' Brief facts necessary for decision of this appeal are that appellant purchased 579 bags of D.G.
Cement from Responded No, 3 on 31.03.2011 for construction of his plaza. The linter of the plaza was prepared and stretched but the same collapsed on 18.04.2011. The appellant served legal notice upon the respondents on 10.09.2011, and they, did not respond, whereupon he filed claim before the learned District Consumer Court, Multan. However, he withdrew his claim on 22.11.2011. Subsequently, the appellant re-filed the complaint on 21.12.2011 which was contested by the respondents, by way of filing written reply as well as application for dismissal of, the claim as being time barred. The learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Multan heard the arguments of the parties on the application of dismissal of claim filed by the respondents and dismissed the claim filed by the appellant vide Order dated 04.01.2013. The said order of the District Consumer Court has been assailed through this appeal.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that appellant's claim was within time in terms of Section 28 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005. The learned Consumer Court has passed the impugned order without Consumer Court has passed the impugned order without recording the evidence of the parties and violated the procedure laid down in Section 30 of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005; adds that the objection of respondents against Analysis report dated 21.11.2012, was filed after six months of receipt of copy of the said report; which was not entertainable in terms of Rule 15(3) of PCPR, 2009, but the learned trial Court ignored this fact while passing the impugned order. Further contends that PCs and IR report also shows that the disputed cement was defective in composition, but learned trial Court also ignored this important fact and passed that impugned order. He relies upon the following case law:--
(i) "Dr. Muhammad Ishfaq Gojar, etc. Vs. The District Consumer Court, Multan through its Presiding Officer and another". (2014 CLR 533).
(ii) "Muhammad Mansha vs. Shahid Rana, Regional Manager OCS etc." (FAO NO. 133/2013)
3. Learned counsel for respondents submits the claim of the appellant was grossly barred by time and the delay involved was not satisfactorily explained in the application seeking condonation of delay. He relies upon the following case law:--
(i) "Muhammad Aslam vs. General Manager Pioneer Pakistan Seed Ltd, Lahore" (2014 CLD 257)
(ii) "COCA-COLA Beverages Pakistan Lid. Vs. Ashiq Ali" (PLD 2014 Lah. 196)
(iii) "Muhammad Azhar Khan and another vs. Assistant Commissioner/Collector, Toba Tek Singh and others" (2006 SCMR 778)
(iv) "Messrs Qureshi Salt and Spices Industries, Khushab and another" (1999 SCMR 2353) ,
(v) "Muhammad Yar (Deceased) through L.Rs, and others vs. Muhammad Amin (Deceased) through L.Rs and others" (2013 SCMR 464)
(vi) "Syed Sibtul Hassan Sabzwari and others vs. Azad Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through Chief Secretary and others" (2013 PLC (CS) 848).
(vii) "Muhammad Azhar Khan and another vs. Assistant Commissioner/Collector" (2006 SCMR 778)
(viii) "Sheikh Muhammad Saleem vs. Faiz Ahmad" (PLD 2003 SC 628)
4. Heard.
5. The learned Presiding Officer, District Consumer Court, Multan has noted in the impugned order that the appellant purchased 579 bags of D.G. Cement from Respondent No, 3 on 31.03.2011 and the same was used in preparation of linter, but the linter fell down on 18.04.2011. The appellant served mandatory legal notices on 10.09.2011, but the same were not responded, whereupon, he filed claim before learned District Consumer Court, Multan. However, he withdrew his complaint on 22.11.2011.
Thereafter, appellant re-filed the complaint on 21.12.2011 before the said learned Court, accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. The application for the condonation of delay moved by appellant was not containing any cogent, convincing and appealing reason to justify the condonation of delay within the contemplation of Section 28(4) of Punjab Consumer Protection Act, 2005 therefore, his claim was dismissed vide impugned order dated 04.01.2013 by the learned District Consumer Court, Multan, after taking into account, the above narrated facts an law applicable thereto.
6. The claim of appellant was vividly time barred and his pleadings did not disclose and cogent, convincing and justified reasons for condonation of delay. Thus, the appellant has failed to point out any illegality and legal infirmity in the impugned order. Law on the subject is very clear that each and every day's delay is to be satisfactorily explained. The reference in this regard can be made to the following case law:--
(i) "Lanvin Traders, Karachi v. Presiding Officer Banking Court No, II, Karachi" (2013 SCMR 1419)
(ii) "Worldcall Telecom Limited v. Pakistan Telecommunication Authority through Chairman" (2011 SCMR 959)
(iii) "Lal Khan V. Muhammad Yousar (PLD 2011 SC 657)
(iv) "Qaiser Mushtaq Ahmad v. Controller of Examinations" (PLD 2011 SC 174)
(v) "Food Department Gujranwala V. Ghulam Farid Awan" (2010 SCMR 1899)
(vi) M/s. Nida-e-Millat, Lahore Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Zone I, Lahore (2008 SCMR. 284)
(vii) "Almas Ahmed Fiaz. V. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another" (2007 PLC 64)
(viii) "Rehmat Din and others v. Mirza Nasir Abbas" (2007. SCMR 1560)
7. In the case titled "Almas Ahmad Fiaz v. Secretary Government of the Punjab Housing and Physical Planning Development, Lahore and another" (2007 PLC 64), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under:-- "It is a settled principle of law that the question of limitation under Section 46 of the I.R.O. Has to be rigidly construed on the well-known maxim that no party is allowed to circumvent the provisions of the statute of limitation. It is yet another principle of Law that the party approaching Court of competent jurisdiction for redress of grievance beyond specified period of limitation is bound to explain each day's delay to the satisfaction of`respective forum because a valuable right accrues to the other side. See "Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Salim" (PLD 1995 SC 396), (1995 SCMR 546) "Rehmat Ullah and others v. Ulyas Khan" (1968 SCMR 957) and "Pakistan Railway v. Ghulam Sarwar (1989 SCMR 864).."
8. The case law cited by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the case in hand as the same has its own distinguishable features and based on different fact. Even otherwise law declared by the Supreme Court in the judgments referred to supra is binding in terms of Article 189 of the Constitution, 1973 on all executive and judicial authority throughout Pakistan.
9. In view of aforesaid discussion, this appeal has no merit and is, therefore, dismissed in limine.