' BASHARAT AHMAD SHAIKH, J.---Public Service Commission advertised some posts of Section Officers in the Law Department. Out of them two posts were to be filled in from amongst Jammu and Kashmir refugees settled in Pakistan. In the written test and interview the appellant secured second position. His name was about to be recommended to the Government but respondent No,1., Shaikh Rashid Majeed, filed a writ petition in the High Court, inter alia, to challenge the proposed recommendation in favour of the present appellant on the ground that his domicile certificate from Kasur (Punjab) was based on misrepresentation and he in fact was not settled in Pakistan. It was stated that the appellant firstly obtained domicile certificate from District Poonch and subsequently domicile certificate from District Kasur, and applied for getting his previous domicile certificate cancelled but he had never lived in Kasur. The writ petition was accepted by holding that the appellant is not a domicile of District Kasur. He was granted leave to appeal.
2. Averments made in the writ petition filed by respondent No,1 were that the appellant, a refugee from occupied Kashmir, initially lived in Pallandri from where he obtained a domicile certificate on 4th July, 1989. He was educated in High Court School Traarkhal from where he matriculated. He was enrolled as a Pleader in 1991 and in his application to obtain the pleadership licence he stated he was resident of District Poonch. The same residence was entered in his subsequent application of enrollment as Advocate of the High Court. He was enrolled as an Advocate on 11th December, 1994.
Admittedly, the petitioner now practices law at Muzaffarabad. On 19th November, 1992 the appellant, on his application, was granted a domicile certificate by District Magistrate, Kasur. The address given in the domicile certificate is Ghausaia Colony near Police Station Kasur city. It is the appellant's case that his in-laws are settled there. In the domicile certificate it was mentioned that Pervaiz Akhtar was residing in Kasur District since birth. The appellant also applied to the District Magistrate Poonch for cancellation of his domicile certificate issued by him.
3. In order to show that the appellant was in fact domiciled in Azad Jammu and Kashmir, respondent No,1 attached many documents. Subsequently he moved an application before the High Court that during the pendency of the writ petition District Magistrate, Kasur had cancelled the domicile certificate issued in favour of Pervaiz Akhtar and prayed that permission may be granted for making the cancellation order a part of the file. The application was accepted. While accepting the writ petition the High Court.Has given various reasons to give the finding that Pervaiz Akhtar was not a domicile of Kasur and also observed that it was an additional ground that the domicile certificate issued in favour of Pervaiz Akhtar had been cancelled by the District Magistrate, Kasur.
4. We have heard lengthy arguments of the learned counsel for the parties. However, in our opinion, there is no point in attending to the other material on which the High Court reached the conclusion that the appellant was not a domicile of Kasur because our view is that after the cancellation of the domicile certificate issued by District Magistrate Kasur there is no basis left in favour of the appellant which may enable him to get relief from this Court. The post against which the appellant was about to be recommended by the Public Service Commission was reserved for Jammu and Kashmir refugees settled in Pakistan. Domicile Certificate is an essential requirement before the Public Service Commission for proving one's domicile. From the record it is clear that the appellant was born, brought up and educated in Azad Jammu and Kashmir. It is an admitted fact that he has all along been practising law in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and the address given in his licence is not that Kasur but of Poonch. The only proof on the basis of which the appellant claimed to be a domicile of Kasur was the domicile certificate which was issued or. Him by District Magistrate, Kasur. Since the certificate has been cancelled, there is no proof on.The basis of which the appellant can claim to be a refugee settled in Pakistan.
5. It was contended by Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the cancellation order passed by the District Magistrate, Kasur on 10th December, 1998 was bad in law because it was passed behind the back of the appellant. We have perused the order. It is mentioned in para.3 that the matter was inquired into through Tehsiladr Kasur who reported that Pervaiz Akhtar was not resident of Ghusia Colony Kasur and that on receipt of this report Pervaiz Akhtar was provided a chance of personal hearing through notice but he did not turn up. No material is available to disprove the statement that a notice was given to the appellant but he did not turn up. In fact presupmtion of truth is attached to the above statement. We note that the statement made by the appellant before the District Magistrate, Kasur that he had all along been residing in Ghusia Colony, Kasur since his is on the face of it wrong in view of the voluminous official available in the High Court. Therefore, in our opinion, the cancellation order passed by the Tehsildar Kasur has to be acted upon.
6. It was vehemently contended by Mr. Abdul Rashid Abbasi, the learned counsel for the appellant, that the appellant was not an aggrieved person because admittedly respondent No,1 was placed at No,4 in the merit list and even if the appellant is excluded from consideration the respondent will not be able to get appointment. He relied on the case reported as Syed Shaukat Hussain Gillani v.
Abdul Rehman Abbasi and others (1992 SCMR 369 = 1992 PLC (C.S.) 438) in support of his contention. Facts of that case were that respondent Abdul Rehman was promoted as Naib- Tehsildar from ministerial staff. The appellant was a Qannongo. He departmentally challenged the appointment of appellant and his appeal was accepted and promotion of respondent was set aside. However, appeal filed by the respondent was accepted by the Service Tribunal. Appeal filed in this Court was dismissed on the ground that appellant had no right to be considered for promotion as Naib-Tehsildar in light of the departmental rules. It was held that he was not an aggrieved person. This finding was explained in the following words:-- "At least a civil servant challenging the appointment of another civil servant should prima facie, show that he had a chance to be considered for appointment against the civil post at the relevant time. If he is not found to be qualified for appointment either by initial recruitment or otherwise, he cannot be permitted to challenge the appointment of another civil servant on the ground that although he was not qualified to be considered for the appointment yet his rival was also suffering from the same disqualification. The civil servant who invokes the jurisdiction for redressing his grievance must show that he was an aggrieved person as envisaged under the relevant law."
7. It is clear in present case the appellant had no chance to be considered for appointment because he was not qualified for promotion as Naib-Tehsildar. The present case proceeds on facts are clearly distinguishable. The respondent was a rival candidate who has qualified the test and interview held by the Public Service Commission. It is well-settled that to be an aggrieved person it is not necessary that one should have strict juristic right to enforce it by filing a writ petition.
Therefore, the precedent case does not advance the case of the appellant.
' The appeal is, therefore, dismissed for the reasons stated above.