' MUHAMMAD NAWAZ ABBASI, J.--- These appeals by leave of the Court, involving common question of law and facts, have been directed against the judgment dated 6-12-1993 passed by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No,28/R of 1979 in a settlement matter.
2. The relevant facts in the background are that the appellants were transferred building site situated at Ghazi Road, Lahore, under para.7(a) of reconstituted Settlement Scheme No,VIII framed under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, by the Settlement Department before the repeal of evacuee laws and having paid the entire transfer price obtained Permanent Transfer Orders (PTOs) vide order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 13-11-1973.
Later Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) on 30-10-1974 on receipt of a letter of Commanding Officer of Special Branch, GHQ, Rawalpindi containing the information that the husbands of the appellants who being members of the armed forces, were posted in Pakistan Rangers arranged allotment of plots in the names of appellants through fraud and misrepresentation, without notice to the appellants on the same day proceeded to cancel the transfer of plots in their names. The appellants challenged the above order passed on 30-10-1974 in the Lahore High Court, Lahore, through a Constitution Petition bearing No,1733-R of 1974 and a learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 4-5-1976 while allowing the writ petition remanded the case to the Member, Board of Revenue exercising the powers of Chief Settlement Commissioner for decision of the matter afresh.
The learned Single Judge in paras. 7 and 8 of the judgment held as under:-- ' "There is no doubt that the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 30-10-1974 is clearly without jurisdiction. He has passed a single order depriving petitioners in seven petitions of their separate properties transferred to them without any notice or affording any opportunity to them of being heard.
' Since one finds enunciation of principles in Anglo-Sexon jurisprudence with reference to scripture, one might as well refer to the Holy Qur'an. When the Almighty Allah directed Angels to prostrate before Adam, all did excepting the Arch Angel. When the later was asked as to why did he not do, the Arch Angel offered the explanation that he was made of fire whereas Adam was made of clay.
Then, he was punished with expulsion from Heaven for disobedience. The lesson, besides others, one learns is that the Almighty all knowing did not condemn the Devil without affording him an opportunity of explanation. Who could be more powerful and more knowing than the God Himself that the later would not punish by expulsion from his abode His own creation, the Arch Angel? How can .a human being deprive his equal human being of his home without hearing him? This is not all religion or matter of belief but an elementary principle of temporal law as well. The highest Courts in the land as far ago as 1959, in the words of the later noble Judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan who later on became the Chief Justice of Pakistan, Mr. Justice Shahabud Din, held that 'It cannot be disputed that it is a principle of natural justice that no one should be dealt with to his material opportunity disadvantages or deprived of his liberty or property without having an opportunity of being heard and making defence. It was, further, observed that rule of justice is not confined to proceedings before Court but extends to all proceedings by whosoever held, which may affect the person or property or other right or the parties concerned in the dispute. As a just decision in such controversy is possible only if the parties are given an opportunity of being heard, there can be as regards the right of hearing, no difference between proceedings which are strictly judicial and those which are in the nature of a judicial proceedings though administrative in form'.
Reference is Chief Settlement Commissioner, Karachi and another v. Mrs. Dina Sohrab Katrak PLD 1959 SC (Pak.)
45. This principle of law has never been deviated but reiterated all over the years spreading more than a decade and a half. The slender argument addressed feebly that the petitioners had given affidavits that if the lands are subsequently found to be not available, -the transfer would come to an end and otherwise it has if subsequently found, and this finding cannot be handed out in the absence of the process likely to be affected. On this ground alone, these petitions have to succeed.
8. Besides, on the day the Deputy Settlement Commissioner passed the order viz. 30-10-1974, the law under which he had the jurisdiction had been repealed by Ordinance XV of 1974 Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary Part I - 30th September, 1974, to be effective from 1st of July, 1974 therefore, Statute which conferred powers on the Deputy Settlement Commissioner was denuded of all powers. He had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order on the day he did so. It is nobody's case that the proceedings were pending before him. From the impugned order, it appears that the Officer Commanding Special Investigation Branch G.H.Q., Rawalpindi wrote a letter to the Deputy Settlement Commissioner on 30-10-1974, which appears to have been delivered to the later the same day and that very day the learned Deputy Settlement Commissioner passed the impugned order. No doubt, the Officer Commanding Special Investigation Branch GHQ, was a highly responsible Officer but he did not demand that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner should pass an order in haste, without jurisdiction and contrary to all canons of law."
3. The disputed plots were part of evacuee land situated adjacent to the Headquarters Sutlaj, Rangers, in village of Harbanspura, Tehsil and District Lahore, Pakistan Rangers being in need of land for construction of Headquarters of Sutlaj Rangers, Lahore, approached the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department, for transfer of the land measuring 21 Kanals, 5 Marlas belonging to Khasra Nos.3164, 3180, 3163, 3166, 3167, 3179 and 3168 for the use of Pakistan Rangers and the Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner, West Pakistan, vide letter, dated 25-5-1970 accorded sanction for the sale of aforesaid land to Pakistan Rangers in exercise of his powers under section 12(b) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 and in pursuance thereto, the tentative sale price to the tune of Rs,37,825 was paid to the Settlement and Rehabilitation Department by the Executive Engineer, Provincial Building Circle, Lahore. Subsequently, the concerned authorities in the Rangers Headquarters, including the husbands of the transferees, who at the relevant time, were posted in the Rangers Headquarters communicated to the Settlement Department that the land was not required by the Pakistan Rangers and sought refund of the sale price already deposited.
The claim of Pakistan Rangers, respondents herein, was that in pursuance of the sanction granted by the Chief Settlement Commissioner vide letter dated 25-5-1970, the tentative price was deposited therefore, the property was no more part of compensation pool to be available for transfer to the appellants. The plots in question being in possession of the appellants were transferred to them as building site on the applications submitted by them on BS Forms under Settlement Scheme No,VIII, on the basis of report submitted by the Settlement Inspector according to which some construction was in existence at the spot and plots in possession of appellants were also available for transfer. The above factual position was further verified by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) through spot inspection before transfer of these residential plots to the appellants. The transfer of the plots as building sites under Settlement Scheme No,VIII remained unchallenged before the Settlement Authorities under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, .1958 before the repeal of evacuee laws w.e.f, 1-7-1974 by virtue of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974 and after repeal of evacuee laws, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) in his capacity as Notified Officer appointed under repealing Ordinance, 1974 proceeded to cancel the transfer of plots in question vide order, dated 30-10-1974.
4. The Member, Board of Revenue on remand of the case by the High Court entrusted it to the Additional Commissioner (Revenue), Lahore, who in exercise of his powers as Chief Settlement Commissioner, Lahore while disposing of the case vide order, dated 31-8-1978 observed that after repeal of evacuee laws by virtue of Evacuee Property Displaced Persons (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974, the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) was not competent to interfere in the matter and the cancellation of transfer of plots of appellants under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 was without jurisdiction. The relevant portions of the above order of Chief Settlement Commissioner is reproduced hereunder:-- "24. I have given my serious consideration to the arguments forwarded by both sides. The fact of the matter is that the parent Act stood repealed on 30-6-1974 and section 2(2) of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 envisaged only two categories of cases, which are to be decided by the Notified Officers by applying the parent Act, i.e, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The first category of cases are those which were pending before the Settlement Authorities on 30-6-1974 and the second category of cases are those, which in the absence of the repeal of the parent Act were to be remanded to the same Settlement Authorities and now to be decided and dealt with by the Notified Officers.
25. The present case was initiated on 30-10-1974. Therefore, admittedly it was not a pending case and the first clause of section 2(2) will not be applicable. The case was initiated on 30-10-1974 and the order was passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) passed an order on a date when he did not exist under the law and denuded of all powers under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. This order was challenged in writ petitions before the High Court, and no doubt the case has been remanded by the Honourable High Court to this Court for decision in accordance with law, in all humility and the greatest regard for the Honourable Court cannot empower or clothe this Court with the authority which it does not possess under section 2(2) of the said Repeal Act, 1975. Admittedly as the order in this case was passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) on 30-10-1974 i.e, after the repeal of laws, therefore, the case by no stretch of imagination could be remanded to the same officer in the absence of repeal.
Therefore, the power of authorizing the Notified Officer to decide -the remanded cases under the old law would not be available to this Court in the present case. As such, it is ordered that no proceedings can legally be initiated on the letter dated 30-10-1974 and that as already decided in the remand order, dated 4-5-1976 the position as it existed before 30-10-1974 shall be deemed to have been restored and that the notices issued to the respondents are hereby cancelled and the request made in the letter dated 30-10-1974 also stands rejected."
5. The Pakistan Rangers challenged this order before the High Court through Writ Petition bearing No,28/R of 1979 and a learned Single Judge by allowing the writ petition vide impugned judgment again sent the case back to the 'Member, Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner for its decision by the Notified Officer.
6. The leave was granted in the present appeals, vide order dated 13-11-1995 in the following mannei:-- "The learned counsel for the petitioners in seeking leave to appeal contended that the learned Judge while remanding the case to Board of Revenue/Chief Settlement Commissioner failed to take into consideration that the application filed by respondent No,1 for re-opening of the case was made on 30-10-1974 after the repeal of Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 by Act XIV of 1975 which came into effect on 1-7-1974. The application filed by respondent No,1 before the Settlement Authority, therefore, could not be treated as a pending case within the scope of section 2 of the Act XIV of 1975 so as to give jurisdiction to the Board of Revenue to reopen the case. The contention raised by the learned counsel requires examination and we, accordingly, grant leave to appeal to consider the same. The parties are directed to maintain status quo until decision of the appeal."
7. The sole question for determination in the present case would be whether the Notified Officer appointed under repealing Ordinance was competent to interfere in a matter which at the time of repeal of evacuee laws was not pending before any forum in terms of section 2(2) of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974 which subsequently acquired the status of Act XIV of 1975. Section 2(2) of the above Act, 1975 provides as under:-- "(2) Upon repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, all proceedings which, immediately before such repeal, may be pending before the authorities appointed thereunder shall stand transferred for final disposal to such officers as may be notified by the Provincial Government in the official Gazette and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court after such repeal which would have been remanded to any such authority in the absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the officers notified as aforesaid."
8. The learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the residential plots were transferred to the appellants through separate orders, dated 13-11-1973 passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner under Scheme No, VIII framed under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and after repeal of evacuee laws w.e.f, 1-7-1974, the Notified Officer had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter and re-open the past and closed transaction. Learned counsel argued that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner impugned in the writ petition was not suffering from any legal defect to be interfered by the High Court.
9. The learned Deputy Attorney-General on the other hand, contended that the case on remand by the High Court would be deemed to be pending in terms of subsection (2) of section 2 of the Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act, 1975 and Notified Officer was bound to decide the same on merits. It was next contended by the learned Deputy Attorney-General that in view of the sanction accorded by the Chief Settlement Commissioner for sale of land to Pakistan Rangers in 1970 under Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 the same stood transferred to the said department and would not be available for transfer to the appellants under Settlement Scheme No,VIII as building site. The learned Deputy Attorney-General argued that it is matter of record that the husbands of the appellants while holding important position in Pakistan Rangers at the relevant times, made official correspondence with Settlement Department for refund of sale price and in collusion with the staff of Settlement Department got the land free for transfer in the name of their wives under Settlement Scheme No,VIII as available property and that the said officers for the said reason, were also proceeded against the disciplinary action for the misuse of official authority for their personal benefit. The learned D.A.-G. Vehemently argued that the transfer of plots being result of fraud and misrepresentation, would not create any right in favour of transferee and since the property was not part of the compensation pool at the time of transfer to appellants, therefore, on remand of the case by the High Court, the matter would be deemed to be pending under section 2(2) of the repealing Act of 1975 for decision by the Notified Officer. The learned Single Judge while disposing of the Writ Petition bearing. No,28/R of 1979 through the impugned judgment held as under:-- ' "I have heard the learned counsel for petitioner as well as the respondents who cited authorities for and against the proposition. However, I am of the opinion that the,controversy is finally settled in Muhammad Baran and others v. Member (Settlement and Rehabilitation), Board of Revenue, Punjab (PLD 1991 SC 691) and applying the law, the respondent could not have refused to exercise jurisdiction vested in him by law because the present was pending case and was remanded by this Court. Even in the earlier litigation, the counsel for the parties agreed that the case may be remanded for fresh decision and this was strictly in accordance with law. There was, therefore, no justification for the learned Chief Settlement Commissioner declining to decide the case on merit merely because the order, dated 30-10-1974 was passed after the repeal of the evacuee laws. This plea was available to respondent in the first round of litigation.
' In view of above order, dated 31-8-1978 of the Additional Commissioner (Rev.) Chief Settlement Commissioner is declared to have been passed without lawful authority and by accepting the writ petition the case is remanded to the BOR/Chief Settlement Commissioner for entrusting it to the Notified Officer for decision afresh. There is no order as to costs."
10. There can be no exception to the legal position that jurisdiction of Notified Officer under Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act (XIV of 1975) would confine only to the extent of pending cases of the categories mentioned in section 2(2) of the Act of 1975. The first category of the cases was which were pending before Settlement Authorities and second of the cases which were pending before the Courts at the time of repeal of evacuee laws is which the orders of the Settlement Authorities were under challenge. The cases which were neither pending before the Settlement Authorities nor before the Courts and in which the orders passed were not challenged set aside or recalled under the provisions of the relevant statute would not by virtue of an order passed by any Court or authority after repeal, be covered by the provisions of section 2(2) of the Ordinance, 1974 (Act XIV of 1975), and therefore, the Notified Officer appointed under the repealing Ordinance, 1974 (Act XIV of 1975) would not be competent to re-open the matter finalized under the relevant statute before the repeal of evacuee laws. In the present case, the Notified Officer in exercise of his powers as Deputy Settlement Commissioner after repeal of evacuee laws w.e.f, 1-7- 1974 while retracing his steps cancelled the transfers of plots Made under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 and since the orders by virtue of which the plots in question were transferred by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to the appellants were not under challenge before any forum at the time of repeal of evacuee laws, therefore, the cancellation of plots by the Notified Officer subsequent to repeal of evacuee laws was held without jurisdiction by the High Court vide order, dated 4-5-1976 passed in Writ Petition No,1731/R of 1974, but for some misconception of law on the subject, remanded the case to the Member, Board of Revenue for its decision by the Notified Officer, and the Chief Settlement Commissioner on remand vide order, dated 31-8-1972, impugned in Writ Petition No,28-R of 1979 having examined the question of jurisdiction showed his inability to proceed in the matter. The perusal of the impugned judgment would show that High Court in the second round of litigation, without dilating upon the important legal question relating to the jurisdiction of Notified Officer and the nature of cases falling within the purview of section 2(2) of repealing Ordinance, 1974, sent the case back to the Notified Officer for decision after hearing the parties without realizing that Notified Officer had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. There can be no deviation from the legal position that a case which was not pending before any forum in terms of subsection (2) of section 2 of the repealed Ordinance, 1974 (Act of 1975) would not be treated as such under the orders of any authority or Court arising in consequence to the proceedings initiated subsequent to the repeal of evacuee laws and thus despite remand of the case to the Notified Officer by the High Court, the limit of his power under the law would not be extended to the cases which had attained finality under the statute. It is settled law that if an authority has no jurisdiction in the matter under the law, the jurisdiction cannot be conferred on said authority by an order of the Court.
11. There can be no departure to the legal position that in consequence to the sanction accorded by the Chief Settlement Commissioner for the sale of land in favour of a person and deposit of the sale price. The property would no more be available for transfer to any other person but in the present case, the tentative price deposited on behalf of the Pakistan Rangers was subsequently withdrawn and the proposal of purchase of land was dropped, therefore, the land would remain part of compensation pool and would be available for transfer. It is well-settled proposition that after issuance of documents of title, the Settlement Authorities became functus officio and property on the basis of documents of title would exclusively vest in transferee and the transfer of evacuee property on attaining finality, would go out of the compensation pool and would be no longer subject to the suo motu exercise of jurisdiction by the Settlement Authorities under the relevant statute. Reference may be made to Muhammad Din v. Ghulam Muhammad Naseem Sindhu PLD 1991 SC 1. In the present case, the transfer of plots in favour of appellants attained finality on repeal of evacuee laws w.e.f, 1-7-1974 and the Notified Officer had no power to interfere in the transfer of plots made under Settlement Scheme No,VIII and exercise jurisdiction as Deputy Settlement Commissioner in the 'matter under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The provisions of subsection (2) of section 2 of Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974 (Act XIV of 1975) would only authorize the Notified Officer to deal with the cases which were pending before the different forums of competent jurisdiction in which the allotment/transfer was not finalized or the claim was not yet finally adjusted or that the authority which passed the order before the repeal of evacuee laws had no jurisdiction or the authority proceeded by misconstruing the legal and factual position in contravention of law or rules applicable at the relevant time and in such a case, the order would be open to scrutiny and would not attain finality due to inherent defect of jurisdiction of the authority passing the order. It was not the case of respondents at any stage of the litigation that the Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) had no authority to pass the order of transfer of plots in favour of appellants or that the transfer was made without determining the entitlement of appellants under the scheme prepared under relevant statute and thus the crucial question to decide the fate of the case would be that of the finality attached, to the order of transfer of land passed by the competent authority under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. The subsequent order passed by the Notified Officer through which the plots from the names of appellants were cancelled after repeal of evacuee laws being, without jurisdiction would be a void order and non-existent i.. The eyes of law and all subsequent orders based on a void order would have no legal effect. We, therefore, in the light of above discussion, conclude that the transfer of plots in favour of appellants made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner under Scheme No, VIII being not suffering from jurisdictional or any other legal defect, was legal and valid which could not be interfered by the Notified Officer in exercise of his powers of Deputy Settlement Commissioner under Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Ordinance, 1974 and the interference of High Court in the order of Chief Settlement Commissioner which was challenged in the writ petition, would amount to perpetuate the illegal and unjust order of Notified Officer. This Court in Raunaq Ali v.
Chief Settlement Commissioner PLD 1973 SC 236 held "A study of various cases decided by this Court would show that before a person can be permitted to invoke the discretionary powers of a Court, it must be shown that the order sought to be set aside had occasioned some injustice to the parties. If it does not work any injustice to any party rather it cures a manifest illegality then the extraordinary jurisdiction ought not be allowed to be invoked". In Chittagong Chamber of Commerce and Industry v. C.S. Ltd. PLD 1970 SC 132 it was observed as under:-- ' "This is no doubt correct, but it is also now well-established that where an inferior Tribunal or Court has acted wholly without jurisdiction or as Rubinstien puts it in his book 'jurisdiction and illegality' taken any action 'beyond the sphere allotted to the tribunal by law and therefore, outside the area within which the law recognizes a privilege to err', then such action amounts to a `usurpation of power unwarranted by law' and such an act is a nullity; that is to say, 'the result of a purported exercise of authority which' has no legal effect whatsoever'. In such a case, it is well-established that a superior Court is not bound to give effect to it, particularly where the appeal is to the latter's discretionary jurisdiction. The Courts would refuse to perpetuate, in such circumstances, something which would be patently unjust or unlawful,"
12. The withdrawal of sale price from the Settlement Department through the correspondence made on behalf of Pakistan Rangers if was not done with the approval of higher authorities in the Pakistan Rangers and the concerned officers in the Pakistan Rangers were proceeded against for disciplinary action, would neither affect the jurisdiction of Settlement Authorities nor would make the transfer illegal to justify its cancellation by the Notified Officer. It was not the case of respondents that allotment was obtained through practising fraud in the Settlement Department or that at the relevant time, the case was pending before any forum of competent jurisdiction or that the finality was not attached with the transfer order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and the transfer was yet to be finalized under the relevant statute. The transfer order in the present case, certainly attained finality on repeal of evacuee laws, therefore, the Notified Officer would have no jurisdiction to interfere in the transfer under the repealing Ordinance, 1974 (Act XIV of 1975) and to above legal position, the only exception would be in case the property would have not transferred by the competent authority, the same on repeal would be deemed to be available under section 3 of the repealing Act, 1975 and an order passed in respect of the property would not attain finality under the relevant statute.
13. The concept of the judicial review of the orders passed or actions taken by administrative of quasi-judicial forum is to ensure the command of law and the supremacy of Constitution. The writ jurisdiction is discretionary in the nature which can be invoked in the cases of patent illegality, lack of jurisdiction, the exercise of authority not vested by law and to correct any other such illegality but the scope of the judicial review is not confined only to the extent of legal requirement rather in case of omission of equitable consideration, the Court can interfere in the matter in exercise of the powers of judicial review. The object of the superior Courts while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction is to protect the rights and undo a wrong done in law and faster justice and keeping in view this object, the Court may in equity set aside or annul a void order.
14. The law has defined limits of the power of Notified Officer under the relevant statute and if the limit of jurisdiction of an authority is prescribed in the statute, the same cannot be enlarged or curtailed by an order of the Court, therefore, the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review could not confer jurisdiction to the Notified Officer which was not available to him under the statute. The jurisdictional bar under the statutes can only be removed through the statutory law and there being no concept of hypothetical jurisdiction in law, the authority which does not enjoy the power should not proceed on the assumption of jurisdiction and defeat the purpose of law. We find that the High Court without attending this important aspect of the matter, allowed the writ petition and remanded the case to the Member, Board of Revenue on the assumption that Notified Officer was competent to exercise jurisdiction in the matter under the relevant statute.
15. The discretionary power of the Supreme Court under Articles 185 and 187 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 is very wide and it is obligatory for the Supreme Court to ensure that apart from the legal formalities, the equitable aspects of a matter was not violated so that the concept of doing complete justice in law and equity can be advanced. The land in the present case was transferred as available property by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner in proper exercise of jurisdiction through a valid and legal order and the subsequent order passed by the Notified Officer by virtue of which the allotment of the plots was cancelled, was patently an illegal order which was passed without jurisdiction. We have been told that the appellants having constructed houses on the plots transferred to them, were residing there since 1973 and have acquired a valuable right in the property, therefore, their dislocation at this stage merely on the technical ground purchase of land by the Pakistan Rangers would defeat the concept of that their husbands were responsible for dropping the proposal of equitable justice.
16. In the light of foregoing discussion, we hold that at the relevant time the Notified Officer had no jurisdiction to interfere in the matter either under Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 or under Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal)
Ordinance, 1974 (Act XIV of 1975) and we, while declaring the order, dated 31-10-1974 passed by the Notified Officer exercising, the powers of Deputy Settlement Commissioner (Plots) as without lawful authority, set aside the judgment of the High Court impugned in these appeals which are allowed with no order as to costs.