' MIAN MUHAMMAD NAJAM-UZ-ZAMAN, J.---The nomination papers of the appellant for the Constituencies NA-122 Lahore and PP 148 Lahore were rejected by the learned Returning Officer vide order dated 29-8-2002 while accepting the objection petition titled Fareed Ahmad Paracha and others v. Akhtar Rasool Ch. Holding therein that case of appellant is covered under clause (g) of section 99(1-A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, hence not entitled to participate in the forthcoming election.
2. Learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the legality of impugned order submitted that the appellant was no doubt convicted by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan for the commission of contempt of that .Court, but that was a past conduct of the appellant whereas his nomination papers were rejected in lieu of clause (g) of section 99(1-A) of ibid Act which deals with the situation happening in the present; that admittedly there was no material evidence available on the record showing that the appellant in the recent past had defamed the judiciary or acted in a manner to attract the provisions of clause (g) of the abovesaid Act, that in the circumstances of this case, the nomination papers of the appellant were erroneously rejected by the Returning Officer.
3. We have heard learned counsel for the parties as well as Deputy Attorney-General at some length and have gone through the relevant record.
4. On 28-11-1997 admittedly the appellant was sitting Member of Provincial Assembly, representing the ruling party (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group), on the said date, mob comprising of people belonging to different areas of the country who were allegedly workers of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Group including some MPAs and MNAs relating to the ruling party stormed the building of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan during the proceedings and having forced their entry into the Court premises raised slogans against the then learned Chief Justice of Pakistan. The appellant alongwith others was proceeded against in contempt proceedings by the august Supreme Court of Pakistan and vide judgment dated 28-9-2000 appellant alonewith others namely Tariq Aziz, Mian Muhammad Munir, Chaudhry Tanvir Ahmad Khan, Akhtar Mehmood Shehbaz Goshi and Sardar Muhammad Nasim Khan was found guilty of contempt of that Court and all of them were convicted and sentenced under Article 204 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan read with sections 3 and 4 of the Contempt of Court, 1976, to undergo simple imprisonment for one month each and to pay tine of Rs,5,000 each or in default whereof to further undergo simple imprisonment for one month each. Admittedly, the appellant had already undergone the sentence of imprisonment as well as paid the fine.
5. As it is evident from the impugned judgment, the learned Returning Officer while rejecting the nomination papers had kept in mind the contents of section 99(1-A) clause (g) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976. This clause reads as under:-- "He is propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan, or".
' The bare reading of this clause shows that it deals with the recent affairs and does not cover the incidents/actions of a person which had taken place in the past. The argument of learned counsel that learned Returning Officer while rejecting the nomination papers of appellant has erroneously relied upon this clause of Election Law is well-founded and forceful. Learned Deputy Attorney- General has also supported the appellant on this legal aspect of the case and submitted that since the appellant was convicted for the contempt of Court in the past, the ingredient of clause
(g) of section 99(1-A) of ibid Act would not be 'attracted in the circumstances. The learned Law Officer further submitted that the case of the appellant would fall within the ambit of clause (h) of ibid Act which reveals that a person who has been convicted by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction on the charge of moral turpitude would not be entitled to participate in the forthcoming election.
Learned counsel for respondent No,3 while assisting the Court also took up the same plea that case of the appellant would be covered under the said clause. He had also relied upon certain case-law in support of his arguments.
6. In order to appreciate the arguments of learned Deputy Attorney-General as well as the counsel for respondent, clause (h) of section 99(I-A) of the Representation of the People Act, 1976 is reproduced as under:- "has been convicted by a Court of Competent Jurisdiction on a charge of corrupt practice, moral turpitude or misuse of power or authority under any law for the time being in force; or".
' It is apparent from the contents of this clause that they speak about a person who has been convicted on the charges of corrupt practice, moral turpitude, misuse of powers and authority.
Admittedly appellant was convicted of the offence of committing contempt of the Supreme Court in the year 2000 and the only thing to be seen is whether the ingredients of the said clause would be attracted or not in the case of appellant.
' The word "moral turpitude" has not been defined in the election laws and to interpret the same we have to look for the meaning of this words as given in different dictionaries or as defined by the Courts. In Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary Eleventh Edition, the word "moral turpitude" has been interpreted in the following form:-
(1) Whether the act leading to a connection was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general?
(2) Whether the motive which led to the act was a base one; ? And
(3) Whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be considered to be a depraved character of a person who was to be looked down upon by the society? (Mangali v.
Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All. 527 quoted in Risal Singh v. Chandgri Ram AIR 1966 Punj. 393).
' Similarly in Pramanatha Aiyar's Dictionary reprinted in 1996 the word "moral turpitude" has been defined as under:-- "Anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals an act of baseness vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man."
' The word moral turpitude" has also been interpreted by Courts in Pakistan in case titled "Imtiaz Hussain Phulpoto v. Returning Officer" (1987 SCM R 468), their lordships while interpreting the word "moral turpitude" observed that:- "the test which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appeal to be:
(1) Whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general?
(2) Whether the motive which led to the act was base one; ? And
(3) Whether on account of the act having been committed perpetrator could be considered to be a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down by the society."
'Similarly, in case titled "Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi v. Abdul Rasheed Mughal" (1984 CLC 270), a Division Bench of Lahore High Court, Rawalpindi Bench interpreted the word "moral turpitude" as under:-- "The expression implies anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals; and act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellow man or to society in general contrary to the accepted and customary rules of right and duty between man and man."
' Admittedly, at the time of occurrence appellant was sitting MPA representing the ruling party. He alongwith other members of his party stormed the building of Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan during the Court proceedings and having forced their entry into the Court premises, raised slogans against the sitting honourable Chief Justice of Pakistan. The conduct of the appellant being MPA on the face of it was sufficient to shock the moral conscience of the society in general and also show that he was a man of depraved character. In the light of above said circumstances, we are convinced that the case of the appellant falls within the ambit of clause (h) of section 99(1-A) of the Representation of People Act, 1976 as well as Art. 8D(2)(h) of the Conduct of the General Elections Order, 2002. In this view of the matter, we see no force in this appeal, same stands dismissed.