IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---This petition for leave to appeal has been filed against the judgment, dated 2nd March, 1999 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby R.S.A. Filed by petitioners has been dismissed and the trial Court was directed to decide the suit within the period of six months.
2. Precisely stating the facts of the case are that petitioners filed a suit for declaration with the averments that they were owner in possession of 4/5 share in the suit land, details whereof were mentioned in the plaint, on the basis of sale mutation made by Mst. Sattan, mother of respondents/defendants for a sum of Rs,3,000. The respondents/defendants contested the suit by denying the claim of petitioners/plaintiffs. As such trial Court proceeded with the matter and framed issues. During the pendency of the case before trial Court petitioners/plaintiffs made an offer for decision of the case on oath which was accepted by Jewan, one of. The defendant.
Accordingly, oath was administered and Muhammad Nawaz brother of respondents/defendants deposed in favour of petitioners/plaintiffs in his statement on oath. Consequently, trial Court decreed the suit in favour of petitioners/plaintiffs vide judgment, dated 13th July, 1974.
Respondents/defendants feeling dissatisfied from the judgment/decree of the trial Court appealed before Appellate Court with the plea that Muhammad Nawaz has given a favourable statement in collusion with the other side. Learned Appellate Court after hearing both the sides and taking into consideration all, attending circumstances, vide judgment" dated 28th June, 1975, set aside the decree passed by the trial Court in favour of petitioners/plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial Court for decision on merits. Petitioners/plaintiffs feeling aggrieved from the judgment of the Appellate Court filed a R.S.A. Before Lahore High Court, Lahore which too was dismissed by means of impugned judgment, dated 2nd March,1999 with the direction to the trial Court to decide the suit within the period of six months. As such instant petition has been filed.
3. Learned counsel appearing for petitioners argued that defendant Jewan voluntarily accepted offer of the plaintiffs for decision of the case on oath. Therefore, as per his satisfaction, oath was administered to his brother Muhammad Nawaz, who deposed against him. On this he made an application alleging therein that his brother had given statement on oath adverse to his interest, in collusion with the other side, Therefore, he withdrew from his commitment for the decision of case on special oath. Learned trial Court did not agree with his such stand and decided the case on accepting the statement of Muhammad Nawaz which he got recorded on oath. But on appeal, learned Appellate Court without assigning cogent reasons accepted the plea of respondent/defendant Jewan. Similarly, learned High Court vide impugned judgment did not interfere in the judgment of the Appellate Court without assigning any cogent reason except stating that acceptance of the offer by respondent/defendant Jewan was unambiguous, therefore, the trial Court may have not decided the case on the statement of Muhammad Nawaz on special oath.
4. We have heard the learned counsel for petitioners at length 'and have perused the impugned judgment carefully. Relevant para. From the impugned judgment is reproduced thus:- "I am further not inclined to examine the question whether an appeal in District Court was or was not competent and whether the trial Court's decree was consent decree or otherwise? It is a fact that the offer and acceptance was vague. All that Jewan stated was that he will be bound by the oath taken by Muhammad Nawaz. What it meant is a matter of inference. The offer and acceptance has to be clear, certain and unambiguous. Had Jewan stated that after oath by Nawaz, the plaintiffs' suit be decreed, the issue would have been clinched. His statement does not specify the consequence of oath in affirmative and in the negative."
5. It is to be noted that the plaintiffs/petitioners had not offered decision of the case on oath by filing a specific request in writing before the trial Court. It so happened that in the Courts of cross- examination of D.W. Jewan, a suggestion was given to him in reply to which he answered as follows:-- {{URDU TEXT}}
6. It may be noted that above-noted version of respondent/defendant Jewan did not specify that in respect of which aspect of the case, he is binding himself with the statement of his elder brother Muhammad Nawaz if given him on oath. Essentially, there is an ambiguity in acceptance of offer by Jewan, therefore, learned Presiding Officer may have called upon the plaintiffs (petitioners) to submit an application specifying the nature of the statement which they wanted to obtain on oath for the decision of the case and then the defendant Jewan should have also been provided an opportunity to categorically accept or reject the offer being made by the petitioners/plaintiffs. It may not be out of place to observe that sections 9, 10 and 11 of the Oaths Act, 1873 have not provided any procedure for recording of the statement on special oath but the Court can lay down its own procedure to ensure that prejudice is not caused to any of the parties depending upon the circumstances of each case. It is also not advisable for the Courts to accept the offer of anyone of the parties for the decision of the case on oath so promptly because there is every possibility that may be, for the time being, the offer for the decision of the case on special oath is accepted without knowing its consequences but after some time the party may resile from such offer for any cogent reason. In this behalf this Court has already made certain observations in the case of Muhammad Ali v. Maj. Muhammad Aslam and others PLD 1990 SC 841. Relevant para. Therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "In cases such as the present, where it is not possible to lay down guiding principles as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a judge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance, it is necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap decisions taken by the parties in this connection. More often than not during examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this respect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do.
The Court should be careful to see that such offers and acceptances 'are not recorded with the.
Same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made at the highest level of truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement on the Holy Qur'an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and state the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be somewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to enter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have been made by them in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of indecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the parties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the oath. The need for recording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such cases deserves to be over emphasized, for such a procedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty decisions, before appending their signatures to their statements. We do not wish to go down on the record as suggesting that this procedure must invariably be observed, for there is no such legal compulsion, nor do we want to suggest that certain safeguard suggested here should be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such instructions, but we would say that all this may be treated as a note of caution, for a Court inasmuch bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them."
7. There is no hard and fast rule for accepting or rejecting the statement of a person given on oath provided departure from it is made on the basis of cogent grounds, depending upon case to case.
As in instant case the apprehension of Jewan that his brother Muhammad Nawaz in collusion with the other side has given the statement on oath seems to be convincing because the same fellow had denied the claim of the petitioners/plaintiffs by filing written statement but after some time he has changed his earlier stance. Therefore, in such circumstances, the trial Court may have not accepted the statement of Muhammad Nawaz made by him on oath and on allowing the application filed by Jewan alleging therein that his brother has given the statement in collusion with the other side may have proceeded to decide the case on merits.
8. Therefore, for the above-added reasons, we are inclined to maintain the impugned judgment with observation that let the trial Court dispose of the matter expeditiously as far as possible within the period of six months preferably because decision of the case had already taken a long time, during which it remained pending on the tile of High Court for 25 years without any progress. Thus, we see no force in instant petition, as such the same is dismissed and leave declined.