' This civil revision assails the order dated 24-1-2002 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Talagang whereby memorandum of appeal filed by the petitioner (C.A. 362 of 2000) was ordered to be returned for its presentation to the Court having pecuniary jurisdiction.
2. Precisely relevant facts are that the petitioner pre-empted the sale of land measuring 326 Kanals and 18 Marlas, sold by his brother in favour of predecessor of the respondents. The suit was contested by the respondents and the learned Civil Judge, who was seized of the matter vide his judgment and decree dated 10-11-2000 dismissed the same.
3. The petitioner aggrieved of the decision of the trial Court filed an appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, who returned the same through the order impugned dated 24-1-2002, taking the view that on account of findings by the trial Court on Issue No.1-A, holding that valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction was Rs.4,41,181.20, he has no pecuniary jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The petitioner received the memorandum of appeal back and filed the same along with the C.M. 561/2002 and besides this, he challenged the order of return of appeal by the learned Additional District Judge through the revision petition in hand. The respondents in response to notice by this Court have appeared and are represented through their counsel.
4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that valuation of the suit for the purpose of court- fee was to be determined under the provisions of Court Fee Act whereas its valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction was to be determined in view of provisions of section 3 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 but the trial Court while deciding Issue No.1-A only determined the valuation for the purposes of court-fee and did not fix valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction, thus, the value for this purpose mentioned in the plaint would determine the forum of appeal. He further contended that since, the valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction under section 3 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1887 was to be worked out on the basis of revenue assessed to the land subject of suit, being its 30 times and it being much less than the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Courts, the appeal has incorrectly been returned. He further submitted that on account of dispute regarding determination of valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction, the Appellate Court was required to see the legality of findings of the trial Court on Issue No.1-A before passing the order of return impugned in the revision petition, but this course was wrongly not adopted, which negatively, reflects thereon.
5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents refuted the arguments of the petitioner, supported the order of return of appeal of the petitioner and argued that it is settled controversy that valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction determined by the learned trial Court would' settle the forum of appeal and in this case there is a definite finding by the trial Court on Issue No.1-A that this valuation is Rs.4,41,181.20, which was not within the competence of the District Courts and thus the appeal was rightly returned. He referred to the judgment in the case of Ditta Khan v. Muhammad Zaman and others 1993 MLD 2105; Shera v. M. Akram 2001 YLR 2326.
6. I have anxiously considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record appended herewith. There is no cavil about the proposition that the valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee is to be worked out under section 7(v) of the Courts Fees Act, according to the valuation calculated at 30 times of the net profit of the land, if such net profit had accrued during the preceding year whereas the valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction had to be worked out under section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887. According to this provision of law method for determination of valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction with regard to suit for possession of immovable property (including the suit for possession through pre- emption) is that where the land is permanently assessed to land revenue the valuation would be calculated 30 times of the land revenue so assessed and if the land is not permanently assessed, this valuation has to be worked out at 15 times of the net profit, arising out of the land a year earlier to the institution of the suit. The cases which are not covered by the above noted 2 categories, market value of the land will be jurisdictional value of the suit. In the case in hand, undeniably the land subject of suit is assessed to land revenue, and is permanently settled as such, this case falls within the first category and the jurisdictional value of the suit will be 30 times of the assessed land revenue. Copy of the Jamabandi of the land in dispute for the year 1991-92 Exh.P.4 shows that the land revenue assesvd is not more than Rs.100 and if it be multiplied with 30 according to the formula given by section 3 of the Act, 1887, noted above, the appeal was competent before the District Courts. My this view gets support from the judgments in the cases of Sana Ullah v.
Muhammad Akhtar and 11 others 1979 CLC 578; Nazir Ahmad and another v. Muhammad Tahir and another PLD 1992 Lah, 89; Sardar Din v. Elahi Bakhsh and another PLD 1976 Lah.1 and Mumtaz Begum v. Ch. Zulfiqar Ali 1960 (W.P.) Lah.1088.
7. No doubt Issue No.1-A covered both valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction and while answering this issue the trial Court returned the following findings:-- "Issue No. 1-A.
12. The burden to prove this issue was on the shoulders of parties. In para. No.6 of the plaint value of the suit for the purpose of court-fee has been fixed as Rs.15,000 i.e. 15 times of the net profits arisen from the disputed property in the preceding year. In this regard plaintiff produced map of net profit marked as Exh.P.17 according to which net arisen from disputed property is Rs.7,254.05 15 times of it will be Rs. 1,08,823.82 whereas defendants have stated that the disputed property having not been properly valued for the purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction. The defendants tendered map of net profits marked as Exh.D.1, according to which the net profits arisen in the preceding year are Rs.29,412.08 admittedly the disputed property is 326 Kanals, 18 Marlas and the net profits shown by the plaintiff is not appealing to mind whereas net profits as per Exh.D.1 seems to be proper and genuine relying upon Exh. D.1 net profits is Rs.29,412.08 and 15 times it will be Rs.4,41,181.20 hence the value of the suit for purpose of court-fee and jurisdiction is fixed Rs.4,41,181.20. The issue is decided accordingly."
Analysis of findings of the trial Court shows that valuation was worked out according to "map of net profit" Exh.D. I by multiplying the net profit of Rs.29,412.8 shown therein by 15 times. This calculation has been done according to the formula given by the Court Fee Act for the purposes of affixation of court-fee on the plaint and the same value was erroneously fixed for the purposes of jurisdiction of the Court, without adverting to exercise of working out the valuation in terms of section 3 of the Suits Valuation Act, 1887.
8. Petitioner in para.8 of his plaint mentioned valuation of the suit for the purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction as Rs.15,000 and in absence of determination of valuation for jurisdiction by the trial Court, the valuation mentioned in the B plaint should have been considered for settling the forum of appeal, as per decision by this Court in the case of Sardar Din (supra).
9. Memorandum of appeal of the petitioner before the Appellate Court, though' is not heavily worded, yet controversy regarding fixation of valuation by the trial Court on Issue No.1-A was brought to the notice of the learned Additional District Judge through an application filed by the respondents whereby they urged dismissal of the appeal on the ground that valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction being beyond his pecuniary jurisdiction. The Appellate Court was required to look into the determination done by the trial Court on Issue No.1-A, but no such exercise was undertaken before passing the impugned order of return of appeal. Had this determination been done by the Appellate Court itself, the order impugned would not have been passed. Section 107 of the Civil Procedure Code equipped the Appellate Court with the same power which vested in the trial Court and thus Issue No.1-A could have been resettled in view of the repeated mandates of the Honourable Supreme Court in the cases of Municipal Committee, Bahawalpur v. Sh. Aziz Elahi PLD 1970 SC 506; Manager, Jammu and Kashmir v. Khudayar and another PLD 1975 SC 678; Messrs UBL v. Yousaf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhodi 1988 SCMR 82 and Naseem Ahmed and another v.
Bostwana (Pvt.) Ltd. 1993 SCMR 647.
10. The above discussion brings me to hold that valuation of the suit for the purposes of jurisdiction worked out in terms of section 3 of Act, 1887 was much less than pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Additional District Judge, which at the time of passing of the impugned order was Rs.2,50,000, hence the order of return of appeal suffered from material irregularities and illegalities, as envisage by section 115, C.P.C. Before parting with the judgment I observe that section 18 of the Civil Courts Ordinance, 1962 was amended by Punjab Ordinance LV of 2002 dated 26-9-2002 enhancing the pecuniary "jurisdiction of the learned District Judge to Rs.25,00,000 and even if the valuation worked out by the trial Court at Rs.4,41,181.20 be accepted as correct, returned appeal which has been appended with C.M. 561 of 2002, has to go back for its decision by the learned District Judge.
11. For what has been discussed above, I am constrained to hold that the learned Additional District Judge erroneously returned the appeal of the petitioner through his order dated 24-1-2002 and the same being contrary to law is not sustainable. This revision petition is consequently accepted and the order of return of appeal dated 24-1-2002 passed by the First Appellate Court is set aside. There will be no order as to costs.
12. In view of my order in C.M. 561 of 2002 of even date memorandum of appeal along with the documents be returned to the petitioner for its presentation to the learned Additional District Judge, Talagang.