ; one verandah ; one open-yard and one deohri. The situation of these rooms is that three of them are situated on the water works road side which may be called the front rooms. In between these front rooms is the deohri which constitutes an entrance for going into the open-yard; the verandah and the three rooms at the back.
2. The landlords filed an application for ejectment of Muhammad Hanif and two others (hereinafter called the tenants) on various grounds but all of them need not be adverted to because most of them were not pressed in the Courts below and even before me and the claim for ejectment is based now only on one ground, namely, the requirement of the landlords for reconstruction or erection of a building on the same site. The learned Rent Controller accepted this plea and by means of his order, dated 12-10-1963, directed the eviction of the tenants. The tenants filed an appeal which was, however, accepted by the learned District Judge, Multan, in part by means of his order, dated 27-5-1964. The learned District Judge with reference to the plans produced in the case came to the conclusion that it were the frontal three rooms which were to be demolished and re- constructed by the landlords and, therefore, he modified the order of the learned Rent Controller and directed that the tenants should be evicted only from those three rooms and not from the rest of the property which was according to the learned District Judge neither to be demolished nor reconstructed. The landlords have come up in second appeal to this Court.
3. Learned counsel for the landlords/appellants argued that the tenancy in the eye of law is one entity and it cannot be severed and that the learned District Judge has acted illegally-- in directing eviction of the tenants only from a portion of the property in dispute, He maintains that the tenancy must stand or fall as a whole. His argument is that if once the, landlords had succeeded in establishing that they wanted to demolish and reconstruct the oilier parts of the main building, and also a part of tile property demised on the present tenants, the ejectment nevertheless should have been ordered from, the whole of the demised building. The contention of the-- learned counsel cannot be accepted and my reasons in this respect are as follows:
(a) In the Ordinance, the law for eviction of a tenant on such a ground is contained in subsection
(2) of section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction (Ordinance VI of 1959), (hereinafter called the Ordinance) which (at the relevant time; when application for eviction was filed), read as follows :- "(2) A landlord who seeks to evict his tenant shall apply to the Controller for a direction in that behalf. If the Controller, after giving the tenant a reasonable opportunity of showing: cause against the application is satisfied that :- (i)* (ii)* (iii)* (iv)* (v)*
(vi) the landlord intends to demolish the building for constructing a new building on the same site and has --already obtained the necessary sanction for the said construc--petition from the Improvement Trust or the Municipal Corporation, Municipality, Municipal Committee, Town Committee or Notified Area Committee, of the area where such building issituated, the Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application Provided that the Controller may give the tenant a reason--able time for putting the landlord in possession of the building. Or rented land and may extend such time so as not to exceed four months in the aggregate."
The word "building" is defined in section 2(a) of the Ordinance--s follows :- "2(a). `Building' means any building or part of a building let for any purpose; whether being actually used for that purpose: or not, including any land, godowns, out-houses, together with --furniture let therewith but does not include a room in a `Sara', hotel, hostel or boarding-house."
The above reproduced definition would show that the emphasis therein is on its having been "let for any purpose." If the whole building is let for any purpose to a tenant, then the whole premises constitutes a building, but if a huge building is let in parts to various tenants, then each part so let is a building by itself. Reading this definition with section 13(2)(vi) ibid in the light of the clarification hereinbefore made, the position comes to be, that where a part of a huge building is let a tenant, then since that part constitutes a building (for the tenant), then it should be that part which should be needed for demolition and construction. Similarly, if the main building is let to one tenant then the whole of that building constitutes a building and the same i.e., whole of it should be needed for demolition and construction. Applying this principle to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the mere fact that some of the parts of the main building were to be demolished and constructed, it was not necessary that a tenant from his part should compulsorily be thrown out, if, for instance his part (which constitutes a building for him) was not to be touched at all or was to be touched only in immaterial) parts.
(b) The theory that tenancy is always one single units entity or institution, w!Iich cannot be severed, is not wholly true. As for example, where a landlord assigns a part of his ownership to another then vis-a-vis the new owner of a part of tire demised premises, the tenancy will get severed and he will be in a position to enforce his rights with regard to his part. See Puthiapurayil Kannyan Baduvan and another v. Chennyantekath Puthiapurayial Alikutti and 2 others (I L R 42 Mad. 603). Learned counsel for the respondent-tenant cited a number of case-law to demonstrate, that severance can be possible keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. He refers to (i) Abrahart v. Webster ((1925) 1 K B 563); (ii) Holme v. Brunskill ((1878) 3 Q B 495); (iii) Stockham v. Easton ((1923) 92 L J R K B 926.) and (iv) Atkinson v. Bettison ((1955) 3 All E R 340), which need not be attended to in detail because there can be various occasions of severance and 1 need not attempt to make any exhaustive list thereof and for my purpose it is enough to mention that the rule of unity of tenancy is not an inflexible rule and each case depends upon its own facts and circumstances. In some cases, severance may be possible while in other cases it may not be possible. To take up a case of the present type, if a building (for: example of fifty rooms in a row) is let to one tenant and the landlord intends to demolish and construct only four rooms in a corner side, it cannot be said that the tenant should be ejected from the rest of tile 45 rooms also, especially when the said 45 rooms from structural point of view are quite separate and severable.
Conversely, if material and substantial portion of a building is intended to the demolished and constructed; with tae result that the remaining portion cannot be independently used and severed-as for example where what is left after demolition is only the accessory and amenities portions like kitchen bath etc. Etc. And no main portion-then the tenant must vacate from the remaining portion as well. As held in Atkinson v. Bettison, it is a question of decree and fact as to what will be a substantial part of a premises, for the purposes of demoli--petition and reconstruction.
(c) If the argument of unity of tenancy is accepted then if the landlord wants to bind down the tenant with that concept, he himself should also be bound by the same. If for example the landlord states that the tenant can retain the whole of the demised premises or not at all, and that there can be no retention of a part of the premises then so far as the landlord L is concerned, on the same principle, he too should demolish either the whole of the said premises or not demolish it at all because on his own theory tenancy is one unity which cannot be split up. This will show that the theory advanced by the learned counsel is not wholly correct and cannot be indiscriminately applied without attending to the relevant facts and circumstances of each case.
(d) The Legislature has in section 13(2) laid down that the eviction of a tenant can be had, if "the landlord intends to demolish the building for constructing a new building on the same site." The phrase constructing a new building on the "same site" suggests to me that the extent of demolition and construc--petition are very relevant factors to be kept in view by a Rent Controller. Similarly, the word new building is also very significant and cannot be said to be redundant or to have been used superfluously. Cases may come up, for instance, where no demolition is to take place or only a renovation is to be done. Similarly, there may be cases where only slight repairs are to be carried out. A Rent Controller is enjoined by law to see whether (i) this is a case of demolition and (ii) construction of a new building and (iii) on the same site if after attending to these facts, a situation crops up where there is to be no total demolition or no new building, and the same site, which I occupied by previous building, is not wholly to be disturbed then the Authority under the law will be justified in confining ejectment to such portions which are covered by the provisions of the Statute and cannot extend their jurisdiction further.
4. When confronted with the above situation and arguments, learned counsel for the landlords argued that in the instant case there has taken place a misreading of the evidence, inas--much as, his clients intend to demolish the whole of the godown portion in dispute and not merely its front rooms. This contention again has no force. If the plans which were filed by the landlords themselves are kept in view, we note that plan Exh. P. 3 relates to the entire building comprising of various godowns and parts. Plan Exh. P. 2 then relates to the portion presently in dispute which is known as Godown No. 2397. Reading these two maps together, it further transpires that in the whole building including the portion in dispute, the landlords wish to make some structural changes. We are, however, not concerned with the rest of the building and focussing our attention merely to the portion in dispute, we note that in the said plans, the landlords have described their designs with the following indication marks :-
(a) One mark is headed Against this is written a whitish shaded mark---which shows that all portions which are shaded white are to be demolished and reconstructed ;
(b) the second indication is of against which a blank mark is indicated ;
(c) the third writing is of against this slanting lines close to one another are indicated ;
(d) the last indication is of with which we are not concerned.
Reading these two maps together, the learned District Judge was of the view that the rooms at the back side of this godown i.e. Towards the north were neither to be demolished nor reconstructed and were to remain in the condition in which they at the moment existed. Similar was the position of the courtyard and the verandah. It were only the front three rooms which were to be demolished and reconstructed and were to be converted into six rooms out of which one was to remain as deohri/entrance for the back portion as before. This shows that the whole of this godown--(which constitutes a building within the meaning of section 2(a) of the Ordinance)-was not to be demolished. The learned District Judge, therefore, committed no illegality in reading the above maps in the manner indicated heretofore. Learned counsel for the landlords argued that the mark really meant that that construction was also to be demolished but was to be reconstructed in the same fashion. This contention does not fit in the context in which it is placed and as such cannot be accepted.
5. At this juncture, learned counsel for the landlords made an oral request that since the aim of his clients is to demolish the whole of the part in dispute, but probably they have not been able to male it clear in the various maps filed by them in Court, they may be allowed to adduce additional evidence and the case may be remanded for this purpose. He submitted that he would like to produce some further copies of the maps and copies of some correspondence in exchange with the Municipal authorities and also to lead oral evidence on the subject. I am not prepared to allow the landlords to fill in the gaps of their case in this fashion. The judgment had gone against them from the Court of the learned District Judge in the year 1964 since which time the appeal is pending in this Court. The finding of the learned District Judge was well-known to the landlords. They never moved earlier either here or in the Court of the learned District Judge when they were confronted with the aforesaid factual aspect. Allowing additional evidence at this stage, will mean opening a gate-way for other controversies like fabrication of evidence which I do not propose to do.
6. Last of all is the question as to whether this case is to be governed by the law contained in the old section 13(2) as it existed at the time when the ejectment application was filed or the law which exists today, in the amended form of section 13(2) (the amendment took place in 1965). Learned counsel argued that right of ejectment is a vested right of a landlord and it should be regulated by law which existed at the time when it was invoked, especially, when the amendment brought in was not retrospective. He cited Mian Taj Din v. Messrs Royal Engineering Works (PLD 1967 Lah. 718) for this purpose. There are authorities to the contrary also but since the landlords have failed even on the old law, I need not attend to the point in hand because the new section 13(2) is more stringent and the landlords will have to satisfy certain more requirements which, in the context of the view I have taken, need not be attended to. At this juncture, it may be pointed out that the tenants have filed cross-objections contending that since only a portion of the demised premises is to be demolished and reconstructed, the case does not fall within the provisions of section 13(2)
(vi) and, therefore, ejectment from a portion of the property should not have been ordered. The contention has no force. Since the portion which is to be demolished and constructed thereafter is separate and severable from the rest of the portion, the tenants are bound to quit the same. For the same reasons for which I have not accepted the plea of the unity of tenancy as advanced by the landlords, I am not prepared to accept the present argument of the tenants as well.
7. No other point was argued before me.
8. The upshot of the above discussion is that neither the appeal nor the cross-objections have any merit and the same are dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.