MIAN MUHAMMAD AJMAL,J.---This appeal under Article 185(2) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 calls in question the validity of the judgment of the Lahore High Court, Lahore dated 13-3-2001, whereby Regular First Appeal No,157/1989 of respondent No,1, was partly allowed, the judgment impugned therein was set aside, the suit of the respondent was decreed to the extent of 11 Kanals of the suit property still owned by the appellant subject to payment of Rs,12,15,789.47 and the respondent was directed to deposit the said amount in the trial Court after deducting Rs,50,000 already paid by him to the appellant within two months, failing which his suit would stand dismissed.
2. This appeal is barred by 14 days. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant for condonation of the delay was that the appeal before the High Court was argued on 6-2-2001 and judgment was reserved which was announced on 13-3-2001 and counsel for the appellant in the High Court was informed by the Reader of the Court that appeal has been dismissed, whereas on obtaining the certified copy of the judgment on 9-4-2001, it revealed that the appeal had not been dismissed rather the same had been partly allowed. Thereafter the clerk of the Advocate in the High Court applied for another certified copy of the judgment and decree on 17-4-2001 for availing the remedy of appeal in this Court, the copy was obtained on 20-4-2001 and thereafter, it took few days in obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial Court and other record and in preparation of the appeal, which was filed on 26-4-2001.
3. It is pertinent to mention here that this appeal was earlier heard by a Bench comprising of two Judges of this Court who vide its judgment dated 15th May, 2001 dismissed the appeal as barred by time. Thereafter review petition was filed on the ground that as the R.F.A. Was decided by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, therefore, under Order XI of the Supreme Court Rules, 1980, the appeal against the said judgment could be heard by a Bench consisting of at least three Judges. The review petition was thus accepted and the order under review was recalled directing the office to fix the appeal alongwith the application for condonation of delay before the appropriate Bench.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and have gone through the record of the case. There is no denial the fact that after announcement of the reserve judgment by the High Court on 13-3-2001, an application for certified copies of the judgment was submitted by the clerk of the Advocate on 22-3-2001 and copies were received on 9-4-2001. The contention of the appellant that on 13-3-2001 when the judgment was announced, the Reader of the Court informed the learned counsel for the appellant in the High Court that R.F.A. 157/1989 has been dismissed but on receipt of copies of the judgment on 9-4-2001, the learned counsel attained the knowledge that the appeal was partly accepted, has no substance, for, according to the affidavit of Muhammad lqbal, clerk of Khawaja M.Tariq Rahim, Advocate, he on the direction of the learned Advocate applied for two certified copies of the judgment for private use on 22-3-2001 and after obtaining the copies on 9-4-2001, the same were handed over to the learned counsel. Even if the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that they attained the knowledge of partial acceptance of the appeal on 9-4-2001, is accepted, they could file an appeal before this Court within time as they were in possession of two certified copies of the judgment and had three days for filing the appeal within time. In the instant case, apparently there was no need to apply for another certified copy of the judgment on 17-4-2001 when, limitation period for filing the appeal had already expired and two certified copies already obtained on 9-4-2001 were available for filing an appeal before the expiry of limitation period. It is strange to note that though the latter certified copy of the judgment was prepared on 17-4-2001, the same day when it was applied for but it was obtained on 20-4-2001 and after taking its delivery the filing of the appeal was delayed for another six days for which no explanation has been offered. After the expiry of the prescribed period of limitation the person seeking condonation must satisfactorily explain delay of each and every day to the satisfaction of the Court and should also establish that delay has been caused due to reasons beyond his control. The delay in filing the instant appeal was seemingly due to mere negligence and carelessness of the appellant who failed to pursue his cause with due diligence and care as such he is not entitled for any indulgence by this Court. In case of almost identical nature reported as Raheem Bakhsh v. Pathani (PLD 1985 SC 324), this Court refused to 'condone delay by observing that where on the day period of limitation expired, copies of the impugned judgment were available with appellant and appeal could have been filed in time, delay regarding time consumed between preparation of copies and its delivery was condoned but each day after expiry of period of limitation not having been satisfactorily explained, appeal held liable to be dismissed as time-barred.
5. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that since valuable property is involved, therefore, delay be condoned, is least convincing as such a ground hardly constitutes a sufficient cause for condonation of delay. In Mst.Hajran v. Sardar Muhammad (PLD 1970 SC 287), it has been held that involvement of valuable rights does not furnish a proper ground for condonation of delay in a civil matter. In yet another case titled WAPDA v. Aurangzeb (1988 SCMR 1354), it has been laid down by this Court that after the prescribed period of limitation has elapsed, the door of justice is closed and no plea of injustice, hardship or ignorance can be of any avail unless the delay of each day is properly explained and accounted for.
6. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any sufficient cause for condonation of delay, consequently the application for condonation of delay is dismissed and in consequence thereof the appeal is also dismissed as barred by time.