'MAULVI ANWARUL HAQ, J.--- On 19-4-2003 Khushi Muhammad deceased petitioner filed a suit against the respondents. He sought a declaration that mutation No,2137 attested on 24-4-1991 recording a gift of the suit land owned by the petitioner in favour of Mst. Naziran Bibi (respondent No,1) (wife of the said Khushi Muhammad) is illegal and void for reasons stated there. The suit was contested by respondent No,1. Issues were framed: Evidence of the petitioner was recorded and concluded on 5-9-2005. On 6-3-2006 the evidence of respondent No,1 was being recorded. She, was in the witness box as D.W.1. While she was being cross-examined, she stated that let the suit be decided on the basis of oath on Holy Qur'an. The learned trial Court stopped recording other evidence and recorded her statement to the effect that in case the petitioner states on oath of Holy Qur'an that he had not gifted the land to her while in his senses the suit be decreed otherwise it be dismissed. The petitioner accepted the offer and made the said statement. On the same day the suit was decreed. Respondent. No,1 filed an appeal which has been allowed by a learned Additional District Judge, Mandi Bahauddin on 4-12-2006 who has set aside the said judgment and decree and remanded the case to the learned trial Court directing that the remaining evidence be recorded and the suit be decided on the basis thereof.
2. Sh. Naveed Sheharyar, Advocate for the petitioner contends that the offer having been made, accepted and oath having been taken accordingly the appeal itself was not competent and that the learned ADJ has acted without jurisdiction while passing the impugned judgment and decree.
He relies on the case of Mukhtar Ahmed Khan v. Mushtaq Ahmad 1998 SCM R 2049, Muhammad Rafique and another v. Sakhi Muhammad and others. PLD 1996 SC 237 and Attiqullah v. Kafaytullah 1981 SCM R 162. Learned counsel further contends that the reliance by the learned Additional District Judge on the case of Ahmad Khan and others v. Jewan PLD 2002 SC 655, is rather misplaced.
3. Malik Amjad Pervaiz, Advocate for respondent No,1, on the other hand, contends that the impugned judgment is fully supported by the said case of Ahmad Khan and others and further relies on the case of Muhammad Ali v. Maj. Muhammad Aslam and others PLD 1990 SC 841.
4. I have gone through the copies of the records. I have already detailed above the proceedings that took place before the learned trial Court. As noted by me above the evidence of the deceased petitioner was concluded and thereafter respondent No,1 had entered in the witness box. After her examination-in-chief, she was subjected to lengthy cross-examination. Towards almost the fag end thereto, the said statement was made by respondent No,1 and immediately thereafter her statement was recorded. The offer was accepted and oath was taken and the suit was decided. I have examined the judgment cited by the learned counsel for the parties. To my mind the following excerpts quoted from the judgment in the case of PLD 1990 SC 841 and reproduced by their lordships in the case of Ahmad Khan and others at pages 658 and 659 wholly supports the observation of the learned Additional. District Judge in the impugned judgment: "Incase such as the present, where it is not possible to lay down guiding principles as to what facts or circumstances in a given case would induce a Judge to permit a party to resile from either the offer or the acceptance, it is necessary for the Court to guard itself and the parties against snap decisions taken by the parties in this connection. More often than not, during examination of a party or a witness, or during a heated discussion or argument, a party in the excitement of the moment may be led to make a snap decision in this respect. He may in the heat of passion make such an offer, or accept such a one, which otherwise in a state of cool deliberation he would not do.
The Court should be careful to see that such offers and acceptances are not recorded with the same snap speed with which they are made, for such offers and acceptances would not be founded in piety and grace and would not be made the highest level of truth. For no sooner a person makes an offer to another to make a statement on the Holy Qur'an or his Holy Book, whichever it may be, with regard to any matter or fact, the effect of which will be to bind him in a particular manner, for good or for worse, he does so on the assumption that the person who will accept it is conscious of his trust and whilst making the statement on the Holy Book shall place himself figuratively before his Maker and his Holy Prophet and state the truth, on pain of divine wrath. The Court should, therefore, be somewhat circumspect in this matter and refrain from permitting parties to enter into such agreements, which otherwise do not appear to have been made by them in some reasonable frame of mind, or which appear to be the result of indecent haste, or which otherwise, from the apparent conduct of any of the parties, appear to be such as would make a mockery of the other. The need for recording separate statements of the parties in respect of the offer and acceptance made in such cases deserves to be .Over emphasized, for which a procedure would give parties some short time to think over the matter and extricate themselves from hasty decisions, before appending their signatures to their statements. We do not wish to go down on the record as suggesting that this procedure must invariably be observed, for there is no such legal compulsion, nor do we want to suggest that certain safeguard suggested here should be treated as rules of prudence to be observed in such cases, because sections 9 to 11 of the Oaths Act do not admit of such instructions, but we would say that all this may be treated as a note of caution, for a Court inasmuch bound to ensure the solemnity of these proceedings, as the parties are bound to respect them."
5. It will be noted that it has been emphasized by their lordships that in such like manner Courts are not required to act too promptly as has been done by the, learned trial Court in the present case. I therefore, do not find any ground being made out for interference with the impugned judgment and decree in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. Before I part with this judgment I may note here that Khushi Muhammad, had died during the pendency of this civil revision. C.M.1 of 2007 was filed for impleading his sister namely. Mst. Shakeela Bibi as a L.R. This C.M. Was disposed of by me on 2- 5-2007 subject to all just and legal exceptions. Learned counsel for respondent No,1 questions the correctness of several facts mentioned therein including the fact that Khushi Muhammad had divorced Mst. Naziran Bibi respondent No,1. Apart from this the application itself gives an impression that there are some other L.Rs, as well. Copy of pedigree table and some other documents are annexed with this C.M. Since the suit is still to be decided Eby the learned trial Court after recording the remaining evidence, I deem it appropriate that requisite inquiry in terms of Order XXII, rule 5, C.P.C. Be also conducted by the learned trial Court in the matter of appointment of L.Rs, of Khushi Muhammad deceased (petitioner/plaintiff). The office shall remit the said C.M. Along with the documents annexed therewith to the learned trial Court along with a copy of this order. The civil revision accordingly is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.