1. NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.-This order will dispose of C. P. S. L. A. No. 513 of 1978 and C,. P. S. L. A. No. 425 of 1978 as these petitions are directed against a common order passed by the Lahore High Court, disposing of certain miscellaneous applications during the pendency of the writ petitions themselves.
2. The petitioners had applied for interim orders of stay in their writ petitions which were granted, but the question arose whether under the present Constitutional provisions the interim orders granted in their favour could endure during the pendency of the writ petitions or ceased to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months following the day on which they were made.
3. The background is that clause (4-A) was inserted in Article 199 of the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975. This came into effect from 21st November 1975, and provided :- "An interim order made by the High Court on an application made to it to question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceeding taken or act done by any authority or person which has been made, taken or does or purports to have been made, taken or done under any law which is specified in Part I of the First Schedule, or relates to or is connected with assessment or collection of public revenue shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of sixty days following the day on which it is made unless the case is finally decided or the interim order is withdrawn by the Court earlier."
4. In the First Schedule amongst the laws which are exempted from the operation of Articles 81 and 82, the Land Reforms Regulation, 1972 is included.
5. In C. P. S. L. A. No. 425 of 1978 the petitioners had filed a Writ Petition (No. 672 of 1977) impugning the order of respondent No. 2 (Member, Federal Land Commission) on the ground, inter alia, that while sitting as a single Member of the Federal Land Commission he was not competent to pass the impugned order. A prayer was also made that until the disposal of the writ petition the respondent should refrain from giving effect to the impugned order, i.e. No surrender of land should take place in pursuance thereof. The writ petition came up for hearing before Mr. Justice Karam Elahee Chauhan, who, while admitting it vide order dated 11-4-1977, ordered that the status quo be maintained meanwhile, subject to notice for a period of sixty days as envisaged by clause (4-A) of Article 199 of the Constitution.
6. On the 5th of July 1977, Martial Law was proclaimed and the Constitu--tion of 1977 was kept in abeyance. However, by the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, it was provided that notwithstanding the abeyance of the Constitution the country was to be governed, subject to the said Order and any Martial Law Regulation and Martial Law Order, as nearly as may be, in accordance with the Cons6itution of 1973. By C. M. L. A. Order No. 3 of 1977 Article 2-A was inserted in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977. This had the effect of modifying Article 199 and reads as follows "2-A. Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 2, an interim order made by a High Court on an application made to it to question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceeding taken or act done by any authority or person, which has been made, taken or done or purports to have been made, taken or done under any law which is specified in the Schedule or relates to, or is connected with, assessm ent of collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months following the day on which it is made, unless the case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn, by the Court earlier."
7. The status quo order passed by the learned Judge of the High Court on 11-4-1977 thus stood extended for sii months by virtue of C. M. L. A. Order No. 3, dated 12th July 1977.
8. Yet another amendment was made in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, on 22-9-1977 by adding an "Explanation" to sub-Article (2) of Article 9 thereof in the following terms:- "Explanation.-In this order, the term, `Constitution' shall be so construed as if Articles 179, 195 and 199 of the Constitution had not been amended by any of the Acts amending it."
9. Upon this amendment applications were submitted for issuance of fresh orders of status quo until the final disposal of the writ petitions on the footing that the constitutional amendment made in the Constitution by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, which restricted the powers of the High Court to grant interim orders under Article 199 of the Constitution had come to an end on 22-9-1977 by virtue of C. M. L. A. Order No. 6 of 1977, dated 22-9-1977. These along with the other applications of similar nature were heard together and rejected by the same learned Judge by his order dated 24-4-1978. It was held that the status quo order beyond the period of six months, as envisaged in Article 2-A added by C. M. L. A. Order No. 6 of 1977, was the terminal limit for .The continuance of the stay orders whereafter they would automatically expire.
10. The contention raised before us is that Article 2-A as added by C. M. L. A. Order No. 3 of 1977 on 13th July 1977, stood impliedly repealed by virtue of the subsequent promulgation on 22-9-1977 of C. M.
11. L. A. Order No. 6 of 1977 and the effect of the "Explanation" was that the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973 were revived in their pristine form. It was further submitted that in so far as the provisions contained in Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order 1977 could not stand together, the same had to give way on the doctrine of implied repeal.
12. In short the position is that by the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, clause (4-A) was added to Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in November 1975 to restrict the power of the High Court to pass interim orders including issuance of stay orders in matters, amongst others, arising out of or under laws specified in the First Schedule. The validity of such orders was not to extend beyond sixty days following the day on which these were made unless the case was legally decided or the orders earlier withdrawn; they were to automatically lapse after. The expiry of this stipulated period. However, on 13-7-1977 Article 2-A was inserted in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 (C. M: L. A. Order No. 1 of 1977) by an order of the C. M. L. A., namely Order No. 3 of 1977. It extended the life of the interim order that could be passed to six months. No specific reference was made to Article 199 of the Constitution or its clause (4-A), although it clearly altered the tenure of the interim order which by virtue of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act was sixty days. C. M. L. A. Order No. 6 of 1977 further amended the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 on 22-9-1977 by adding an Explanation to Article 2(2) thereof.
13. According to it the term "Constitution'", in the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 was to be so construed as if Articles 177, 195 and 199 of the Constitution had not been .Amended by any of the Acts amending it.
14. The basis of the contention is than despite the insertion of the "Explanation" by C. M. L. A. Order No. 6 of 1977 Article 2-A, which had been added by C. M. L. A. Order No. 3 of 1977, was not expressly repealed and is very much a part of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977.
15. It is an established principle of interpretation of statute that Courts should not too readily lean towards admitting repeal by implication and rather endeavor to reconcile and harmonize the two provisions which are ,t allegedly inconsistent or repugnant to each other. This principle also plies to the interpretation of the Constitution. This was so held by this court in Reference by the President under Article 162 of Constitution: of 1956 (PLD 1957 S, C (Pak.) 219).
16. It has already been seen that Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977 continues to be on the statute book. It dealt with a particular subject; while maintaining the restriction on the powers of the High Court it extended the tenure of an interim order that can be passed by it. There is also an "Explanation" added by C. M. L. A. Order No: 6 of 1977 which, in the context of the case before us, ostensibly seeks to remove the said restriction as well. This being the position, 8 effect has doubtless to be given to- both the provisions namely, the "Explanation" as also Article 2-A on the elementary rule of construction of constitutional instruments that (a) effect should be given to every part and every word of the Constitution and (b) any construction which render any provision meaningless or inoperative should possibly be avoided. It is on these bases that we venture to examine the question before us. In other words, whether the provisions as they exist can possibly be reconciled ?
17. When in September 1977 C. M. L. A. Order No. 6 was promulgated and the Explanation added to the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, the law-giver must be presumed to be also conscious of the existence o Article 2-A in it. But he chose not to do away with its provisions which is clear from the fact that Article 2-A has indeed not been expressly repealed. The only intention that can be imputed to the law-giver, there--fore, is that notwithstanding the addition of the Explanation Article 2-Al was intended to be retained.
18. It now remains to be seen whether the "Explanation" and Article; 2-A, despite their apparent repugnancy with each other, can stand together. We may point out that Explanation in question is generally worded and one might - say it somehow traverses the field covered by Article 2-A. But it is the latter which, in our opinion, particularly deals with the subject of tenure of an interim order that can be passed by a High Court and would hold the field.
19. Again where there are two sections dealing with the same subject --matter, one being unqualified end the other containing some qualification, effect, according to Maxwell (11th Edition page 156) should be given to the section containing the qualification. Of the two provisions under discussion D the one which contains a qualification is Article 2.A, whereas the "Explanation" on the other hand seeks; to give back something which had been taken away by the Acts amending the Constitution.
20. Another way of looking at the matter is this Article 2-A has not been expressly repealed by C. M. L. A.
21. Order No. 6. Effect has, therefore, to be given to it and to reconcile its provisions with those in the Explanation added to Article 2(2), which does away with the Acts amending the Constitu--tion, but at the same time keeps intact Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977. The Act amending the Constitution, in the relevant context, would be the Constitution (Fourth Amendment)
22. Act, 1975 with particular reference to clause (4-A), which it added to Article 199 of the Constitution.
23. Article 2-A, therefore, irrespective of the provision made by the Explanation, is to be treated as an exception to what is generally stated in the Explanation. The position is akin to a provision to a statute which gives general intention and another which gives a particular intention and if the principle enunciated by Maxwell (11th Edition) at page 162 be pressed into service, the provision giving the particular intention (here Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order) is to be considered as an exception to the general one, namely, the "Explan--ation" to Article 2(2) of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order.
24. It is also clear to us that the Explanation and Article 2-A are parallel provisions and to contend that the Explanation impliedly repeals Article 2-A is consequently untenable. We have already reached the conclusion that there is harmony between the two provisions and both can stand side by side.
25. So, the doctrine of implied repeal cannot be successfully pressed into service in the present case.
26. Besides, this doctrine is subject to the maxim Generalia specialibus non derogant. The Legislature having already given its attention to the particular subject of duration of an interim order in Article 2-A wanted to preserve it and the "Explanation" has to be given effect accordingly.
27. The upshot of the above discussion is that the power of the High Court to grant interim orders under Article 199 of the Constitution would remain restricted and the tenure of its interim orders is qualified to six months in terms of Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 11977. The petitions must, therefore, fail and are accordingly dismissed.