' We intend to decide the following I.C.As. By one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law and this order will govern the following I.C.As.: ' I.C.As. Nos.262 to 280 and 337 to 353 of 1994.
2. Brief facts out of which the aforesaid I.C.As. Arise are that private respondents in the aforesaid I.C.As. Filed writ petitions with the following prayers: "It is, therefore, humbly prayed that this writ petition be allowed, the notifications, dated 25-10-1992 be declared to be without any lawful authority and of no legal effect.
' It is further prayed that a declaration be granted to the effect that Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik (respondent No,2) has ceased to exist and is no more a legal entity, accordingly it has no jurisdiction or authority in law to recover any kind of taxes. Moreover, a direction be issued to respondent No,2 to refund the amount of taxes already recovered by it from the petitioner. Costs be also awarded."
' All the writ petitions were accepted by the learned Single Judge vide impugned judgment, dated 22-2-1994. Town Committee Kot Abdul Malik and Provincial Government being aggrieved tiled aforesaid I.C.As. Alongwith applications for condonation of delay for tiling the belated aforesaid I.C.As.
3. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that Notifications dated 25-10-1995 published in the Punjab Gazette, dated 4-11-1992 were neither sent for publication nor they were signed by. The competent Officer of the Government. These notifications so published were not signed and a such, the Superintendent Printing Press had no authority to publish the same in the Government Gazette without first ascertaining as to whether these were issued by the competent Authority. He further submits that the aforesaid plea was raised in the comments submitted by the Secretary/respondent No,2 in the W.P. No,11969 of 1992 out of which these I.C.As. Have been arisen.
He further submits that this aspect was not noted by the learned Single Judge but on the contrary made the following observations: "It was not disputed that the two notifications in questions had been issued by the Government but it was pleaded that the said notifications were subsequently withdrawn."
' He further submits that the Division Bench of this Court examined the original record and after recording the evidence the I.C.As. Were admitted for regular hearing by observing in para. 4 that the facts which emerge are that the original of the Notification, dated 25-10-1992 published in the Gazette are not available on the record of Printing Press. He further submits that learned Single Judge should have directed the private respondents to file civil suit for resolution of disputed questions of fact. He further submits that this Court has ample jurisdiction to look into the subsequent events while deciding these I.C.As. He further submits that notifications in question were got published by the private respondents with the connivance of the officials of the appellants. He further submits that huge public revenue is involved in these cases. He further submits that private respondents did not challenge the Notification, dated 15-10-1991 in their writ petitions.
4. Dr. A. Basit, Senior Advocate has raised the following preliminary objections,. I.C.As. Are not maintainable in view of proviso of section 3(2) of Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972 as the impugned notifications and subsequent actions of the respondents are appealable by virtue of section 166 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 and rules framed thereunder. The appellants were duly represented by the Advocates and Additional Advocate-General as is evident from the impugned judgment. They were present at the time of announcement of the impugned judgment on 22-2-1994 whereas the appellants filed these I.C.As. Belated. Applications filed by the respondents for condonation of delay did not provide sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
The Provincial Government has taken a stand in their applications that they came to know about the aforesaid decision from Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik. Similar ground was originally taken for condonation of delay in their application filed by the Town Committee but subsequently in additional grounds Municipal Committee had taken stand in paras. 3 and 4 in C.M. No,1309 of 1995 that power of attorney of Mr. Abdul Aziz, Advocate was cancelled by the Administrator Town Committee, Kot Abdul Malik vide his letter, dated 18-11-1993 as he was engaged by the then Chairman without prior permission of the Law Department. This letter was duly received in the office of Advocate-General on 22-11-1993 and also in the office of the learned High Court on the same day. Therefore, Abid Aziz Sheikh, Advocate was not authorised to represent Town Committee on 22-2-1994. Similarly as regards the other counsel Ch. Abdur Rashid, Advocate, the Law Department had accorded sanction to his engagement on the payment of consolidated professional fee of Rs,7,000 to defend all 21 writ petitions on behalf of the Town Committee. Ch. Abdur Rashid, Advocate wrote to the Administrator Town Committee vide letter, dated 2-2-1994 that he would charge Rs,7,000 per writ petition. As the terms of the learned Advocate were not acceptable to the Town Committee, accordingly vide letter, dated 21-2-1994, the power of attorneys to defend the afore-said writ petitions were cancelled with immediate effect.
5. Dr. A. Basit, Senior Advocate submits that aforesaid additional grounds did not advance the cause of the appellants for condonation of delay at all. He further submits that there is no disputed question of fact at all as is evident from the para. 6 of the impugned judgment. He further submits that there is much difference qua the publication of the Notification and to find out the authenticity of the notification published in the official Gazette. This Court has no jurisdiction to go beyond the notification on the well-known principle that official acts are presumed to be correct. He further submits that appellants in ground B of present appeal highlighted the reply submitted by the appellants of paras. 6 and 7 of the writ petitions and also attached Annexures P2 with the grounds of appeal which reveals that notification of even number, dated 25-10-1992 (which infact has since been withdrawn/cancelled) may not be published as according to the report of our official visiting your office on 27-1-1993, the same is still lying pending for want of publication vide No,45/S & GAD Part-I Letter No,891-910/P, dated 4-11-1992. He further highlighted that aforesaid Annexure-P/2 letter, dated 28th January, 1993 clearly reveals that the proposed notification was sent by the respondents for publication and the same was published on 25-10-1992. He further submits that area of Union Council was not declared as Urban Area Town and the Union Council in question was not up-graded as Town Committee in terms of the provisions of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. In support of his contention he relied upon the following sections: Section 3 (xvii)'local council'
Section 3 (xxi)Municipality, Section 3 (xxii)Municipal Committee.
Section 3 (xxiii)Municipal Corporation Section 3 (xli)RuralLocal Council Section 3 (xlvi)Town Committee Section 3 (xlvii)Town Section 3 (I)Union Section 3 (lii)Union Council Section 3 (lii)Urban area Section 3 (liii)Urban Local Council read with section 6(1) (d) of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance.
' He further submits that it is conditioned precedent that area must have been declared to be town under the Ordinance by virtue of section 3 (XLVII). The appellants did not convert and up-grade the Union Council in question as Urban Town in the prescribed manner prescribed in the aforesaid provision of Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. He further submits that appellants be directed to implement the judgment of the learned Single Judge in letter and spirit and should file a suit for declaration for resolution of disputed questions of fact that the impugned notifications were not issued by the Printing Press under the valid authorization of the appellants. He summed up his arguments that he did not raise preliminary objection qua the dismissal of the present I.C.A.
On technical ground infact point of jurisdiction is being raised qua the maintainability of the appeals on the basis of the preliminary objections.
6. Mr. Shahzad Shaukat, Advocate adopted the arguments of Dr. .A. Basit, Advocate for the respondents. In addition to his arguments he submits that respondents got the information that the learned Single Judge had decided the case against the appellants on 25-4-1992 but the appellants filed present I.C.As. On 16-5-1992 without explaining the delay of each day after the knowledge as alleged by the appellants. Therefore, I.C.As. Should be dismissed as time-barred. In support of his contention he relied upon the following judgments: ' 1981 SCMR 37 (Ris Pir Ahmad Khan's case, 1970 SCMR 558 (Abdul Hamid Darsi's case), 1988 SCMR 1229 (The Sky Room Ltd.'s case), 1988 SCMR 1906 (Abdul Nabi's case), 1994 SCMR 833 (Abdul Malik's case).
' He further submits that Division Bench of this Court recorded the evidence of the official/officers of the appellants in the absence of the private respondents before admitting the I.C.As. For regular hearing which cannot be taken into consideration. He further submits that this Court has no jurisdiction to record the evidence while deciding I.C.As. He further submits that learned Single Judge has given finding of fact against the appellants and the learned counsel for the appellants failed to point out any illegality or infirmity in the impugned judgment. He further submits that respondents also challenged the illegal demands from the private respondents by the appellants on the basis of the notifications, dated 25-10-1992. This action of the respondents is appealable under the provisions of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 and rules framed thereunder, Therefore, I.C.As. Are not maintainable.
7-A. Learned counsel for the appellants in rebuttal submits that basically the private respondents had challenged the wires of the Notification, dated 25-10-1992 which is not appealable before any higher forum. Therefore, I.C.As. Are maintainable. They further submitted that huge amount of public exchequer amounting to Rs,31 to 32 crores are involved and the I.C.As. May not be dismissed on technical grounds and the appellants should not be knocked out on technical grounds.
8. Learned Additional Advocate-General submits that department action has been initiated against the official/officers who are responsible not to file these I.C.As. In time. He further submits that superior Courts insisted that cases must be decided on merits instead of technicalities.
8-A. We have considered the contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record ourselves. We would like to decide the preliminary objections first. It is admitted position that private respondents had challenged basically the vires of the Notifications, dated 25-10-1992 through the Constitutional petitions. It is better and appropriate to reproduce section 166 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance to resolve the controversy between the parties to the extent whether the I.C.As. Are maintainable or not. In view of proviso of section 3(2) of Law Reform Ordinance, 1972: "166. Appeals---(1) Any person aggrieved by any order passed by a local council or its Chairman or its Vice-Chairman or officer, in pursuance of the Ordinance or the rules or bye-laws, may appeal to such authority, in such manner and within such period as may be prescribed."
' The aforesaid section clearly reveals that the allegedly impugned notifications were issued by the Secretary Local Government and Rural Development is not appealable. In this view of the matter preliminary objection raised by the learned counsel for the respondents has no force. Nor we intend to decide the application filed by the appellants for condonation of delay. It is stated by the learned counsel for the appellants that amount involved in these cases is Rs,31/32 crores of public exchequer. This fact was not denied by the respondents counsel coupled with the fact that the Division Bench of this Court observed in para. 4 of the order, dated 19-5-1994 as follows after recording the statements of Mr. Jawad Ali Khan Lodhi Superintendent Government Printing Press Punjab, Malik Muhammad Adrees Senior Manager and Ahmad Ali Khan Section Incharge Printing Section Government Printing Press Punjab. "The facts which emerge are that the original of the notification, dated 25-10-1992 published in the gazette are not available on the record of Printing Press. Inter alia, the question whether notifications, dated 25-10-1992 published in the Gazette, dated 4-11-1.992 had the sanction of the competent Authority, requires consideration".
' Keeping in view the huge public exchequer we condone the delay. In arriving to this conclusion we are fortified by the law laid down in Muhammad Tahir and two others case (PLD 1989 SC 627) and the relevant observation is as follows: "in this case, prima facie, some of the lower functionaries, as explained in , the application, seem to have misconducted in the matter of vigilance and preparation for filing of petition for leave to appeal. And further, as admitted at the Bar, departmental action is being taken against them in this behalf. This amongst others shows bona fides on Government's part. We consider it a fit one for condonation of delay. Accordingly the application in that behalf h allowed and the delay is condoned."
' The word sufficient cause mentioned in section 5 of the Limitation Act is also interpreted by the superior Courts and defined the word sufficient cause means a cause beyond control of party. It is a question of fact that varies from case to case and ultimately it rests on the decision of the Court and it should receive liberal construction so as to advance cause of substantial justice. The para meter of each case would primarily be its own facts which would have to be taken into consideration for determining as to whether sufficient cause is shown or not. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mst. Begum and others v. Mst. Begum Kaniz Fatima Hayat (1989 SCMR 883) laid down the following Principle:-- "This Court has also emphasized that the rules of procedure are not to be too technically applied but are construed to foster the cause of justice."
' Now we intend to decide the case on merits. It is settled principle of law that Courts have ample power to look into the subsequent events while deciding the cases. We are fortified by the law laid down by the Division Bench of the Karachi High Court in Nasir Jamal s case (1990 CLC 1069) coupled with the facts that appellants denied the authenticity of the notifications in question in reply of paras. 6 and 7 which are reproduced hereunder for ready reference to resolve the controversy between the parties: "6. Not admitted. No doubt the notification in question were drafted but in view of certain defects (noticed during the process of preparation/issuance) were revoked and cancelled. Therefore, the question of their being illegal, arbitrary or having been given a retrospective effect etc. Does not arise.
7. Since the notifications referred in this para. Were never issued, therefore, the question of their withdrawal or rescindment is irrelevant."
' The aforesaid replies of paras. 6 and 7 of the appellants brings the case in the area of disputed questions of fact coupled with the fact that the Division Bench had also observed this fact after recording the evidence in the order, dated 19-5-1994.We cannot shut our eyes.
'It is settled principle of law that this Court has no jurisdiction to resolve the disputed questions of fact in a Constitutional jurisdiction. In arriving to this conclusion we are fortified by the following judgments: ' 1993 SCMR 618 (Muhammad Younis Khan's case), 2001 SCMR 155 (Bachoo and others' case), 2001 SCMR 574 (Sarfraz Khan's case) and PLD 2001 Lahore 22 (Mian Muhammad Yousaf's case).
' It is pertinent to mention here that 'the word notification means a notification published under proper authority in the official gazette as per principle laid down in Chief Administrator Auqaf v.
Narrin and others (1980 CLC 378).
' In view of what has been discussed above, these I.C.As. Are accepted and impugned judgments are set aside. However, respondents are at liberty to avail alternative remedies by tiling a civil suit for resolution of the disputed questions of fact. In case the respondents file suits before the competent Civil Court. Then the Civil Court shall decide the same without being influenced by the aforesaid observations. Keeping in view the abovementioned circumstances, in the interest of justice and fairplay, we direct the Secretary Local Government and Rural Development of the Punjab to constitute high powered committee to 'probe into the matter and shall complete the process within three months. In case the committee finds any official/officer responsible for any mischief or commit any misconduct then initiate departmental action against the responsible official/officer and also get criminal cases registered against them.
' These I.C.As. Are disposed of with the above observations.