' This revision petition is directed against the order of the Civil Judge dated 16-7-1977 by which objections in the execution proceedings were rejected and the appeal before the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore was also dismissed on 31-7-1977.
2. According to the facts of the case the respondent being a landlord filed an application for ejectment under section 13 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (hereinafter called the Ordinance) on 27-7-1974 on the ground that the petitioner-tenant was a defaulter. The application was resisted by the petitioner and the issues were framed. Both the parties led evidence. During these proceedings before the Rent Controller both the parties entered into compromise on 16-1-1976 and their statements were recorded to this effect, they admitted the contents of the compromise to be correct and it was signed by both of them. The learned Rent Controller passed an order on the same day in terms of the compromise and stated that the compromise deed shall be considered as a part of the order and according to the compromise deed it was stipulated that the respondent-landlord will get possession of the property in dispute if he gets site plan sanctioned by the Municipal Corporation and within 4 months from the date of possession, he will start construction. This order dated 16-1-1976 of the learned Rent Controller is to be considered as a decree within the meaning of section 17 of the Ordinance. The respondent submitted an application for the execution of the decree in the civil Court for getting possession of the property in dispute. Along with this application he filed an affidavit that he wants to demolish the property in dispute and wants to reconstruct the same. The petitioner-judgment-debtor objected to the execution on the ground that the decree of the Rent Controller is not in conformity with law but this objection was rejected by the learned executing Court on the ground that he himself had compromised the matter and had signed the same so he is estopped to raise any objection to the validity of the decree. As far as other objections are concerned, the learned executing Court stated that the decree-holder-respondent had filed an affidavit that he intends to demolish the property in dispute and wants to reconstruct the same. The objection of the judgment-debtor was rejected and the respondent-decree-holder was issued warrant of possession on 16-1-1977 and the next date was fixed as 30th of July 1977.
3. Against this order dated 16th January 1977 the petitioner-judgment debtor filed an appeal before the Court of learned Additional District Judge, Lahore, which too was dismissed on 31st July 1977.
Against these two decisions of the executing Courts the petitioner has filed the present revision petition in the High Court. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has challenged the findings of the both Courts below on the following grounds :-
(1) That the decree passed by the learned Rent Controller was defective because there was no order directing the tenant to vacate the house and to put the landlord in possession of the building within the meaning of section 13 (2) (vi) read with section 17 of the Punjab Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959.
(ii) That the order dated 16th January 1976 of the learned Rent Controller is not a decree within the meaning of section 47 of the C. P. C.
4. At the time of admission the learned counsel of the petitioner was confronted with two legal propositions :-
(i) That the compromise entered into by the petitioner with the respondent before the Rent Controller on 164-1976 constitutes an executable decree and whether it can be challenged in the revisional jurisdiction?
(ii) Whether the revision is competent in the present form?
' It was not admitted as yet but the counsel of the respondent along with respondent appeared voluntarily and accepted notice. The case was admitted to regular hearing and after receipt of the record it was decided to dispose of the entire matter. The Civil Miscellaneous 3336 of 1977 was withdrawn by the learned counsel of the petitioner ; and the same was dismissed as having been withdrawn. The learned counsel for the petitioner laid much emphasis on section 13 (2) (vi) of the Ordinance which reads as under :- "(vi) the building or rented land is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for the reconstruction or erection of a building or the landlord has obtained the necessary sanction for the said reconstruction or erection from the Town Improvement Trust, Municipal Corporation, Municipal Committee or Town Committee for the area where such building or rented land is situated.
' The Controller may make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building or rented land and if the Controller is not so satisfied he shall make an order rejecting the application;" and on the basis of this provision he has argued that the respondent decree-holder should have obtained necessary sanction for the construction or erection from the Municipal Corporation, Lahore and only then he could submit an application for the ejectment of the tenant or in other words the learned Rent Controller can assume jurisdiction only if the sanction from the Municipal Corporation, Lahore had been obtained by the applicant decree-holder which is a condition precedent to confer jurisdiction, in the absence of which the learned Rent Controller could not assume jurisdiction. Since the very foundation by which Rent Controller could assume jurisdiction is missing the decision arrived at by the learned Rent Controller dated 16-1-1976 cannot be termed as a decree within the meaning of section 17 of the Ordinance and it may be presumed that there is no decree in existence which could be executed.
5. The contention of the learned counsel is completely devoid of force because the application was filed on the ground of default and it is only during the proceedings before the Rent Controller that the petitioner judgment-debtor wanted to compromise the matter and it was one of the conditions of the compromise that the respondent would get sanction of the Municipal Corporation for the reconstruction of the house in dispute and on the basis of this the possession will be delivered to him and within the four months of the possession he will have to start construction after demolishing the existing structure. As far as the order dated 16.1-1976 passed on a compromise is a consent decree it is neither appealable nor any other proceedings has been filed to challenge the validity of this decree. The order dated 16-1-1976 has attained finality and the validity of the decree based on such order cannot be challenged in a collateral proceedings i,e, in execution proceedings. Reliance can be placed on Nawab Syed Raunaq All v. Chief Settlement Commissioner and others (1) which reads as under :-- "Jurisdiction-Decision-Finality given by Legislature to decision of certain Tribunal which also has jurisdiction to decide finally facts upon which its own jurisdiction founded, decision, in such case, cannot be called into question in any collateral proceeding by another Tribunal or body of limited jurisdiction."
' This matter can be examined from another aspect, under section 115, C. P. C. The High Court can revise any case which has been decided by any Court subordinate to High Court. In other words it can be revised only if it is a case decided by a Court. The Rent Controller which passed an order dated 16-14976 is not a Court within the meaning of section 115 of C. P. C. It may be quasi-judicial Tribunal but not a Court. Reliance can be placed on Khadim Mohy-ud-Din and another v. Ch. Rehmat Ali Nagra and another (2) which reads as under :- "Rent Controller acts in quasi-judicial capacity and not as a Court."
' On the basis of this reasoning the revision is not competent and no relief c be granted to the petitioner.
6. The maintainability of this Revision Petition can yet be examined from another aspect. Any order passed by the Rent Controller for the eviction of the tenant is to be construed as a decree within the meaning of section 17 of the Ordinance. This is executable and the execution proceedings were started by the respondent (decree-holder). The objections were filed by the judgment-debtor under section 47, C. P. C. All the objections urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner relate to the validity of the decree, whereas under section 47, C. P. C. Only the execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree can be challenged and only question relating to execution, discharge and satisfaction can be determined. The validity or invalidity of the decree cannot be challenged under section 47 of the C. P. C. If the original decree based on compromise dated 16-1-1976 I valid because none of the parties raised any objection at that time. No objection to its validity can be raised in the executing Court. The learned counsel has entirely based his case on the ground that the decree passed by the learned Rent Controller is not in accordance with law nor it is in conformity with section 13 (2) (vi) read with section 17 of the Ordinance. In other words validity of the decree has been challenged in execution proceedings which cannot be done. Reliance can be placed on Kazi Abdul Qadder v. The East Pakistan Provincial Cooperative Bank Ltd. (3) which reads as under :-- "Section 47. Executing Court cannot go behind an award and determine its validity or invalidity. The executing Court is required to execute award as it is."
7. Although the language of section 47 is very clear yet it has received interpretation in the above- mentioned Supreme Authority. On the basis of this authority I hold that the question of validity or invalidity of the decree is not within the scope of enquiry by the executing Court.
(1) PLD 1973 SC 236 (2)PLD1965 SC459
(3) 1969 SCMR 275 ' The findings of the Rent Controller relating to the validity of the decree cannot be examined in the execution proceedings yet it has been pointed out for the satisfaction of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is a clear stipulation in the compromise that the tenant-petitioner will surrender possession of the property in dispute in favour of the respondent-landlord when the latter will get sanction of the Municipal Corporation for the reconstruction of the house in dispute and the respondent had to start construction within 4 months from the date of possession so there is a clear direction of the Rent Controller directing the tenant to vacate the house and put the landlord in possession of the building within the meaning of section 13 (2) (vi) of the Ordinance. It has already been stated above that according to this condition the compromise was to constitute a part of the order of the Rent Controller.
8. That both the Courts below i,e, the Executing Court and Appellate Court have decided that the objections by the petitioner are not entertaining.
I also agree with the findings of the Courts below and hold that while exercising the jurisdiction they have not committed any illegality or material irregularity. The revision petition is therefore, dismissed with costs.
9. The learned counsel for the petitioner has last of all requested that at least 15 days may be given to the petitioner to retain the possession of the house in dispute so that he may make some alternative arrangement. The learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposed this prayer on the ground that the petitioner after entering into the compromise has dragged the respondent into unnecessary litigation and he is not entitled to any indulgence by the Court. I find much force in the arguments of the learned counsel of the respondent. The oral prayer made by the learned counsel of the petitioner for allowing the petitioner to retain the possession of the house even for 15 days is disallowed.