' MIAN HAMID FAROOQ, J.-Messrs Mushtaq Company etc, the appellants/judgment-debtors, through the filing of the appeal in hand, on 2-8-1997, under section 21 of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances), Act, 1997, have called in question judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996, passed by the then Banking Tribunal and order dated 5-7-1997, rendered by the Banking Court with the prayer "that this Honourable Court may graciously accept this appeal and set aside the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1997 and order dated 5-7-1997".
2. Briefly stated the facts, relevant for the decision of the present appeal, are that the respondent- Bank, on 2-1-1992, filed a suit for the recovery of Rs.9,56,717 against the appellants alleging therein that at the request of the appellants a cash finance limit of Rs.15 Lacs was sanctioned and then availed by them against the security of pledge of goods and mortgage of property. The appellants executed the relevant documents and as they failed to liquidate the outstanding liabilities, thus, necessitated the filing of the suit. In response to a notice under section 6(2) of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, (since repealed), the appellants filed the reply to the show-cause notice and the then Banking Tribunal framed certain issues. The learned Banking Court recorded the evidence of the parties and ultimately decreed the suit for the recovery of Rs.9,56,717 with costs against the appellants jointly and severally, however, the prayer for the liquidated damages was disallowed, vide judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996. The appellants did not challenge the said decree before this Court and instead thereof, after the expiry of more than four months, on 16-10- 1996, choose to file an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Praying therein that the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996, may be declared as illegal, void and having been obtained by fraud. The said application was resisted by the respondent-Bank and the learned Banking Court after finding that there is no ground to set aside the decree under section 12(2), C.P.C., proceeded to dismiss the said application vide order dated 5-7-1997, hence the present appeal thereby challenging both the judgment, decree and order, as noted above.
3. Despite service of notice, the learned counsel for the respondent, who is an outside counsel, for today and publication of his name in the daily cause list, none has entered appearance to defend the respondent, hence, the respondent is proceeded ex parte.
4. Learned counsel for the appellants has contendea that the impugned judgment and decree is contrary to the evidence on record and the law on the subject, thus, not sustainable in law.
5. Firstly dealing with the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996. Admittedly, at the time of passing of the decree, no appeal was preferred by the appellants against the said judgment and decree, though the right of appeal was available to the appellants under section 9 of the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, which appeal was to be preferred before this Court within a period of 30 days.
However, the appellants after the lapse of more than a year, in their own wisdom, instituted the instant appeal, on 2-8-1997, thereby challenging the decree dated 9-6-1996, thus, the appeal against the said judgment and decree is grossly barred by time. The appellants, being conscious of the fact that their appeal is hopelessly barred by time, have filed an application (C.M. No,2 of 1997) for condonation of delay. In reply to this Court's question that how the present appeal against the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996, is within time and what are the sufficient causes for condonation of delay, the learned counsel, while arguing the application for the condonation of delay, has submitted that as the appellants filed an application under section 12(2), C.P.C. Before the learned Banking Court, therefore, the pendency of the said application is sufficient ground for not preferring the appeal within the stipulated period, thus, according to the learned counsel there are sufficient causes for condonation of delay for filing the appeal beyond the period of limitation.
6. Admittedly, the impugned judgment was passed, on 9-6-1996. At the relevant time Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, was in force and section 9 of the said Ordinance provides that any person aggrieved by the decree may within thirty days prefer an appeal to the High Court.
However, in this case, the appellants have filed the present appeal after the expiry of nearly 13 months.
7. The primary question which has arisen for determination by this Court is as to whether section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case and the secondary question is as to whether the appellants have made out "sufficient cause" for the condonation of delay. Section 29 of the Limitation Act provides that where in special law or local law different periods of limitation have been prescribed, the provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable. Needless to mention that under the ordinary law for filing regular first appeal before this Court a period of 90 days has been prescribed, while the present case is covered by the provisions of Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1984, which is a special law and, as noted above, prescribes a period of 30 days for filing appeal before this Court against the judgment and decree passed by the then Banking Tribunal. From the above narrative, it is thus, clear that the special law has provided a different period of limitation than the ordinary law, therefore, section 5 of the Limitation Act is neither applicable nor attracted in the present set of circumstances.
8. In above perspective, without adverting to the merits of the application, the same on the legal plain is not maintainable. Provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable in the present case in view of the provisions of section 29(2) of the Limitation Act as per the law laid down by this Court in Bashir Ahmed and others v. Messrs Habib Bank Ltd. 1990 CLC 1105 and by the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Allah Dino and another v. Muhammad Shah and others 2001 SCMR 286. Being guided by the aforesaid law declared, the application in hand (C,M. No,2 of 1997), which has been filed for condonation of delay, is misconceived, incompetent and not maintainable, hence dismissed. In view of the above, no findings on the secondary question are called for.
' With the dismissal of the aforesaid application, the appeal to the extent it challenges the judgment and decree dated 9-6-1996, is grossly barred by time, thus, we are constrained to hold that the said appeal to that extent cannot proceed and deserves to be dismissed.
9. Now coming to the order dated 5-7-1997, whereby the then Banking Court dismissed an application, filed by the appellants, under section 12(2), C.P.C. In addition to the reasons advanced by the learned Banking Court, for the dismissal of the appellant's application under section 12(2), C.P.C., it is now well-settled that the provisions of section 12(2), C.P.C. Have no applicability to the proceedings arising out of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advances, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997, as per the law declared in the judicial pronouncements reported as Messrs Gold Star International and another v. Muslim Commercial Bank Ltd. 2000 MLD 421; United Bank Ltd. v. Messrs Zafar Textile Mills Ltd. 2000 CLC 1330 and Emirates Bank International Ltd. v. Messrs Usman Brothers and others PLD 1998 Karachi 338 and Life Papers and others v. Bank of Punjab 2001 YLR 77, thus the application filed by the appellants/judgment-debtors under section 12(2), C.P.C. Was misconceived, incompetent and not maintainable and was rightly dismissed by the then Banking Court.
' In view of the above perspective, we are constrained to hold that the appeal is time-barred and devoid of merits, thus, the same is dismissed with no orders as to costs.