' This petition for leave to appeal has been directed against the order and judgment passed by the High Court on 13-6-2001 in Criminal Miscellaneous No,74 of 2001, whereby the application moved by the petitioner, herein, for pre-arrest omnibus bail in all the offences under the Ehtesab Act, A.P.C., Anti-Corruption Laws and other Criminal Laws in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir was consigned to record on the ground that the petitioner is neither being arrested nor is there any case registered against him.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present petition for leave to appeal, are that the petitioner, herein, moved an application for grant of his pre-arrest omnibus bail in all the offences under the Ehtesab Act, A.P.C., Anti-Corruption Laws and all the Criminal Laws in force in Azad Jammu and Kashmir before the High Court on 6-6-2001, whereby the learned Chief Justice admitted him to pre-arrest omnibus bail in the sum of Rs,10,00,000 with a personal bond of the same amount to the satisfaction of any Magistrate 1st Class, Muzaffarabad to ensure his presence in the Court and also to assist the Investigating/Inquiry Officer when called for the purpose on 13-6-2001. The Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau, Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, appeared in the High Court and stated that as no case is registered against the petitioner nor is Ehtesab Bureau and Anti-Corruption intending to arrest the petitioner. However, an inquiry on the application filed by one Fawad Fayyaz is underway in which the petitioner is not required to be arrested. The application, in view of the above circumstances, was consigned to record. It is the aforesaid order of the High Court, dated 13-6-2001 which is the subject-matter of the present petition for leave to appeal.
3. In support of the petition, it was vehemently contended by the petitioner, who is one of the Senior Advocates of the Supreme Court, that the Chairman, Ehtesab Bureau has personal animosity with him which spreads over the decades, therefore, with mala fide intents and purposes the Chairman and the other officials of the Ehtesab Bureau want to arrest the petitioner in order to harass and humiliate him before the public-at-large. Thus, if they accomplish their designs, the petitioner shall suffer humiliation and unjustified harassment and! Irreparable injury to his reputation as he belongs to very noble profession of advocacy, besides the fact that no case stands registered against the petitioner rather a false inquiry on the basis of an application stands pending in the Ehtesab Bureau. The petitioner also contended that he applied for the pre-arrest omnibus bail before the High Court and the ad interim bail was granted in the sum of Rs,10,00,000 by furnishing his bail bond on behalf of a surety and a personal bond of the same amount and had been joining the investigation wenever required by the officials of the Ehtesab Bureau and also under the directions of the High Court but when the matter came up for hearing before the High Court for confirmation of pre-arrest bail, the High Court vide its impugned order consigned the application of the petitioner to the record on the ground that it was stated at bar by the Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau, that no case stands registered against the petitioner nor the Ehtesab Bureau intends to arrest him. The petitioner contended that under section 4 of the Ehtesab Bureau Act.
2001, the accused, as defined, includes a person in respect of whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is, or has been involved in the commission of offence triable under this Act is subject to an investigation or inquiry by Ehtesab Bureau or concerned agency. Under section 27 of the said Act the Chairman, Ehtesab Bureau has been vested with wide powers at any stage of the investigation/inquiry under the Act to direct that the accused, if not already arrested, shall be arrested. In this view of the matter, the petitioner contended that the interpretation of the word "accused" used in the Ehtesab Bureau Act hat not been made by the High Court in its true perspective. His contention precisely is that as an inquiry/investigation is pending against him, therefore, he can be ordered to be arrested a any time by the Chairman, Ehtesab Bureau, particularly when it is alleged by him in clear and unequivocal terms that the Chairman has personal motives and malice to harass the petitioner and to cause damage to his reputation by ordering his arrest. The petitioner also contended that the High Court has given a very evasive look to a very grave issue involving the liberty and overall prestige and repute of a person i,e,, the petitioner, and dismissed the pre-arrest bail of the petitioner through a telegraphic order, which did not at all conform to the provisions of law.
4. The office has reported that the petition for leave to appeal filed by the petitioner is barred by limitation of 26 days as the same was lodged on 9-8-2001, whereas the impugned judgment was passed by the High Court on 13-6-2001. One day was spent in obtaining the copies of the relevant documents. Thus, by deducting one day from the period of 57 days, the total period spent in lodging the petition for leave to appeal is 56 days.
5. Ch. Muhammad Ibrahim Zia, Chief Prosecutor Ehtesab Bureau, also contended that the petition for leave to appeal being barrea by limitation is liable to.Be dismissed and no sufficient cause has been shown by the petitioner in his application for condonation of delay. The learned Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau contended that the only ground taken by the petitioner in trs application for condonation of delay is that the petitioner was under the bona fide impression gathered by the general reading of Order XXIII, rules 1 and 2 and Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1978 that the limitation for filing petitions for leave to appeal in criminal cases like the civil cases was sixty days but it transpired from the perusal and deep reading of rule 2, of the Order XXIII, that in spite of application of provision of Order XIII, with respect to the proceedings regarding petitions for leave to appeal on civil side, the application for leave to appeal in criminal matter, the limitation with regard to filing of criminal petitions for leave to appeal in the Court has been prescribed as thirty days. Thus, the petitioner has prayed that the mistake was bona fide in filing the petition beyond time and the same happened due to the jumbled reading of Order XXIII, rules 1 and 2 and Order XIII of the Supreme Court Rules, 1978 due to which the mistake occurred which requires to be graciously excused by the Court. The learned Chief Prosecutor Ehtesab Bureau has vehemently urged that the plain reading of Order XXIII, rule 2 and its title reveals beyond any manner of doubt that all petitions and applications for leave to appeal in criminal matters shall be lodged in the Court within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be appealed from or from the date of the refusal or grant of the certificate under section 42(11)(0 of the Constitution by the High Court: Provided that the Court may for sufficient cause shown 'extend the time. The title of Order XXIII relates to petitions for leave to appeal in criminal proceedings.
Similarly, the title of Order XIII, relates to petitions for special leave to appeal in civil proceedings and under rule 1 of Order XIII, a petition for special leave to appeal shall be lodged in this Court within sixty days of the judgment or order sought to be appealed from or as the case may be .Within thirty days from the date of the refusal or grant of certificate under section 42(11)(0 of the Constitution by the High Court. Provided that the Court may for sufficient cause extend the time. So, the learned Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau contended that even by the plain reading of both the provisions of law, there remains no confusion that in criminal matters the period of limitation prescribed under the relevant law is thirty days whereas in civil matters the period of limitation for lodging the petition for leave to appeal is sixty days. Thus, the ground taken by the petitioner cannot be onstrtled to be a sufficient cause as such the petition is liable to be dismissed without entering into its merits. However, the learned Chief Prosecutor stated at Bar that he made a statement before the High Court that the petitioner is neither an accused of an offence committed under the Ehtesab Act nor he is wanted in other case to be apprehended. The learned counsel also submitted that even before this Court he is making an unequivocal statement that the petitioner is not wanted in any case under the Ehtesab Act nor the Ehtesab Bureau wants to arrest him on the basis of inquiry which is pending against him. The Chief Prosecutor ...:ontended that in this view of the matter the High Court was left with no option except to dismiss the application of the pre-arrest omnibus bail filed by the petitioner and the same was rightly so. Even this Court in the circumstances of the case should not allow the petition for leave to appeal to be granted iust for the purpose of academic discussion and merely on the ground as contended by the petitioner that the petition in question involves law points of public importance.
6. Syed Ejaz Ali Gillani, the learned Assistant Advocate-General, fully supported the arguments advanced by the Chief Prosecutor, Ehtesab Bureau.
7. Controverting the arguments raised by the Chief Prosecutor Ehtesab, Mr. Mujahid Hussain Naqvi, the petitioner, contended that as a matter of fact due to jumbled reading of both the provisions as postulated under Order XXIII, rules 1 and 2 and Order XIII, of the Supreme Court Rules, the confusion arose in the mind of the petitioner as such the bona fide mistake might be excused. The petitioner also submitted that the impugned judgment was passed by the High Court on 13-6-2001 and before the expiry of limitation period there were summer vacation as such the period of summer vacation is to be excluded from the total period of lodging the petition for leave to appeal. The petitioner in support of his contention relied on the reported case titled S.M. Sadiq v. Settlement Commissioner and others (1974 SCMR 149) wherein it was observed by the Supreme Court of Pakistan that the petition is though barred by 13 days but the learned counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner therein frankly conceded that the mistake was his, as he was under the impression that during the long vacation of the Supreme Court the time would not run. In view of his frank confession, the learned Judges condoned the delay and dealt with the petition on merits. The petitioner also relied on another case titled Fazal Karim and another v. Ghulam Mani and others (1975 SCMR 452) wherein it was observed that we are convinced with the view taken by the learned Judge of the High Court was exceptionable. From the plain reading of section 4 of the Limitation Act, it becomes clear that the period during which the Court remains closed on account of vacation, has to be excluded from the computation of the limitation and the notification cannot take precedence over the statutory provisions. Even otherwise we find that there is no conflict between the notification and the provisions contained in section 4 of the Limitation Act. According to the notification the office was to remain open for receipt of petitions from person who might choose to file. Surely, the word "office" as used in the notification is not a synonymous with the "Court" as used in section 4 of the Limitation Act. The Court may be closed and yet the office might still to be open. Even otherwise the notification merely gives the petitioners an option to file petitions. Such option cannot be construed so as to take away a statutory right. Even otherwise it is doubtful that the word "petition" as used in the notification will cover a memorandum of appeal. I am, therefore, clearly of the view that the appeal even though filed during the summer vacation could not be filed on the reopening of the Court and was, therefore, well within time. The petitioner also contended that the Supreme Court has inherent powers and even without a valid appeal has the power to decide the issue involved in exercise of inherent jurisdiction which it possesses under the Constitution. A reference was made to a reported case of this Court tilted Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan v. Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government, Muzaffarabad (PLD 1990 SC (AJ&K) 23).
8. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties and perusing the relevant record, it may be stated that both the provisions Contained in Order XXIII, rule 2 and Order XIII, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules are abundantly clear not only because of the manner in which they have been coached but also the fact that title of both the orders makes it abundantly clear that Order XIII relates to petitions for special leave to appeal in civil proceedings whereas Order XXIII, relates to petitions for leave to appeal in criminal proceedings. Rule 2 of Order XXIII, provides that all petitions and applications for leave to appeal in criminal matters shall be lodged in the Court within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be appealed from or from the date of the refusal of certificate under section 42(11)(f) of the Constitution by the High Court: Provided that the Court may for sufficient cause shown extend the time, whereas Order XIII, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules is as follows:-- "1. A petition for special leave to appeal shall be lodged in this Court within sixty days of the judgment or order sought to be appealed from or as the case may be within thirty days from the date of the refusal or grant of certificate under section 42(11)(f) of the Constitution by the High Court: ' Provided that the Court may for sufficient cause extend the time."
Even from the plain reading of both the provisions contained in Order XIII and Order XXIII, makes it abundantly clear that a different period of limitation has been prescribed for lodging the appeals in criminal matters and in civil matters. The contention of the petitioner that due to jumbled reading of both the above-referred previsions a confusion arose in his mind that the period prescribed for lodging the appeal even in criminal matter was sixty days is devoid of any legal force and the same is hereby repelled. The petitioner is one of the Senior Advocates of the Supreme Court and erne cannot expect from an Advocate of his calibre that he would have fallen in some confusion by reading the aforesaid provisions. Moreover, the ignorance of law has never been considered as a valid ground for condonation of delay either in civil or in criminal matters. The petitioner has thus, been clearly negligent and indolent in lodging the petition for leave to appeal beyond the period of limitation. The cause shown for the condonation of delay is also superficial and artificial and the same cannot be regarded as one of the recognized grounds for condonation of delay. It was also contended by the petitioner that the petitioner involves a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Act as well as the subordinate legislation as the matter involving the liberties of the citizens in special reference to the Ehtesab Act, 2001 and the serious question of public importance necessitated authoritative judgment for the future guidance. This argument, too, is unfounded and cannot be looked into specially when the petition for leave to appeal is barred by limitation. Needless to emphasise that the Supreme Court always grants leave only on a point which is of legal importance and not for mere academic discussion.
9. Facing the predicament and the hurdle to cross the barrier of limitation, during the course of arguments, the petitioner contended that when the petition for leave to appeal against the impugned judgment of the High Court was lodged in the Supreme Court on 9-8-2001, it was a summer vacation period. As the summer vacation started in the Supreme Court from July 2nd to 30th September, 2001, therefore, according to him after deducting the period from 2nd July to 30th September, 2001 the petition for leave to appeal would be deemed to be within the period of limitation. In support of his above contention the petitioner relied upon a reported case titled S.M.
Sadiq v. Settlement Commissioner and others (1974 SCMR 149) and another case titled Fazal Karim and another v. Ghulam Jillani (1975 SCMR 452). ' I have no quarrel with the rule laid down in the above-referred authorities of the Supreme Court of Pakistan but in my humble view the same are distinguishable in view of the facts and circumstances of those cases as they have nothing common with the facts of the case in hand and as such have no bearing. In the instant case in the application for condonation of delay no such ground was taken that the petitioner was misled or he fell under the bona fide impression that due to summer vacation of the Supreme Court the period of limitation would not run. The other authority cited by the petitioner titled Fazal Karim and another v. Ghulam Jillani and others is also distinguishable due to the reason that the notification which was issued in that case was only to the effect that during the period of vacation the petitions will be received daily from such person who may choose to present them except on Sundays and public holidays. Thus, it was observed that notification dated 12-5-1954 cannot take precedence over the statutory provisions and it was in these circumstances observed that period of vacation is to be excluded from computation of limitation. Even no plea in the application for condonation of delay with regard to such a notification was taken either specifically or impliedly by the petitioner whereas in the notification issued by the Registrar of this Court on 14-6-2001, it has been made abundantly clear that during the summer vacation I (Muhammad Yunus Surakhvi, J.), shall act as a Vacation Judge and the Court proceedings will continue as usual. It is worthwhile to point out that the petitioner was well-aware of the aforesaid notification issued by the Registrar of this Court and it was only for this purpose that he filed the petition for leave to appeal before the Registry Office and on 15-8-2001 obtained a relief of ad-interim pre-arrest bail in his favour from the Vacation Judge which was subject to confirmation and the same came up for hearing along with the petition for leave to appeal on 10-9-2001. On the one hand the petitioner claimed a relief from the Vacation Judge praying that he may be admitted to ad-interim pre-arrest bail and on the other pressed into service the submission that the whole period of summer vacation should not be computed in the period of limitation. The conduct of the petitioner being contradictory in nature, he does not in my view, deserve the condonation of delay, particularly so when the above ground has not been taken in the application for condonation of delay. It is a settled law that the ground which has not been taken in the application for condonation of delay cannot be taken into consideration for the first time at the time of arguments. My above stated view stands fortified by a Full Bench case of the Supreme Court of Pakistan reported as Fateh Ali Khan v. Subedar Muhammad Khan (1970 SCMR 238), wherein it was observed as follows:--- "Ch. Abdur Rehman, learned counsel for the petitioner, has contended that this Court was closed for summer vacation during the months of August and September, 1969, and therefore, under section 4 of the Limitation Act, the petitioner is entitled to claim extension of time up to the re- opening of the Court. In the first place, this ground is an afterthought because no such ground was taken in the application for condonation of delay filed with the petition for special leave to appeal.
The very fact that the petition filed by the petitioner for special leave to appeal during vacation shows that he has no such ground in mind at the time when he filed his petition. Secondly, this contention is devoid of all force because though this Court was in vacation it cannot In said to be closed because its Registries were open for receiving the petitions and other work. Section 4 could only be applied in case there was no arrangement for doing the business of the Court during the vacation. Since this Court was open for receiving petitions and for doing other work, section 4 of the Limitation Act has no application."
' Therefore, the aforementioned plea raised by the petitioner being unfounded is also repelled. The petitioner also contended that the Court has inherent jurisdiction to pass any order for the purpose of doing complete justice under Order XLIII, rules.1 and 5, of the Supreme Court Rules and as such the period of limitation can be condoned by exercising inherent jurisdiction. In case reported as Muhammad Ilyas Khan and 6 others v. Sardar Muhammad Hafeez Khan acid 3 others (2001 PLC (C.S.) 445), it was observed by this Court that inherent powers can be resorted to if there is no specific provision on the statute book dealing with a situation that despite this fact the specific provision for the redressal of grievance on the statute book, inherent powers can be exercised is accepted, it was tantamount to render the whole law on the statute book as redundant because in that eventuality every litigant can advance the argument that he could not prove his case legally but in the interest of justice he is to be given relief by invoking the inherent powers. Therefore, even this contention of the petitioner being devoid of any legal force cannot be accepted as the provisions of Supreme Court Rules are absolutely clear that for filing a petition for leave to appeal in criminal proceedings the period of limitation is provided as thirty days and delay of each day has to be explained by the applicant seeking the condonation.
10. Before parting with the judgment, I cannot close my eyes to the fact that the petitioner in his petition for leave to appeal as well as in the application for condonation of delay has employed a language which, on the face of it, appears to be scandalous, abusive and highly objectionable by highlighting the fact that he had strained relations with the Chairman Ehtesab Bureau, respondent No,4, who happens to be the respectable retired Judge of the apex Court. The language used in drafting the petition for leave to appeal is unbecoming of a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court.
After all the decency and etiquettes demand that a due respect should be shown even to one's opponents and particularly to the Judges of the superior judiciary whether they are in service or out of it. When during the arguments the petitioner was confronted with the language used by him in drafting the petition he for sometime tried to justify his action but ultimately tendered apology to be careful in future. Such a sort of language which has been employed by the petitioner in drafting the petition for leave to appeal cannot be allowed to be repeated in future. Indeed such a practice is highly undesirable and is to be deprecated. Therefore, a warning is given to the petitioner that in future he would be careful while drafting his petitions in a scandalous and contemptuous manner, otherwise the law will take its own course.
11. The petitioner in support of his contentions has cited about half a dozen of rulings which have no bearing or relevancy to the facts and circumstances of the present case so the same have not been discussed.
12. In the light of what has been stated above, the petition for leave to appeal being barred by limitation is hereby dismissed. In view of dismissal of petition for leave to appeal the ad interim pre-arrest omnibus bail granted to the petitioner vide my order, dated 15-8-2001 also stands recalled.