SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.---With the consent of learned counsel this Constitution petition was finally heard at Katcha Peshi and is being decided accordingly.
2. On 13-2-2010 a notification was issued "with the approval of the competent authority" and in exercise of powers vested in the Secretary to the Local Government under section 6(2-A) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982, for taking over the charge and control of affairs of the petitioner society with immediate effect. On the same date by the same authority another notification was issued in which it was stated by the Secretary to the Government of Sindh that in exercise of powers "vested in me" under section 7 of the Ordinance of 1982, authority is pleased to appoint one Kamran Ahmed Shaikh, as Administrator of the petitioner society. This Constitution petition has been filed and the following prayers have been made:-- "(I) Direct the respondent No.2 to withdraw impugned Notification dated 13-3-2010 bearing No. SO (C-1)11(09)/2010/54 whereby the respondent No.3 has been directed to take over the charge and control of affairs of the petitioner having been issued illegally and arbitrary.
(II) Direct the respondent No.2 to withdraw impugned Notification dated 13-2-2010 bearing No. SO (C-1)11(09)/2010/55 whereby Administrator of petitioner Society has been appointed having been issued illegally and arbitrary.
(III) Declare that the impugned Notifications have been issued without lawful authority and of no legal effect."
2. Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner made the following submissions: -
(1) Learned counsel referred to section 6(1) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Ordinance, 1982 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance of 1982) and contended that order under section 6(1) can only be passed when there is satisfaction of the government in respect of at least one of seven things mentioned in the section and then government can do one of the two things specified in the section. No such satisfaction existed or could possibly exist in the circumstances and no direction or inquiry was ordered before 13-2-2010.
(2) That subsection (2) of section 6 is consequent to subsection (1) of that section and not independent of it.
(3) Since no direction or inquiry was ordered under subsection (1) of section 6 no action under subsection (2) could be taken.
(4) Learned counsel referred to subsection (2-A) of section 6 and submitted that this section came about as a consequence of judgment by the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Province of Sindh v. Public at Large, PLD 1988 SC 138. He submitted that no reason for the emergent measure has been stated and the order is absolutely silent as to what was the emergency. In any case no opportunity of showing cause either before or after issuing order under subsection (2-A) has been given.
(5) There was no material available with the respondents Nos.2 and 3 and no direction had been given by it and therefore the order passed could not be sustained. Learned counsel in this regard relied upon Syed Saeed Hassan v. Pyar Ali and 7 others, PLD 1976 SC 6.
(6) Learned counsel submitted that all the judicial principles are applicable to quasi-judicial Tribunals. In this regard he relied upon Yousaf Muneer Shaikh and others v. Election Commission of Pakistan and others, 2004 CLC 123, Karachi Cooperative Housing Societies Union Ltd. v. Government of Sindh and another, 2003 YLR 1513, Liaquat Ali v. Government of Sindh through Secretary, Home Department and another, PLD 1973 Karachi 78.
(7) Learned counsel submitted that no inquiry was ordered after supercession of the society. In any case, Rule 4 of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority Rule. 1986 have not been complied with Learned counsel in this regard relied upon Fishermen's Cooperative Society Limited and 7 others v.
The Registrar, Cooperative Societies, Sindh, Hyderabad and 3 others, 1998 CLC 1285.
(8) Regarding appointment of the Administrator, learned counsel submitted that Authority is defined in section 2(a) of the Ordinance of 1982 and under section 4(2) it is a body corporate and its composition is defined by subsection (3) of section 4. Learned counsel submitted that in section 7 order can be passed for appointment of Administrator only by the Authority and not by the Secretary Local Government in spite of the fact that Secretary Local Government is also Chairman of the Authority.
(9) That whatever allegations have been levelled against him have been levelled after the two impugned orders were passed and not before that.
3. Mr. Abrar Hasan, learned counsel for the Administrator submitted that show-cause notice can be issued after passing of orders under section 6(2-A). In this regard lie relied upon The Ismailia Garden Cooperative Housing Society Limited and 2 others v. Province and Government of Sindh through Chief Secretary and 5 others, 1992 CLC 2088. He distinguished the judgment reported at 2003 YLR 1513 and submitted that show-cause-notice was issued on 22-3-2010.
4. Mr. Zubair Hashmi, learned counsel for the official respondents referred to paras 7 and 8 of the petition and submitted that there were allegations in respect of actions of the society as well as encroachment of the park wherein 13 residential plots were created out of the parkland. He further submitted that 37 residents and original members had moved the government for supercession of the society. He referred to C.M.A. No.2030 of 2010 filed by some persons who had filed application under Order I, Rule 10, C.P.C. wherein they stated that Government appointed Administrator may be allowed to scrutinize the record of the society and submit report in Court relating to misdeeds of one man management by Secretary of the society. He submitted that show-cause notice was issued on 22-3-2010 but no reply to the show-cause notice has so far been submitted. Learned counsel referred to a plethora of documents to contend that there was the material available before the Authority. He further submitted that inquiry had been held before issuing orders dated 13-2-2010.
5. Exercising his right of reply Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi submitted that all proceedings before issuance of the impugned notification on 13-2-2010 were under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 and not under the Ordinance of 1982 or the rules framed thereunder and no inquity was ordered under section 6(1) of the Ordinance of 1982 and therefore all the proceedings of inquiry under the Cooperative Society Act, 1925 cannot be utilized for the purpose of action under the Ordinance of 1982. He further submitted that the person who recommended action against the society was appointed under the Act of 1925 and he recommended an action under the Ordinance of 1982.
Learned counsel further submitted that section 24-A of the General Clauses Act, has not been complied with as the two impugned orders are not speaking orders. He relied upon Messfs Noorani Traders, Karachi through Managing Partner v. Pakistan Civil Aviation Authority through Airport Manager, Karachi, PLD 2002 Karachi 83, Federation of Pakistan and others v. Tahir Latif, 2007 SCM R 152 and Haji Abdullah Khan and others v. Nisar Muhammad Khan and others, PLD 1965 SC 690.
6. We hive considered the submissions made by the learned counsel and have also gone through the record.
7. First question is whether any inquiry was held or not. It was contended by Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi that no inquiry was held before the impugned orders dated 13-2-2010 were issued. On the other hand Mr. Zubair Hashmi referred to an order titled Charge Sheet dated 10-3-2008 issued to the Secretary-of the petitioner's society. In the charge-sheet as many as 13 allegations were levelled. It was stated that majority of the members of Managing Committee had resigned and only Mr. Muhammad Iqbal Khan who was elected 4 years ago has assumed the charge of the society and was running it all alone and therefore no Managing Committee existed and no election had been held for the last 4 years. Taking on rent office by the society which office was owned by son of Muhammad Iqbal Khan, embezzlement of funds etc. were alleged. Consequently vide order dated 11-3-2008 Deputy District Officer Muhammad Akhtar Pathan, who had been appointed as Inquiry Officer informed the petitioner and directed him to produce record of Society before him on 12-3- 2008. On 21-8-2008 said Muhammad Akhtar Pathan submitted a report. He stated that Secretary of the society avoided to produce the record in spite of repeated calls and therefore he could not conduct inquiry. Finally be made the following recommendations: -- "In view of the above stated position it is suggested that Gulshan-eFaisal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. may be superceded and an Administrator may be appointed to take the charge and control of the said Society under sections 6(2) and (7) of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority.
Ordinance, 1982 in order to safeguard the larger interest of the Society and its members."
Mr. Zubair Hashmi further submitted that reports of unauthorized encroachment were received and consequently the Registrar Cooperative Societies directed the Deputy District Officer Cooperative to look into the complaints. This was done vide order dated 10-11-2009. In letter dated 2-12-2009 Deputy District Officer stated that he called upon the Secretary of the Society to furnish his report but the Secretary did not furnish copies of the required record i.e. copy of approved/revised layout plan, copies of last 5 years Government Audit reports with Financial Statement, Breakup of amenity and commercial plots. In this view of the situation Deputy District Officer suggested that the order for holding inquiry under section 22 of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 may be passed to ascertain the factual position of the working and affairs of the petitioner society.
8. A question which is connected with this question is whether there was any material before respondents for taking action that they did. Mr. Zubair Hashmi in this regard pointed the following from the record:--
(1) Request by a large number of residence of the Society alleging gross violation of law and the by-laws in running of the Society and misappropriation. In fact there appeared to be as many as 37 such complaints.
(2) Taking on rent office premises belonging to son of said Muhammad Iqbal Khan by the Society and payment in this regard without any approval by the Managing Committee. It was further alleged that this office was being taken on rent in spite .of the fact that there was no requirement for such an office.
(3) Managing Committee consisted of President and 5 Members of Managing Committee. Out of these 5 members a Chairman and Secretary' is elected. One Hussain Bux member of Managing Committee resigned from membership which was accepted by the Managing Committee.
Thereafter one Zaman Khan also resigned from membership and the Managing Committee consists of three members. It was alleged by one of the three members that since corum for meeting was three and he was never called or never attended any such meeting, no meetings of Managing Committee were held and decisions were made and account operated by the said Muhammad Iqbal Khan singly. It was also claimed by one Muhammad Eijaz-ul-Yaqeen, that he was Honorary Secretary. Similarly one Muhammad Hanif also made complaint against the Secretary of the society as did one Syed Asif Khursheed. It was also alleged that amenity plots had been converted into residential plots.
9. Based on this material it was stated by Mr. Zubair Hashmi that an inquiry was held and there was material available before the competent authority to take action.
10. Mr. Rasheed A. Rizvi, relied upon Fishermen's Cooperative Society Ltd. case (Supra). Facts of this case were that their existed a long standing dispute between the society and the Government of Sindh in relation to properties, business and income of the society. A Constitution petition was filed by the society and an interim injunctive order restraining respondents was passed in 1996.
Notwithstanding the injunctive order respondent No.2 issued two Gazette Notifications whereby the society was directed to enter into a lease with Karachi Fish Harbour Authority in respect of one of properties and was also ordered to pay 50% of the commission collected by it through the mole holders to Karachi Fisheries Harbour Authority. There were some other orders. Petitioner did not comply with the notifications. The Fish Harbour Authority addressed a letter to Secretary, Live Stock and Fish Department suggesting that action under Cooperative Societies Act, be taken. At the end the Registrar Cooperative Societies superseded the Board of Directors of the society and appointed an Administrator. These orders were challenged and impugned in the writ petition. Division Bench of this Court referred to Rule 48 of the Cooperative Societies Rules which required that show-cause notice be issued to the society and did not accept contention of the government that since the society was not substituted and only the Committee was substituted therefore, the show-cause- notice was not necessary. It further observed that since the dispute was pending for a considerable time there appeared no urgency in the matter. It was further observed that since neither the show- cause notice nor impugned order states any urgency nor any total damage to the office of the society was stated, so also nothing had been stated that it would be impossible to take effective action for the protection of interest of the society, it could not be said that there was urgency. The case relied upon by Mr. Rizvi is quite distinguishable. In the present case an inquiry has been held and without going into the fact whether the allegations levelled in the material available with the authority were valid or not material itself was sufficient for coming to the conclusion that action had to be taken. In Fishermen's Cooperative Society Ltd. case one of the reasons that prevailed upon the court was that no damage to the funds or properties of the society was stated and that there was grievous breach of trust between the authority and the society. In the present case material is available alleging that substantial sum of the funds of the society have been used without authority, the Managing committee is non-functional, nepotism is alleged as much as it is alleged that premises belonging to son of Muhammad Iqbal Khan had been taken on rent by the society and it has been stated that amenity plot has been converted to residential use. All these would require determination but contention that no material was available and no inquiry was held are without any force.
11. Next contention of Mr. Rizvi was that even if it is assumed that inquiry was ordered this inquiry was held under the provisions of the Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 and therefore it could not be utilized for the purpose of action under the Ordinance of 1982. He relied upon Syed Saeed Hassan's case (Supra) for his contention that no material was available and no direction was given therefore no order could be passed. Syed Saeed Hassan was declared elected to the Provincial Assembly of Sindh in election of 1970. Such election was challenged through an election petition and allegations of corrupt and illegal practice were made against the returned candidate. It was'in this context of facts that the Supreme Court dilated upon meaning of the words 'satisfaction', and held that analogy of criminal trial would hold good in matter of a corrupt and illegal practice.
Saeed Hassan's case is clearly distinguishable. It was a case when an elected candidate was sought to be unseated upon allegations of corruption and corrupt practices. This was a final punitive action. What has happened in the present case is that only interim measures have been taken and a show-cause notice has been issued. It is only once the question relating to the show- cause notice is decided by the Departmental Authorities that one can go into the question of validity of the charges alleged against the Secretary of the society.
12. Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 was promulgated on December 4, 1925. It provides for creation of an office of Registrar for Cooperative Societies (under section 5), thereafter it provides that a society may be registered and made elaborate provisions with regard to registration of societies.
Thereafter under section 10 it provides that Registrar on being satisfied that the society has complied with provisions of the Act and rules may register the society and its bye- laws. Thereafter it provides the way in which changes in the name of the society or its by-laws can be made. Rights and liabilities of the members are specified as are the duties and privileges of the society.
Provisions are made relating to property and fund of the society. Power is given to the Registrar to conduct enquiry on his own either himself or by a persons authorized by him into constitution, working and financial condition of the society. It is further provided that Registrar shall hold an enquiry, when requisition or application is made in terms stated in the section. Provisions regarding cost of inquiry and inspection and provisions regarding liquidation and winding up are also made.
There is also provision for arbitration regarding disputes touching business of the society. Power is conferred upon the Registrar to set aside arbitration award. Appeal is provided against an award of the Arbitrator and revisinnal powers are also provided. Ancillary provisions are also made. On the other hand Sindh Cooperative. Housing Authority Ordinance of 1982 was promulgated on 3-6-1982.
It provided for creation of Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority. It defined society under section 2(g) as under:-- "(g) "Society" means a society, whether registered under the Sindh Co operative Societies Act, 1925 or not, established solely or partly for the purpose of carrying on business of cooperative housing, including acquiring, buying, allotting, selling, hiring, letting and developing land for that purpose and constructing buildings, roads and providing other amenities therefore."
Section 3 provided as under:- "(3) This Ordinance shall have effect, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force or in the constitution, memorandum, articles of association, or bye-laws of a society, or in any agreement, or in any award, order, decree, injunction or Judgment of any Court."
Section 4, provided for establishment of Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority and made provisions regarding its constitution and appointment of Managing Director. Section 6 confers power on the Government to conduct inquiry in the affairs of the society or to issue directions. Subsection (2) of section 6 provides for supercession of the society. Section 7 provides for appointment of Administrator. Provisions regarding election of superseded society are made under sections 14 and 14-A.
13. A survey of the provisions of two pieces of legislation indicates that the Ordinance of 1982 does not exclude provisions of Act of 1925. In fact under the Ordinance of 1982 there is no provision for registration of a society and registration has to be in accordance with the provisions of Act of 1925.
Section 3 of the Ordinance of 1982 says that the Ordinance shall have effect notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other law for the time being`in force etc. it means that this section recognizes that there may be and are other laws which govern the society and matter relating thereto and provisions of other laws shall be applicable subject of course as long as there are not contrary to the provisions of the Ordinance of 1982. Therefore fact that inquiry was initiated under the provisions of Act of 1925 could not be taken to mean that, such an inquiry is of no significance or reliance whatsoever-for the purpose of Ordinance of 1982. It may be pointed out that the Secretary Local Government is also the Chairman of Housing Authority. Therefore looking at it from another angle if a wrong law or section has been cited that would not mean that action has been taken without lawful authority. Therefore this contention of Mr. Rizvi must also be repelled.
14.Next contention of Mr. Rizvi was that second notification dated 13-2-2010 which is passed under section 7 is passed without lawful authority. His precise contention was that Authority is defined in section(a) of the Ordinance of 1982 as to mean Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority established under section 4. Subsection (1) of section 4 stated that Government may, by notification establish an Authority called Sindh Cooperative Housing. Authority. This has already been done. Subsection
(2) says that Authority shall be a body corporate and may, by its name, sue or be sued. Subsection
(3) provides that Authority shall consist of a Chairman and official and non-official members, as may be appointed by the Governor. Learned counsel referred to notification dated 13-2-2010. This notification is in the following words:-- "No. SO(C-1)II(09)/2010:---With the approval of Competent Authority and in exercise of powers vested in me under section 7 of Sindh Cooperative Hosing Authority Ordinance, 1982, the Authority is pleased to appoint Mr. Kamran Ahmed Shaikh son of Khurshid Ahmed Shaikh, . MC No. 42000- 8262567-3 as Administrator of Messrs Gulshan-e-Faisal Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. Karachi with immediate effect.
He will perform the duties of the Managing Committee subject to the condition imposed by the department.
ALI AZHAR KHAN BALOCH SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT OF SINDH"
He submitted that under section 6 action is to be taken by the Government whereas under section 7 Administrator is to be appointed by the Authority. His contention was that the Administrator has not been appointed by the Authority as the notification has been issued by the Secretary to the Government of Sindh. Section 7 is in the following words- "(7) The Authority may appoint a Managing Committee consisting of such member of persons as it may determine from amongst the members of the society, or an Administrator for performance of such duties and functions of the society as may be assigned by the Authority."
15.On the plane of legal exposition Mr. Rizvi is not on the mark. Whereas section 6 provides that the "Government may, on being satisfied" take action specified in that section, section 7 states that Authority may appoint a Managing Committee or an Administrator. Therefore the Administrator or Managing Committee once an order under section 6 has been passed can be appointed only by the Authority not by the Government or by the Chairman of the Authority or by the Secretary to the Provincial Government. Incidentally the Secretary to the Provincial Government Cooperative Department is also ex-officio Chairman of the Society. Notification dated 13-2-2010 has been reproduced above. It is clearly stated in the notification that "the authority is pleased to appoint"
Therefore notwithstanding fact that it was signed by the Secretary to the Government (who is also Chairman of the Authority), the notification does not say that the "Government is pleased to appoint" as it states that the "Authority is pleased to appoint". Use of the words "powers vested in me" appeared to be a semantic mistake because it is clearly stated that it is the authority which is pleased to appoint the Administrator. Therefore this contention of Mr. Rizvi is also repelled.
16.After the notification dated 13-2-2010 was issued it has been brought on record that show- cause-notice as contemplated by subsection (2-a) of section 6 has been issued. Therefore contention of Mr.Rizvi that no show-cause-notice has been issued does not appear to be correct.
However, his contention was that no show-cause-notice was issued before order under section 6(2) was passed. Section itself provides that when taking of immediate action is necessary show- cause notice may follow the order under subsection (2) of section 6 and in the present case we have already held above that there were reasonable grounds for taking emergent action.
17.We may here take care of two of contentions of Mr. Rizvi. First was that notification dated 13-2- 2010 is not a speaking order and therefore is violative of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act. He relied upon Noorani Traders's case (Supra). Facts of this case were that the appellant had been awarded a contract for three years starting from July, 2000 to 2003 by the respondent for collecting Cargo at Quaid-e-Azam International Airport. During the currency of the contract respondents issued a letter to the appellant stating that pursuant to a meeting held between the parties it had been decided that charges should be collected at the rate of 2% of the Airfreight at IATA rates as opposed to collection of such charges at 2% of the Airway Bill. Such proposal was not accepted by the appellant and he made counter proposals. It was case of the appellant that without considering the proposals licence agreement was terminated vide letter dated 31-3-2001. It was alleged said termination was arbitrary, malicious and a capricious exercise of authority and was resorted for the purpose favoring another contractor. A suit for injunctive relief was filed. An application for interim relief was also filed. Such application was dismissed and matter was taken in High Court Appeal. Division Bench of the High Court observed as under:-- "Similarly, we also cannot agree with the learned counsel for the respondent's proposition that the General Clauses Act would only apply where no particular law holds the field viz. since the rights and obligations of the parties were controlled by the Easements Act, therefore, there is no scope for the application of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act. In this connection, it would be seen that section 24-A does not enact a law as such but only enjoins that where as statute confers power to make any order or to give any direction to any authority, office or person this should be exercised reasonably, fairly, justly and for the advancement of the purpose of the enactment. In fact section 24-A recognizes this doctrine, which was enunciated by the superior Courts a long time ago.
Consequently, it cannot be said that section 24-A can, in any manner, be in conflict with the provisions of any law as such since as observed above it only regulates the exercise of power by State Functionaries under the various laws of the land. As regards the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his proposition viz. Neimat Ali Goraya v. Jaffar Abbas and Matloob Hassan v. Brooke Bond Limited (supra) there can be no cavil with the proposition regarding the interpretation of statutes laid down therein by the Honourable Supreme Court viz. that a special law takes precedence over a general law and a statute must be construed according to its own terms and not with reference to any other statute to whittle down the provisions of the former respectively. However, as observed above such is not the import of section 24-A of the General Clauses Act since it only enjoins State functionaries to act reasonably, fairly, and equitably while discharging their functions and exercising powers under any law."
18. In Tahir Latif s case (Supra), the respondent was selected for a Post Graduate Course in USA for two years. The course was not completed therefore he applied for extension of leave for six months and for Ex-Pakistan leave for three months. Ex-Pakistan leave was allowed but extension of leave for six months was refused by the competent authority. He again requested for extension stating that he had not completed the course. Request was not accepted. Disciplinary action was initiated.
While disciplinary action was pending the petitioner actually returned for duty. However, two months later penalty of withholding of increment was imposed upon him. He filed appeal before Service Tribunal who allowed the appeal. Matter was taken in C.P.L.A. to the Supreme Court.
Supreme Court held that it was duty and obligation of the competent authority to award minor punishment to the appellant after application of mind with reasons after addition of 24-A to the General Clauses Act.
19. Last case relied upon by Mr. Rizvi was that of Nisar Muhammad Khan (Supra). This case predates section 24-A of-the General Clauses Act and was in respect of dispute regarding sale and purchase of a piece of land.
However, it was held by the Supreme Court as under:-- "It may be pointed out that it is the duty of the Court itself to apply the law. A party is not bound to engage a counsel. Whatever law becomes applicable on the admitted or proved facts law has to be given effect to whether or not it has been relied upon by a party."
20.There is no cavil with the above proposition. However, if a competent authority has appointed an Inquiry Officer and Inquiry Officer after conducting inquiry has submitted its report and the competent authority merely agrees with the report of the Inquiry Officer it is not required to record separate reason as to why it agrees with the report of the Inquiry Officer because the mere fact that competent authority agrees with the report of the Inquiry Officer means that the reasons recorded by the Inquiry Officer become reason for which the competent authority decided to make the decision. However if competent authority dis-agrees with the Inquiry Officer then it is duty bound to record its reasons. If any authority is need one may refer to Ram Kumar v. State of Haryana, AIR 1987 SC 2043 where it has been observed as under:-- "When the punishing authority agrees with the findings of the Enquiry Officer and accepts the reasons given by him in support of such findings it is not necessary for the punishing authority to again discuss evidence and come to the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the same findings as that of the Enquiry Officer and give the same reasons for the findings. When by the impugned order of termination of service the punishing authority has accepted the findings of the Enquiry Officer and the reasons given by him, the question of noncompliance with the principles of natural justice would not arise and it is also incorrect to say that the impugned order is not a speaking order".
Therefore, since competent authority agreed with the Inquiry Officer and issued the orders in consequence of the inquiry it was not necessary for it to record its own separate reasons.
21.This leads us to next contentions of Mr. Rizvi. He referred to Rule 4 of the Sindh Cooperative Housing Authority, Rules, 1986. Said rule is in the following words:-- "(4). Enquiry.---(1) An enquiry uncle; subsection (1) of section 6 shall be made in the manner hereinafter appearing.
(2) Government shall decide whether in the light of facts of the case or the interest of justice an enquiry should be conducted through an Inquiry Officer or Inquiry Committee.
(3) On appointment, the Inquiry Officer or, as the case may be, the Inquiry Committee shall---
(a) frame a charge and communicate it to the society the charge and control of which has been over under subsection (2) of section 6 together with statement of the allegations explaining the charges and of any other relevant circumstances which are proposed to be taken into consideration;
(b) require the society within a reasonable time, which shall not be less than seven days or more than fourteen days from the day the charge has been communicated to it, to put in a written defence and to state at the same time whether it desires, to be heard in person.
(4) The Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, as the case may be, shall enquiry into the charge and may examine such oral or documentary evidence in support of the charge or in defence of the society as may be considered necessary and the society shall be entitled to cross- examine the witness against it.
(5) The Inquiry Officer, Inquiry Committee, as the case may be, shall hear the case from day to day and no adjournment shall be given except for reasons to be recorded in writing and where any adjournment is given, it shall not be for more than a week and the reasons therefore shall be reported forthwith to Government.
(6) Where the Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, as the case may be, is satisfied that the society is hampering, or attempting to hamper the progress of the enquiry he or it shall administer a warning, and if thereafter he or it is satisfied that the society is acting in disregard of the warning, he or it shall record a finding to that effect and proceed to complete the enquiry in such manner as he or it thinks best suited to do substantial justice.
(7) The Inquiry Officer or the Inquiry Committee, .as the case may be, shall within ten days of the conclusion of the proceeding or such longer period as may be allowed by Government, submit his or its findings and the grounds thereof to Government."
22. Reading of the above rules states that a charge shall be framed and communicated to the society and it will be given an opportunity of explaining the charge and shall also be given reasonable time which shall not be less than 7 days and more than 14 days for putting in it written defence. What has happened in the present case is that after charge-sheet dated 10-3-2008 was issued to the petitioner, the petitioner did not put in written defence and did not produce record before the Inquiry Officer. Therefore, if any one is to be blamed it is the petitioner and not any body else. In any case now that the show-cause notice has been issued. The petitioner may reply to the show- cause notice and thereafter the competent authority shall decide upon the show-cause notice in accordance with the law.
23. Last contention of Mr. Rizvi was that allegations levelled against him have been levelled after the two impugned orders and not before passing of those orders. This does not appear to be borne from the record produced by the respondents. Charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner as early as March, 2008 and the material produced by the departmental authorities predates 13-2-2010.
24. Society has been taken over and an Administrator has been appointed. It is requirement of law under section 14 that within a period of one year election of office-bearers be held. We therefore, dispose of this Constitution Petition by directing the respondents to give an opportunity to the petitioner to submit his reply to the show-cause notice and thereafter decide upon it in accordance with the law. Subject to such decision election of the society be held within a period of one year from the date of orders challenged in this petition i.e. on or before 12-2-2010 and affairs of the society be handed over to the newly elected Office-Bearers.
This constitution petition is disposed of in the above terms. Listed applications are also disposed of.