1. This is a Constitutional Petition challenging the orders passed by Sind Labour Court on 4-6-1975 and the orders passed by Junior Labour Court on 12th May, 1975 dismissing prayer of petitioner Abdul Sattar for reinstate--ment.
2. The relevant facts are that the petitioner was a permanent employee of the respondent and was drawing a salary of Rs. 850 per month on 24-9-1974 when his services were terminated. At the relevant time petitioner was designated as the Assistant Security Officer. The petitioner did not give grievance notice to the respondent under section 25-A (1), but filed a direct petition for re- instatement under section 25-A of I. R. O. Before the Junior Labour Court. The respondent filed their reply and took preliminary legal objections and evidence was recorded for applicant as well as respondent but the application was dismissed and the appeal therefore was also dismissed. The Junior Labour Court dismissed the application on the preliminary ground that the application was incompetent in view of the fact that grievance notice had not been served by the petitioner upon respondent before filing the application. The Labour Court took into consideration both the objections, viz. The lack of grievance notice as well as the plea of the respon--dent that the petitioner was Head of the Department was not covered by the definition of the workman and dismissed the appeal and hence this petition.
3. Mr. M. L. Shahani, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. A. A. Shareef learned counsel for the respondent assisted by Mr. Latif Sarwari addressed the arguments. Mr. Shahani's contention is that the view taken by the Labour Court that grievance notice was mandatory before an application under section 25-A could be filed is incorrect. He says that subsection (6) of section 25-A of the Ordinance was in existence at that time and the same had allowed the filing of application direct before the Junior Labour Court without giving a grievance notice. He has relied upon the judgment of a Single Judge of a Lahore High Court reported in PLD 1976 Lah. 1176. On the other hand Mr. Shareef has relied upon three decisions from Karachi where several Judges of the High Court individually took the view that subsection (6) of section 22-A did not dispense with the grievance notice as the grievance notice as required under section 25-A (1) of I. R. O. Those judgments are reported in PLD 1975 Kar. 719 (2), PLD 1977 Kar. 166, PLD 1975 Kar. 716. In PLD 1977 Kar. 793, same view was taken. Mr. Shareef has also pointed out that subsection (6) of section 25-A of the I. R. O.
4. Has been completely repealed in 1977, and therefore, the intention of the Legislature has further become clear that sending of grievance notice to the employer was mandatory, as required under section 25-A (1) of the I. R. O. I agree with the submissions of Mr. Shareef and in view of the decisions of our own High Court I cannot adopt the view of the Lahore High. Court. I therefore reject this contention of the petitioner.
5. Mr. Shahani has argued with a great deal of vehemence that the findings of the Labour Court that the petitioner was not a workman has been arrived at without taking into consideration all the relevant facts and he says that only part of the deposition of the petitioner has been considered, the rest of the deposition had been left out of consideration. He particularly points out two passages of the affidavit of the petitioner filed before the Junior Labour Court where the petitioner has stated in para. 3 that most of the time he performed his duty on checking and preventing any untoward incident that may cause harm to hotel reputation. He further stated in para. 5 that he did not perform security job independently, as the Resident Manager was also the Chief Security Officer, and that he did not state that he was the Head of the Department while the Labour Court had so inferred. And, lastly in para. 12 of the affidavit he stated that he was only a title head in name, but vested with no powers of Management. And further he has stated that he bad neither an office of his own nor even a chair and table and that he performed duty with other security staff on foot. Mr. Shabani therefore contended that the Labour Court was wrong in saying that peti--tioner did not disclose what kind of -manual labour he was doing or that the petitioner did not adduce any evidence with regard to the duties performed by him. I however find that there is good deal of material which has come on record in the shape of the affidavit and depositions from the respondent supported by relevant documents and that there is sufficient material on record to justify the inference that the Learned Labour Court has drawn in respect of petitioner not being a workman, although, the Labour Court has not specifically referred to the same. It is the overall view of the evidence which learned Labour Court has taken from the evidence and the documents and even in his cross-examination the petitioner has admitted that he was Assistant Security Officer and he was not punching time card like the workmen do and that he prepared the duty Roster and time-sheet of the security Department and that he has granted leave application of some workmen and recommended the leave of some others, he also admitted that instructions were issued by him to all parking attendants doormen. Documents were also signed by him in these respects and they are signed by him as Head of the Department. He has also admitted having signed as Head of the Department recommending the increments of security stag and also reviewed the appraisal of the performance of different members of the Security Staff and gave his own independent view in respect thereof. All those documents have been submitted by the respondent and shown the petitioner and their petitioner had to admit the same. His explanation of course was that he had done so under the instruction of the Resident Manager. However, the', fact is that he has acted as Head of the Department and had exercised administrative powers in respect of his Department and the mere fact that the Resident Manager was the Chief Security Officer does not detract from the effect of the various actions that he took as the acting Head of the Department which is convincingly proved by .The documents above referred.
6. In any case, it is not a case of finding having been reached without any material, so that it can be vitiated. In 1977 PLC 640 it was held that a finding of fact by Courts below that petitioner was not a workman, if properly supported by material on record, is not a finding which could be stated to be without a lawful authority. I am in respectful agreement which this view. 1n any case, even if, the Labour Court did not specifically refer to the various documents which are on the record they can still be taken into consideration in order to scrutinize whether the finding is justified on record or not. Mr. Shahani referred to various authorities in respect of his contention that the petitioner was a workman. He referred to unreported decision of Civil Petition No. 3 of 1976 decided on 3-10-1978 by my learned brother Mr. Mushtak Ali Kazi, J. Where he held that in order to treat an employee as an employer he should be responsible to the owner of the establishment and there should be no link in between. In that case a Shift Incharge of a Textile Mills having 50 workers under his control was not held to be an employer, as be could not be said to control the whole estab--lishment as he was working under Weaving Master. Mr. Shabani also relied upon PLD 1975 Kar. 342 where My Learned Brother A. H. Kureshi held that Chief Accountant whose salary was about Rs. 1,100 was a workman.
7. He also observed either a person is a workman or he is an employer in the two definitions of the employer and workman as given in the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. But Mr. Shareef pointed out that the same learned Judge in PLJ 1975 Kar. 59 while considering a case under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 had held that a salesman although an- employee was not a workman, therefore, an employee need not necessarily be either a workman or an employer. Mr. Shareef has also relied upon 1977 PLC 640 where Project Engineer of R. C. D. Ball Bearing was not held to be a workman under section 2(xxviii) of I. R. O. By my learned Brother Agha Ali Hyder, J. In the same case the learned Judge had noted that the case of Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills had been explained by the Supreme Court in C. P. S. L. A. K. 145/76 where their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that case did not support the view that a person is a workman merely because he may be working under someone else. Mr. Shareef also relied upon PLD 1978 Kar. 649 wherein a D. B. Judgment Mr. Justice Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim had observed that incharge of a part of establishment is not a workman under Industrial Relations Ordinance. In 1975 PLC 147 (Retd.) Mr. Justice Inamullah as an Appellate Tribunal had held that the Administrative Officer of a Branch having no authority to fire and hire was not regarded as a workman under I. R. O., 1969. I may note here, the definition of a workman as given under Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968 in section 2(1) :----- "Workman" means any person employed in Industrial and Commercial Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire and reward.
8. The definition of the employer given in section 2 (c) (iii) in substance is the owner of the Commercial and Industrial Establishment who employs workmen in the establishment under a contract and includes (1) --(not applicable) (ii)---(not applicable) (iii) in any other industrial or commercial establishment any person responsible to the owner for the supervision and control of such establishment. Mr. Shahahi states that the petitioner was not directly responsible to the owner for the supervision and he was not controlling the establishment of Inter-Continental Hotel and hence he could not be regarded as employer and since he was not an employer, therefore, he had to be regarded as a workman. I am afraid that I cannot accept the conclusion that an employee working in an establishment must be regarded as a workman, if he is not covered by the definition of employer in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders)
9. Ordinance. If that were so, it was no use giving the definition o workman in that Ordinance. Since, the Legislature, decided to give the definition of a workman, therefore, we have to consider the same first and the definition of the employer can only be looked into forth purposes of comparison.
10. The Legislature has in its own wisdom given the benefit of the provisions of the Standing Orders Ordinance only to that specified type of worker of an establishment, who were doing a specified', type of work and were covered by the definition of workmen, as given in that Ordinance and not to all employees. Since Mr. Justice A. H. Kureshi had held in PLJ 1975 Kar. 59 that a salesman is not a workman under the definition of `workman' given in section 2(i) of Standing Orders Ordinance, therefore, I feel, it is this definition of `workmen' which is important to consider and the case of the petitioner could hardly be covered by this definition as he was not doing either any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical Work. He was mostly doing the work of supervision of the security staff and he had himself stated that he was responsible for the checking and preventing untoward incident that may cause harm to hotel reputation which shows that he was looking after the whole establishment as far as the security side was concerned and was therefore supervising work of the entire security staff including doormen and for doing that supervision he had to move about but that would not bring his duties within the definition of manual work.
11. Since the right of the petitioner was given in Standing Order 12 therefore it was necessary for the petitioner to bring himself within the definition of a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance and as I have held that the Labour Court was justified in holding that the petitioner was not covered under that definition, therefore it may not be necessary to refer to the lengthy arguments advanced by the counsel in respect of the definition if `workman' and `employer' as given I. R. O.
12. Under sections 2(xxviii) and 2(viii) respectively. But since the counsel had addressed me at length in respect of these definitions. I may notice the same in substance. In section 2(xxviii)-of I. R. O.
13. Workmen is defined as under:----- " `Worker' and `workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor, or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connec--tion with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay off or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person -
(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capa--city, or
(b) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensem or performs, either because of the nature of duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature.
14. The relevant provision for the purpose of the present arguments are clauses (a) and (b) of this subsection. 'Employer' is defined in section 2(viii) of I. R. O. As under :- "Employer" in relation to an establishment means any person or body of persons, whether incorporated or not, who or which employs workmen in the establishment under a contract of employment and includes-
(a) an heir, successor or assign as the case may be, of such person or body as aforesaid ;
(b) any person responsible, for the management, supervision and control of the establishment ;
(c) in relation to an establishment run by or under the authority of any Department of the (Federal Government) or Provincial Government, the authority appointed in this behalf or, where no authority is appointed, the Head of the Department ;
(d) in relation to an establishment run by or on behalf of a local autho--rity, the officer appointed' in this behalf or where no officer is so appointed, the chief executive officer of that authority ; Special provision.-For the purpose of distinction from the category of "worker or workmen" officers and employees of a Department of the (Federal Government) or a Provincial Government or a local authority, who being to the-superior, managerial, secretarial directional supervisory or agency staff and who have been notified for this purpose in the official Gazette shall be , deemed to fall within the category of emp--loyers..
(e) In relation to any other establishment, the proprietor of such establishment and every director, manager, secretary, agent or officer or person concerned with the management of the affairs thereof (------------..); The relevant provision is clause (e). The contention of Mr. Shabani is that the definition of an employer in section 2(viii) although quite wide but is still restricted to those persons who are concerned with the management of affairs of the establishment and the same refers to establishment as a whole and the Management, should also refer to the whole of the establishment of the hotel and not to management of a part of the establishment like a security Department. While in respect of workmen he states that the entire set of employees who are employed for hire or reward have been declared to be workmen by section 2(xxviii) of I. R. O. And it is only those persons who are either covered by the definition of employer under section 2(viii) or excluded by the clauses A & B of section 2(xxviii) who are to be excluded from the definition of the workmen. Mr. Shareef has based his case upon clause B of section 2(xxviii) which excludes a person who is employed in supervisory capacity and draws wages of Rs. 800 per month or more and he contended that the petitioner being the Assistant Security Officer was essentially a supervisor and since he was getting Rs. 850 per month therefore he was not a worker. Mr. Shahani contended that clause lb) of sec--tion 2(xxviii) should be read as a whole and the word "or" used in this clause between the words "mensem" and "performs" should be read as 'and' in order to get the correct sense which the Legislature wanted to convey. He says that the whole scheme of this Ordinance particularly that which can be spelt out from 2(viii) and 2(xxviii) seems to be designed to exclude managerial and administrative staff from the definition of the workmen but otherwise to widen the definition of workmen to every other employee and therefore he says that clause (b)-of section 2(xxviii) should be read in such a manner that a person who is working in supervising capacity and gets wages of Rs. 800 or more he should also be performing the duties and functions mainly of managerial nature as otherwise even a jobber in a textile mills who is supervising work of four persons may have to be declared as a workman. I do not agree with these submissions as the words have to be ordinarily read and considered according to their ordinary meaning as they are used unless there is a compelling reason to change one word into another and that could only be done if 'or' would not make any sense and therefore 'or' will be read as 'or' or convey a disjunctive sense and cannot be changed to read as 'and' which gives a conjunctive sense. I do not find any com--pelling reasons to depart from the ordinary principle of reading the word 'or' as it is as the phrases used in clause B seem to have been used disjunctively, Moreover, the learned counsel has omitted to consider the second 'or' which has been used in this clause between the words 'office' and 'by'. This 'of cannot be read as 'and' as it is clearly used in a disjunctive sense for the alternate clause. This again emphasises the performance of functions mainly of a managerial nature irrespective of the fact whether the employment is in a managerial capacity or not. The. Legislature has created different categories of employees who will be excluded from the definition of workmen if they are working in the capacity shown in clauses A & B of section 2(xxviii). The excluded categories are as follows :---
(i) who is employed mainly in a managerial capacity, section 2(xxviii) (a), or
(ii) who is employed mainly in an administrative capacity, section 2(xxviii) (a), or
(iii) who being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding Rs. 800 per month, section 2(xxviii) (b), or
(iv) who performs either because of the nature of the duties attached to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions o mainly a managerial nature, section 2(xxviii) (b).
15. It may be noticed that in the above categories of (i), (it) and (iii) which I have made out of clauses A & B of section 2(xxviii) of I. R. O. The emphasis is on the capacity in which the person is employed which is either managerial or administrative or supervisory, while in the 4th category which I have made the emphasis is on the nature of the duties attached and the powers vested and the performance of functions irrespective of the fact whether a person is employed in the managerial, administrative or supervisory capacity or not. Therefore, the four categories envisage 4 different positions and hence there is no difficulty in reading the word 'or' as it is in its ordinary disjunctive sense.
16. I may also add here that even if clause (b) of section 2(xxviii) of I. R. O., 1969 is read in a manner in which employment in supervisory capacity is read as a predominant part and drawing of wages of Rs. 800 per month or performance of managerial functions clauses are read as subsidiary parts of the same clause even then the word 'or' has to be read as 'or' and not as 'and'. The intention of the Legislature in respect of clauses (a) & (b) seems to be clear that all those persons who are either employed in managerial or administrative capacity or who are employed in merely supervisory capacity and receive a particular pay per month or perform managerial functions although they may not be employed for the same are to be excluded from the definition of workmen. I therefore do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent and therefore even if I.
17. R. O. Was applied in this case, the case of the petitioner would be covered by the exclusion part of clause (b) of section 2(xxviii) of I. R. O., where a person employed in -a supervisory capacity and drawing Rs. 803 per month or more is excluded from definition of workman. The petition is therefore dismissed with no order as to costs.
18. I may however note the industry and labour put in by Mr. Shahani and Mr. Shareef in expounding their respective cases.