' SALEEM AKHTAR, J.-This petition has been filed against the order of the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal. The petitioner was employed with respondent No 2 as Medical Detailing Representative, Ethicon Division. He was charge-sheeted and after an enquiry he was dismissed and removed from service with effect from 16th February, 1976. He moved an application under section 25-A of I.
R.
0., 1969 before the Sind Labour Court, who granted it and he was reinstated with full back benefits.
The respondent No, 2 filed an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, who by the impugned order allowed the appeal and held that the petitioners was not a workman.
' On the date of hearing the learned counsel for the respondent was not present, and therefore, we heard Mr. Shahenshah. Hussain, Advocate for the petitioner. After the judgment was reserved the Advocate for the respondent appeared on the next date of hearing and orally explained that due to illness he was unable to attend the Court. However, he submitted his notes of arguments and the authorities upon which be relied.
The main contention in the petition is that the petitioner is a workman. It is an admitted position that before an action under section 25-A of I. R.
0., 1969 could be initiated the petitioner should prove A that he is a workman. As in the present case for the purposes of invoking section 25-A of I. R.
0., 1969 the petitioner was relying upon the right conferred on him by virtue of the provision of West Pakistan Industrial' and Commercial Establishment (Standing Orders) Ordinance 1968, he had to establish that he was a workman within the meaning of the said Ordinance of 1968. The entire case, therefore, hinges on the interpretation of the definition of the "workman", as provided in the Standing Orders Ordinance. On the basis of the evidence the Labour Court has held that the petitioner was a workman, whereas the finding of the Appellate Tribunal is otherwise. Without entering into the merits of the case at this stage, we refer to the following definition of the word "workman" as provided by section 2, sub-clause (1) of the Standing Orders Ordinance :- "Workman" means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
' No doubt it is the nature of duty performed by an employee which will determine whether he is a "workman" as defined by Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. It is, therefore, of utmost importance that it should be proved by evidence. But before appreciating the evidence one has to clearly understand the interpretation of the definition reproduced above. There are various authorities reported in the impugned judgment where the word "workman" as defined in 1. R.
0. Has been interpreted. It may be noted that the definition of the "workman" under I. R.
0. Is substantially different from the definition of "workman" given under the Standing Orders Ordinance. These authorities may give aid to interpretation but cannot finally determine the interpretation of workman as defined in Standing Orders Ordinance. The question for consideration is which category of employees fall within the definition of the "workman" as defined by Standing Orders Ordinance. One possible view is that those employed to do skilled work, unskilled work, manual work or clerical work fall within the definition. Another view is that person employed in "skilled manual work" "unskilled manual work" "skilled clerical work" and "unskilled clerical work" may be termed as workman.
' There seems to be several authorities in which word "workman" as defined under the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 and Standing Orders Ordinance has been interpreted. As stated above the definition of workman as contained in Standing Orders Ordinance is substantially different from the definition contained in I. R.
0. But closely resembles with the definition provided by Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959.
' In the case of Chairman Brooke Bond (Pakistan Limited) Karachi v. Central Security Union Karkunan-e-Brooke Bond, Rawalpindi (1) the Division Bench interpreted "workman" as defined in Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959, and observed as follows :- "According to this definition a 'workman' is employed in any industry to do skilled or unskilled work which is manual or clerical. Manual work entails physical exertion to distinguish from the mental on intellectual exertion involved in the clerical work. But both the' manual and clerical work, in the sense these terms are used here, connotes that it is more or less as routine work, not
(1) PLD 1969 Lah. 717 requiring any great amount of initiative, imagination, direction, control and supervision in discharging the same.'
' In the case of Muller & Phipps (Pakistan) Limited v. District Magistrate, Karachi (1), a Division Bench while interpreting the word "workman" as defined in M. L. O. 52, which was a verhitum reproduction of the definition as provided by the Standing Orders Ordinance, observed as follows :- "No doubt the words skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work also occur in the definition of that term and it was construed as such in the above case. It was while elucidating definition of workman that it was observed that he was employed in an industry to do skilled or unskilled work, which could either be manual or clerical. If that is so then a peon will not be covered by the definition of the term workman, who neither does manual nor clerical work, but that does not seem to be the intention of the legislature, which while laying emphasis on the nature of work seems to give to it a wide meaning by using the words sgilled or unskilled, manual or clerical which, to my mind illustrate the nature of the work and have to be read disjunctively. As such, it is not possible to read the words skilled or unskilled to mean either manual or clerical, whether, comma is or is not taken into consideration while construing these words. Therefore, the nature of the duties performed would not except him from the definition of the word workman."
' Again in a case of Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal (2) a Division Bench while considering the the word "workman" as defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance observed that :- "It will, however, be fair to state that the learned counsel for the petitioner made no attempt to argue that the petitioner came within the aforesaid definition of workman and rightly so for the duties of petitioner enumerated above would clearly exclude him from being a workman for he was not employed to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work."
' There seems to be some what a divergence of opinion in these cases with regard to the interpretation of "workman". In the case of Bashir Ahmad Zia v. The Chairman, Punjab Lahore Appellate Tribunal and another (3), where an Assistant Manager of Punjab Agricultural and Development Corporation had filed a civil petition for special leave to appeal challenging the judgment of the High Court, the Supreme Court observed that "the High Court has in the light of the charter of his duties and the duties he was actually performing held him to be not a workman. His duties were mantifestly not clerical or manual". It seems that the question whether the words "skilled or unskilled, clerical or manual" have been used disjunctively or not was not under consideration.
The point involved is a matter of considerable importance and isl likely to affect a large number of cases. It is necessary that this divergence's of opinion should be settled by an authoritative decision of a larger Bench. '
(1) PLD 1974 Kar. 261 (2) PLD 1978 Kar. 649
(3) 1982 SCMR 407 ' We, therefore, order that the case may be placed before the Honourable Chief Justice for 'consideration and referring the following questions to a larger Bench :- ' Whether in section 2(i) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 the words "skilled or unskilled" "manual or clerical" have been used disjunctively and a person employed to do skilled work, unskilled work, manual work or clerical work is a workman.
' Whether in section 2 (1) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 a person employed to do skilled manual work, unskilled manual work, skilled clerical work or unskilled clerical work is a workman.
' NAIMUDDIN, J.-This Full Bench has been constituted to consider the following questions referred to by a Division Bench of this Court by the order dated 30-7-1981.
"(1) Whether in section 2 (i) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1959, the words 'skilled' or 'unskilled', 'manual' or 'clerical' have been used disjunctively and a person employed to do skilled work, unskilled work, unskilled work, manual work or clerical work is a workman?
(2) Whether in section 2 (i) of West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial (Standing Orders)
Ordinance, 1959 a person employed to do skilled, manual work, unskilled manual work, skilled clerical work or unskilled clerical work is a workman."
2. Before considering the abovementioned questions the relevant facts may be stated and these are : The petitioner who was employed with Messrs Johnson and Johnson (Pakistan) Limited (hereinafter called `the company ), as Medical Detailing Representative, Ethicon Division, was charge sheeted and after an enquiry dismissed from service with effect from 16-2-1976.
3. The petitioner moved an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, before the Sind Labour Court, Karachi, which was granted by the order dated 9-5-1979.
Consequently the petitioner was reinstated with full back benefits.
4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order the Company preferred an appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi and succeeded on the finding recorded in the order dated 10-10-1979, that the petitioner was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 of clause (i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter called 'the Ordinance').
5. This order led the petitioner to file a constitution petition wherein the questions now under consideration cropped up. The reasons which led to the making of reference of the two questions to this Full Bench was somewhat divergence of opinions as to the meaning of the term 'workman' as defined in the Ordinance. The Division Bench in the order of reference has noticed the following cases; ' Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Limited v. Central Security Union Karkunan-e-Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Limited Rawalpindi, Muller & Phipps (Pakistan) Limited v. District Magistrate, Karachi, Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and Bashir Ahmed Zia v. The Chairman, Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunel and another.
6. We have heard Mr. Shahenshah Hussain learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Kh. Naveed Ahmed learned counsel for respondent No, 2, and the learned Advocate-General, Sind.
7. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the words `skilled or unskilled', 'manual' or clerical' used in section 2(i) of the Ordinance, signify four distinct categories of work which, according to him, are covered by the term 'workman'. While Mr, Kh. Naveed Ahmed learned counsel for respondent No, 2 submitted that the words `skilled or unskilled', do not signify any independent categories of workmen but further qualify the two categories of persons who do manual work or clerical work.
8. Mr, Shahenshah Hussain, learned counsel for the petitioner in addition to the cases noticed in the order of reference by the Division Bench referred to the following cases : ' Pakistan Tobacco Co. Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Co., Employees Union Dacca and others PLD 1961 SC 403, Unreported decision of this Court in Petition No, 432 of 1969, Messrs Abro Salt and Chemical Works v. The Chairman, Second West Paki tan Industrial Court and another. Unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, K-75 of 1970, Messrs Abro Salt and Chemical Works v. The Chairman Second West Pakistan Industrial Court Karachi and Abu Baker Murad ; Bashir A. Malik v. Punjab Labour Court (Northern Zone), Lahore and 2 others P L lD 1973 Lah. 594, I. E. Saleh v. International Laboratories Limited etc. PLD 1975 Kar. 279, Brooke Bond (Pakistan Ltd. v. Conciliator Appointed by the Government of Sind and 6 others P 1 D 1977 SC 237, Pakistan Television Corporation Limited v. M. Baber Zoo an 1981 PLC 219, Rehmat Ali v. Security Papers Limited and another PLD 1982 Kar.
913.
9. On the other hand, Mr. Khawaja Naveed Ahmed, learned counsel for respondent 2 besides relying on chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. Karachi v. General Secretary Union Karkunane Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Rawalpindi, Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal and another which have been referred to by the Division Bench in their order also relied on the Sind Labour Appellate Tribunal decision in Messrs Sandoz (Pak.) Ltd. v. Bakhtrawan (1), Johnson & Johnson (Pak.) Ltd. v. Zubair Ahmed (2).
10. In addition to the above cases noticed by the Division Bench in their order of reference or cited by the learned counsel for the parties, the following other cases which are directly relevant or have some bearing on the questions involved have been referred or relied upon in the aforesaid cases or have been noticed by us. The Workers of Bata Shoe Co.
(1) 1983 PLC 796 (,2) 1980 PLC 622 Lahore v. Bata Shoe Co. Ltd., and another (1), Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Muhammad Abdul Ghani and another (2), Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court No, 4 Karachi and 2 others (3), Bashir Ahmad Zia v. The Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another, Muhammad Sadiq v. Punjab Labour Court No,
1. Etc. (4), Abdul Sattar v. Vth Sind Labour Court, Karachi and 2 others (5), Grind Wheel Pakistan Ltd. v. Syed Khalid Ahmad (6), I. E. Saleh v. Messrs International Laboratories (7), Tarbela Joint Venture through Major C. J. Biggs. Personal Manager, Chief Camp Commandant v. Labour Appellate Tribunal, N.-W. F. P. And 2 others (8), Messrs Sethi Straw Board Mills Ltd. v. Punjab Labour Court No, 3, Lyallpur and 2 others (9), S. M. Rizvi v. IV Sind Labour Court and others (10), Bakhtiar All Afghani v. Roll Corporation of Pakistan Ltd. Lahore (11), Pakistan International Airlines Corporation v. The Chairman Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore and another (12), Karachi Transport Corporation v. Muhammad Hafeez Siddiqui and 2 others (13), Allied Bank of Pakistan Ltd. v. Muhammad Humayun Khan and 2 others (14) and Organization of the Karachi Port 'Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust etc. C. P. S. L. Appeal No, K-6 of 1968.
11. In order to answer the questions referred to us for our opinion and to appreciate the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and before we consider the cases cited before us or noticed by us, it may be convenient for ready reference that we may here reproduce the definitions of the term "workman" as given in.
"(1) Section 2 (n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 ;
(ii) Section 2 (u) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 ;
(iii) Section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (substituted and amended in 1972), and
(iv) Section 2 (i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment Standing Orders Ordinance (VI of 1968).
(i) Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959.
' Section 2 (n).- "Workman" means any person, including an apprentice employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward and includes, for the purpose of any procedings under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute, a workman discharged during that dispute but does not include any person employed in the police or armed forces of.
Pakistan.
(ii) The West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968: ' Section 2 (u).-` workman' means any person, including an apprentice, employed in any industry to do any skilled, unskilled, manual, technical or clerical work, for hire or reward, whether the terms
(1) 1971 PLC 1
(3) 1977 SCMR 103 (5) 1979 PLC 297
(7) PLD 1975 Kar. 279 (9) PLD 1977 Lab. 71 (11) 1979 PLC 79
(13) 1980 PLC 644 (2) 1979 SCMR 304
(4) NLR 1983 Labour 25 (6) 1975 PLC 263
(8) PLD 1975 Pesh. 240 (10) 1977 PLC 640
(12) PLD 1979 Lah. 415 (14) 1983 PLC 498 of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purposes of any proceedings under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged, or retrenched in connection with, or in consequence of, that dispute, or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person ; . . . .
(i) to (v) not relevant.
(iii) The Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (As substituted and amended in 1972).
' Section 2 (xxviii).-`worker and 'workman' means any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed including employment (as a supervisory) or as an apprentice in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute includes a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge retrenchment, lay-off, or removal has led to that dispute but does not include any person.
(a) who is employed mainly in a managerial or administrative capacity, or
(b) who, being employed in a supervisory capacity draws wages exceeding rupees eight hundred per mensern or performs, either, because of the nature of duties attached to the' office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature.
(iv) The West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968).
' Section 2 (1)-`Workman' means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
12. Having stated the definitions as given in various Ordinances, we now proceed to consider the definition of "workman" given in the Ordinance. In doing so we may at the very outset state that the cardinal rule for construction of statutes is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the statutes themselves. The intention is to be gathered from the words used in the statutes. If the words of the statutes are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in the ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the Legislature. See : Craies on Statute Law, 6th Ed., p.
66. This rule was declared by the Judges in advising the House of Lords in the Sussex Peerage claim (1844) 11 Cl. & F.
85. 143 and accepted by the Judicial Committee in Cargo Ex argos (1873) L R 5 P C 134, 153.
13. Examined in the light of the above rule we find that the word, "any" is of great significance. This word according to the Stroud Judicial Dictionary, 4th Ed., Vol. I, p. 145, means : "(1) 'Any' is not confined to a plural sense (Eaton v. Lyon 3 Ves. 694), 'Any' is a word which excludes limitation (emphasis* supplied) or qualification (per Fry L. J. Duck v. Bates 12 Q. B. D. 79); *Mere is italics] `as wide as possible' (Chitty, J., Beckett v. Sutton (51 L J Ch. 433). A remarkable instance of this wide generality is furnished In re: Farquhar (4 Notes of Ecc. Cases 651, 652, cited Wms. Exs.), wherein the words 'any soldier' etc. (Wills Act, 1937 (c. 26), S. 11), were construed as including miners, so that soldiers and seamen, within that section can make Nuncupative wills though under age, so a power in a lease, enabling the lesser to resume 'possession of any portion of the premises demised' enables him to resume all Liddy v. Kennedy LR5HL 134."
' According to Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Edn., p. 120, it inter alia, means : " 'Any' Some; one out of many: (emphasis supplied) an indefinite number State v. Pierson (204 Lowa 837, 216 N. W. 43,
44. One indiscriminately of whatever kind or quantity. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Wintion C. C. A. Tenn 131 F. 2nd 780, 782)."
14. This word obviously, therefore, applied to all the four succeeding words namely, "skilled", "unskilled", "manual", and "clerical" which words though no doubt qualify the word "work".
Accordingly, it means that any person doing any skilled work or any unskilled work or any skilled clerical work or unskilled clerical work will be covered F by the definition. Therefore, it is not every work which a person generally does that qualifies him as a workman within the meaning of section 2 (1) of the Ordinance, but when he does the skilled work or unskilled work, or manual work or clerical work that brings him within the purview of the Ordinance. Further, if we examine the definition of `workman as given in section 2 (n) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 and in section 2 (u) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 in order to discover the intention of Legislature, we find that the expression 'skilled, or unskilled', 'manual or clerical', used in the definition of workman given in section 2 (n) does not contain any punctuation or commas while in the expression skilled, unskilled, manual, technical, or clerical used in the definition of workman given in section 2 (u) of the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968, the first three words are separated by commas. It is, therefore, clear that previously also the Legislature used these words in the sense of separate categories of work. The definition came up for consideration by a Division Bench of this Court in Muller & Phipps (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. District Magistrate, Karachi and 4 others Muhammad Haleem, J. (as the Honourable Judge then was and now the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Pakistan) who in writing the opinion for the Court observed that words "skilled", "unskilled", "manual", or "clerical", illustrated the nature of work and had to be read 'disjunctively' and as such, the learned Judge further observed that it was not possible to read the words "skilled", or "unskilled" to mean either "manual" or "clerical", whether comma is, or is not taken into consideration. It may be useful here if we may quote paragraph 8 of the judgment, for it also distinguishes two cases namely, Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. General Secretary, Union Karkuaan-e-Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Rawalpindi and Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Employees' Union, Dacca and others (1) and obviates the necessity to separately discuss them here.
"Paragraph 8.-The legal contention that emerges is that being a
(1) PLD 1961 SC 403 *Rim in italics) sales representative, respondent No, 5 could not be placed in the category of workman, for its definition visualises that he should either be skilled or unskilled, which in turn must be either manual or clerical. Thus, 'skilled' must convey the sense of manual or cierical. Similarly, unskilled work should also be such. This is how he wanted us to construe the words 'skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work' occurring in the definition of the word 'workman' in section 2 (i) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance, which meaning is also assigned to it by para. 3 (b) of the Order, which reads :- ' Any person employed in any industrial and commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward.'
' In so urging Mr. Salim Akhtar placed reliance on the case of Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. General Secretary, Union Karkunane Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Rawalpindi PLD 1969 Lah. 717, where the definition of 'workman' as it is worded in the Industrial Disputes Ordinance (LVI of 1959) was under consideration. No doubt, the words 'skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work' also occur in the definition of that terms and it was construed as such in the above case. It was while elucidating definition of 'workman' that it was observed that he was employed in an industry to do skilled or unskilled work, which could either be manual or clerical. If that is so, then a peon will not be covered by the definition of the term `workman'; who neither does manual nor clerical work, but that does not seem to be the intention of the Legislature, which while laying emphasis on the nature of work seems to give to it a wide meaning by using the words 'skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical' which, to my mind, illustrate the nature of the work and have to be read disjunctively. As such, it is not possible to read the words 'skilled or unskilled' to mean either manual or clerical, whether comma is or is not taken into consideration while construing these words. Therefore, the nature of the duties performed would not except him from the definition of the word 'workman'.
There is another distinction. In that case, the definition had a bearing to the key word 'industry', which is defined in Ordinance LVI of 1959 and it was, therefore, that the observations of the Supreme Court in Pakistan Tobacco Company Ltd. v. Pakistan Tobacco Employees' Union, Dacca and others PLD 1961 SC 403 were relied on, which are to the effect that a salesman cannot be regarded as a workman because he is not assumable either to the group of workers, whose manual labour contributed to product or those of the clerical establishment who perform the paper work connected with the operation of the company. It seems, if I may say so, that the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the work of a salesman is in a wholly different category from manual or clerical work have weighed with the minds of the learned Judges, who decided that case, while construing the definition of 'workman'. Such construction cannot be given to the term `workman' as defined in the Ordinance."
' It may however, be mentioned that the learned Judge was considering the definition of workman as given in M. L.
0. 52 of 1972, which was in similar words as given in section 2 (i) of the Ordinance.
15. The above interpretation finds support from an unreported judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, K-75 of 1970, Messrs Abro Salt and Chemical Works v.
The Chairman, Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi and another wherein it was contended by the petitioners that Abu Baker Murad, respondent 2, their employee, was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the Ordinance inasmuch as he was their Jamadar and his job was of supervisory in nature and does not include any manual labour. This contention was also raised before the Industrial Court as well the High Court and was repelled by both the Courts. Dealing with the contention the learned Judges observed as follows : "Upon the basis of the evidence laid before the Industrial Trial Court it was found that respondent No, 2 did work with his own hand by digging the heap upto the arms length and upto the width of one foot' in order to perform his duties. Both the Courts, accordingly, held that respondent No, 2 was a workman. In any event he certainly falls within the terms 'skilled' or 'unskilled' labour (Emphasis* supplied)."
' From the last sentence of the judgment, underlined* by us, it is clear that the learned Judges considered that the words "skilled" or "unskilled" indicating two separate categories and were not used as qualifying the latter words. It may be mentioned that the definition of the "workman" at the time when the judgment was delivered was slightly different in that instead of the word "work" the word "labour" was used which was substituted by the Ordinance XXIII of 1973.
16. Support can also be drawn from the judgment of the Supreme Court in C. P. S. L. A. No, K-6 of 1968, Organization of the Kara, hi Port Trust Workers v. Karachi Port Trust etc.) decided on 19-1-1970, wherein the learned Judges had held that (Chowkidars' and `Hawaldars' in the Watch and Ward Department of the Karachi Port Trust were workmen within the definition given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance which we have already reproduced and wherein the words "skilled", "unskilled", "manual" and "clerical" have been used without any punctuation. This judgment has followed by the Supreme Court in Shahzar Khan v. Sind Labour Court No 4, Karachi and 2 others wherein the Supreme Court was considering the definitions of "workers" and "workman" as defined in section 2 (xxviii) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. Obviously, this judgment also supports the view which we have taken for unless "skilled" and "unskilled" work were considered as-a separate category, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court would not have held that `Chowkidars' and `Hawaldars' who divicosiy do not do any clerical or manual work, were workmen within the meaning of section 2(n) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1959, which, as stated before, is in identical terms with this difference only that there is no punctuation i,e, comma, between the words "skilled", "unskilled" and "manual".
17. In Dost Muhammad Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Muhammad Abdul Ghani and another although the definition of the words used therein were not directly considered but the finding that the respondent who was "(Here in italics) the Chief Accountant of the petitioner Company and was drawing a salary of Rs, 1,050 per month, was a workman was upheld. In our view, this view was possible, if the words 'skilled', and 'unskilled' were considered as indicating separate categories, otherwise the work of Chief Accountant could not be said to be clerical or manual though it would no doubt, fall in the category of skilled work.
18. There is no doubt that the Supreme Court in the case of Workers of Bata Shoe Co. Lahore v. Bata Shoe Co. Ltd. And another did hold that a 'foreman', a person holding supervision and management in a factory was not workman within the definition of workman given in section 2(n) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, so far as material phrase is concerned was the same as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1959.
18-A However, in Bashir Ahmed Zia v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal and another the Supreme Court upheld the finding that the Assistant Manager with the Punjab Agricultural Development and Supplies Corporation whose duties according to the chart of duties involved achieving the goals of the Corporation i,e,, increasing agricultural production, collection of information and making projection of requirement in future and also to keeping liaison with the people and the Governments departments was not workman and dismissed the petition for Special Leave to Appeal. In the decision it is implied that "skilled" and "unskilled" work were not considered as separate categories of work.
18-B So far as Muhammad Sadiq v. Punjab Labour Court No, I., etc., is concerned it may be stated that this was a Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal from the judgment by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court, whereby he accepted the petition filed by the General Manager, Hotel Intercontinental, Lahore, in reversal of the two concurrent orders passed by the Labour Courts reinstating the petitioner by setting aside the order of his removal from service with back benefits.
In this case the cases of Muller & Phipps (Pakistan) Limited, Karachi (supra) and The Chairman, Brooke Bond, Pakistan Limited, Karachi (supra), were referred and while granting the leave to it was observed as follows :- "In the opinion of the learned Judge in Chambers the expression skilled or unskilled quality the words manual or clerical and had read these two expressions used in section 2 (i) of the Industrial and Commercial employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 in conjunction with each other.
But in this behalf the learned counsel for the petitioner before us has relied on the observations in Muller & Phipps Pakistan Ltd., Karachi v. District Magistrate, Karachi, and 4 others PLD 1974 Kar. 261 in which a similar expression in Martial Law Order 52 of 1972 was construed disjunctively. This authority evidently supports his contention. The learned counsel has further relied on the pronouncement in Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. General Secretary. f.Inion Karkunane Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd., Rawalpindi (PLD 1969 Lah. 717) to contend that in construing the definition of the term 'workman' for the purpose the basic nature and the true character of the work entrusted to the employee had to be looked at without being unduly influenced by the sundry and purely incidental duties performed by him. Last but not the least the learned counsel has vehemently contended before us that in the circumstances of this case the learned Judge in Chambers was not justified in sitting in appeal over the concurrent finding of fact recorded by the two Labour Courts on the evidence before them and the inferences drawn by them in this connection."
19. Reference may also be made to a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rehmat Ali v.
The Security Papers Limited and another (1), wherein the learned Judges have held that the words skilled, unskilled, clerical, manual employed in M. L.
0. 52 are to be read disjunctively and they have followed the decision of this Court in Mullers & Phipps (Pakistan) Ltd., Karachi v. District Magistrate, Karachi and 4 others.
19-A. However, it was contended by Mr. Khwaja Naveed Ahmed learned counsel for respondent No, 2, that if the punctuation is kept in view while considering the definition, the words "skilled", and "unskilled", would qualify the words "manual" and "clerical" and therefore, would be applicable to those workmen who do any "manual" or "clerical" work, for, the words skilled, or unskilled preceding the words manual or clerical are separated by a comma.
20. As regards to this submission it may be stated that according to Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 82, p. 673, section 341, the general rule that punctuation is no part of a statute, and cannot control its construction against manifest intent of the Legislature and the Court will punctuate or disregard the punctuation as may be necessary to ascertain and give effect to the real intent. (See 1) U. S.-U. v. Shreveport Grain and Elevator Co., La, (2) and U. S. Egyptian Supply Co. v. Boy C. C. A. Ky. (3).
' Reference may also be made to Crawford's "The Statutory Construction", section 199, page 342, which reads as follows :- "Section 199. Punctuation.-Of course, the punctuation of a statute may lend some assistance in its construction but when the intention of the statute and the punctuation thereof are in conflict, the former must control even where the punctuation is regarded as a part of the statute. In other words, the punctuation will not control the plain, meaning of the text of an enactment. It is subordinate to the text, and the retention of a word is of far more importance than the position of a comma. Indeed, the Court may punctuate, or disregard existing punctuation, or punctuate in order to give the legislative intention effect. Thus, a semi-colon may be placed where a comma appear, or a semi-colon substituted in lieu of the word 'and'.
' But 'where a statute is ambiguous, its punctuation may and should be considered and given weight, especially where the act is carefully punctuated. If the punctuation is in accord with the suggested meaning of the statute, it is an important additional reason for the acceptance of that meaning. It should be given weight, unless, from the inspection of the whole statute, it is apparent that the
(1) PLD 1982 Kar. 913 (2) 53 S. Ct. 42, 287 U S 77 L Ed. 2
(3) 117 F 2d. 60$ punctuation must be disregarded in order to arrive at the legislative intention."
' Reference may also be made to the following statement in Crazies on Statute Law, Seventh Edition, page 197: "In Stephension v. Taylor (1861) 1 B & S 101, 106) Cockburn, C. J. Said: On the Parliament Roll there is no punctuation, and we therefore, are not bound by that in the printed copies." (This is not strictly accurate on examination of the enrolment of the Treason Act 1351 (for the purposes of R. v. Lynch ((1903) 1 K B 444), some punctuation was found). This statement seems to be also applicable to the vellum prints. The copies printed on vellum since 1850 were certainly in some cases punctuated, but punctuation is discouraged by the Parliamentary officials owing to the difficulties which arise when the punctuation is not altered to give effect to amendments made in committee.
Punctuation when it occurs in the vellum copies is, it is submitted, to be regarded, to some extent at least, as contemporanea expositio (see p. 79 seq., ante.). The Queen's Printer's copies of modern Acts are punctuated in the normal why but punctuation forms no part of any Act. (Duke of Devenshire v. 0' Connor ( (1890) 24 Q B D 468 (see p. 199 post). In Barrow v. Wadkin ( (1857) 24 Beay.
327, 330) the question arose whether the words in the British Nationality Act, 1773, section 3. Were to read `aliens' duties, customs and impositions," or "aliens, duties, customs and impositions.' "I supposed," said Romilly M. R., "I should not learn much on the subject from the inspection of the Roll of Parliament (The document referred to by Lord Romilly seems to be the Chancery Roll, and not the Parliament Roll of the Statutes (see pp. 44, 45, ante.) but as it was in my custody I have examined it. It seems that in the Rolls of Parliament the words are never punctuated, and accordingly, very little is to be learnt from this documents."
Construction where no punctuation: "One of the effects of the original statutes not being punctuated is that it is often difficult to decide whether words apply only to a particular branch of a sentence, and are to be read distributively, reddendo singula singulia as it is called, or whether they govern the whole sentence. It does not appear that any definite rule can be laid down as to this, but, as Dwarris says as to this point, (2nd ed., p. 601)' the intention must be collected from the context to which the words relate. "Thus, it was held in Badger v. South Yorkshire Ry , ( (1858) I. E. & E 359, 364, Williams, J., Cf. Bishop v. Deakin ((1936) Ch. 409, 414, Clauson, J.) that the word "purchase" as used in a local Act, (12 Geo. 1, c. 38, s. 2) may 'be applicable, .. Reddendo singula singulis, to the other purpose for which the : acquisition of the soil is certainly necessary' and in Phillips v. Highland Ry. ((1883) 8 App. Cas. 329, 336), it was held that section 189 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854 (Repealed and re-enacted in the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, section 165), must be so read."
21. However, the rule that punctuations including 'comma' are mot past of the statute is well established also and if any authorities are needed reference may be had to N_ swab Haji Khair Muhammad Khan v. The State (1), Muhammad Salim and another v. The Land Commissioner, Bahawalpur Division and others (2), Majid Khan and others v. Mujahid Khan and others (3), P. D. H.
Laboratories Employees and Workers Union v. Registrar of Trade Unions and another (4) and Tanzeem-e-Mulzamin Baldiya and 2 others v. Government of West Pakistan and 4 others (5).
21-A. In the case of Majid Khan and others N. Mujahid Khan and others a Full Bench of Peshawar High Court in paragraph 10, at page 275 of the report observed as follows : "Paragraph 10.-The second substantial reason is that the punctuations, including comma are not part of the statutes. In this connection, I would extract the following observations of Lord Warrington, J., (at page 71) in Lawis Pugh Evans v. Asbutosh Sen and others AIR 1929 P C 69.
"The truth in that if the article is read without the comma inserted in the print, as a Court of law is bound to do, the meaning is reasonably clear."
' The same view was approved in Gurmukh Singh v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Lahore AIR 1944 Lah. 353, Munir, J., as his Lordship then was, at page 367, expressed himself thus :- 'In the interpretation of statutes punctuation, not being a part of the statute to be construed, iS not the determining factor and if the. . Provision as punctuated leads to an absurd result or conflicts with some other provision of the statute which is unambiguous and free from doubt, the punctuation must yield to an interpretation that is reasonable and makes it consistent with the other provisions of the Act.' `The two authorities cited above demolish the reason which prevailed with Sheikh Muhammad Shafi, J., in interpreting the material language of section 5(c) that the absence of the comma after the word 'house' gives clear indication that the word `house' was also governed by the words `measuring more than one Kanal'.
22. This question of punctuation was considered in relation to the very definition which is under consideration by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court consisting of Abdul Shakurul Salam and Muhammad Zaffarullah, JJ., in Pakistan Television Corporation Ltd. v. M. Babar Zamaa (6), at page 227 of the report and it would be advantageous to reproduce the entire observation in this regards which reads as follows :- "13.:The contention that the respondents were not `workers' according to the definition of `workmen' as given in clause (i) of section 2 of the aforesaid Ordinance is not forceful, though appears to be specious. The respondents are News Producer, Senior Make-up Artist, Cameraman and Calligraphist. The learned Single
(I) PLD 1963 (W. P.) Kar. 757 (2) PLD 1964 (W. P.) B J 15
(3) PLD 1966 (W. P.) Pesh. 264 (4) PLD 1973 Lab. 256
(5) PLD 1971 Kar. 535 (6) 1981 PLC 219 Judge, on the basis of the affidavits filed by the parties, came to the conclusion that the respondents were workers. The definition of the workman under the aforesaid provision is : "Workman means any person employed in any Industrial or Commercial Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward."
' The contention that only manual of clerical workers are covered by the definition whether they are skilled or unskilled, is tenuous indeed, but without substance. If it was so intended, the definition would be : "Workman means any person employed in an Industrial or Commercial Establishment to do any skilled or unskilled-manual or clerical work for hire or reward.'
' Then, workman whether skilled or unskilled would relate to manual or clerical. But the definition as it is means any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled or manual or clerical work for hire or reward. I am aware that I am putting `or' in-between unskilled and manual but that is the sensible construction of the statute keeping in view the aim and object of the statute which is "to amend and consolidate the law relating to industrial employment'. And it is permissible to add a 'or', or, 'and' while construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the law-maker. Even in a penal statute 'in' and 'or' were inserted in the statute to give effect to the intention. In Adler v. George (1964) 2 Q B 7, a prohibition upon being 'in the vicinity of any prohibited place' and obstructing certain persons on duty there, was construed as referring to being 'in or in the vicinity of the place. An accused person was thus disabled to escape conviction by pleading that while actually within the perimeter of a Royal Air Force Station, he had not literally been in its vicinity or neighborhood. The Ordinance intended to amend and consolidate the law relating to industrial employment and in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 'Worker and Workman' were defined to mean 'any person not falling within the definition of employed who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or an apprentice) in an establishment or industry for hire or reward. Therefore, the ideas of defining 'Workman' in the definition was not to exclude workers except manual or clerical. In artistic or incorrect punctuation of the draftsman cannot defeat the intention of the law. As seen above, either putting the dash in between unskilled and manual, and, clerical and work, or, putting 'or' in between unskilled and manual, will make the sense clear and the purpose of the statute will be served, which is primarily meant to help the needy workers. Construction of a statute is to advance remedy and suppress mischief and not the other way round. This is the rule of interpretation of long standing. Sophistory in interpreting the meaning of workman to exclude the workers is uncalled for. In this view of the matter, the conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge on the basis of affidavits produced before him that the respondents are workers calls for no interference."
23. We have already pointed out that in similar expressions used in the definition of 'workman' given in section 2 (n) and section 2 (u) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 and the West Pakistan Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1968 either there were no commas in between the words skilled, unskilled, manual, or each of these words were separated by commas.
24. This brings us to the cases wherein contrary view has been taken. The first case to be considered is of Muhammad Aqil v. Sind Labour Appellate Court (1) is the judgment of Lahore High Court in Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. General Secretary, _Union Karkunan-e-Brooke Bond Rawalpindi has already been considered in the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court headed by Muhammad Haleem, J., and we have already quoted in extenso the relevant paragraph. In this case the petitioner was In charge of Printing Section of Pakistan Paper Products Company Limited and his duties were production, planning and supervision of the printing section as well as canvassing for obtaining printing order. In this case the counsel really relied on the definition of worker in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, in support of the contention that the petitioner was not employer but workman within the meaning of the said Ordinance. Now, so far as the definition- given in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 is concerned it was observed by the learned Judge that the learned counsel for the petitioner made no attempt to argue that the petitioner came within the definition of workman as given in the Ordinance. The relevant observations may be quoted here :- "It will, however, be fair to state that the learned counsel for the petitioner made no attempt to argue that the petitioner came within the aforesaid definition of workmen and rightly so for the duties of petitioner enumerated above would clearly exclude him from being a workman for he was not employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work. I have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that the learned Appellate Tribunal rightly came to the conclusion that the petitioner was not a workman as defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance and, therefore, not entitled to its benefits."
It will be seen that the meaning of the words skilled, or unskilled or even the effect of punctuation was not considered in this case. In this case the learned Judges were considering the contention whether the petitioner was a workman or not within the meaning of the term `workman' as given in the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, wherein the definition of 'worker' and 'workman' is very broad and any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed including employment as supervisor or as apprentice in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor is considered to be a workman. This case, therefore, does not really decide the question under consideration.
25. The other case to be considered is an unreported decision in Petition No, 432 of 1969 Messrs Abro Salt and Chemical Works v. The Chairman, Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi and another. In
(1) 1974 PLC 194 PLD 1978 Kar. 649 this case the petitioner was a Jamadar and it was contended that being a Jamadar he was not a workman within the meaning of section 2 (i) of the Ordinance.
26. This judgment was considered in the Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No, K-75 of 1970, Messrs Abro Salt and Chemical Works v. The Chairman Second West Pakistan Industrial Court, Karachi and another and we have already quoted the observations of the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 page 14 of this judgment that the work of respondent 2 in that case, in any case, fell within the term "skilled" or "unskilled" labour.
27. After hearing, the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties we reserved the order but before we could deliver our opinion the latest decision of the Supreme Court in Ganga B. Maahani v. Standard Bank Ltd. And others (1), decided on 20-5-1985, has come to our notice wherein the following test laid down in the case of the Chairman, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Ltd. v. General Secretary, Union Karkunan-e-Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Limited, Rawalpindi has been approved though in relation to definition of workman given in M. L.
0. 52, winch, as stated earlier, is same:- "A `workman' is employed in an industry to do skilled or unskilled work which is 'manual or clerical'.
Manual work entails physical exertion to distinguish from the mental or intellectual exertion involved in the clerical work. But both the manual and clerical work, in the sense these terms are used here, connote that it is more or less a routine work, not requiring any great amount of initiative, imagination, direction, central and supervision in discharging the same. The true nature of the duties performed by the employee is the determining factor in ascertaining if he was a workman or not within this definition. In case the manual work forms only a small and auxiliary part of his responsibilities or he is incidentally required to prepare a statement, maintain a register or submit a report, he cannot be considered to be a workman if otherwise his main and primary duties do not belong to this category. The true test, therefore, is to look to the direct, immediate and the substantial part of the work for which he is employed and not the sundry duties incidentally performed by him. The true answer to this question will, therefore, depend upon the proved facts in each case.'
28. The learned Judges have pointed out that the conclusion reached in the Lahore case was referred to by the Supreme Court with approval in another case namely, Brooke Bond (Pakistan)
Ltd. v. Conciliator appointed by the Government of Sind and 6 others (2). Proceeding further Mr. Justice Aslam Riaz Hussain, who delivered the opinion on behalf of the Supreme Court observed in paragraphs 11 and 12 as follows :- "11. It would, thus, be noticed that in determining the status of an employee, i,e,, deciding as to whether or not he is a 'workman', what is to be seen is the overall nature of the duties assigned to the person in question and the main or primary functions that he is required to perform and not the work that he might have to do
(1) 1985 SCMR 1511 (2) PLD 1977 SC 237 incidentally in the course of performance of his normal duties, because even a person employed at the highest managerial or supervisory level has, sometimes, to perform functions or do some work which may be termed as 'manual' or 'clerical'. No doubt, in the present case some of the duties assigned to the appellant were of a routine nature and he was required to maintain Fixed and Short Term Deposit registers and was also required to prepare balance sheets, salary vouchers and bills, etc. But it is pertinent to note that he had also been given a Power of Attorney by the respondent-Bank authorising him to perform, jointly with an other attorney of the bank, a large number of functions which are clearly of managerial nature. The Power of Attorney is available at page 102 of the Paper Book and it would be useful to reproduce some of the paragraphs thereof to show the nature of the functions entrusted to him thereby :- '3. To buy, sell, hypothecate, pledge, mortgage, endorse and transfer Government securities, municipal, port and Improvement Trust Bonds, and Shares of Joint Stock Companies and all other Securities and execute and countersign Letters of Guarantees and other indemnities ;
4. To receive deposits, to sign receipts and to give effectual discharges in the dame of the bank ;
5. .
6. To recover and take possession of and manage all lands, houses, buildings and other property mortgaged to or otherwise belonging to the bank and to let on lease or otherwise manage the same and to make sale and dispose of lands, houses, buildings, goods, merchandise, and property of every description, whether belonging to the bank absolutely or in trust or as security and for any such purpose to exercise all such powers and authorities and adopt proceedings as the bank might exercise ;
7. To purchase or take on lease or other terms any lands, houses or buildings for the purpose of offices or premises suitable for carrying on the business of the bank or for the residence of its officers and staff at any place and to build, alter and furnish and to recover any sum or sums which may become due thereunder :
8. To assign and reassign Policies of Insurance also in the name of the bank or in which the bank is interested in any way, to file proofs and to recover any sum or sums which may become due thereunder.' `12. A reading of the above-mentioned paragraphs clearly shows that powers thereby conferred on and functions thereby required to be performed by the appellant can neither be termed as manual nor clerical work and evidently involve the exercise of discretion and taking of important decisions.
It is noteworthy that he has also been given in clear and unambiguous words the power to manage some of the affairs of the bank. He was also given a number of powers which he can exercise by himself. This is clear from a reading of paragraph No, 10 of the Power of Attorney which authorizes him to do all acts, deeds and things, which are necessary requisite or expedient for the ',better or efficient performance of several acts, relating to the affairs of the bank."
29. This a judgment by a Full Bench of the Supreme Court and being latest in point of time, must be followed, being binding on us under Article 189 of the Constitution. In this case it seems that it has been held that only the workman performing manual or clerical whether the same is "skilled" or "unskilled" could be considered to be/ the "workman" within the meaning of the word 'workman' as defined under section 2 (1) of he Ordinance. In view of this decision it is now not necessary to consider the other High Court cases noticed by us and we answer the question referred to us accordingly.
SALEM AKHTAR, J.--I agree with the conclusion.
THE END