RANA BHAGWANDAS, J.--This appeal with the leave of this Court arises out of judgment dated 18- 3-1998, passed by a learned Judge in Chambers of the Lahore High Court, Lahore, in Writ Petition No,64-R of1997 filed by the respondents directing the Chief Settlement Commissioner to allot land measuring 12-1/2 acres anywhere in Punjab, out of the evacuee land, now forming part of the Provincial Government Pool.
2. Respondents being the legal heirs of Syed Subhan Ali Shah, a displaced person from India filed a writ petition on 31-3-1997 on the averments that their predecessor-in-interest was a displaced person from Hyderabad Deccan and his Claim Form No,6279 was duly verified by the Central Record Room for 17853 P.I. Units. It was the case of the respondents that the said claim was transferred to village Tung, Tehsil Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura and entered at Khata No,80 of the RL-I Register where an area of 612 Kanals was proposed in the year 1967 against the said claim.
It was averred that they have been constantly approaching the local authorities for the confirmation of the said proposal but it did not bear any fruit. They were, however, informed that, on account of floods, most of the record of Tehsil Ferozewala was badly damaged and as such entries against the said Khata had been washed away and mutilated to a great extent, therefore, it was not possible to give effect to the proposal for allotment. According to the respondents during the subsistence of the said proposal the Government issued instructions on 25-6-1973 whereby all such proposals were ordered to be cancelled. Kelevant memo. Issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner was challenged by the affected parties before the Lahore High Court and was finally decided in the case titled "Mst. Inayat Bibi v. Additional Settlement Commissioner and others" on 1- 7-1974 reported as PLD 1978 Lahore 252. The Chief Settlement Commissioner also issued instructions that where a proposal for allotment of rural agricultural land had been made in the Register kL-II and the prescribed period of 15 days in accordance with the provisions contained in para. 68, Part II Chapter-II of the Rehabilitation Supplementary Scheme had elapsed on or before 15-6-1973 when the allotments were stopped such proposal shall be confirmed subject to entitlement. Respondents urged that in view of the memo. Dated 14-3-1974 issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner they were entitled to and eligible for confirmation of the proposal of the land but the appellants failed to discharge their statutory obligations and to confirm the proposal in their favour, hence the petition.
3. In the para-wise comments and departmental report appellants stated that entire record of Tehsil Ferozewala was badly damaged during floods, in 1988. Entries of Register RL-II of village Tung were defaced. As per note at, Khata No,80 of Register RL-II, 2694 PIUs of M.R.V. Entitlement were transferred to this village on 7-7-1966 but it was illegible as to how much land was proposed for allotment. According to appellants it was evident from the Register of Haqdaran Zamin for the year 1966-67 that neither any land existed in the name of Syed Subhan Ali Shah nor was any land available for allotment which fortified that proposal if any was rescinded at the same time.
Deliberate silence and non-persuasion for more than 30 years showed that the claim was transferred and settled elsewhere because the claimant or the respondents did not challenge the rejection of so-called proposal. The proposal, if any, was finalized in the year 1966 and it was not correct that it subsisted till the year 1974. Respondents' case, therefore, did not fall within the preview of the Policy Letter No,312- POL/74, dated 14-3-1974 relied upon by them. Appellants claimed that after more than 30 years' deliberate delay, the respondents had no locus standi or genuine cause to file the petition for resurrection of non-existing proposal.
4. During the hearing of the petition, learned Judge in Chambers summoned Original Register RL-II to find out as to whether any proposal was indeed made in the name of the claimant. The officer who produced the register submitted before the Court that entire record of Tehsil Ferozewala had been damaged due to the floods. This register was also found to be in damaged condition and it was not ascertainable from the perusal of Khata No,80 as to whether some proposal was made in the name of the claimant, though the factum of entering the claim form of the claimant from the said Khata could be deciphered.
5. Learned Judge in the High Court was of the view that since there was an entry of the claim form of the respondent's predecessor-in-interest in the Register RL-lI, it seemed that some steps were being taken for allotment of land but the same could not fructify. On the concession of the respondents' counsel that he would not press for a direction for allotment of land measuring 612 Kanals and would be satisfied with the direction for allotment of land to the extent of subsistence holding the petition was allowed and the direction issued as aforesaid leading to this appeal.
6. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the following questions of law of public importance:
(i) Whether the High Court could issue direction to allot the land to the respondents when order proposing the land could not be established from the record?
(ii) Whether the direction to allot the land could be issued by the High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution after the repeal of Evacuee Laws and also the fact that allotments stood banned since 1974?
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and examined the record with their assistance.
Ch. Mushtaq Masood, learned Advocate Supreme Court for the appellants vehemently contended that after the repeal of Evacuee and Settlement Laws by virtue of Evacuee Property and Displaced Persons Laws (Repeal) Act No,XIV of 1975 with effect from 1st July, 1974 respondents could succeed in the petition only if they were able to establish on the face of the record that there were pending proceedings before the repeal of laws before any competent Authority with stood transferred for final disposal to Notified Officer whereas no proceedings were pending in the present case. It was further submitted that the case of the respondents at any event did not fall within the purview of policy decision contained in the letter, dated 14-3-1974 issued by the Chief Settlement Commissioner in that there was neither a subsisting proposal for allotment of agricultural land in favour of the claimant or the respondents after his demise, nor were respondents In actual and physical possession of the proposed area since Kharif 1971. Learned counsel urged that in the absence of any pending proceedings direction of the High Court after the repeal of Evacuee laws was illegal and without jurisdiction. Lastly, impugned judgment was assailed on the premise that in any event the High Court could not assume the role of Chief Settlement Commissioner by issuing a direction of the nature as in the present case in the exercise of extraordinary Constitutional jurisdiction.
8. Conversely, Mr. Gul Zarin Kiani, learned counsel for the respondents defended the impugned judgment on the grounds that in view of existence of a proposal for allotment of land in satisfaction of a verified claim in favour of the claimant and no land having been allotted against the said claim, there were pending proceedings on the date of repeal of Evacuee laws, .Therefore, the High Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction in order to secure the ends of justice and to redress the wrong. He submitted that the respondents had been constantly approaching the relevant authorities for the allotment of land and running from pillar to post for seeking the enforcement of their rights which did- not fructify, therefore, they were constrained to invoke the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court as the High Court is the custodian of the fundamental rights of the citizens. Learned counsel pointed out that the respondents could not be non-suited on the ground of lathes as the question of delay in approaching the Court of law must be examined with reference to the merits of the case. Mr. Kayani, however, conceded that the High Court instead of making a direction for allotment of land ought to have remanded the case to the Notified Officer for consideration of respondents' claim for allotment of land according to law.
9. In order to determine the right and entitlement of the respondents to seek the allotment of land in satisfaction of the claim and to consider whether the High Court- was possessed of requisite jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition, it is of utmost significance to ascertain whether there were any proceedings pending before an authority appointed under the provisions of Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 on the date of repeal of the Settlement Laws within the purview of section 2 (2) of Act XIV of 1975, which reads as under: "(2) Upon the repeal of the aforesaid Acts and Regulations, all proceedings which, immediately before such repeal, may be pending before the authorities appointed there under shall stand transferred for final disposal to such officers as may be notified by the provincial Government in the official Gazette and all cases decided by the Supreme Court or a High Court after such repeal which would have been remanded to any such authority in the absence of such repeal shall be remanded to the officers notified as aforesaid."
10. It is the case of the respondents that notwithstanding the fact that the public record including the record relating to displaced persons' claims and settlement of land had been inundated by heavy floods in Tehsil Ferozewala in 1988 in fact a proposal with regard to settlement of 2694 PIUs in the name of late Syed Subhan All Shah existed at Khata No,80 of the RL-II Register. Furthermore, no land in satisfaction of the verified claim of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest had been allotted despite their repeated efforts, therefore, these were pending proceedings before the authorities in the eyes of law. Respondents may be correct to the extent of saying that there existed an entry in R1.-H Register with regard to 2694 PIUs against the verified claim of Syed Subhan All Shah, received in the village on 7-7-1966, there is absolutely no evidence to indicate as to the fate of any likely proposal, Obviously it is not known as to whether any land and if so, which Khasra numbers were ever proposed for allotment against the aforesaid claim. Stance of the appellants in the parawise comments that neither the claimant nor the respondents perused their claim for more than three decades would fortify the view that the claim was transferred and settled somewhere else or rejected would not seem to be without any basis. Primarily, it is for the respondents to show by concrete evidence that the proposal, if any, for allotment of land remained intact and alive till 1974 when policy decision, vide Circular letter dated 14-3-1974 was made by the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Indeed there is no circumstance to reflect that any land was ever proposed for allotment to the claimant in Tehisil Ferozewala or elsewhere in the District. The circumstance that the respondents and their predecessor-in-interest kept quiet till 1997 would speak volumes about the bona fides and genuineness of their inordinately belated petition. To say the least, their case is completely shrouded in mystery and nothing can be spelt out with an amount of certainty owing to their total inaction, indifference and lack of prosecution. It is difficult to subscribe to the view of the learned counsel that since the claim remained unsatisfied till the repeal of the Evacuee Laws it, would constitute pending proceedings within the purview of the term.
Learned counsel relied upon Nawab Din v. Member, Board of Revenue (PLD 1979 SC 846), Government of Punjab v. Muhammad Yaqoob PLD 2002 SC 5 and Farhatullah Khan v. Additional Commissioner (Revenue) 2002 SCMR 1507).
11. In Nawab Din's case (supra) it was observed that affixation of word "all" before word "proceedings" in section 2(2) of Act XIV of 1975 does not authorize exclusion of any type of proceedings from ambit of such word by making a division of kind of judicial proceedings and executive proceedings as long as such proceedings dealt with settlement of land and decided eligibility of an applicant for its transfer. When the words used in the statute are all proceedings" it is not justified to diminish the totality of those proceedings by introducing jurisprudential concepts, for example, judicial proceedings, quasi-judicial proceedings, executive proceedings, administrative proceedings, penal proceedings, fiscal proceedings and proceedings before a Court etc. The focus should remain on the words deployed in the Statute and so long as the proceedings are under the Act repealed; before the competent Authorities; and are of the kind and for the purposes indicated in that Act, for the enforcement of rights mentioned therein on the applicants concerned, they are the proceedings which are saved so as to continue under the relevant law repealed.
12. In Muhammad Yaqoob's case (supra) there was a definite proposal for allotment of evacuee land and allottee was in possession thereof pursuant to confirmation of the proposal in his favour, which was disputed by the Authorities. In this background, it was observed that the term "pending proceedings" as used in the Act, 1975 would mean that an initial step was taken as contemplated under the Settlement laws for allotment of land against verified claim of the claimants but the same did not finalize before the repeal of evacuee laws. Again in Farhatullah Khan's case (supra) respondents had purchased the disputed land from a person whose allotment was set aside by the Authorities. Respondents were seeking protection of section 41 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882.
It was in the circumstances observed that any transaction, which was based on fraud could not be sustained in the eyes of law and such transferees were bound to swim or sink alongwith the transferor. Elaborating the issue of "pending proceedings" it was held that merely on the basis of inconsumable produce index units, the case of a claimant could not be treated to be a pending case and if such claimant desired he could ask for compensation from the concerned authorities of the Provincial Government.
13. There may be no cavil with the proposition of law propounded by this Court in the decided precedents the fact would remain that the respondents utterly failed to demonstrate that except an entry with regard to receipt of a claim concerning 2694 PIUs in favour of their predecessor-in- interest in RL-ll Register of village Tung, there was no application, complaint, petition or an actionable cause for satisfaction of claim or allotment of land pending before an authority appointed under the provisions of repealed laws before the repeal with effect from 1-7-1974. It would thus be unnatural and illogical to hold that simply because in the mutilated and defaced record there appeared an entry with regard to a verified claim, Courts must assume that there were pending proceedings, which could be revived in the writ jurisdiction of the High Court, after the passage of more than three decades. In the absence of any strong documentary or circumstantial evidence tending to substantiate the highly belated claim of the respondents, it would be difficult to hold that the claim of the respondents' predecessor-in-interest remained unconsumed or that they were legally entitled to ask for activating the same after the lapse of more than thirty years without approaching the forums available under the hierarchy of Evacuee Property and Settlement Laws. Judged in the perspective of the decided precedents we are of the firm view that there were no pending proceedings within the ambit of the term used in the abovesaid laws, which could be revived, activated or remanded to a notified Officer as contemplated by the repealing enactment. We are fortified in our view by the dicta of this Court reported as Karim Bibi v. Hussain Bakhsh (PLD 1984 SC 334).
14. The expression "proceedings" has not been defined in the Act XIV of 1975 but it is a very comprehensive term and generally includes a prescribed course of action for enforcement of a legal right, which would essentially involve the requisite steps by which judicial action is invoked. A "proceedings" would include every step taken towards the furtherance of a cause before a Court or a Tribunal where it might be sub judice. It is the step towards the objective to be achieved, say for instance the judgment in a pending suit. The proceeding commences with the first step by which the machinery of law is placed into motion in order to take cognizance of a cause. In the light of the abovesaid discussion proceedings under the repealed laws would appear to commence with the application of a person entitled to the transfer of land out of evacuee pool under the schedule and the schemes framed thereunder. Normally, such application would be disposed of through an order passed by a competent Authority designated under the and any person dissatisfied with such order may seek remedy before the appellate and/or revisional forum provided by law. In such a case proceedings remain pending until their final conclusion by the highest authority prescribed under the law.
15. The expression "proceedings" came up for interpretation before a Full Bench of this Court in The State v. Naeemullah Khan (2001. SCMR 1461) in the context of the term used in section 46 of the Hazara Forest Act, 1936, it was held by this Court in the precedent case that the word "proceedings" is a comprehensive expression which includes every step taken towards further progress of a cause in a Court or Tribunal, from its commencement till its disposal. In legal terminology the word "proceedings" mean the institution- or carrying on of an action of law. Generally, a proceeding is the form and manner of conducting judicial business before a Court or Judicial Officer, including all possible steps in an action from its commencement to the execution of a judgment and in a more particular sense, it is any application to a Court of justice for aid in enforcement of rights, for relief, for redress of injuries, or damages or for any remedial object. It in its general use comprehends every step taken or measure adopted in prosecution or defence of an action. Obviously, in the present case, neither the claimant nor the respondents after his death made any application, complaint or written request before an authority in prosecution of their object at relevant time with a view to obtain the allotment of land in satisfaction of their claim. They remained totally silent and unmoved for more than 30 years and perhaps waited for the emergence of calamity and disaster of heavy floods resulting in destruction of the records. One fails to understand any rationale and logic behind inactive and indifferent attitude of the respondents, who got up from a deep slumber long after the repeal of laws without taking any concrete steps or measures for advancement of their cause which strongly militates against an element of fairness and bona fides on their part. On account of laches in setting the machinery of law into motion they have indeed disentitled themselves to the exercise of discretionary and equitable jurisdiction, which in all cases must be exercised in order to foster the ends of justice and to right a wrong. Writ jurisdiction is undoubtedly discretionary and extraordinary in nature which may not be invoked by a party who demonstrates a style of slackness and laxity on his part. Furthermore, if a party does not choose legal remedy available under the Statute strictly speaking Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be exercised in his favour. Law is well-settled that a party guilty of gross negligence and laches is not entitled to the equitable relief. One who seeks equity must show that equities lean in his favour. In the facts and circumstances of the appeal we are, therefore, in no manner of doubt that the High Court was not competent to exercise its writ jurisdiction conferred under Article 199 of the Constitution.
16. Adverting to the question whether it was an appropriate case for the exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court we are clear in our mind that since there were no pending proceedings before the Authorities before the repeal of laws High Court was not legally competent to make any direction. Legally speaking even in a fit and proper case High Court could only remand the case to the relevant authorities for consideration of the right and interest of a person according to law in order to secure the ends of justice, and not to determine the right and entitlement of a person itself.
No doubt, discretion conferred on the superior Courts under the Constitution is very wide and extraordinary such discretion is always required to be exercised judiciously and not in an arbitrary manner. It was submitted at the bar that since the High Court had exercised its discretion in favour of the respondents this Court was not bound to interfere with the exercise of discretion. The argument is without any substance and has least impressed us. In our considered opinion High Court did not exercise the discretion vested in it by law in a just and lawful manner, therefore, this Court is under a legal obligation to undo the wrong rather than to act in aid of injustice.
Referenceto the precedent Wajih-ul-Hassan Zaidi v. Government of Punjab (1997 SCMR 1901) is, therefore, completely misconceived and out of context.
17. For the aforesaid facts, circumstances and reasons this appeal is allowed, and impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside with no order as to costs.