SAYED ZAHID HUSSAIN, J.--- On 25.2.2004 Government of the Punjab, Colonies Department conveyed to the District Officer (Revenue), Sheikhupura the approval of the Chief Minister Punjab regarding "transfer of state land measuring 188 Kanals and 8 Marlas, free of cost (owned by Provincial Government under the possession of C&W Department), situated in Mauza Wandala Dial Shah, Tehsil Ferozewala, District Sheikhupura in favour of HUD & PHE Department, Government of the Punjab for the construction of Punjab Government Servants Housing Scheme." It is subject to the conditions mentioned therein. This action has been assailed through this petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, as being mala fide, illegal and ultra vires the provisions of law.
2. It is contended by the learned counsel that the land had been acquired from an evacuee owner in the year 1944 for the construction of a bridge and since the land was not utilized for that purpose, it cannot be put to any other use by the Government. It is contended that the purpose of acquisition could not be deviated from by the Government and the land was liable to be reverted if it was not required for the purpose it was acquired. It is contended that there was indeed a proposal for de-notification of the land for its vesting in the Central Government and the matter was under consideration with the Committee to de-notify the land. According to the learned counsel the unsatisfied claim of the petitioners was since pending, they would have sought allotment of the land as and when it was de-notified. He has cited Muhammad lqbal and another Vs. Member, Board of Revenue (Colonies), Punjab Lahore and 2 others (PLD 1978 Lahore 372), Nazir Ahmad and 8 others Vs. Commissioner, Lahore Division, Lahore and 3 others (2000 MLD 322), Sahib Dad Khan Vs. The Commissioner, Rawalpindi Division and others (1969 SCMR 317), Federation of Pakistan Vs. Province of Punjab etc. (NLR 1993 SCJ 635), Allah Ditta and others Vs. Province of Punjab (PLD 1997 Lahore 499) and Divisional Engineer (Dev.) N-11 T&T, Gujranwala and 3 others Vs. Rana Muhammad Sharif (2002 CLC 985) to support his contentions.
3. The learned Additional Advocate-General, Punjab on the other hand has vehemently opposed the maintainability of the petition and contends that since the land was never de-notified, the petitioners had no locus standi to maintain this petition. It is contended that the acquisition had been completed since long for which compensation even had been paid and the land had remained in possession of the Provincial Government ever since. According to him mere proposal for de-notification was of no effect unless it had been so done. It is contended that the fact of the matter is that the land still vested in the Provincial Government and petitioners could not lay any claim to the same. He has relied upon a Division Bench judgment in Syed Zianuddin and 9 others Vs. Assistant Commissioner-cum- Collector, Quetta and 2 others (1996 MLD 731) to contend that once the land had been acquired for public purpose and vested in the Government it could be utilized for any public purpose, it was considered necessary by the Government.
The respective contentions have been considered in the light of the material on the record.
4. Admittedly the land was acquired by the Provincial Government in the year 1944 from the erstwhile owner (evacuee). On fulfilment of procedural steps payment of compensation, taking over of possession, the acquisition was complete in all respects. It vested in the Provincial Government free encumbrances in view of section 16 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. In quite a recent judgment Messrs Dewan Salman Fiber Ltd., and others Vs. Government of N.-W.F.P. Through Secretary, Revenue Department, Peshawar and others (PLD 2004 S.C. 441) section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan. In that case on acquisition of land by the Government of N.W.F.P. For Sarhad Development Authority, the land in dispute was allotted to the Industrial Units for a period of 99 years. The Provincial Government, however, proceeding on the assumption that the same was not put to the use for which it was acquired and cancelled the allotment made in favour of the appellants, which action was assailed by the appellants before the High Court being violative of section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Their writ petition was dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the Peshawar High Court. On appeal, it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan that the power to withdraw from acquisition envisaged by section 48 of the Act, was not absolute and was "subject to the condition that possession of the land has not been taken.
It is significant to hate that in these cases the possession of the land was taken by the government and thereafter it was transferred to the appellants." It was thus, held that section 48 was not attracted to such a case. Allowing the appeals the order of the Provincial Government was struck down. In Syed Zainuddin and 9 others (supra), the learned Division Bench of the High Court, took the view that power under section 48 could be exercised by the Government to withdraw from acquisition "when the possession is yet to be taken" and in case the possession had been taken by the government it was not at liberty to withdraw from the acquisition. It was observed that "The land having once vested in the Government, the Government cannot divest itself of it by withdrawing from the acquisition, which his already complete except for payment of compensation." Thus, there remains no obscurity as to the power of the Government qua acquisition, withdrawal thereof and vesting of the land.
5. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel that the purpose for which the acquisition was made has remained unfulfilled, therefore, the land could not be put to any other use, suffice it to observe that once the land had vested in the Provincial Government it can make use of the land for any "public purpose" considered appropriate and best for its utility. In Zainuddin's case (supra), it was observed that: "The concept of public purpose is quite exhaustive and cannot be confined to a limited definition.
"The expression, however, has been interpreted to include a purpose, i.e. An object or aim, in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly concerned. It is not necessary that the land should be made available to the public-at- large. All that is necessary is that it should serve that general interest of the community. The inclusive definition of public purpose in section 3(f), Land Acquisition Act, not being compendious is not useful in ascertaining the ambit of that expression. Broadly speaking, the expression, `public purpose' would, however, include a purpose in which the general interest of the community, as opposed to the particular interest of individuals, is directly and vitally concerned. Public purpose is bound to vary with the times and the prevailing conditions in a given locality and, therefore, it would not be practical proposition even to attempt a comprehensive definition of it PLD 1984 Karachi 56. It is because of this that the Legislature has left it to the Government to say what is a public purpose and also to declare the need of a given land for a public purpose." (Somvanti Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1963 SC 151 + See the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 by Sardar Muhammad lqbal Mokal).
In our view anything which is useful, beneficial, and advantageous for the public or in its interest in the sense of conferring some public benefit can be termed as public purpose. Once the land in acquired for public purpose after completion of all the formalities and its title is transferred to Government, the land can be utilized for any public purpose and it is not necessary that it must be used for specific purpose for which it was so acquired as it would not cause an prejudice to the previous owners, who have already been compensated. The public purpose is not a static one and is subject to vary with the times, and therefore, the legislature has left it to the discretion of Government to determine that as to what is a public purpose, initiate and complete acquisition process of a given land for a public purpose. Reference in its regard can be made to AIR 1963 SC + AIR 1963 SC 1890 + AIR 1919 PC 155 (PLD 1984 Quetta 24). Any alteration in the public purpose does not vitiate the entire proceedings initiated under the Act. "All that the Act requires is that the land should be required for a public purpose."
In Allah Ditta and others Vs. Province of Punjab (PLD 1997 Lahore 499) also it was held that "public purpose" will have to be a purpose which his in furtherance of the general interest of the community at large as opposed to the particular of an individual. As is evident from the impugned order in the instant petition, the land is proposed to be utilized for construction of Punjab Government Servants Housing Scheme, which will cater for the need of the Government Servants to accommodate them and providing them shelter. It cannot be considered as beneficial to any individual only. It cannot be construed by any standard that such would not be a "public purpose."
6. I also find force and substance in the contention of the learned Additional-Advocate General, Punjab that the petitioners lack locus standi in maintaining the petition inasmuch as that the mere proposal floated at sometime to de-notify the acquisition of the land, which never matured and has remained as a proposal does not furnish them with a locus standi to file such a petition for assailing governmental action of utilizing the land for the purpose mentioned above. Suffice it to observe that till date the land has vested in the Provincial Government pursuant to a lawful acquisition to which the petitioners cannot object nor can have legitimate grievance about the same. It may be noted that mere filing of an application or claim for the transfer/allotment of a particular property does not confer vested right in such property. In Mian Rafi-ud-Din and 6 others Vs. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and 2 others (PLD 1971 S.C. 252) it was held that transfer of a particular property in the compensation pool was not a vested right of a claimant and that by making some application for the transfer he does not acquire any indefeasible right therein. As has been noticed in the present case, the property was not even in the compensation pool, which had been acquired much before partition under the prevailing Acquisition Law and has remained vested in the Provincial Government. Mere possibility that it will revert to the compensation pool does no entitle the petitioners to assail the impugned order by means of a petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Such a remote and far-fetched possibility of land becoming available if denotified, would not make the petitioners an aggrieved person to maintain such a petition. The precedents cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the peculiar context of this case are of no use and assistance to the cause of petitioners.
7. As a result of the above, the petition being without merit is dismissed accordingly. No order as to costs.