' GUL MUHAMMAD KHAN, J.--This and other similar cases had been taken up together in pursuance to a miscellaneous application made by the Deputy Attorney-General praying that the interim relief granted in these cases, after the expiry of six months, be vacated as the same militate against Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, order sought to be vacated goes as under:-- [URDU TEXT] ' The Deputy Attorney-General relied on Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills PLD 1977 SC 397 and Allah Wasaya v. F.I.C. PLD 1979 SC 44 in this regard to say that the power of the High Court to grant interim relief under Article 199 of the Constitution remains restricted to a period of six months and cannot be extended further. He also pointed out that a similar view in this very case (W.P. 739- 77) had been taken by Mr. Justice Shafi-ur-Rehman in the following words when he passed his order, dated 20th November, 1977: "The period of six months in two periods is over. The order cannot be repeated."
2. The learned counsel for the respondent/writ petitioner relied on the case of Mrs. Nusrat Bhutto PLD 1977 SC 657 and went through page 721, starting with the words "The legal consequences of such a change must therefore, be suppressed". He also referred to the contents of serial (iv) at page 722, as well as pages 752 (para. 12), 757 (last para.), 763 (para. 30) to say that as the Martial Law regime had been recognised only for a limited purpose, the responsibility of the Court is to see that there is peace, order, justice, morality and good government. He also tried to distinguish the two cases referred to by the learned Deputy Attorney-General to say that the power of the Court could not be interfered with regard to the interim relief.
3. It is to be noted that the Supreme Court in the case of Federation of Pakistan v. United Sugar Mills Ltd. interpreted Article 199 (4-A) of the Constitution which provided that an interim order relating to assessm ent or collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration of period of 60 days. Their Lordships held that the High Court had no jurisdiction to issue a fresh interim order for a fresh 60 days period. It was further held that as the power to afford interim relief had not been completely taken away and the Court could decide the matter finally within the 60 days, the constitutional amendments were unassailable.
4. The other case dealt with the same provision i.e. Article 2-A as inserted by C.M.L.A.'s order No. 3 of 1977 and Article 2(2) and the Explanation as added by C.M.L.A.'s order No. 6 of 1977 read with Article 199 of the Constitution of 1973. The Supreme Court held that both the Explanation and Article 2-A have to be given effect and that notwithstanding the addition of the Explanation Article 2-A had been consciously retained. Their Lordships concluded the matter as under:-- "The upshot of the above discussion is that the power of the High Court to grant interim orders under Article 199 of the Constitution would remain restricted and the tenure of its interim orders is qualified to six months in terms of Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 19'77
5. Admittedly, in the cases in hand, the full span provided for in Artricle 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, 1977, had been utilized. In fact once it was refused to be allowed for a further period vide order, dated 20th November, 1977. Thus the order, dated 12th March, 1980, being in violation of Article 2-A cannot be allowed to operate and is, therefore, declared as such and vacated.
6. The learned counsel who defended another type of order in writ petition No. 6034-78, submitted that the order passed in W.P. 739-77 was not applicable to his case. He, however, referred to the order, dated 18th February, 1979, passed in his case, which is as under:- "Learned counsel for the Land Commission happens to be here as is Senior Officer who is a Member of the Inspection Team. I have explained to them that I have taken up all the cases against the Federal Land Commission and the Provincial Land Commission much before the time when they should have been taken up only with a view to disposing them of and avoid multiplicity of litigation.
But if the Land Commission or its officers persist in disturbing the status quo, the net result would be that although they might by doing so to perpetuate themselves but they will be creating so much trouble among the tenants and creating a position which would not be in the interest of anybody who believes in the existence of this country.
2. They have assured me that during the pendency of these cases status quo will be maintained."
' It is contended by him that as it was not a stay order in specie there is no question of vacating It and consequently this application is misconceived. When asked if the Deputy Attorney-General could ask for vacation of an assurance, the learned counsel submitted that the Government was bound by the same and could not do so now. The learned counsel admitted that there is no estoppel against law and that no commitment or assurance running counter to an express provision of law can be maintained. He also admitted that a person violating an assurance could be proceeded against under the Contempt of Court Act. The learned Deputy Attorney-General also denied if any authority had been conferred on the functionary who gave the assurance and that he committed competent to do so.
7. The situation arising, however, is that though the commitment violates Article 2-A of the Laws (Continuance in Force) Order, yet it has to be obeyed by the Federal Land Commission unless vacated. The short question thus again will be should such an assurance, which runs counter to an express provision of law and which prevents a statutory functionary from performing its functions in accordance with law, be allowed to continue? The learned counsel is not in a position to defend such a proposition and we are obliged to hold and it is the duty of this Court to see that illegality is not continued and perpetuated as held by the Supreme Court in Muhammad Yousuf v. Collector of Sea Customs PLD 1969 SC 153.
8. In view of what has been stated above, we are of the view that the interim relief granted in writ petition No. 739-77 and other cases as well as the assurance given by a functionary- of the respondent must be vacated so that the statutory functionaries can proceed to discharge their duties in accordance with law. . There will be no order as to costs.