The appellant is a printing press and is alleged to be employing a handful of persons in their establishment. The Provincial Government vide Gazette Notification No. SOG (Lab) 6-21/74 (Pt-11) dated 22-1-1977 purported, in exercise of its powers under subsection (3) of section 1 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance), to apply the said Ordinance with immediate effect to the employees and employers of various establishments mentioned in the Schedule incorporated in the Notification and ordered that employees of the said establishments and their dependents will be entitled to benefits under various sections of the Ordinance specified in this Notification. The appellant --establishment was also mentioned at No. 46 in the Schedule.
2. It is alleged by the appellant that as the employees in its establishment were already enjoying all the benefits intended to be provided under the said Notification including medical facilities from the appellant's establishment, protested against the issuance of the Notification to the Sind Employees' Social Security Institution, the respondent and sought its can--cellation. Likewise the appellant also requested the respondent to consider the wishes of the employees in this regard before implementing the decision. Additionally the appellant also questioned the validity of the aforesaid Gazette Notification as being ultra vires the Ordinance and violative of Article 25 of the Constitution.
3. In spite of the above, the respondent issued a demand notice for recovery of dues calling upon the appellant to pay the dues within 3 days at the pain of coercive process for recovery of the amount. Aggrieved by the notice of demand the appellant preferred an appeal under section 59 of the Ordinance before the Sind Social Security Court No. 1 at Karachi. Before the Social Security Court the appellant reiterated its contention that the Gazette Notification was discriminatory in nature and it was ultra vires section 1(3) of the Ordinance. The respondent, however, challenged the jurisdiction of the Social Security Court to go into the question of validity or vires of the Notification, on the plea that adjudication of this question was outside the jurisdiction of the Court under section 57 of the Ordinance. The learned Judge considered the submissions of both parties and came to the conclusion that the impugned Notification was issued within the provisions of the Ordinance. Additionally he upheld the contention of the respondent that the question of the validity of the Notification was beyond the jurisdiction of the Social Security Court conferred under section 57 of the Ordinance. Accordingly the Social Security Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant by its order dated 30-7-1977. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid decision the appellant has come up in appeal before this Court under section 64 of the Ordinance.
4. Mr. Khurshid Anwar Shaikh, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, in the first instance repeated his contention that the impugned Gazette Notification issued by the Provincial Government was void being violative of Article 25 of the Constitution as well as ultra vires the powers of the Provincial Government under subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance. The submission of the learned counsel as to the first point regarding discrimination, was that the decision of the Government to extend the provisions of the Ordinance to the appellant's establishment was discri--minatory, in so far as the establishment of the appellant was singled out for inclusion under the scheme leaving out other similar establishments in the same area. The appellant has given a list of 8 such establishments in the area which have not been included in the Schedule to the Notification. Counsel relied upon a large number of reported cases in support of his submission that Article 25 of the Constitution enjoins upon the State to extend to all citizens equal protection of law and treat them equally before the law. I would deal with this question at a later stage of this judgment but for the present I will consider first the other limb of the argument advanced by the learned counsel.
5. It was contended by the learned counsel that the Government has no power under the Ordinance to extend its provisions to a single establishment leaving out other such establishments in the same class from the application of the Ordinance. It will be advantageous to set out below the provisions of section 1 of the Ordinance;
(1) This Ordinance may be called the Provincial Employees' Social Security Ordinance, 1965.
(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan.
(3) It shall come in force at once but shall apply only to such areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments, from such date or dates and with regard to the provision of such benefits as Government may, by Notification, specify in this behalf.
A plain reading of the above provisions shows that although the Ordinance came into force at once and extended to the whole of Pakistan, it did not apply to any areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments at once. The Ordinance granted the power to the Government to apply its provisions to such areas, classes of persons, industries or establishments from a date to be specified through a notification. Now, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that upon a proper interpretation of sub--section (3) above, the power of the Government to extend the provisions of the Ordinance is to apply the Ordinance, inter alia, to classes of establishments and not to individual establishment according to the choice of the Govern--ment.
In other words the submission is that the word "classes" qualifies not only the word "persons" in the section, but also the words "industries" and "establishments". If section 8 is construed in this manner, counsel argued, the impugned Notification, in so far as it extends the Ordinance to a single establishment of the appellant and not to the entire class of establish--ments consisting of printing presses, the same was ultra vires the provisions of subsection (3).
6. Mr. S. A. Sarwana, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the vires of the impugned Notification cannot be assailed in these proceedings as the scope of the present appeal is confined to the matters enumerated in section 57 of the Ordinance, which prescribes the limits of the jurisdiction of the Social Security Court. He argued that the present appeal is a continuation of the proceedings before the original Court and is, therefore, subject to similar limitations as to the scope of the jurisdiction to adjudicate matters falling within the purview of section 57. Section 57 of the Ordinance lays down as under "57. Decisions on complaints, questions and disputes.---If any complaint is received or any question or dispute arises as to-
(a) whether any person is a secured person within the meaning of this Ordinance ; or
(b) the rate of wages or average daily wages of a secured person for the purposes of this Ordinance ; or
(c) the rate of contribution payable by an employer in respect of an employee ; or
(d) the person who is or was the employer in respect of a secured person ; or
(e) any benefit and the amount and duration thereof ; or (f ) any other matter in respect of any contribution or other dues payable or recoverable under this Ordinance ; the matter shall be decided by the Institution, in such manner, and within such time as the regulations may provide, and the Institution shall notify its decision to the person or persons concerned, in writing, stating therein the reason or reasons for its decision."
7. The moot question that, therefore, arises is whether the dispute brought before the Social Security Court by the appellant was a question or a dispute as prescribed by section 57 of the Ordinance, so as to be entertained by the Social Security Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had an occasion to construe the scope of section 57 in Sind Employees' Social Security Institution v. Mumtaz A.I Taj (PLD 1975 SC 450 ). In that case a medical practitioner was engaged by the Social Security Institution to provide medical care to the secured persons upon payment of monthly retainer covering his consul--tation fee. The Institution subsequently sought to change the existing terms of the engagement, upon which the medical practitioner treating the difference arising between him and the Institution as a dispute, filed a complaint under section 57 read with section 61 of the Ordinance before the Social Security Court. The Institution challenged the jurisdiction of the said Court, inter alia, on a plea that the medical practitioner was not an "employee" within the meaning of section 2(8) of the Ordinance and, therefore, the said Court had no jurisdiction to entertain his complaint for adjudication of the dispute. The objection was however, not immediately decided and was deferred for consideration at the final hearing in the case. Thereupon, the Institution approached the High Court in Writ Jurisdiction but their petition was dismissed as premature. In the Supreme Court the question arose whether in the circumstances of the case the Social Security Court had jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon, the dispute. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the medical practitioner cannot be treated as an "employee" within the meaning of the Ordinance. However, a contention was advanced before their Lordships that the dispute was covered by the expression "other dues payable or recoverable under the Ordinance" in clause (f) of section 57, which was canvassed to be couched in general terms so as not to be confined to the dues of "employees" or "secured persons". Their Lordships after examining the provisions of section 57 of the Ordinance made the following observation; "Thus it will be seen that clauses (a) to (e) directive or indirectly concern matters relating to "secured persons". The question therefore, is, whether (f) which is in general terms, on its proper interpretation would apply to matters somewhat similar to the matters dealt with in the preceding clause, or would extend to matters which are wholly dissimilar, in regard to their subject-matter or the parties thereto."
After referring to the doctrine of ejusdent generis, it was further observed; "Nothing has been said to indicate, that clause (f) should be read differently from the immediately preceding context. Moreover, clause (f )concerns matters in respect of "any contribution or benefit or other dues payable or recoverable under this Ordinance". These words plainly referred to various benefits admissible to "secured persons" under different situations contemplated by the Ordinance or the Schemes framed thereunder : These words cannot on any reasonable interpretation extend to the case of the respondent No. 1 whose claim arises out of agreement between the patties and not "under" any provisions of the Ordinance. Therefore, reliance by learned counsel for respondent No. 1 upon section 57 to invoke the special jurisdiction of respondent No. 2, is wholly mistaken, And a fortiori, the matter cannot be taken in appeal before the respondent No. 2, under section 61 of the Ordinance."
8. I shall now consider in the light of the observations of their Lordships, whether in the facts and circumstances of the present case the dispute between the parties falls within the ambit of section 57 so as to enable the Institution and Social Security Court to adjudicate upon it. There is no controversy between the parties that the precise dispute raised for adjudication was whether the Notification issued by the Government extending the provisions of the Ordinance to the appellant's establishment was ultra Tires being in excess of authority conferred by the Ordinance and in violation of Article 25 of the Constitution. It was firstly argued on behalf of the appellant that this dispute falls within the ambit of sub-clauses (a) and (f) of section 57. A plain reading of the wording of sub-clause (a) of section 571 shows that the dispute contemplated in this sub-clause relates to the question relating to the status of a person as a "secured person" within the meaning of the Ordinance. Section 2(25) is the relevant definition clause which defines "secured person" to mean a person in respect of whom contributions are or were payable under this Ordinance.
Reading these two provision together, therefore, the dispute covered under sub-clause (a) would be as to whether in respect of a particular person contributions are payable under the provisions of the Ordinance. Section 20 of the Ordinance, inter alia, lays down that the employer shall in respect of every employee pay to the Institution a contribution at the prescribed rate. It is clear that sub- clause (a) comes into operation only after the Ordinance applies to a particular establishment and the dispute has, therefore, to be determined with reference to the provisions of the Ordinance. For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of section 57 the Legislature obviously assumed that the Ordinance would re in operation with regard to the concerned employer. Therefore, this sub. Section speaks of a dispute "under" the Ordinance. However, in the present case, the dispute is collateral to the application of the Ordinance itself, in so far as a challenge was offered to the application of the Ordinance to the appellant's establishment. Similarly, clause (f ) of section 57 speaks of disputes in respect or contributions or other dues payable or recoverable "under" the Ordinance. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that these two sub-clauses, by no stretch could extend to include the fundamental question B whether the Ordinance itself was legally applicable to a particular establishment.
9. It is now well established that statutory Tribunals of limited jurisdiction have to function strictly within the sphere allotted to them under the Statute and are not Courts of general jurisdiction to entertain all disputes of civil nature. It could not have been the intention of the Legislature to confer on the Institution, or for that matter on the Social Security Court C the power to adjudicate and decide upon the Constitutional question involving the vires of the Statute or the Notification issued by the Government under subsection (3) of section 1 of the Ordinance. The Supreme Court in some--what similar circumstances in the case of Raunaq A.I v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1973 SC 236) held that the Officer on Special Duty, Central Record Office could not, being an authority with limited jurisdiction, treat Verification Orders under the Registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1956 as nullities.
10. For the foregoing reasons, I have no doubt in my mind that the present controversy was beyond the jurisdiction of the Social Security Institution, being itself the creature of the Ordinance, to adjudicate upon and, therefore, it follows that the Social Security Court could not also in appeal adjudicate upon this question.
11. It was, however, contended by Mr. Khurshid Anwar Shaikh that now since the matter has come up before this Court, the limitations operating on the statutory authorities under the Ordinance, in the matter of jurisdic--petition to entertain and adjudicate disputes of specified nature, no longer are a hurdle to prevent this Court from deciding the question. Learned counsel placed reliance in this behalf firstly on Umar Khan v. Market Committee (PLD 1972 Lah. 497), in which contention was advanced that a law could not be attacked by filing a petition for quashing of proceedings and that the validity of law could be called in question only by a writ petition. This was a case on the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code. The contention was repelled on the ground that the Court was sufficiently empowered under the aforesaid provision if a prosecution is entirely unwarranted under the law and amounts to an abuse of process of Court. I think the facts are apparently distinguishable in so far as the High Court's inherent powers to prevent abuse of process of the Court cannot be compared with the powers of the High Court to hear appeals under special laws to which the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Code of Civil Procedure are not attracted. Counsel then referred to the case of Bliagwan Das v. Chabill Das (AIR 1964 Andh. Pra. 170), in which a rule framed under the Payment of Wages Act was struck down as being in excess of the rule-making power of the Government. The precise question which requires to be decided in this case was not raised in that case. It seems the question requiring decision in the cited case was a question of the forum of appeal under the Payment of Wages Act but from the report it seems that the High Court decided the case in its Civil Revisional Jurisdiction. Therefore, for the reasons already stated, the facts appear to be distinguishable. Counsel also referred to two English decisions but to my mind, they render no assistance in resolving the present issue and I would, therefore, not burden this judgment with a discussion about them.
12. It is axiomatic that an appeal is a continuation of the original proceeding and, therefore, it follows that an Appellate Court would, in absence of a contrary provision in the Statute conferring Appellate Jurisdic--petition, be confined in regard to the scope of the jurisdiction to the limits prescribed on the original forum. This could be illustrated by many examples in which High Court has been conferred Appellate Jurisdiction under special laws. A prominent example would be the power of appeal under section 15 of the W. P. Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. Obviously, the High Court while exercising such Appellate Jurisdiction would be confined to adjudicating disputes between landlord and tenant within the meaning of that Ordinance.
13. The distinction between "judicial power" and "jurisdiction" was admirably elucidated by Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. In State v. Zia-ur-Rahman (PLD 1973SC49) where his Lordship has observed at page 69 as under; "It may well be asked at this stage as to what is meant by "jurisdiction" ? How does it differ from "judicial power" ? Apart from setting up the organs the Constitution may well provide for a great many other things, such as, the subjects in respect of which that power may be exercised and the manner of the exercise of that power. Thus it may provide that the Courts set up will exercise revisional or appellate powers or only act as a Court of cessation or only decide constitutional issues. It may demarcate the territories in which a particular Court shall function and over which its writs shall run. It may specify the persons in respect of whom the judicial power to hear and determine will be exercisable. These are all matters which are commonly comprised in what is called the jurisdiction of the Court. It expresses the concept of the particular res or subject-matter over which the judicial power is to be exercised and the manner of its exercise. Jurisdiction is, therefore, a right to adjudicate concerning a particular subject-matter in a given case, as also the authority to exercise in a particular manner the judicial power vested in the Court."
Merely because a matter comes before the High Court by virtue of special jurisdiction conferred under a special law, it cannot be said that the High Court can exercise its judicial power irrespective of the limited subject--matter capable of adjudication under the relevant special law, and resort to its powers available under other jurisdictions of wider extent and scope like the constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. If, F therefore, any matter falls beyond the jurisdictional limits of the Institution under the Ordinance in regard to its subject- matter, the same limitation would continue to apply to the High Court in exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction under section 64 of the Ordinance. The issue raised in this appeal is, therefore, beyond the scope of section 64 and cannot be adjudicated upon in the present appeal.
14. Be that as it may, the contention that in subsection (3) of section I the word "classes" qualifies the words "industries" or "establishments", is plainly untenable on a bare reading, of the subsection.
It was surely the intention of the law that the Ordinance be extended, subject to the discretion of the Government to particular industries or establishments if section 70 G of the Ordinance is perused alongwith subsection (3). In section 70 the Legislature has not used the word "classes" and has clearly referred to a situation where the Ordinance is "applied to some areas or establishments, but not to other areas or establishments". It seems the learned counsel overlooked section 70 in advancing this argument.
15. In the result, I find no justification to interfere with the decision of the Court below and would, therefore, dismiss this appeal but in the circumstances of this case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.