' RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.-This is a petition by Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi, petitioner, calling in question the election of Abdul Rashid Mughal, respondent, to the seat of a councillor from Ward No, 8, Municipal Committee, Murree, on the ground that he was convicted and sentenced in a criminal case and, therefore, was disqualified from contesting the said election under section 21 (1) (d) and
(1) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, read with Article 10 (2) (aaa) of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977.
2. By a short order passed on 8th November, 1983, we had accepted this writ petition. We now record our reasons for having passed the said order.
3. The brief facts of the case are that, on 18th May, 1983, F. I. R. No, 53 was lodged by Ashiq Hussain, complainant at Police Station, Murree, with respect to offences under section 506/353/332, P. P. C.
Against the present respondent and others. The facts of the incident as given by the complainant may be reproduced below for reference- "I, Ashiq Hussain No, P. 2517704, am a Government servant of 408 Intelligence Battalian, Murree. On 17th May, 1983 at about 5-00 p. In. I came in the verandah of my barrack and saw Zaid Khan son of Madhan Khan urinating near the verandah. I prohibited him from doing so as we lived there. I asked him to go down to the jungle to make water. He (Zaid Khan) said to me "who are you to prohibit me, this is our place. If there is anything, I will teach you a lesson." Meantime, the following persons were attracted to the spot. Israrul Haq son of Hakim Ziaul Haq, Abid Butt son of not known, Haji Rashid son of not known, Mahmood Iqbal son of not known. These persons abused me. When I told them that I was an employee of the Pakistan Army and present on duty, they not only abused me, but the Pakistan Army also. I requested them not to abuse me, on which they attacked me. Israrul Haq started beating me with a hockey, which was in his hand, which hit my shoulders, arms and legs. At that time, Abid Butt asked his other fellows to stop, as he would teach me a great lesson. He inflicted a hockey blow on my back side and I fell on the ground. -During this course of time, my second colleague Muhammad Aslam No, H. A. U., who was seeing a football match in the lower ground, also rushed towards the office. When he reached at the spot, the aforesaid persons had felled me to the ground. When he supported me to lift me, Israrul Haq inflicted a hockey blow on his person, who ultimately fell. As soon as he fell, Abid Butt and Mahmood Iqbal started beating him with a hunter. After a short while, some soldiers who were seeing football match, hearing the noise, came there. Besides this, many other persons collected there. Meanwhile, some soldiers brought Muhammad Aslam H. A. V. To the C. M. H. Hospital. One of the persons present there asked me who I was. He also asked me not to tell anybody about the occurrence. On hearing this, I told him that I would tell the incident to my higher authorities. On this, Haji Rashid aimed his pistol at me and said that "if you divulge the incident to anybody, I will kill you with my pistol and your progeny would remember that, for not acceding to my request. He abused me as well as the Army and threatened to murder me. I, being a Government servant, first informed Colonel on phone, who sent Captain Malik Jahan Khan, who brought me from office to the Police Station. Application for necessary action is submitted. Signature of Ashiq Hussain, complainant, Murree.
' On the basis of the said F. I. R., a case under section 506/353/332, P. P. C. Read with M. L. R. 9 and C.
M. L.
0. 77 against the respondent and others was sent up for trial before the Summary Military Court, Rawalpindi. The respondent was convicted under the said sections and was awarded six months' rigorous imprisonment by the said Military Court on 16th August, 1983. He was admitted to jail on 16th August, 1983 to serve out the said sentence and was released on 15th September, 1983, after the remaining sentence was remitted by the D. M. L. A., Sector 5, Rawalpindi, vide his Order No, F I R/53/83/Jag, dated 10th September, 1983 (Annexure B to the writ petition). Immediately after his release, the respondent contested election to the seat of councillor from Ward No, 8, Municipal Committee, Murree, to which he was elected. Muhammad Shabbir Abbasi, the present petitioner, who is also a voter in the municipal area and an elected member of the Municipal Committee, Murree, has filed the present petition calling in question the election of the respondent.
4. On behalf of the petitioner, it is submitted that clause (d) of subsection (1) of section 21 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, disqualifies a person to be a candidate or a member of a Local Council- "if he has been, on conviction by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence involving moral turpitude or an offence involving sections 181, 182, 295, 295-A, 295-B and 298 of the Pakistan Penal Code, sentenced to imprisonment, unless a period of three years has elapsed from the expiration of such sentence" and under clause ( f ) of subsection (1) of the same section- "if he for the time being is disqualified for membership of the Parliament or a Provincial Assembly under any law for the time being in force.
' It is further submitted that para. (aaa) of clause (2) of Article 10 of the House of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections) Order, 1977, disqualifies a person from being elected or chosen as, and from being, a member of Parliament- "if he is propagating any opinion, or acting in any manner, prejudicial to the ideology of Pakistan, or the sovereignty, integrity or security of Pakistan, or morality, or the maintenance of public order, or the integrity or independence of the judiciary of Pakistan, or which defames or brings into ridicule the judiciary or the Armed Forces of Pakistan ; ' In view of these provisions, it is submitted that the respondent who was convicted and sentenced by a Court of competent jurisdiction for an offence involving moral turpitude, which act was also one which was prejudicial to morality and the maintenance of public order and which defamed or brought into ridicule the Armed Forces of Pakistan, the respondent stands disqualified to be a member of the local council.
5. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that the incident out of which the respondent was convicted and sentenced arose impromptu ; that the respondent had no base motive to commit any of the offences, for which he was convicted that no fire-arm was recovered at his instance : that the Summary Military Court did not give any written judgment from which it could be ascertained what part of the story alleged against him stood proved and whether the conviction recorded against him on each charge stood clearly established ; that whilst not admitting, but assuming for the sake of argument, that he stood correctly convicted, his acts did not show any depravity in respect of his character nor had he done anything which could be considered base or demeaning by society in general ; and that in these circumstances, the conviction of the respondent, at worst, was really a technical one and could not be considered so grave as one involving moral turpitude. It is further submitted that the expression "moral turpitude" is not defined clearly anywhere, but it generally means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It is contended that the expression implies depravity and weakness of character in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellow man or to society in general. Since the acts complained against the respondent do not show any depravity or vileness and the occurrence was not the subject of any private or social duty which the respondent owed to any fellow man or to the society in general, it could not be said that the respondent was guilty of moral turpitude. In this connection, learned counsel for the respondent has cited Durga Singh v. The State of Punjab (1), Mango!! v. Chhakki Lal and others (2), Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate etc. (3), Saudagar All v. Chairman District Council (4) and Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 910, defining the expression "moral turpitude".
6. We have given our anxious consideration to this case. First and foremost, the main question that arises is what is meant by the expression "moral turpitude" with particular reference to the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, wherein this expression occurs.
7. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Edition, page 910 defines moral turpitude as follows :- "The act of baseness, vileness, or the depravity in private and social duties which man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. State v. Adkins, 40 Ohio App. 2d 473 ; 320 N. E. 2d 308, 311 ; 69 O.O. 2d 416.
Act or behaviour that gravely violates moral sentiment or accepted moral standards of community and is a morally culpable quality held to be present in some criminal offences as distinguished from others. Lee v. Wisconsin State Bd. Of Dental Examiners, 29 Wis-2d 330: 139 N. W. 2d 61,65. The quality of a crime involving grave infringement of the moral sentiment of the community as distinguished from statutory ma/a prohibita. People v. Ferguson, 55 Miscellaneous 2d 711 ; 286 N.Y.S. 2d 976, 981.
8. This High Court in Saudagar Ali's case, whilst dealing with clause (c) of section 2, Part II of the Second Schedule to the Basic Democracies Order, XIX, which provided that a person could be disqualified if he was convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude and had been sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not less than six months in respect thereof, held that where a person sought to be disqualified had been pro-
(1) AIR 1957 Punj. 97 (2) AIR 1963 All 527
(3) AIR 1959 All 71 (4) PLD 1963 Lah. 601 ' secuted and convicted under Martial Law Regulation No, 49 on the charge that he was in possession of land obtained by fraudulent allotment to which he was not entitled and that he had failed to make a declaration in respect of the same, as required by the said Rugulation, he was guilty of moral turpitude. The Court held that the expression moral turpitude, as generally understood, implied anything which was done contrary to the good principles of morality i. e.
Anything that injured the moral fibre of a person and lowered him down in moral values and that the offence of the petitioner in the circumstances did involve moral turpitude.
9. In Durga Singh's case, the Punjab High Court dealt with the case of a policeman found drunk at a public place and who had been convicted under section 34 of the Police Act, 1861, and examined the question whether the said conviction could be treated as involving moral turpitude. In dealing with the subject, Bishan Narain,
1. Held that the expression "moral turpitude" was rather a vague term and it could have different meanings in different contexts, but the term generally was taken to mean conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals and contrary to what a person owed to his fellow man or to society in general. The learned Judge in the said case found that the conviction of the policeman involved moral turpitude.
10. The Allahabad High Court in Baleshwar Singh's case dealt with the case of a person convicted under section 182, I. P. C. For laying false information and whether the offence involved moral turpitude, so as to disqualify one Baijnath Singh from holding the office of Nyaya Punch under the U.
P. Punchayat Raj Act, 1947. J. K. Tandon, J. Observed that the expression "moral turpitude" meant anything which was done contrary to justice, honesty. Modesty or good morals ; that it implied depravity and wickedness of character or disposition of the person charged with the particular conduct ; and that though every false statement made before the police would not involve "moral turpitude", but it could be so if it disclosed vileness or depravity in the doing of any private or social duty which a person owed to his fellow man or to the society in general. The learned Judge concluded that if the individual charged with a certain conduct, owed a duty, either to another individual or to the society in general, to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acted contrary to it and did so knowingly, his conduct should be held to be due to vileness and depravity.
Accordingly, Baijnath was disqualified from holding the public office.
11. The Allahabad High Court in Mangali's case considered the question whether a conviction for an offence under section 60 of the U. P. Excise Act, 1955, for being in possession of a small quantity of bhang under medical advice, amounted to moral turpitude as to disqualify the person convicted from filing his nomination paper for election to the office of Pradhan of Gaon Pancha"at Sheora under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. A. P. Srivastawa S., held that though no absolute standard could be laid down for deciding whether an offence involved moral turpitude, he felt that the question necessarily depended on the circumstances in which the offence was committed. He stated that the tests which should be applied to judge whether an offence did or did not involve moral turpitude were (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of the society in general, (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the act having been committed, the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who should be looked down upon by the society. Mangali was held not to be guilty of moral turpitude.
12. We have given our anxious consideration to this case and to the deep and weighty observations made by the learned Judge in this connection. First and foremost, we find that the expression moral turpitude implies anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or goo morals ; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private an social duties which a man owes to his fellow man, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rules of right and duty between man and man. However, we cannot help but observe that the expression is relative and its meaning must vary in the context of the provision of law where the said expression occurs and the circumstances in which the offence is committed. What constitutes "moral turpitude" or what may be held as such, in one case, may not apply in another situation. We are presently concerned with electoral law. What action involve moral turpitude in respect of persons who hold public elective offices, must have particular reference to what individuals and the society regard or expect as correct and upright conduct and behaviour, which persons holding such offices should possess.
This Court in Muhammad Saif Ullah Khan's case (1) had the opportunity of examining paragraph
(aaa) of clause (2) of Article 10 of the Houses of Parliament and Provincial Assemblies (Elections)
Order, 1977, which provided that a person stood disqualified from being elected or chosen as, and from being, a member of Parliament if he acted in any manner prejudicial to morality. In that case, this Court held that the word "morality" was not used in any narrow sense, but in a general sense, such as the law of conscience ; the aggregate of those rules and principles of ethics which relate to upright behaviour and right conduct of elected representatives and which prescribe the standards to which their actions should conform, in their dealings with each other or with institutions or the State. This Court further observed that it should not be forgotten that the word "morality" was to be interpreted in respect of legislation dealing with the elected representatives of the people and, therefore, its broad and general meaning had to be applied. In the instant case, the respondent was one of the group which took umbrage when one of their companions urinated near barrack and was ticked off for the same by the complainant and, instead of showing remorse, the respondent not only joined his companions in abusing the complainant and the Pakistan Army, of which he was a member, but physically assaulted him and, in particular, threatened him not to divulge the incident to anybody and that when the complainant refused to accede to his threat, the respondent took out his 12 B bore pistol and threatened the complainant that if he disclosed the matter to anybody, he would shoot him and that his progeny would remember the consequences for the disclosure made. It is urged tha exchange of abusive language and petty assault is common in the Punjab and that no element of depravity or baseness can be spelt out from such an action. In the first instance, we cannot accept such a position which gives any licence to anybody to exchange abusive language or
(1) PLD 1982 Lab. 76 indulge in assault and battery, as any form of natural conduct or pastime. However, even assuming for the sake of argument that abusive language and assault be taken as some form of jocund conduct, it hardly gave the respondent any right to join his companions in insulting.
Assaulting or causing or attempting to cause hurt to an army personal in the discharge of his duty or to deter him from doing his duty, or to pull out his 12-bore pistol and criminally intimidate the complainant with dire consequences, if he did not keep quiet, but reported the matter to his superiors. We. Therefore, have no hesitation in holding that the whole behaviour was sufficient to shock the moral conscience of any individual and the society in general, apart from constituting behaviour highly unbecoming of a person holding an elective office, and that he was convicted for an offence involving moral turpitude. Here we would emphasised that we have not attempted to lay down any principle which can be uniformly applied or considered sufficient for enabling one to arrive at a conclusion whether any act or series of acts constitute moral turpitude. We mention this, as we consider that the meaning of this expression will vary with the circumstances and the situation in which the offence is committed and with the law in which this expression is found.
13. Before concluding, we would like to refer to one matter raised by the learned counsel for the respondent. It was submitted that since no revolver was recovered at the instance of the respondent, it must be assumed that part of the story which related to the respondent threatening the complainant with his pistol, should be disbelieved. Unfortunately, judgments in Martial Law cases are not delivered in the manner in which judgments in criminal cases are delivered. A Military Court judgment is cryptic and only states that an accused is convicted of such and such offence and the sentence is thereafter stated. Neither brief facts of the case, nor any analysis or appraisal of the evidence nor any reasons for the judgment, are given. In these circumstances, I is difficult to state what evidence was recorded and what was accepted C by the Military Court. There are no documents before us from which the counsel's assertion can be verified. In the absence of any such material and considering the fact that the respondent has been convicted and sentenced for all the offences for which he was charged, we have been constrained to accept the story of the prosecution, as given in the F. I. R., as having been proved.
14. For the foregoing reasons, we accept this petition and declare that Abdul Rashid Mughal, respondent, stands disqualified to be a member of the Municipal Committee, Murree, and that he can no longer act or hold himself out as such member. The petitioner shall be entitled to his costs.