' SYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.---This is an appeal against order dated 17-11-1998 of the learned Judge Banking Court No,IV, Lahore, whereby, an application, filed by the appellants/defendants under section 12(2) of C.P.C., has been dismissed. The appeal arises in the following circumstances: ' A suit for recovery of Rs,13,56,990 was filed by the respondent/Bank against the appellants on 30- 9-1997 which was entertained by the learned Banking Court No,IV, Lahore and process issued to the appellants/defendants. On 6-12-1997, an application was field by the appellants/defendants for leave to defend. On 21-1-1998, the respondent/Bank was directed to submit reply to the same. The case was, thereafter, adjourned on few dates. On 9-6-1998, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants requested for adjournment as he was not prepared to argue the case. It was adjourned to 16-7-1998. On the adjourned date, it was again adjourned to 5-8-1998. On 5-8- 1998, the learned counsel for the appellants/defendants was not present and request for adjournment was made on his behalf. Accordingly, the case was adjourned to 16-9-1998, subject to payment of Rs,4000 as costs. The learned Judge Banking Court No,IV, Lahore fixed the time for appearance in the case as 9-15 a.m., in case, the costs were paid by the respondent/plaintiff. On 16-9-1998, none, entered appearance on behalf of the appellants/defendants till 1-00 p.m. Nor the costs had been paid as such the learned Judge Banking Court proceeded against them ex parte and after hearing the learned counsel for the respondent/Bank, passed a decree for Rs,13,50,970 with costs disallowing the claim of liquidated damages of Rs,2,26,165.
2. Admittedly, the judgment and decree was not appealed against and instead an application was field by the appellants/defendants under section 12(2) of C.P.C. On 15-10-1998. The reason for non- appearance before the Banking Court on 16-9-1998 urged in the petition was misapprehension as to the date of hearing which allegedly was recorded as 16-10-1998. This application was dismissed by the learned Banking Court No,IV on 17-11-1998. Hence this appeal.
3. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the dismissal of the application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. By the learned Banking Court No,IV that the same was not maintainable and competent under the law, is erroneous as the said application was competent in view of the provisions of section 7(2) of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans, Advance, Credits and Finances) Act, 1997 as according to him, the learned Banking Court was obliged to follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure in matters with respect to which the procedure had not been provided for in the Act. It is further contended that the judgment and decree is without jurisdiction, for the reason, that the suit was filed before the learned Banking Tribunal whereas no such Tribunal existed at the time under any law. His further contention is that on 16-9-1998, when the ex parte decree was passed the appellants/defendants could not appear on account of inadvertence in noting the date of hearing as 16-10-1998.
4. As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent/Bank contends that the suit was entertained and tried by the learned Banking Court No,IV which had jurisdiction in the matter and that even the appellants/defendants had made an application for leave to defend before the Court and had been appearing before the Court, therefore, the objection that the learned Banking Court No,IV has proceeded without jurisdiction in the matter is merely an afterthought and has no substance whatsoever. It is contended that against the judgment and decree no appeal was filed which has thus attained finality in terms of section 27 of the Act and no application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. Was competent which was rightly dismissed by the learned Banking Court No,IV. It is contended that there was no question of any misapprehension as to the date of hearing as on 5- 8-1998 the date was fixed in the presence of the learned counsel who had appeared on behalf of the appellants/defendants. Her further contention was that the assertion of the appellants/defendants as to inadvertant noting of the date of hearing as 16-10-1998 is belied by the fact that application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. Was filed on 15-10-1998.
5. The brief resume of the proceedings in the suit would show that the application filed by the appellants for leave to defend was taken up by the learned Banking Court on 21-1-1998 when the matter was adjourned for its reply and arguments to 2-4-1998. On the adjourned date, reply to the application was submitted by the respondent/Bank and it was adjourned to 20-5-1998 for arguments. The case was taken up on 21-5-1998 on account of holiday on 20-5-1998 when counsel for both the parties were present and it was adjourned to 9-6-1998 for arguments. On 9-6-1998, the learned counsel for the appellants was not prepared for arguments and the matter was adjourned to 16-7-1998. On the said date, it was again adjourned to 5-8-1998. On the adjourned date i,e,, 5-8-1998, the learned counsel for the appellants was not present and on a request made by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants it was adjourned to 16-9-1998, subject to payment of costs, and it was made clear that, in case, the costs are not paid the suit will be heard ex parte and even the time for appearance of the parties was also indicated i,e, 9-15 a.m. The appellants/defendants, however, did not appear on 16-9-'1998 when the suit was decreed. The reason for non-appearance on the said date as given in the application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. Is not convincing. If indeed the date had been noted as 16-10-1998, how then possibly the application could be moved on 15-10-1998 a day before the so-called inadvertent noting of the date. There is no explanation on record to this effect. It is thus very hard to believe that there was any misunderstanding as to the date of hearing in the case when the proceedings of 5-8-1998 had taken place in the presence of counsel for the parties.
6. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the learned Banking Court had no jurisdiction in the matter as the plaint in its title described "the Banking Tribunal" instead of "Banking Court" is not tenable. A misdescription as to the designation of the Court or Tribunal does not affect the jurisdiction, otherwise, possessed by it under the law. See for reference Maulvi Abdul Ghani and, another v. Election Tribunal, Balochistan and others (1999 SCM R 1). At page 6, it was held that mere wrong description of forum does not change the capacity of an authority passing such order.
Misdescription seems to be a typographical error which was corrected later on with "Banking Court No,IV, Lahore". The title of the plaint also mentioned "Under Act No,XV of 1997". It is undeniable position that the learned Banking Court No,IV which has taken proceedings in this case and passed the decree, has been constituted under Act No,XV of 1997. It may also be noted that the appellants/defendants applied to the said Court i,e, Banking Court No,IV, for leave to defend and had been appearing before the learned Court and at no stage any such objection was raised by him which was otherwise rectifiable error and has no effect or impact as to the lawful authority and jurisdiction of the Court which proceeded in the matter.
7. We also find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that under section 27 of Act XV of 1997 subject to the provisions of appeal the judgment and decree attains finality and cannot be called in question. Act XV of 1997, which is a special law provides the remedies to the parties concerned including the right of appeal under section 21 of the Act and an application in the nature of section 12 of the Act if and when warranted by the circumstances. Since the special law takes care of the various situations itself, application under the general law i,e,, section 12(2) of C.P.C. Would not be competent. To hold, otherwise, would amount to circumvent the provisions of a special law which will erode the very object and purpose of the said law.
8. It may be noted that an appeal under section 21(4) can be preferred even against a decree passed ex parte which admittedly was not filed by the appellants. The judgment and decree thus became final against the appellants/defendants which could not be sought to be reopened through a sidewind by making an application under section 12(2) of C.P.C. We have noted that the learned Judge Banking Court had dismissed the application not only for the reason that the same was not competent but also on merits.
' For the reasons stated above, we are not pursuaded to interfere with the order, passed by the learned Judge Banking Court No,IV, Lahore. This appeal has no merit which is accordingly dismissed.