SABIHUDDIN AHMED, J.---Through this petition the petitioner has called in question the order of the respondent No,1 directing that an enquiry into the affairs of the petitioner which is a union of about 24 cooperative societies registered under the Cooperative Societies Act be held by the respondent No,2 in terms of section 6(1) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982.
2. The short question involved is whether the necessary prerequisites for ordering an enquiry in terms of the provisions of the Ordinance of the statutory rules were met. Section 6(1) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982 requires that the Government may on being satisfied inter alia that the Society has indulged or is indulging in mismanagement of its affairs or is acting in a manner prejudicial to the interests of the members issue such direction to the Society as it deems fit or order an enquiry to be made into its affairs in the prescribed manner. Section 6(2) enables taking over control of the functions of the Society after giving appropriate notice.
3. Rule 4(2) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Rules, 1986 enables the Government to decide in the lights of facts of each case whether in the interest of justice an enquiry should be conducted through an enquiry officer or any enquiry committee. Mr. Iqbal Kazi learned counsel for the petitioner argued that prima facie there was no material to satisfy the respondent to order an enquiry and in any event no such order could be passed without notice to the petitioner. In the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents, it is not disputed that no notice prior to taking the decision to conduct an enquiry into the affairs of the petitioner vide order dated 13-5-1990 was given to the petitioner. However, it was averred and reiterated in the course of arguments by Mr. Sarwar Khan learned Additional Advocate-General that no such notice was necessary. It was contended that action detrimental to the interests of the petitioner if any was to be taken only on the basis of the findings of the enquiry and needless to say the petitioner would be fully entitled> to meet the allegations and present their point of view before the enquiry officer.
4. Moreover, it was pointed out by way of background that on 8-3-1989 under the directions of the then Minister for Co-operative Societies the respondent No,1 ordered an enquiry into the working and financial position of four Cooperative Housing Societies (including petitioner) and appointed the enquiry officer. Such order was questioned before this Court by the petitioner by way of C.P.D.
446 of 1989. Vide judgment dated 4-12-1989 this Court declared the order to be without lawful authority but left it open to the respondents to take fresh action in accordance with law. It was argued that the impugned order reflected the fresh action taken by the respondents pursuant to the observations of this Court and could be not considered illegal.
5. Without going into unnecessary details it may be observed that the opening words of the impugned order dated 13-5-1990 reads as follows:-- "Whereas the Government of Sindh is satisfied that the Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Limited have indulged in mismanagement of the affairs there of and have acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the members of the Society..."
6. A perusal of the above in conjunction with the relevant provisions of the Ordinance and the statutory rules clearly indicate that satisfaction of the Government as to failure of the Society to perform its duties according to law or as to mismanagement of its affairs or acted in a manner contrary to the interests of the members is a precondition for taking action under section 6(1) i.e, either to A issue such directions to the Society as 'it deems fit or order an enquiry to be made into the affairs of the Society. It is therefore, clear that the law places the power to order an enquiry at par with the power to issue appropriate directions ltd therefore, it is not possible to contend that no rights or privileges of the petitioner are infringed by passing of an order under section 6(1). It is well settled that the principles of natural justice are to be read into every statute unless made inapplicable by express provisions or necessary intendment. While it is not possible to say that a definite conclusion as to the petitioner's breach of obligations under section 6(1) of the Ordinance should have been reached, we are, clearly of the view that an order could have been made only if there was some material available with the respondents establishing a prima facie nexus with the allegations made and an order could have only been passed after affording an opportunity to the petitioner to present their version.
7. For the foregoing reasons, we would allow this petition declaring the impugned order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The respondents however, would be free to take appropriate action strictly in accordance with law.