1. ' NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.---This appeal, by leave of this Court, is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh dated 20-9-1990 passed in Civil Revision Application No,237 of 1986.
2. ' The relevant facts are that the appellants, who are husband and wife, filed a suit for recovery of Rs,25,000 in the Court of Civil Judge at Karachi, as loss suffered by them on account of damage to 9 packages and short delivery of three packages in respect of 27 packages of their household effects air-freighted by them. All the six defendants in the suit are Airlines. Several issues were framed out of which one was with regard to jurisdiction of the Court which was taken up as preliminary issue and answered affirmatively in consequence whereof suit was dismissed. Against the dismissal of suit, revision was filed in the High Court which was dismissed vide judgment dated 20-9-1990.
3. ' The revision was dismissed as incompetent on the ground that against the dismissal of the suit the proper forum of appeal was District Judge and without approaching the said forum a direct revision was not competent in the High Court. In support of this view, reliance was placed upon case of Municipal Committee, Bahawalpur v. Shaikh Aziz Elahi (PLD 1970 SC 506) wherein it was held that to allow a direct revision to the High Court in cases where an appeal lay to the Court of the District Judge would lead to anomalous situations in that it would entitle a person to circumvent the ordinary procedure laid down for preferring an appeal or appeals as the case may be and enable a party aggrieved from a decree or order from which an appeal lies to the District Judge to short circuit the procedure prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure and come direct to the High Court.
4. However, the view taken above has to some extent been modified by this Court in subsequent judgments delivered by this Court and the view subsequently taken is that undoubtedly the Courts will ordinarily decline to exercise revisional jurisdiction wherein alternative remedy is available but this should not be regarded as an inflexible rule to be followed rigidly without exception because in special circumstances of a case, a departure from this rule could be justified. Thus, this Court in Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan and others v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678) inter alia observed:-- "As a general rule the principle to be followed in all such discretionary matters is that special and extraordinary powers ought not to be exercised in favour of an applicant who has been negligent in pursuing the normal remedies open to him. Thus where an appeal lay to some other Court and could have been filed if the applicant was diligent but he has not done so, then the High Court should not ordinarily entertain a revision even if the order or decision complained of does not amount to a decree ' This rule is not, however, an inflexible one and it will, no doubt, depend upon the special circumstances of each case whether it will be followed or not."and recently in the case of Messrs United Bank Limited v. Yousuf Haji Noor Muhammad Dhadhi (1988 SCM R 82) after noticing the above-mentioned two decisions it was observed:-- "Learned counsel also contended, on the basis of Municipal Committee v. Sh. Aziz Elahi (PLD 1970 SC 506) and S. Azizul Hassan and another v. Malik Ghulam Muhammad (1971 SCM R 123), that no revision under section 115 was competent if no appeal was preferred from the order which was appealable. This point, however, is concluded and determined by a judgment of this Court in Manager, Jammu and Kashmir State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678), in which it was held that although ordinarily Courts have declined to exercise revisional jurisdiction where an alternative remedy is available, yet this is not an inflexible rule to be rigidly followed and a departure could be justifiably made if required from circumstances of the case.
5. Having regard to all the circumstances of this case we feel that in this ease the High Court ought to have entertained the revision application and set aside the order impugned before it whereby the plaintiffs were non-suited for a trivial formality."
6. In our opinion, the present was a fit case justifying a departure from the normal rule and in which the High Court should have exercised jurisdiction. The case raised a serious question of law namely whether in the circumstances of the case, the learned Judge in the High Court was right in holding that the Courts at Karachi did not have the jurisdiction to entertain the suit when the offices of at least two defendants were located in Karachi, although the claim for damages and short delivery of the goods pertains to the carriage undertaken by the airlines outside Pakistan. An authoritative decision of the High Court was necessary in the light of section 20, C.P.C. And Article 28 of the first schedule to the Carriage by Air Act, 1934. The last mentioned Article states that an action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff either before the Court having jurisdiction where the carrier is ordinarily resident, or has his principal place of business, or has an establishment by which the contract has been made or before the Court having jurisdiction at the place of destination. Four alternatives have been provided to give jurisdiction to a Court in a dispute coming under this Act. This being the first case of its kind required consideration in depth by the High Court. Moreso for the reason that in the present case, six Air Companies were involved having their head offices in different countries, considering that the present day air travel has become so common that a passenger expects to receive redress of his grievance at a place which is more convenient to him if a branch office is also established at a place of suing.
7. ' We would, accordingly, set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 20-9-1990 and remand the case to it for disposing it of on merits. No costs.