' AJMAL MIAN, J.---This is an appeal with the leave of this Court against the judgment dated 21-8- 1991 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Peshawar High Court in Civil Revision No, 196 of 1990 filed by the appellants against the concurrent judgment/decrees of the two Courts, namely, of the learned Senior Civil Judge, Swat, and the learned District Judge, Swat dated 17-11-1987 and 10-10- 1989 passed in Civil Suit No, 84/1 (Neem) of 1987 and Civil Appeal No, 5/13 of 1988, respectively, decreeing the respondent's suit for declaration and injunction, dismissing the above civil revision on the ground that the same was barred by limitation. Leave to appeal was granted to examine the questions raised by the learned counsel for the appellants during the arguments.
2. The brief facts are that the respondent filed aforesaid suit for declaration/permanent injunction on the basis of averment that the land on which the suit house exists was given by ex-Ruler of Swat to his father as a gift in lieu of his service for arresting an absconder, namely, Said Arab and that the house was constructed by his father. It was further averred that the appellants were interfering with the respondent's right in the suit house. On the basis of above averment, reliefs for declaration and permanent injunction were sought but in the alternative, Rs,24,000 were claimed as the compensation for effecting improvements on the land. The above suit was resisted by the appellants inasmuch as the contents of the plaint were denied and it was averred that the house was the property of the Government and the same was given to the respondent as a servant. It was further pleaded that the respondent was liable to be ejected.
3. The learned Senior Civil Judge, on the basis of pleadings of the parties, framed as many as nine issues. In support of the claim in suit, the respondent examined himself and two witnesses, namely, Malyar and Amanullah, who belonged to the place where the suit house is situated. Whereas the appellants also examined two witnesses. The learned Senior Civil Judge, after discussing and analysing the evidence of both the parties, concluded as under:- "Examining the evidence of the parties, one fact will become clear, that there is no proof with the defendants that the property belongs to the Government. According to them, the suit house was used as Ghojar of Tehsidlar Madyan in the regime of ex.-Ruler of Swat. An admitted fact is that father of the plaintiff was also 'Sepahey' and according to D.W.2, he has been residing in the suit house, which was given to him as a service man. But in the evidence of the same person it is clear that in the regime of ex-Ruler of Swat the Policeman used to live/reside in a Fort and were given houses within the boundaries of the Fort and that the Fort was constructed on the site where now- a-days Government. High School for Boys is constructed and that the present house is not within the limits of the Fort. So, this thing would become clear that if the version of the defendants is taken to be correct then the father of the plaintiff should have been given a house within the premises of the Fort and not away from the Fort, as service man. The place where the house in dispute is situated is surrounded by the private property. Although the school has been constructed for girls on the back of the suit house, however the land was acquired from a private person. As for as D.W. 1 is concerned he being a service man and has taken the charge in the recent days of the case, is not fully aware of the area. Hence, he could not properly rebut the version of the plaintiff. Similarly, D.W.2, being a local person expressed his interest in the last line of his examination-in-chief, when praying that the suit should be dismissed. Being a witness that too as a disinterested witness, he could not show his interest in the open Court. Then at the same time he posed to be the Head Master of the School and also stated that he was Clerk with the Tehsildar. This witness has expressed his ignorance about the gift of the suit house to the father of the plaintiff."
' Consequently, the suit was decreed.
4. Against the above judgment/decree, the appellants filed above civil appeal, which was dismissed by the learned District Judge, Swat, by his aforesaid judgment/decree dated 10-10-1989, whereby he concurred with the above finding of the learned Senior Civil Judge. Thereupon, the above civil revision was filed on 25-2-1990 i,e. After about 4-1/2 months, which was dismissed on the ground of limitation as stated hereinabove. Thereupon, the appellants filed a petition for leave to appeal, which was granted for the above reason.
5. In support of the above petition, Mr. Anwar H. Mir, learned ASC appearing for the appellants, has vehemently contended that since there is no Article in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act specifically providing period of limitation of 90 days for filing of a civil revision in the High Court, residuary Article, namely, Article 181 providing three years limitation would be applicable. It was further urged that, in any case, the learned Judge in Chambers was not justified to non-suit the appellants particularly when an application for condonation of delay was filed.
6. The above contentions are not tenable. It is true that there is no period of limitation provided for filing of civil revision in a High Court but it seems that some of the High Courts in India, as a matter of practice, apply the period of 90 days as the period of limitation but, at the same time, on showing sufficient reason, civil revisions had also been entertained after 90 days. In this regard, it may be pertinent to refer to the following cases:-
(i) Lahore Municipal Corporation v. Syed Nazir Hussain Shah and others (PLD 1982 Lahore 461);
(ii) Akbar Khan v. Muhammad Khan and others (1990 CLC 1828);
(iii) Mahant Goswa mi Krishnadcvanand Ramji v. Mahant Kapildeo Ramji (AIR 1942 Patna 251);
(iv) Sant Ram v. Mt. Amrawati and others (AIR 1953 Bilaspur 9);
(v) Nani Lal De and others v. Tirthalal De and others (AIR 1953 Calcutta 513);
(vi) Rohtas Industries Ltd. And another v. P.N. Gour, Receiver of Murli Hills and others (AIR 1957 Patna 16);
(vii) Ahmad Sheikh v. Paris Museum (AIR 1959 Jammu and Kashmir 76); and (viii)Sri Ram Narayan Jaiswa l v. Smt. Rajeshwari Devi and others (AIR 1978 Allahabad 214).
' In the above cases inter alia it has been held that if a revision application is filed by a petitioner after the expiry of 90 days or after inordinate delay, he has to explain the above delay in order to seek condonation.
7. This Court, though has not expressly held that the period of 90 days is applicable to a civil revision filed in the High Court, but it has tacitly approved the above practice obtaining inter alia in the Lahore High Court. In this regard reference may be made to the following cases:-
(i) Muhammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies (PLD 1964 SC 97); In which this Court, while dealing with the question what Article would be available for an applicant to get an ex parte decree set aside, held that residuary Article, namely, Article 188 would be attracted. It was further held that even the above Article would not stand in the way of exercise of revisional powers, for these powers can be exercised suo motu. However, the question, whether Article 164 was applicable to the appellants' application was left open. The above case in fact is not directly on the controversy in issue though it has been referred to by the High Court in the judgment.
(ii) Manager, Jammu and Kashmir, State Property in Pakistan v. Khuda Yar and another (PLD 1975 SC 678); ' in the above case this Court made the following observation to the controversy in issue:- "The principle laid down in these authorities is that revision petition filed beyond the =prescribed limitation of 90 days could also be entertained if the Court was satisfied as to the reasons for the delay. In the instant case, we find that an appeal was filed in the High Court having been subsequently discovered to be incompetent a request was made to the Court to treat the same as a revision with some additional grounds. The explanation offered was that the right of the petitioner to file a second appeal on account of dismissal in default of the first appeal had been extinguished by the gross professional misconduct and collusive behaviour of the counsel against whom proceedings were being initiated. It was stated at the Bar by Mr. S.M. Zafar that in fact proceedings had already been initiated against the Advocate.
' Considering the allegation in the context of successive dismissals in default of the appeal as well as the application for its restoration, we are satisfied that this offered a satisfactory explanation of the laches and it is presumably for this reasons that the learned Judge in the High Court did not raise any objection on this account. Since the Limitation Act is not applicable to a revision, the Court was under no obligation to consider the question of limitation, moreso when the point was never raised by the Caveator before us."
(iii) Riasat Ali v. Muhammad Jaffar Khan and 2 others (1991 SCMR 496); in which the above issue has been dilated as under:- ' In extreme cases of urgency, or of delay in obtaining copies, uncertified copies may be filed, where certified copies have been applied for, but limitation is running out, with the prayer that some further time be granted to produce the certified copies, or where the report of the Copying Agency shows that the record cannot be traced, in which case dispensation thereof may be requested.
How these cases will be dealt with, it is not possible to lay down any strict rule, but since there is no period of limitation provided for the filing of revision petitions in the Limitation Act, 1908, the scope of the Court in being liberal in appropriate cases in the matter of filing of certified copies, will always be there."
8. The above-quoted extracts from the above last two cases of this Court indicate that this Court has tacitly approved the practice that a civil revision is to be filed within 90 days and in case of delay, the same is to be explained, though while considering the question of delay in filing of a civil revision, the Court will be more liberal as compared to the approach in an application for condonation of delay of the limitation period provided for in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for any legal proceedings. It is also evident that a High Court can exercise suo motu revisional power even after the expiry of the above period of 90 days as there is no practice obtaining for the exercise of suo motu revisional power within a particular period.
9. We are in respectful agreement with the above two judgments of this Court. We are also inclined to hold that though there is no period prescribed in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act for filing a civil revision but it is to be filed diligently within a period of 90 days, but the same can also be filed after the expiry of 90 days provided the petitioner makes out a good case for condoning the delay. If we were to take a contrary view, it will prolong the agony of the adversary who succeeded in the Court below as the losing party will be able to file a revision application at any time at his sweet will. This will run counter to the basic concept of justice, i,e. Litigation should be finalized as early as possible without any delay. We are further inclined to take the view that a High Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction suo motu at any time without being bound by any period of limitation provided it fosters the cause of justice and the dictates of justice so demand and not in every case.
10. In the present case the ground for the delay given was that a Government department takes longer period than a private litigant in filing the matter. The above ground has been held not sufficient for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for filing proceedings, for which period of limitation has been prescribed under the First Schedule to the Limitation Act and/or under any other law. Reference may be made to the following cases:-
(i) Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner and another v. Ghulam Ghaus etc. (1974 SCMR 38);
(ii) The Province of West Pakistan, Lahore v. Mian Noor Ahmad and others (1975 SCMR 91);
(iii) The Deputy Director, Food, Lahore Region, Lahore, etc. v. Syed Safdar Hussain Shah (1979 SCMR 45);
(iv) Commissioner of Income-tax v. Rais Pir Ahmad Khan (1981 SCMR 37); and
(v) The West Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation and 2 others v. Soomar and 2 others (PLD 1984 Karachi 190).
11. Though while considering the question of condonation of delay in filing of a civil revision, the Court will not follow the strict rule that the delay of each day is to be explained for condonation of delay of the statutory period but, at the same time, every ground of delay cannot be accepted. In the present case, the certified copy of the judgment was delivered W the appellants' counsel, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, on the very day when an application for certified copy of the same was made. No particulars have been given as to how delay had taken place. The above vague averment, therefore, could not have been accepted as sufficient for condoning the delay in filing of a civil revision. We may point out that in India, Article 131 has been provided in the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes the period of 90 days for filing of a revision under the Code of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. Whereas in Pakistan, in Section 115, C.P.C. a proviso has been added by Act VI of 1992 on 30-5-1992 providing the period of limitation of 90 days. In other words, the above practice obtaining in some of the High Courts of Indo-Pak has been accorded statutory recognition by incorporating the above provision in India and Pakistan.
12. As regards the merits of the case, the learned counsel for the appellants is unable to point out any infirmity in the reasoning of the learned trial Court reflected in the above-quoted portion of the judgment. There is a concurrent finding of the two Courts against the appellants and, therefore, even on merits no interference is called for. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.