1. ' GHULAM MUSTAFA MUGHAL, C.J.---Through this petition filed under section 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 nominations of respondents Nos.10 to 14 in MBBS Course have been challenged for having been made without lawful authority.
2. ' Precise facts forming the background of the captioned petition are that both the petitioners applied fort admission in MBBS course in pursuance o advertisement issued by the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Nomination Board against the quota reserved for District Mirpur. On the basis of entry test petitioners were placed at serial Nos.26 and 29 respectively in the merit list prepared for District Mirpur. It is alleged that respondents Nos.10 and 11 who have been placed at serial Nos.10 and 16 ahead to the petitioners are Class III State Subjects of Azad Jammu and Kashmir hence, were not entitled to be nominated against the seats reserved for the First Class State Subjects. It is further alleged that they have obtained domicile certificates of District Mirpur by fraud. It is claimed that respondent No,13 who is listed at serial No,12 of the merit list is also not resident of District Mirpur rather she is living in Chattala Jhelum. Respondent No,12 Zoon Mumtaz, who is placed at serial No,5 of the merit list prepared for the purpose of admission is resident of Hafizabad whereas respondent No,14 who is placed at serial No,22 of the merit list is also not resident of District Mirpur rather he is living in Huripur Ghujran District Bhimber hence, respondents Nos.10 to 14 were not legally entitled to compete against the quota reserved for District Mirpur and their nominations/admissions in MBBS course in Medical College Poonch and Fatima Jinnah Medical College, Lahore are against the law and liable to be set aside.
3. ' Petition has been contested by respondents No,10 to 14 whereas the other respondents were proceeded ex parte. In the written statement filed on behalf of respondents Nos.10 and 11 it is pleaded that petitioners have no locus standi to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. It is further pleaded that petitioners are not aggrieved because the merit list has been prepared by the Competent Authority after considering the merit of the candidates in view of criteria laid down for the purpose of admission in MBBS Course. It is also pleaded that an alternate efficacious remedy is available to the petitioners therefore, this petition is not entertainable. It is claimed by them that they are by birth resident of District Mirpur and also got State Subject Certificates and Domicile Certificates from the District Magistrate Mirpur in accordance with law. The father and mother of the respondents are also in possession of State Subjects and Permanent Resident Certificates of District Mirpur since 1989. The father of the answering respondents abandoned the original place of abode i,e, Lahore and adopted the Mirpur as permanent place of abode. He was granted permission to purchase the property at Mirpur on 29-5-2000. After issuance of the Rayatnama the father of the respondents purchased residential Plot No,257/D1 Sector B-5, Mirpur and Plot No,218 in Sector Jinnah Model Town Mirpur. It is claimed that the father of the respondents is a qualified doctor and is running a hospital known as Rubbina Mubashar Hospital Mirpur for the last 20 years. He is paying all the taxes due to him and the Nadra Office District Mirpur has also issued the relevant card in his favour. Respondents have obtained their education from the different educational institutions Mirpur hence, they have rightly been admitted on merit and their admission cannot be said to have been made without lawful authority.
4. ' In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No,12 it is stated that she has been nominated in MBBS course in Fatima Jinnah Medical College Lahore on the basis of entry test because she was placed at serial No,5 of the merit prepared for District Mirpur vis-a-vis to petitioners Nos.1 and 2 who have been placed at serial Nos.26 and 29 respectively hence, are not entitled to be nominated against the seat occupied by the respondent. The respondent has refuted all the allegations levelled against her in the writ petition. In para 5 of the written statement it was pleaded by her that her parents and grandfather paternal as well as maternal are permanent resident and domiciled of District Mirpur, hence, domicile of District Mirpur has rightly been issued in her favour.
5. ' Respondent No,13 has filed separate written statement and refuted the contents of the petition submitted, that father of petitioner No,13 is also a refugee as is ;:dent from the State Subject Certificate appended with the petition with which has been issued to him from Pindi Gaib and the father of petitioner No,2 is a refugee from Rajori and land was allotted to him in Chamb Teshil Bhimber. It is further stated that father of the answering respondent was appointed as Junior Clerk in High School Sukhchainpur Tehsil and District Mirpur vide order dated 2-10-1986 and he is still serving in the Education Department (Colleges) and prior to his appointment he was living in Mirpur who has purchased a plot on 29-4-2004. As answering respondent is a First Class State Subject and permanent resident of District Mirpur hence, objection against her nomination on the ground that she is not resident of District Mirpur is baseless and has not substance in it.
6. ' In the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No,14 it is stated that petitioners have not challenged the Domicile Certificate of the respondent at any forum and they have also not challenged the merit list hence, they are not entitled to any relief. It is further stated that petitioner No,2 is not a permanent resident of District Mirpur and it is alleged that grandfather of the petitioner migrated from occupied Poonch in 1965 and was allotted the land in District Bhimber.
7. Petitioner No,2 is also not permanent resident of District Mirpur which is very clear from the record. It is submitted that father of the petitioner has left the residence of District Bhimber and requested for the purpose on 25-4-2012 to the District Magistrate. The grandfather of respondent was resident of Mirpur who purchased plot in Mirpur in 1984 which was transferred to the father of the respondent in 2009. The respondent is permanent resident of District Mirpur. His father is practising Advocate at Mirpur hence, it cannot be said that the respondent was not resident of District Mirpur and his nomination by any stretch of imagination is illegal.
8. ' Messrs Sheikh Masood Iqbal and Raja Ayyaz Fareed the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners vehemently argued that nomination of respondents Nos.10 and 11 against the seats reserved for District Mirpur is illegal and without lawful authority because these respondents are Class HI State subjects of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and cannot be preferred over the petitioners who are First Class State Subjects. In support of their submissions the learned Advocates placed reliance on definition of "State Subject" incorporated in section 2 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 and submitted that Notification No,1-L/84, 20th April, 1927 as amended from time to time has been adopted by the Constitution for the purpose of definition of the State Subject. They maintained that in view of the command of the Constitution the State Subject of Class I is to be preferred over other classes, therefore, respondents Nos.10 and 11 who are in possession of State Subjects Class III cannot be preferred for the purpose of admission over the petitioners and their nominations against the seats reserved for State Subject are liable to be declared to have been made without lawful authority. In this regard the learned Advocates placed reliance on Syed Abbas Haider Gillani's case (1996 MLD 1377). The learned Advocate further contended that Zoon Mumtaz and Sana Asghar are refugees settled in Pakistan therefore, they cannot be nominated against the seats reserved for State Subjects rather can be nominated against the seats reserved for refugees settled in Pakistan and their nomination against the quota reserved for State Subjects of Azad Jammu and Kashmir is without lawful authority. The learned Advocates in support of their arguments placed reliance on the following cases.---
(1) Qamar Afzal v. Muhammad Ashfaq Khan and another PLD 1979 (SCAJK) 96.
(2) Miss Rakhshanda Aslam and another v. Nomination Board of Azad Jammu and Kashmir through its Secretary, Muzaffarabad and 2 others PLD 1986 (SCAJK) 1.
(3) Miss Shahida Bano v. Azad Government and 5 others 1998 CLC 534.
(4) Beenish Bashir v. Deputy Commissioner/District Magistrate, District Bhimber and 6 others 2012 MLD 1508.
(5) Pervaiz Akhtar v. Shaikh Rashid Majeed and 3 others 2002 PLC (C.S.) 1425
(6) Fozia Hussain Abbasi v. The Nomination Board through Chairman and 4 others 1995 CLC 1761.
(7) Waqas Ahmad Baig v. Samara Moin and 9 others (2009 SCR 542).
(8) lqbal Razzaq Butt v. Abdus Salam Butt and 6 others 1999 MLD 261.
9. ' The learned Advocates contended that Haseeb Ahsan respondent No,14 was not entitled to be nominated against the seat reserved for District Mirpur because he was resident of District Bhimber hence, his nomination against the quota of District Mirpur is illegal. The learned Advocates referred to and relied upon the Certificate issued by the District Magistrate Bhimber.
10. ' Ch. Muhammad Saddique, the learned Advocate appearing for respondents Nos.10 and 11 vehemently opposed the contentions advanced on behalf of the petitioners and contended that Mr. Mubashar Sarfraz was a resident of Lahore but he shifted to Mirpur and obtained Rayatnama as well as State Subject Certificate from District Mirpur on 10-6-2010. It is further argued that he has also purchased Plot No,257-D measuring 15 Marlas on 14-4-2000. The learned Advocate submitted that the whole education of respondents Nos.10 and 11 is from institution of District Mirpur and father of the respondents is also running a hospital since 1986 therefore, he has clearly shown his intention for permanent abode in future in Mirpur hence, respondents Nos.10 and 11 have rightly been nominated in view of their merit position and their academic record. It is contended that the respondents are also State Subjects hence, cannot be discriminated. The learned Advocate placed reliance on section 4 (12, 15 & 17) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974. The learned Advocate further argued that petition is not maintainable because an alternate efficacious remedy in shape of appeal is available to the petitioners and the disputed questions of fact cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction.
11. ' Mr. Muhammad Yaqoob Khan Mughal, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No,12 vehemently argued that father of Zoon Mumtaz was refugee from occupied part of State of Jammu and Kashmir and Domicile Certificate has been issued in his favour on 10-10-2011 from District Mirpur and the State Subject Certificate was issued in his favour which is available at page 12 of the written statement. The learned Advocate contended that all the family members of respondent No,12 are residing at Mirpur where they have residential property. He further contended that Muhammad Mumtaz father of respondent No,12 was appointed as primary Teacher in Government High School Kalyal Nehro on 9-7-1977. He obtained Plot No,47-V situated in subsector F-4 Mirpur. His name is also entered in the voter list of the area therefore, it cannot be said that he is not resident of District Mirpur.
12. ' Raja Sajjad Ahmed Khan, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No, 11 submitted that father of respondent No,13 is State Subject as is evident from annexe RA/1. He was also allotted land.
13. He has also residential property in Mirpur therefore, it cannot be said that this respondent cannot be nominated against the seat reserved for District Mirpur because she was refugee settled in Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
14. ' Mr. Sadaqat Hussain Raja, the learned Advocate appearing for respondent No,14 vehemently argued that status of respondent No,14 and his father, as State Subject has not been denied by the petitioners. The learned Advocate contended that the nomination of the respondent has been challenged only on the ground that after migration from occupied part of the State of Azad Jammu and Kashmir his father settled in District Bhimber. The learned Advocate contended that he abandoned his residence after obtaining permission from the District Magistrate on 25-4-2012 as is evident from Annexure 'C' appended with the written statement. He obtained residential plot in Mirpur and is residing there. His father is an Advocate who has obtained license showing the place of business at Mirpur therefore, it cannot be said that nomination of the respondent against the quota of District Mirpur is illegal and without lawful authority as is claimed by the petitioner.
15. ' I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record of the case.
16. ' So far as the nomination of respondents Nos.10 and 11 is concerned that has been challenged on the ground that they are not First Class State Subjects hence, in view of constitutional position they cannot be preferred over the petitioners who are First Class State Subjects. The nomination of respondents Nos.12 and 13 has been challenged on the ground that they are refugees settled in Pakistan hence, are not entitled to be nominated against the quota of District Mirpur whereas nomination of respondent No,14 has been challenged on the ground that he is resident of District Bhimber and after abandonment of his permanent place of abode i,e, District Bhimber he has not continuously resided at Mirpur for a period of more than five years as is required under section 5 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Subjects Act, 1980 read with Rule 7 of the Azad Jammu and 'Kashmir State Subjects Rules, 1980.
17. So far as the case of respondents Nos.10 and 11 is concerned admittedly their father has settled in Mirpur on the basis of Rayatnama and has also obtained State Subject. Certificate Class III which is available at pages 49 and 50 of the file. The proposition raised in the case has already been set- at-rest by this Couirt in a case titled Syed Abbas Haider Gillani v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir University through its Vice-Chancellor and 6 others (1996 MLD 1377). It may be stated that the definition of the State Subject has been given in Notification No,I-L/84 of 20th April, 1927 as under:-- - State Subject Definition "Notification dated the 10th April, 1927.
18. ' No,I-L/84--- The following definition of the term "State Subject" has been sanctioned by His Highness the Maharaja Bahadur (vide Private Secretary's letter No,2354 dated the 31st January, 1927 to the Revenue Member of the Council) and is hereby promulgated for general information.
19. ' The term State Subject means and includes--- ' Class I All persons born and residing within the State before the commencement of the reign of His Highness the late Maharaja Ghulab Singh Sahib Bahadur, and also persons who settled therein before the commencement of the Samvat year 1942, and have since been permanently residing therein.
20. ' Class II All persons other than those belonging to Class I who settled within the State before the close of the Samvat year 1968 and have since permanently resided and acquired immovable property therein.
21. ' Class III All persons other than those belonging to Classes I and II permanently residing within the State, who have acquired under Rayatnama any immovable property therein or who may hereafter acquire such property under an Ijazatnama and may execute a Rayatnama after ten years continuous residence therein.
22. ' Class IV Companies which have been registered as such within the State and which, being companies in which the Government are financially interested or as to the economic benefit to the State or to the financial stability of which the Government are satisfied, have by a special order of His Highness being declared to be State Subjects.
23. ' Note matters of grant of the State scholarships, State land for agricultural and house building purposes and recruitment of the State service, State Subjects of Class I should receive preference over other Classes and those of Class II over Class III, Subject, however, to the order dated 3}st January, 1927 of His Highness,the Maharaja Bahadur regarding employment of hereditary State Subjects in Government service.
24. ' Note II...The descendants of the persons who have secured the status of any Class of the State Subjects will be entitled to become the State Subject of the same Class. For example, if A is declared a State Subject of Class II his sons and grandsons will ipso facto acquire the status of the same Class (II) and not of Class I.
25. ' Note III The wife or a widow of a State Subject of any class shall acquire the status of her husband as State Subject of the same Class as her husband, so long as she resides in the State and does not leave the State for permanent residence outside the State.
26. Note IV For the purposes of the interpretation of the term "State Subjects" either with reference to any law for the time being in force or otherwise, the definition given in this Notification as amended up to date ' shall be read as if such amended definition existed in this Notification as originally issued."
27. Note I reproduced hereinabove postulates that in the matter of grant of State scholarships, State lands for agricultural and house building purpose and recruitmeht of State service, State Subject of Class I should receive preference aver other classes and those of Class II over Class III, subjects. As the admission in the professional colleges is covered by the aforesaid note therefore, when the different classes of State subject are in the run then the State subject Class I is to be preferred over Class II and Class II is to be preferred over Class III. As stated above the proposition has already been settled in the above cited case, therefore, has nothing to add. I would like to refer only paras Nos.9 and 10 of the judgment which are as under"- "9. NOTE I attached to the above referred definition of the State Subject is relevant for the purpose of the case in hand. The Note, on the face of it, makes specific reference to the grant of the State scholarship, State lands for agriculture and house building purposes and recruitment to the State service only, wherein the State Subject of Class I shall have preference over other Classes and Class II over Class III. The question as argued by the learned counsel for the respondents that the Note is derogatory to section 4(4)(15) of the Constitution is to be answered in light of above referred definition of the State Subject. As the Constitution makes specific reference to the above referred notification for the purpose of definition of State Subject, therefore, the entire contents of the Notification along with the amendment therein from time to time shall be deemed to be a part of the definition as given in the Constitution, moreso, in view of Note IV of the above referred definition. As Note I is a part of the Notification which is specifically made a part of the Constitution in view of the definition, hence the argument that it is contrary to the provisions of section 4(4)(15) of the Constitution i,e, equality clause, is untenable. The definition of State Subject and the status of the State Subjects, shall, therefore, be read and meant is given in the Notification as originally issued and all the others Notifications which are issued from time to time whatever can be said in this behalf is that no discrimination shall be made between the holders of the State Subjects of the same Class who shall be treated alike. It is the celebrated principle of equality before law that equals shall be treated equally. Three Classes of State Subjects are three different categories with their respective rights and benefits. None of them can be equal to the other especially in the matters mentioned in the Notes appended with the definition and matters identical therewith. The discrimination would in fact occur when Class III is treated at par with Class I or II or where the Subjects of the same Class are inter se treated differently, not when the members of different classes are treated differently. Thus, the preference of Class I over Classes II and III does not extend section 4(4)(15) of the Constitution.
10. The question which now remains to be answered is as to whether the admission in an institution falls within the category of Note I _and thus the State Subjects of Class I or entitled to preference over other classes of State Subject in the matter of admission in the State Institution. The Note, no doubt, does not specifically refer to the admission in the educational institutions, but the spirit of the Note and the contents of the Notifications at the time of its issuance have to be taken into consideration for determining this question. In the year 1927, accordingly to the record available, the State did not have its own institutions of Medicine, Engineering etc. Etc. The students of the State who were sent abroad for higher studies were sent in accordance with the spirit of the above Notification. The recruitment to the State services was also made in order of preference out of the State Subjects. The admission in the technical colleges of the State could not be stated in the Notification as there were no such educational institutions as are now available by the dawn of independence. Whatever was available then, that stands specifically mentioned. By the blessings of independence, the doors have been opened for creation of institutions within the State and for the students to acquire the higher education in technical colleges. The preference for admission to the institutions shall, therefore, be read between the lines of the Note. Besides and in addition to the State Scholarship, the admission in various technical colleges and institutions shall also be read in the Note as an academic degree entitles a candidate to a recruitment in the service of the State. It would be absurd if we assume that the State Subjects of all the classes be treated alike for admission in the technical colleges and then prefer Class I over others in recruitment. The preference of a higher Class of State Subject over the others in the matters of recruitment to the State Service implies that the admission in the institutions enabling a State Subject for service shall be governed and regulated in accordance with the spirit of the above referred Notification. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondents that the admission in educational institutions is not visualized by the Note, is of no weight".
28. ' The contention of Chaudhary Muhammad Saddique the learned Advocate that under section 4(15) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution Act, 1974 discrimination and inequality has been prohibited between the State Subjects therefore, respondents Nos.10 and 11 cannot be discriminated for being III Class State Subject vis-a-vis to the petitioner who are I class State Subject is not tenable in view of the settled position of the law. As the Constitution has adopted the definition of the expression "State Subject" given in the Notification dated 20th April, 1927 therefore, the State Subjects Class I have been treated as separate class by the Constitution itself hence, the question of discrimination and inequality as has been pleaded by the learned Advocate in the present case does not arise. The father of respondent as well as respondents Nos.10 and 11 themselves accepted the status of Class III and surrendered their position therefore, they cannot claim preference against the clear-cut provision of the Constitution especially so, when the Constitution itself has created classification among the State Subjects. The equality before law can be claimed when the persons are equal in all respects and are similarly placed not otherwise, therefore, the nomination of respondents Nos.10 and 11 against the quota of District Mirpur is declared to have been made in violation of the Constitution and law hence, is set aside.
29. ' The contention of the learned Advocate that petition merits dismissal because disputed questions of fact cannot be entertained in writ jurisdiction and a right of appeal is available to the petitioners is devoid of any force. In Iqbal Razzaq Butt's case referred to and relied upon by the learned Advocate for the petitioners it has already been decided that remedy provided by way of appeal under the State Subjects Act is not adequate, therefore, the petition cannot be dismissed on that score. The relevant observation of the apex Court is recorded in para 9 of the report as under:- "No doubt that the State Subject Certificate issued by the concerned authority can be assailed before the same authority for its cancellation and the relevant Act has provided an appeal against the order not only before the Government but Council can also be moved, but the question is as to whether these remedies are adequate and efficacious in nature. It has been held more than once by this Court that the remedy provided by way of appeal under State Subjects Act is not an adequate remedy. Similarly the remedy before the District Magistrate as well as the Council is also neither adequate nor efficacious. It is in our common experience that these appeals are not disposed of for years together."
30. ' The similar observation was recorded in a case titled Attaullah Atta v. Ghulam Bashir Mughal and 5 others (1996 CLC 1551) as under:-- "After giving our consideration to the matter we agree with the explanation of the learned counsel that the remedies before the Government or the Council were not adequate in the circumstances of the case. The High Court has rightly held that it was common experience that such matters are not decided by the Government and the Council with necessary dispatch. We may observe that delay in the present case would have created unnecessary complication because if the decision was to go against the appellant, he would have been displaced from the post of Assistant Commissioner after serving for a considerable time. Then the dispute about domicile certificate and the appointment based on it are interwoven matters and writ petition was the only efficacious remedy."
31. The contention of the petitioners that respondent No,12 is resident of Chattala Jalum, hence, she cannot be admitted against the quota of District Mirpur is not supported by any record. Firstly, the domicile of the respondent has not been challenged. Secondly, the record appended with the written statement filed on behalf of Zoon Mumtaz reveal that she has obtained ID Card on 24-4- 2013 from District Mirpur. She has also obtained State Subject Certificate, Domicile Certificate and Permanent Resident Certificate from District Mirpur. The domicile of her father has also been issued by District Magistrate Mirpur on 10-10-2011. The State Subject available at page 12 has also been issued by Deputy Commissioner Mirpur in favour of Muhammad Mumtaz Bhatti in 1977. The father of Mumtaz Bhatti has also been issued State Subject Certificate from the same place. The mother and other relatives of respondent No,12 have also been issued certificates from the same District.
32. Record appended with the written statement as Annexures RA-17 to RA-256 reveals that she is domicile of District Mirpur. No doubt her father is refugee but the settled position of law is that if a refugee after migration settled in Azad Jammu and Kashmir then his domicile status would be determined on his permanent place of abode in the same district. In Fozia Hussain Abbasi's case relied upon by the respondents endorsed the same view.
33. ' So far as the nomination of respondent No,13 is concerned that also has been made in accordance with law and record appended with the written statement filed on behalf of respondent No,13 leave no doubt that she is permanent resident of District Mirpur.
34. ' So far as respondent No,14 is concerned, the only allegation against him is that his father was allotted land in District Bhimber from there he has abandoned his place of residence and settled in Mirpur. Before obtaining the Domicile Certificate from District Mirpur he has not physically resided in Mirpur for a period of 5 years as is required by section 5 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Subjects Act, 1980 read with Rule 7 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir State Subjects Rules, E 1980.
35. The contention of the learned Advocate for the petitioners is not tenable. A person, who has obtained domicile of any place out of the territory of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir only he is to be required to live physically for a period of 5 years but the person who is already living in Azad Jammu and Kashmir and is only shifted his place of residence by obtaining the domicile of choice than he is not required to live physically for a period of 5 years and the condition of physical residence of 5 years would not be applicable. The controversy has been examined by the apex Court of Pakistan after considering almost all the case-law relied upon by Sheikh Masood Iqbal, the learned Advocate for the petitioners in a case titled Fozia Hussain Abbasi v. The Nomination Board through Chairman and 4 others (1995 CLC 1761). At page 1774 of the report it was observed as under:--- "It is evident from the above mentioned provisions of law that no distinction has been made in cases for issuing domicile certificate if a person who claims to be domicile of Azad Jammu and Kashmir by origin or who seeks the domicile certificate on the ground that he has adopted Azad Jammu and Kashmir as his domicile by choice. The question arises as to whether while issuing the domicile certificate under the aforesaid statutory provisions, the principle of Private International Law, referred to above, would also be attracted and if so to what extent. Obviously, for issuance of a domicile certificate under section 5 of the State Subjects Act, 1980 and rule 7 of the Rules framed thereunder, the conditions precedent for issuing a domicile certificate envisaged in the aforesaid provision are to be satisfied. The general principle of Private International Law on the point would be resorted to only where the law of the land is silent. For instance, there is no definition of word 'domicile' in the law in force in Azad Kashmir; similarly there are no guidelines in the law to determine the intention of a person that he has abandoned the domicile of origin and acquired the domicile of choice. On such points, the principles of Private International Law would be fully applicable. But the statutory requirements that person seeking domicile certificate has been continuously living in Azad Kashmir for five years and intends to live permanently in Azad Kashmir are to be proved. However, in a case of person who is domicile of Azad Jammu and Kashmir by origin, it would not be necessary to prove that he has been actually residing in Azad Kashmir continuously for five years; if he is domicile of Azad Kashmir by origin, the fact that he has been living out of Azad Kashmir temporarily in connection with his business, service or for any other reason, he would be deemed to be residing in Azad Kashmir for the purpose of section 5 of the State Subjects Act, 1980 and rules framed thereunder; he would be denied domicile certificate only if it is shown that he has abandoned domicile of his origin or does not intend to settle in Azad Kashmir permanently in future."
36. In view of above it is concluded that respondent No,14 is domicile by origin, therefore, he cannot be deprived of on the ground that he was residing at Bhimber and now has adopted the domicile of his choice.
37. ' The upshot of the above discussion is that the petition is accepted to the extent of respondents Nos.10 and 11. The seats occupied by them are declared vacant against which the nomination shall be made on the basis of merit of the candidates prepared for District Mirpur whereas the petition to the extent of respondents Nos.12 to 14 is hereby dismissed.