CONSOLIDATED JUDGMENT SYED MUDASSER AMEER, J.Through this single judgment, the Court shall decide WP No. 316-A/2025 titled: Al-Khalid Stone Crusher-Vs-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Tribunal, Peshawar and others, WP No. 389-A/2025 titled: M/S. Z.K, Jadoon Stone Crusher-Vs-Hashim Iqbal Jadoon and others, WP No. 406-A/2025 titled: Qazi Hammad Stone Crusher Plant Dara Dhodiyal-Vs-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Tribunal, Peshawar and others,WP No. 439-A/2025 titled: Naseem Gul Stone Crusher Plant Dara Dhodiyal-Vs-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Tribunal, Peshawar and others, and WP No.503-A/2025 titled:Hazara Stone Crusher-Vs-Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Tribunal, Peshawar & others, as all these petitions arise out of one and same order dated: 11.03.2025 passed by the respondent/Environmental Protection Tribunal, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar (hereinafter referred to as 'EPT').
2. Facts of the case(s) are that the respondent namely Hashim Iqbal Jadoon (complainant) filed a complaint (No. PC-05/2022)under section 22(3)(ii) of The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Protection Act, 2014 (hereinafter referred to as 'KPEPA'), seeking intervention of EPT against the present petitioners(stone crushers)allegedly for their persistent illegal operation of stone-crushing machines, operating without legal authorization, despite being sealed multiple times by authorities.
In the complaint, the complainant highlights the willful negligence of the respondents, who continue to violate environmental laws with impunity, causing irreversible damage to ecosystems and public health. The complainant urged EPT to take strict legal action against the present petitioners including permanent shut down of their plants, heavy fines and criminal penalties, etc.
3. In response to the complaint, the present petitioners/owners of stone crushing plants filed replies. They also moved application for dismissal of the complaint being malicious, vexatious and not maintainable. Meanwhile, complainant had also moved two applications, one for grant of Interim Relief and another for addition of parties. All these three applications were decided by the EPT vide single consolidated order dated: 11.03.2025, whereby the application of petitioners (owners of stone crushing plants), for dismissal of complaint, was declined while the applications for Interim Relief as well as addition of parties filed by the respondent/complainant were allowed. Hence, the petitioners being aggrieved of the above findings have approached this Court by filing the instant constitutional petitions.
4. The petitioners in these petitions assert that they have legally established crush plants after obtaining all necessary approvals, including authorization from the Mines and Mineral Department, NOCs from the Industries and Consumer Department, and environmental clearance from the Environmental Protection Agency of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa ('EPA'). They emphasize that their operations comply with the prescribed distance requirements maintaining a buffer of 300 meters in rural areas and 500 meters in urban areas, as mandated by relevant regulations. Despite adhering to these legal standards, the petitioners claim they are being subjected to baseless and repeated legal challenges by the respondent/complainant. Consequently, they feel they are being unfairly targeted and harassed through frivolous litigation. They also contend that the complaint filed by the respondent/complainant is also not maintainable on the ground of non-service of statutory notice as required under section 22(3)(ii) of KPEPA and that respondent No.1/EPT also failed to appreciate the mandate of section 22(7) of the KPEPA by not following the procedure as directed to be followed under the provisions of section 200 and 201 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ('Cr.P.C').
5. Arguments heard and record perused.
6. Petitioners are operating Stone Crushing Plants in the Hazara region. The instant lis has a chequered history. Petitioners have been playing cat and mouse with the respondents since long.
All the petitioners want is to be left alone to just do their work/business but the respondents are always interfering in the smooth running of their affairs on one pretext or another. They are particularly aggrieved of their non-stop persecution at the hands of respondentNo.4 (complainant), who has taken it upon himself to ensure that the environment is saved. In his quest, the complainant too has been running from pillar to post and is also much aggrieved of the actions, inactions and omissions of the other respondents resulting in inadequacy of measures to protect the environment particularly from the petitioners.
7. Stone crushing activities in Pakistan, particularly around areas like Margalla Hills, Taxila and Hazara Division, have indeed caused significant erosion and environmental degradation. The industry, driven by demand for construction materials, often relies on blasting and quarrying, leading to hillside denudation and potential damage to ecosystems and communities. Stone crushing operations, especially those involving blasting, cause significant erosion of hillsides, leading to land degradation and loss of vegetation. Back in July 2010, 15 years ago, The Express Tribune published the sad story of stone crushing eating up our mountains. Titled 'Crushing mountains to build buildings', the said article warned us of the dire consequences of the unfortunate and illegal silence of the EPA and governments about this environmental disaster. The following excerpts will remind us: "First it was the Margalla Hills and now the hills of Rutti Mitti of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa are being crushed to feed the never-ending demand for stone. Despite many attempts by the government to halt the practice, the four-decadeold legacy of stone crushing continues as hills disappear.
On way to Abbottabad, about an hour and a half from Islamabad, on the right are the lush-green Murree Hills, Nathiagali and Baarian, while on the left are horrific sites of 'scooped' mountains, some peaks almost invisible and stone crushers operating in full swing. About 18 crushers are working there.
According to a social worker from the area, Jawadullaha Khan Abbasi, the destruction of the hills has caused severe health problems in the area, such as hepatitis, TB and skin infections. The residents of the area also face other issues such as noise pollution caused by dynamite explosions, heavy machinery and about 80 trucks crossing GhoraGali Lora Road in district Abbottabad daily.
Moreover, stone crushing has led to the drying up and contamination of natural streams, the destruction of natural geographical formations, archaeological features and native plant communities. It has also forced native birds to migrate from the area, says Abid Swati, an environment expert in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa."
Many such articles and stories have been consistently published by our newspapers over the years but those responsible kept silently watching as the mountains were eaten up. It is about time that this criminal silence and inaction is ended and concrete measures are taken to save these mountains. Many a times, the honorable Supreme Court has also pointed towards this menace and the proactive approach that is needed to prevent further destruction. It is also disappointing and disturbing that EPA is only focused on the air and noise pollution and doesn't seem much bothered about the eroding mountains. As per the report submitted before the Apex Court in the case of Amer Zshaq& others v. Province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa & others (PLD 2024 SC 1134) there were 900 crushing plants operating in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa by July 2024. This poses a serious existential threat to the mountains. The inspections conducted and the guidelines provided by EPA available on record show various precautionary measures and safeguards related to air and noise pollution, however there seems to be no such measure taken by the EPA to ensure the safety and preservation of the mountains. In the case of stone crushers such measures are mandatory.
Without a comprehensive plan for the preservation of these mountains Environmental Approvals ('EA') cannot, and should not, be issued. If stone crushing can be completely banned in ICT to save the mountains and the environment, why not in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The provincial government should also look into the matter and come forward to perform its constitutional duties in this regard.
8. 'Pre-cautionary principle' in environmental cases requires the States to adopt pre-cautionary approach to protect the environment. To prevent damage to the environment before it is actually caused. This is principle 15 of the 'Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992'. Though the 'pre-cautionary principle' has been recognized, acknowledged and applied by the apex Court since Shela Zia's case (PLD 1994 SC 693), it has more force and binding nature now after insertion of Article 9-A in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 ('the Constitution'). The constitutionally guaranteed fundamental right to a clean, healthy and sustainable environment is not abstract. It is a real and enforceable right. Earlier the Courts interpreted the 'right to life' (Article 9) expansively to include environmental protection and still adopted an inquisitorial and proactive role in environmental cases. Whenever it came to the Court's notice that environment was endangered, the Court has invariably intervened and stopped the environmental damage by applying the 'precautionary principle'.The apex Court in Shela Zia's case emphasized that prevention is better than cure and environmental threats or violations should be arrested from the very inception. Now to ensure the guarantee provided by article 9-A, even more proactive role is required, particularly by those charged with the specific responsibility to protect and preserve the environment. In DG Khan Cement Co. Vs. Government of Punjab (2021 SCMR 834) the apex Court reiterated that courts must act on the basis of the 'pre-cautionary principle' where environmental harm is imminent, cumulative or irreversible. Even more recently, vide Order dated 11.07.2024, his Lordship Justice Syed Mansoor Ali Shah, speaking for a full bench of the apex Court in the case of Amir Ishaq and others v. Province of KP and others (PLD 2024 SC 1134), observed as follows: "5. Air pollution causes an estimated one in every nine deaths worldwide, making it the greatest environmental threat to human health. According to the World Health Organization ("WHO"), air pollution is responsible for an estimated seven million premature deaths worldwide every year.4 Almost all air breathed by humans exceeds the WHO Guidelines limits. It is pertinent to mention here that no other location on the planet illustrates the stubborn nature of air pollution challenge more than South Asia, where pollution continued its upward trend in 2021. Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Pakistan - where 22.9 percent of the global population lives - are the top four most polluted countries in the world.5 As per the World Air Quality Report (2023), Pakistan is the second most polluted country in the world with an annual average PM2.5 concentration 14 times above the WHO guidelines, leading to a loss in life expectancy of 4.4 years.6 The most serious issue of air quality in Pakistan is the presence of excessive suspended PM present in the air.
It is noted that the triple-planetary crisis, which comprises of interrelated urgent crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss, and widespread pollution must entrench environmental concerns as supreme constitutional norms. This strand of demand often coined as "environmental constitutionalism" is a relatively recent phenomenon at the confluence of constitutional law, international law, human rights and environmental law and embodies the recognition that the environment is a proper subject for protection in constitutional texts and for vindication by constitutional courts worldwide. By acting as a method of constitutionally entrenching environmental law and protection at a more enduring or "higher" constitutional level, environmental constitutionalism entails a transformative approach that relies on constitutions to provide for the architecture of environmental governance, whereupon it then acts to improve environmental protection through various constitutional features such as fundamental rights, recognized principles of environmental governance and the rule of law."
9. A review of the relevant law, i.e. 'KPEPA' would show that the object and aim of the said law as reflected in its preamble also lays much emphasis on 'the protection, conservation, rehabilitation and improvement' of the environment and 'monitoring, prevention and control' of pollution. All these terms also predominantly point towards the prevention of damage rather than cure; the 'pre-cautionary principle'. Thus all the provisions of the Act ought to be viewed in this context.
Section 11 of the KPEPA prohibits, in unequivocal terms, the discharge or emission of any effluent or wastes or air pollutant or noise, etc. which is in excess of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Environmental Quality Standards ('KPEQS') or other established standards. Section 13(1) of the ibid Act, couched in negative language, lays down a complete and absolute bar on the commencement and/or operation of any project without first obtaining EA from the EPA. How that approval is to be obtained has also been elaborately provided in the said section and rules made thereunder. Much debate was also made on the lack of efficient mechanisms and resultant delays caused by the EPA in the process of granting such EAs, yet the law does not allow that or any other such excuse to be used for commencement or continuance of operations in the absence of the required EA. No matter how long it takes, no matter how difficult it might be, the commencement or operation of any project in the absence of an EA is illegal and must be stopped immediately. There is no exception provided in law, nor can one be created on any grounds whatsoever. Neither the EPA nor the EPT, nor any other authority for that matter, has been vested with any such powers. Any permission, 'conditional approval', 'interim approval', 'NOC', relaxation, exemption, interim-relief, stop-gap arrangement or any other such instrument, by whatever name called, allowing any person or project to commence or continue operations in the absence of an EA is also ab initio illegal, unlawful and void.
10. After laying down various safeguards and elaborate mechanisms to ensure the safety of the environment and prohibiting any activities that might be harmful, KPEPA provided strict and robust mechanism for its enforcement on various levels. This, at the EPA level, starts with an Environmental Protection Order ('EPO'). Section 17 empowers the EPA to immediately stop any such activity and also to proceed further and take other measures. Section 18 (1) provides that any failure to comply with the provisions of section 11, 12, 13, 14 and 17 or any order passed thereunder shall constitute an offence punishable as provided therein. Any such offence is triable exclusively by the EPT established under section 21 of KPEPA. The EPT has been vested with dual powers and jurisdictions; original jurisdiction under section 22 and appellate jurisdiction under section 23 of KPEPA. Whereas under section 23 it hears appeals against any orders or directions of the EPA, under section 22(3) it can try and take cognizance of any offence upon a complaint in writing (i) by the EPA or any Government Agency or local council or (ii) by any aggrieved person.
11. The instant case pertains to this section 22(3)(ii), where Respondent No.4 (the Complainant as an aggrieved person) filed complaint against the petitioners on the grounds mentioned therein.
Sections 22(5) and (7) vests the EPT with the powers of the Sessions Court and allows it to follow the procedure laid down in the Cr.P.C. The EPT issued summons, notices, etc. and directed the petitioners to furnish bonds, however till date none of them complied with the directions of EPT and instead filed applications for summary dismissal of the complaint being non-maintainable. EPT dismissed their applications and by way of interim order, restrained them from all activities. To understand the gravity of the offence as defined in section 18(1) of KPEPA, for which the petitioners are being tried by the EPT, it is also important to read section 38 of KPEPA, which is as follows: "38. Cognizable offences.---The offences specified in sub-section (1) of section 18, of this Act shall be cognizable to the extent of registration of case, arrest of the polluters / violators, taking action at site warranted to suspend or stop any illegal activity under the Act, rules made thereunder on a written report by any member of the Agency sent to the Incharge of Police Station concerned. The In-charge of the concerned local police station or post shall be duty bound to accompany, provide safety and security to the members of the Agency."
Thus, the law not only empowers but requires the EPT, EPA and even a police officer (upon a written report by any member of EPA) to suspend or stop any illegal activity under this Act. Even otherwise, the overall scheme, letter and spirit of KPEPA is such that every person and authority relevant has been required to protect and preserve the environment and to prevent and stop pollution. Hence, to interpret the law in a manner to deprive the EPT from such powers of stopping violation of KPEPA would,defeat the very aim and purpose of and, be against the scheme, letter and spirit of the law.
In a similar situation, the hon'ble Lahore High Court, in the case of Muhammad Ayaz v.
Government of Punjab and others (2017 CLD 772), held that application of the 'precautionary principle' and the overall reading of the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997 and its implementation in letter and spirit required to interpret its provisions in such manner so as to enable the EPA to enforce its orders. Thus it is clear that the EPT seized of a matter has all the powers to stop or suspend any illegal activity under KPEPA.
12. Petitioners rely on Article 18 of the Constitution to claim their right to do business and earn a livelihood. Even the fundamental right to trade and do business, etc. as enshrined in Article 18 ibid is not absolute; it is subject to such qualifications as may be prescribed by law. The right is limited to lawful activities. Prohibited activities are not protected by this article for good and obvious reasons.
At the very foundation of the human rights and liberties in a harmonious society is the principle that "the freedom of one citizen ends where the liberty of another begins". One cannot claim the right to conduct a business that deprives another from breathing clean air. More so, when the deprivation is not of one person but the public at large. No prudent mind, much less a law, would allow such activity to continue. KPEPA has been enacted to stop any such activities. It is unperceivable that the very law enacted to stop an activity would somehow be used to perpetuate it. The absence of any provision in the KPEPA or the rules, etc. or of any order or existence of any vacancy in any office or any deficiency for that matter cannot vest a person with the license or permission to continue an activity, which is prohibited to start with.
13. Petitioners have tried to build a strong case on several arguments reflecting various deficiencies in the rules and procedure adopted in the impugned order and/or by the EPAor EPT. It is their case that since proper procedure as required by S.22 of KPEPA as well as the one provided for proceeding with a criminal complaint in Cr.P.C, has not been adopted in letter and spirit, the entire edifice built thereon must fall and they should be allowed to continue with their stone crushing activities under the 'Conditional/Provisional Approvals' given by some officer of EPA or some other agency. They stress that something required to be done by law in a particular manner must be done in that manner or not at all and proper procedure having not been followed by the EPT, the proceedings before it should be quashed. No doubt, this legal principle is of fundamental importance in our legal system and ensures across the board application of laws and procedures to avoid any discrimination, arbitrariness or unreasonableness. However, the context in which it is applied matters the most. If a person has been deprived of his legal or fundamental right by adopting a procedure that is not in accordance with law, this principle will always come to his rescue and will set the proceedings initiated against him at naught, annulling the steps taken towards depriving him of what lawfully belonged to him or from stopping him to do what he was lawfully entitled to do. All this rests on one single foundation; The right or liberty to begin with must be lawful. Only holder of a lawful right can challenge the deficiencies or procedural irregularities of a process depriving him of that right. A person having no right to begin with, cannot question the procedural improprieties of the actions taken by authorities or law enforcing agencies for stopping him to do what is even otherwise prohibited by law from its very inception. Regardless of any notice or action taken by the respondents, the law itself prohibits the petitioners from carrying out any activities in the absence of EA. The available record has been thoroughly perused and the petitioners were also asked at the bar, however there is no EA or 'Initial Environmental Impact Assessm ent ('EIA')available with any of the petitioners. Petitioner in WP No.389-A/25, Ms. Z. K.
Jadoon, insisted that his case was different from all others as he possessed a valid 'Approval' in accordance with the Act. The said 'conditional approval' No. 1820 dated: 24.12.2020 is available at page 58 of his petition. It looks nothing like the EA required by section 13 of KPEPA. To further ensure this, the representative of EPA present in the Court was also required to submit a report, clearly providing the status of each petitioner. The report so submitted by the EPA also clearly states the same fact; none of the petitioners have obtained an EA.
14. So far as the procedural improprieties contained in the impugned order are concerned, they do not seem to have caused any prejudice to anyone. It would have been appropriate for the worthy EPT to have decided each application separately to avoid any impression of a mix-up, particularly between the civil and criminal jurisdictions vested in it. However, the said error is not fatal to the otherwise valid proceedings going on before it. Even otherwise, the matter before this Court transcends the mere review of an interim procedural order. At its core, it requires the Court to determine whether writ jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution may be invoked to undermine or nullify a judicial act that enforces binding EPOs issued by EPA; orders which have attained finality due to the failure of the accused to avail the statutory right of appeal under Section 23(1) of the KPEPA within the prescribed 30-day limitation. These EPOs, issued on 10.10.2024 under Section 17 of KPEPA, explicitly directed an immediate cessation of activities at the petitioners' crush plants and have not been challenged by any lawful means. Their continued violation thus constitutes a clear breach of environmental law. The impugned order dated 11.03.2025 passed by EPT does not dispose of the main complaint but addresses the petitioners' non-compliance with these valid EPOs. It is noted that the private complaint pending before the EPT, filed under Section 22(3)(ii) of KPEPA, stands as a distinct legal proceeding initiated by an aggrieved party. In responding to that complaint, and more crucially, to the documentary evidence of EPO violations, the EPT acted within its statutory and constitutional mandate. The failure of the EPA itself to file a formal complaint under Section 17(3)(ii) following non-compliance does not preclude the EPT's power, indeed its obligation, to prevent continued environmental harm in the public interest. In doing so, the EPT rightly exercised its preventive jurisdiction under Section 22(7) and 38 of KPEPA, read with Section 133 and other enabling provisions of Cr.P.C. The Supreme Court in Islam-ud-din v. Ghulam Muhammad (PLD 2004 SC 633) has recognized that environmental degradation, including pollution and unlawful excavation, constitutes a public nuisance meriting immediate judicial intervention. The EPT's Order, based on inspection reports and material records, was not only legally justified but constitutionally necessary to preserve the ecological integrity of the Thandiani region. Furthermore, the jurisprudence of the honorable Supreme Court squarely supports the proposition that rights not pursued within statutory timelines lose enforceability. In State Bank of Pakistan v. Imtiaz Ali Khan (2012 SCMR 280), it was held that: "if [the] party aggrieved do not approach the appropriate forum within the stipulated period/time, the grievance though remains but it cannot be redressed...because the same right then vests/accrues in favour of the opposite party."
In the present case, the petitioners' failure to challenge the EPOs within the statutory limitation period has vested a right of enforcement in the EPA and the EPT, which cannot be defeated by belated constitutional challenges under the guise of procedural objections. The principle is further reinforced in Member (S&R), Board of Revenue, Punjab v. Syed Ashfaque Ali (PLD 2003 SC 132), where the Supreme Court reiterated that constitutional jurisdiction is discretionary and cannot be invoked by a party that demonstrates "slackness and laxity" in pursuing available legal remedies.
The respondents, having willfully ignored the appeal mechanism under Section 23 of the KPEPA, cannot now seek equitable relief from this Court when the only purpose of the EPT's order was to enforce an uncontested and final executive directive. EPT's Order was neither punitive nor final in nature but a proportionate and necessary step to forestall further environmental damage and uphold the rule of law. Accordingly, even if there were procedural infirmities in the impugned order, the underlying EPOs remain fully valid and enforceable. To grant relief in the manner prayed for would not only render the statutory enforcement regime under KPEPA ineffective but would also invite the misuse of constitutional jurisdiction as a shield for environmental non-compliance. The rule of law, particularly in matters of environmental governance, cannot be subordinated to procedural stratagems.
15. Some of the petitioners, including Qazi Hammad plant stressed hard on the fact that as per the visit report of the EPA alongwith other officials dated: 21.08.2024 their plaints have been shown closed, therefore, they cannot be proceeded against for any violation. Conversely, the respondents maintain that though apparently sealed, these plants do operate of and on whenever they can sneak an opportunity and that the complaint is also based on the violations already made and the damage already caused. These factual controversies cannot be decided in constitutional jurisdiction and petitioners in those cases will have ample opportunity to raise and establish these facts through cogent evidence before the EPT. So any and all such objections could be brought before the EPT during the ongoing proceedings which can pass appropriate orders after recording pro and contra evidence.
16. Since the violations primarily have their foundation in section 13(1) of KPEPA, it is crucial to examine the same, which is given below for ready reference: "(1) No proponent of a project shall commence construction and operation unless he has filed with the Agency an initial environmental examination or where the project is likely to cause an adverse environmental effect, an environmental impact assessment, and has obtained from the Agency, environmental approval in respect thereof."
(Underlining supplied)
It is undisputed that none of the stone crushing operations along Thandiani Road, including those of the present petitioners, possess the requisite environmental approvals mandated by Section 13 of KPEPA. This provision, couched in mandatory and prohibitory language, unequivocally bars any person from commencing construction or operation of a project without obtaining prior approval through an Initial Environmental Examination ('IEE') or EIA. The requirement is not a procedural formality, it is jurisdictional in nature and renders any non-compliant operation illegal ab initio. As such, activities commenced in violation of Section 13 of KPEPA are void from inception and incapable of regularization through administrative leniency or post-facto compliance. Earlier in a somewhat similar situation, Ali Steel Industry located in PATA was issued an EPO under section 17 by KPEPA directing it to stop all activities as it was causing environmental damage through pollution and had not obtained an EA before commencement of operations. The mills approached this Court in WP No.2744-P/2015 challenging the said EPO on the ground that KPEPA was not extended to PATA and said the law had no application there and the EPO was thus without jurisdiction. The respondents admitted that KPEPA was not extended to PATA.
However, this Court while relying on Shela Zia's case held that right to clean and healthy environment was part of the right to life and refused to issue a writ in favour of the petitioner and dismissed the petition vide Order dated 10.09.2015.
17. The Islamabad High Court, in Dr. Aziz-ur-Rehman v. Federation of Pakistan (2024 CLD 230), interpreted the parallel provision under the Pakistan Environmental Protection Act, 1997, and held that any development carried out without an EA stands in breach of a prohibitory statutory command. Despite regulatory inaction in that case, the Court granted interim relief and directed further investigation, affirming that constitutional jurisdiction is triggered not despite, but because of, the regulators' abdication of duty. The Lahore High Court, in Muhammad Shahid v. Punjab Environmental Tribunal (PLD 2018 Lahore 356), similarly emphasized that failure to conduct an EIA strips a project of legal legitimacy, particularly when located near human settlements. In both cases, the Courts clarified that such environmental obligations are not discretionary, they are jurisdictional preconditions for lawful operation. The doctrine that 'statutory commands phrased in negative language are mandatory' finds support in Atta Muhammad Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1971 SC 61), where the Supreme Court held that violations of such provisions render acts void and incurable. Further, in Imrana Tiwana v. LDA (PLD 2015 Lahore 522), the Lahore High Court characterized the EA process as "nature's first man-made check post" against irreversible harm, reinforcing that the absence of an EA invalidates any subsequent development activity. These authorities collectively affirm that the continued operation of stone crushing plants in Thandiani road/area, in absence of EA, is not only unlawful but a direct affront to the precautionary and preventive principles of environmental law. Even assuming, arguendo, that the EPT's impugned order suffers from a procedural defect, this Court cannot overlook the independent and ongoing illegality of these operations. As noted above, in DG Khan Cement Co. vs. Government of Punjab (2021 SCMR 834), the Supreme Court reiterated the 'precautionary principle', holding that judicial intervention is warranted where environmental damage is imminent, cumulative, or irreversible.
18. Moreover, Articles 9 and 9-A of the Constitution, which enshrine the right to life and to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, impose an affirmative obligation upon the State, including the judiciary, to prevent ecological harm. In this context, constitutional oversight under Article 199 cannot be reduced to a forum for redressing technicalities while ignoring substantive and continuing violations of environmental law. As held in Dr. Aziz ur Rehman, it is precisely in moments of administrative inertia that constitutional courts must serve as the final bulwark of environmental governance. Therefore, even if the EPT's order were to be set aside for want of procedural compliance, this Court would remain duty-bound to uphold the underlying environmental mandate. To do otherwise would be to allow the judicial process to become a tool for perpetuating illegality and undermining the constitutional imperative of environmental protection. Accordingly, this Court must ensure the continuous restraint of all crushing operations in the province that are being carried out in defiance of Section 13 of KPEPA.
19. It is also settled that a High Court would invariably refuse relief where granting it would tantamount to injustice or would perpetuate an illegality or violate the Constitutional mandate. In the case of Secretary to the Government of the Punjab Forest Department-vs-Ghulam Nabi and 3 others (PLD 2001 Supreme Court 415), it was held as follows: "...There is no cavil to the proposition that superior Courts have ample jurisdiction to refuse a relief where granting it would be tantamount to injustice (1988 SCMR 516 + PLD 1975 SC 331 PLD 1968 Lah.
1334 (DB) + PLR 1969 (1) W.P. 342 + PLD 1968 Lah. 166 + 1973 SCMR 127), or would perpetuate an illegality (PLD 1991 SC 691 + 1990 CLC 1174 + P1.I 1990 Lah. 283 + 1984 CLC 1729 + PLD 1984 Quetta 158 + 1973 SCMR 127) or perpetual injustice, (1990 MLD 2192) or for retention of ill-gotten gains (PLD 1984 Quetta 158) or if greater harm is likely to be caused thereby than the one sought to be remedied.
Individual interest must be subordinated to collective good. (PLD 1989 SC 166 - + 1987 M LD 1098)
High Court, cannot come to rescue of a person seeking its stamp or approval for order or action which was patently unjust, being without jurisdiction and hence void ab initio. (1986 CLC 54).
Therefore, High Court is not bound to grant relief to a petitioner simply because he was legally entitled to it, if the grant of such relief is immoral, unfair or against the dictates of good conscience and fair-play (1990 MLD I 2192 (DB)). It hardly needs any elaboration that High Court is not obliged to press into service its Constitutional jurisdiction in every case in which illegality or void action or order is impugned. The Court is to see, whether the grant of relief prayed for will foster the cause of justice or will it perpetuate injustice. If the Court finds that in a given case though the action taken by the authority is illegal but setting aside of such an illegal action would result in miscarriage of justice instead of advancing the cause of justice, the Court may decline to press into service its Constitutional jurisdiction. In this regard reference can be made to 1990 CLC 954 (DB). We are of the considered view that relief in Constitutional jurisdiction being discretionary should not be granted to hold retention of ill-gotten gains even if for technical reasons impugned order be not strictly justifiable."
Thus, in such circumstances, to hold that EPT did not have powers to stop or suspend environmental damage from taking place would not only be against the very purpose and object of the law and Article 9-A, it would also be against the settled 'pre-cautionary principle'. The EPT has rightly restrained all such activities and should further ensure that no one is allowed to commence or operate in absence of a valid EA.
20. Another one of the major grounds much pressed during arguments was discrimination.
Petitioners were particularly upset because despite being similarly placed as M/s Black Diamond Crush Plant, the EPT ought to have allowed them to operate as well, at least until they get the EAs under section 13 from EPA. This argument does carry weight. As reflected from the impugned order itself, Black Diamond as well does not have a valid EA. In these circumstances the EPT should not have allowed them any preferential treatment. However, on the basis of a wrong precedent further damage to the environment cannot be allowed. Two wrongs do not make one right. Since the said portion of the order allowing Black Diamond Crush Plant to continue operations is not under challenge before this Court nor the said party has been put on notice, this Court will refrain from interference at this stage and will leave it to the worthy EPT to look into the said matter itself at the earliest. The respondents shall also pursue their case against all the violators equally and without discrimination. It is, however, reiterated that in the absence of a valid EA under section 13 of KPEPA, no one can commence or continue any activity that has any adverse impact on the environment.
21. To sum it up, bound by the mandate of 'precautionary principle' and also considering lack of any legal or vested rights of the petitioners, this Court is constrained not only to dismiss these petitions but also to pass appropriate orders to ensure such violations are not repeated in future.
22. Accordingly, these petitions are dismissed and the official respondents, particularly EPA, are directed to ensure the implementation of KPEPA and the constitutional mandate of preservation and protection of the environment in letter and spirit and to take strict action in accordance with law against everyone and anyone violating any provision of these laws.