' MUHAMMAD SAIR ALI, J.--- To acquire the land measuring 9 Kanals and 8 Marlas owned and possessed by the respondent for construction of Telephone Exchange Building by the Federal Government, a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the Act) was issued on 23-10-1982 by the Collector, Gujranwala. The notification was, however, published in the official Gazette on 14-11-1984 i,e, two years after its issuance. Thereafter, no proceedings of any nature were undertaken by the appellants. Neither any notification was published .Under section 5 of the. Act nor were any objections invited or heard in accordance with section 5-A of the Act. Similarly no declaration under section 6 of the Act was published in the official Gazette.
2. However, on 26-1-1987 a notification under section 17 of the Act was issued by the Commissioner, Gujranwala Division, Gujranwala/ appellant No,2 allegedly invoking "urgency" to take over possession of the above said land. This notification was published on 10-3-1987 in the Punjab Gazette. In pursuance of this notification, the Collector/appellant No,3 passed an order on 25-4- 1987 to take over delivery of possession of the said land to the Telephone Department.
3. Thereupon, on 28-4-1987 respondent through Writ Petition No,1900 of 1987 challenged the above said acquisition proceedings, notifications and order, dated 25-4-1987 passed by appellant No,3 for delivery of possession. The learned Single Judge of this Court by order, dated 6-2-2001 accepted respondent's writ petition, hence the present Intra-Court Appeal.
4. Learned Deputy Attorney-General appearing for the appellants contended that the land acquisition proceedings could only be set aside if the land was not required for public purpose and that in absence of such a finding in the impugned order of the learned Single Judge the acquisition proceedings could not have been reversed. It was further stated that the acquiring department i,e, Telephone and Communication Department i,e, now a Corporation, had already deposited a sum of Rs,9,90,000 on 13-10-1986 and Rs,26,600 on 13-4-1987 in the Land Acquisition Fund of the Collector, Gujranwala for payment to the respondent wherefor the land acquisition proceedings and the notification could not have been set aside by acceptance of respondent's writ petition and that the High Court had no jurisdiction to decide this matter in which the only Land Acquisition Authorities had final competence. And that interpretation placed upon "reasonable time" by the learned Single Judge was not in consonance with the provisions of the Act and there was no unreasonable delay in assessing the compensation for the respondent who had admittedly remained in possession of the said land without delivering the same to the appellants.
5. Contrarily the learned counsel for the respondent supported the judgment of the learned Single Judge to contend that the land in question had been reserved by the respondent for construction of his own house being in midst of thickly-populated posh residential area, and that the respondent had agreed to take over an alternate adjoining land as is evident from the correspondence exchanged between the parties. It was further urged that the whole process of acquisition proceedings undertaken by the appellants was adverse to the express provisions of law as the respondent had neither been informed nor associated with the process or any assessment of compensation thereto and the inaction and dilatory conduct of the appellants qua nan- pronouncement of award and non-payment to the respondent also renders the whole exercise ultra vires the law.
6. We have considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and have also perused the record. There is no dispute as to the dates and events of acquisition proceedings carried out by the appellants. Preliminary notification under section 4 of the Act was issued on 23- 10-1982 but the same was published in official Gazette on 14-11-1984 i,e, after two years of its issuance. Neither any notification under section 5 nor declaration under section 6 of the Act was issued by the appellants thereafter. It was after four years and 3 months of the issuance of preliminary notification and about 2 years and 2 months after publication of the same, that section 17 of the Act was invoked through notification, dated 26-1-1987 which again was published on 10-3- 1987 in order to take over possession of the said land on the basis of an alleged urgency. As a result of protection available to the appellants under the above said section 17, provisions of sections 5 and 5(A) of the Act inapplicable qua determination of compensation and objections thereto. In order to take delivery of the land, Collector, Gujranwala i,e, appellant No,3 passed order, dated 25- 4-1987. The respondent thereupon filed the Constitutional petition to challenge the acquisition proceedings, notifications and consequent order, dated 25-4-1987.
7. The above noted calendar of events, notifications and orders patently demonstrates the lethargic, indolent, inactive and indifferent manner of Acquisition Authorities throughout the acquisition proceedings. They appear to be totally unconscious of prompt and efficient performance of the statutory duties enjoined upon them in section to section mandate provided in the scheme of the Act. Appellants also seem to be indifferent to dispensation of corresponding rights vesting in the respondent whose land was being compulsorily acquired. Appellants were probably under the impression that their discretion and actions were not subject to period constraints. Apparently it was under these miscomprehensions that appellants, to fulfil their statutory obligations, arbitrarily enlarged the legally restricted period of "any time" to mean "all the time". This misinterpretation will obviously make the performance of duties by Acquiring Authorities as without a time cap and open ended. Such cannot be the purpose and meaning of the law of acquisition, which in no way can be taken to be an instrument of injustice, oppression, defeat and frustration for the citizens.
8. It was in similar circumstances the Honourable Supreme Court in the case of Government of Pakistan, Secretaries, Works, Communications and Physical Planning v. Tauqir Ahmad Khan and ' others '1996 SCMR 968, noting 3-1/2 years' delay and inaction of the Government/Acquiring Authorities, held as under:-- "Even though the first notification of acquisition was issued in 1979 yet the proceedings for determination of the compensation payable to the contesting respondents had not been finalized till they filed writ petition in the High Court in 1986. During this period the price of the land has escalated manifolds. If the acquisition proceedings are allowed to continue, the compensation which the contesting respondents will receive can hardly bear any proportion to the market value of their land on the day they approached the High Court. We cannot be a party to this manifest injustice. Apart from jhat the order of the High Court is in accordance with the instructions of the Provincial Government as embodied in its memorandum of 15-6-1968 which has been quoted in the impugned judgment. In the circumstances, leave to appeal is refused."
9. Even in the case of Allah Ditta and others v. Province of Punjab PLD 1997 Lah. 499 a Full Bench of this Court holding rules 7 and 8 of the Punjab Land Acquisition Rules, 1983 ultra vires the Land Acquisition Act proceeded to declare that words "at any time" used in section 5 of the Act will not meantime ad infinitum but will mean within a reasonable time which was defined as under:-- "The phrase 'reasonableness' is an all pervasive phrase and escapes a clear-cut legal definition.
'Reasonableness' will necessarily depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. What may be reasonable in one given set of circumstances may be unreasonable in another given set of circumstances. Maxwell in Interpretation of Statutes in the Twelfth Edition at page 199 explains the term as follows:- 'An intention to produce an unreasonable result is not to be imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available as held in Artemious v. Procopiou (1966) 1 QB 878.
' Where to apply words literally would 'defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result we must do some violence to the words' and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction as it was held in the case of Luke v. I.R.C. (1963) AC 557.
' The question of inconvenience or unreasonableness must be looked at in the light of the state of affairs at the date of the passing of the statute not in the light of subsequent events, as held in the case of Attorney-General v. Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover (1957) AC 436'.
We are. Therefore clearly of the Opinion that rules 7 and 8 of the Rules are only directory in nature and not mandatory. The purpose of both these rules clearly seems to be complete the acquisition proceedings without inordinate delay and to achieve the desired results as soon as possible.
According to Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases, Fourth Edition, Void, page 195 to do a thing 'as soon as possible' means to do it within a reasonable time, with an understanding to do it within the shortest possible time."
10. There is no doubt that the Land Acquisition is a confiscatory statute and is "designed to deprive the citizens of their valuable rights in the property through coercive measures by the State exercising authority under the said statute", and, therefore, the provisions thereto have to be strictly construed to jealously ensure protection, preservation and maintenance of rights and interests of the citizens (Province of Punjab v. Mufti Muhammad Ishaq) PLD 1984 Lah.
261. As such without a IA reasonable, plausible and compelling explanation of delay in completion of process of acquisition and payment of compensation to the affected person, the Acquisition Authority should not be crowned for its inaction, delay, indifference and lack of vigilance in performance of its statutory duties as provided under the law.
11. We find re-enforcement from the decision made in the case of Attorney-General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel 1920 AC 508. In this case Crown took possession of the hotel under the defence of the Realm Regulations for the purpose of housing the headquarters personnel of the Royal Flying Corps. The owners handed over the possession under protest (though in the present case possession was never handed over by the respondent who throughout protested against compulsory acquisition).' The owners in the above said case, however, sought rent for the use and occupation of the premises or compensation thereto. The House while, repelling the claim to rent for use and occupation, pronounced that the Crown had no power to take possesion of the hotel in right of its prerogative simpliciter without the payment of compensation and that the suppliants were entitled to the compensation claimed by them. On page 549 of the report, Lord Moulton said this:-- "There could henceforward be no doubt that the Crown possessed the powers formulated in the Regulations and this was the object of the legislation. But when the Crown elects to act under the authority of a statute, it, like any other person, must take the powers that it thus user's cum-owners.
It cannot take the powers without fulfilling the, condition that the statute imposes on the use of such powers."
12. In view of the above we are of the opinion that the learned Single Judge was justified in accepting respondent's writ petition and in declaring notifications issued by the appellants and order of appellant No,3 for delivery of possession as without lawful authority and of no legal effect.
We need not emphasise that notifications, orders and actions of the appellants were justiceable on the touchstone of duties and obligations placed upon them by the Land Acquisition Act. Where for it is not correct to state that the High Court had no jurisdiction to grant above declaration in exercise of its powers under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973' while examining the illegality of the actions of the appellants. This appeal is thus dismissed with costs.