' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way' of leave of the Court, is directed against the judgment passed by the Service Tribunal on 25-4-2000, whereby the appeal filed by Sardar Muhammad Hafeez Khan. Respondent No,1 herein, was accepted.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that appellants and respondent No,1 herein were selected as S.D.Os. Through initial recruitment by the Public Service Commission in Public Works Department vide notifications dated 11-5-1980, and 17-12-1980 respectively. The appointment orders, referred to above, were issued in the light of recommendations of Public Service Commission but the said recommendations did not contain the order of merit of the appointees. The Secretary Works wrote a letter to Public Service Commission for providing a merit list in order af seniority and the Public Service Commission vide letter, dated 8-9-1987 provided a merit list which is available at page 15 of the paper book. On the basis of this letter: (1) Muhammad Najeeb, (2) Muhammad, Javed, (3) Kh. Faqir Muhammad, (4) Muhammad Iftikhar Khan, (5) Abdul Rashid Khawaja, (6) Kh. Ejaz Ahmed and (7) Muhammad Hafeez were shown in the merit list. Thus the competent authority issued a final seniority list vide order dated 25-12-1987 which is available at pages 16 to 18 of the paper book. In this seniority list Muhammad Ilyas Khan, one of the appellants. Is shown at Serial No,8, while Muhammad Hafeez Khan, respondent No,1 herein, is shown at Serial No,6. It is claimed by the appellants that in 1990 the cases of appellants and respondents were referred to the respective Selection Board of promotion in B-18 as Executive Engineers and the Selection Board after considering the merits of the parties promoted the appellants by superseding respondent No,1 vide notification dated 5-6-1990.
3. Feeling aggrieved by the notification, dated 5-6-1990, respondent No,1 preferred an appeal against the said notification before the Government and subsequently after awaiting the statutory period invoked the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal. However, the appeal of respondent was dismissed for non-prosecution on 27-2-1993. Respondent No,I never got restored his appeal, however, persuaded his remedy before the Government which observed that the case of respondent may be referred to the Selection Board afresh. On 8-9-1994, the case of respondent No,1 was referred to Selection Board but it deferred the case because some departmental inquiry was pending against him. In 1995 the case of respondent was again referred to Selection Board and he was promoted vide notification dated 30-5-1995 with retrospective effect from 16-8-1987.
The copy of this notification is attached with the paper book as Annexure "P/13" at page 37 of the paper book. In the meantime appellants were promoted as Superintending Engineers on officiating basis vide orders dated 6-7-1998 and 9-1-1999. On 10-5-1997 a seniority list was issued where respondent No,1 was shown much below she appellants who firstly preferred a review petition and then filed an appeal before the Service Tribunal on 7-10-1997. The Service Tribunal vide its impugned order dated 25-4-2000 accepted the appeal of respondent No,
1. Hence this appeal by way of leave of the Court by the appellants.
4. In support of appeal it was vehemently contended by Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Mughal, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the appeal of respondent No,1 was liable to be dismissed on the ground that promotion order of appellants dated 5-6-1990 was never challenged by the respondent. The respondent though preferred a review petition before the competent Authority but at the same time after awaiting statutory period he approached the Service Tribunal on 8-11-1990 and his appeal was dismissed on 27-2-1990. Thus, the review petition filed by respondent could not be decided because he availed the remedy before the Service Tribunal. Hence the review petition of respondent would be deemed to have been rejected and the Government became functus officio. Therefore, the order of antedated promotion of respondent vide notification dated 30-5- 1995 was without jurisdiction and a nullity in the eye of law. The learned counsel also contended that even on the principle of res judicata the appeal of respondent was liable to be dismissed as the Service Tribunal had dismissed, the appeal of respondent on 27-2-1993 .
5. Controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants, Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, the learned counsel for respondent No, I, contended that the respondent was promoted w.e. f. 16-8-1987 vide notification dated 30-5-1995. The antedated promotion of respondent was not challenged by appellants before any appropriate forum. Thus, the respondent was promoted much earlier than the appellants and the notification dated 30-5-1995 went unchallenged and the same has attained finality. In presence of the notification dated 30-5-1995, the notification dated 5-6-1990 had lost all significance. The learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon section 7(2) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants Act, 1976 and section 8(1)(b) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1977 and contended that seniority of a civil servant shall take effect from the date of his regular appointment.
6. We have given our due consideration to the arguments advanced at the Bar. There is no denying of the fact that the respondent was superseded by the relevant Selection Board in the year 1990 but the fact remains that he was not debarred to be again sent to relevant Selection Board for promotion irrespective of the fact whether he submitted any review petition before the competent Authority against his supersession or not; a civil servant by his performance can render himself fit for promotion. Therefore, even if it is assumed that the review petition filed by respondent against the supersession in the year 1990 was not accepted, it cannot be said that he could not be referred tor his promotion subsequently in the year 1994: it has already been stated that in 1994 the Public Service Commission did not supersede him but merely mentioned in the relevant record that as some inquiry was pending against him his case for promotion was deferred. Thereafter, in the year 1995 when he was again referred to Selection Board he was approved and recommended for promotion to Grade B-18 as Executive Engineer. However, the Government vide the impugned order, dated 30-5-1995 promoted him as Executive Engineer in B-18 from 16-8-1987. This order of antedate promotion was not challenged by appellants and thus, the same has attained finality. It is settled principle of law that seniority would be reckoned from the date of regular appointment in a grade. Thus, the seniority list issued in the year 1997 which was challenged by the respondent before the Service Tribunal did not conform to that principle and respondent was shown junior to the appellants despite the fact that the seniority should have reckoned from his antedate promotion, i,e, 16-8-1987. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that although the order of retrospective promotion of respondent from 16-8-1987 was not challenged by them yet the same can be set aside by this Court in exercise of its inherent powers; we are afraid that we cannot subscribe to this contention because inherent powers can only be resorted to if there is no specific provision on the statute book. The learned counsel for the appellants in support of his contentions relied on the following authorities:-- ' In the case of Inspector-General Prisons, Azad Jammu and Kashmir and others v. Ghulam Muhammad Lolabi and others (2000 YLR 2133) it was observed that the judgments of the reference Judge and the High Court in allowing entire compensation to appellant were in patent violation of para. No,3 of Evacuee of Property Allottees (Compensation) Order, 1967. Therefore, the same were amended with direction that appellant would be entitled to. 2/3rd of compensation amount while 1/3rd would go to the Custodian despite the fact that he had filed no appeal against the judgment of the High Court.
' In Mst. Safya and another v. Muhammad Rafique and 6 others (PLD 1993 SC 62) it was observed as under:- "Clause (1) of Article 187 of the Constitution empowers this Court to issue such directions, orders or decrees as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it.
The power contained in the above clause is quite wide and far-reaching. A party cannot be denied a relief on a technical ground if he is otherwise entitled to such relief."
' In Said Mian and another v. Mian Said Baghdad and another (1980 SCMR 420) it was held as under-- "By Article 187 a power is conferred on this Court to issue orders or directions for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it, including making an order for the purpose of securing attendance of any person."
' In Ch. Abdul Hamid v. Deputy Commissioner and others (1985 SCM R 359) it was held that the rule that High Court will not entertain a Constitutional petition when other appropriate remedy was available is not a rule of law barring jurisdiction but a rule by which the Court regulates its jurisdiction. Where on facts of a case such jurisdiction should have been exercised to relieve parties of illegalities and infirmities appearing on face of record, without of course deciding factual controversy itself, but High Court on ground that other remedy was available to petitioner refused exercise of. Constitutional jurisdiction, the Supreme Court invoked its own jurisdiction under Article 187(1) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973 to do complete justice and allowed appeal against the order of High Court refusing to exercise Constitutional jurisdiction in the matter.
7. It is obvious from the above-referred case-law that inherent powers can be resorted to if there is no specific provision on the statute book dealing with a situation but in the instant case there is no such eventuality, as is evident from the case-law, referred to above by the learned counsel for the appellants. If we accept the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that despite the specific provision for the redressal of grievance on the statute book, inherent powers can be invoked, it would tantamount to render whole law on the statute book as redundant because in that eventuality every litigant can advance the argument that although he could not prove his case legally but in the interest of justice he is to be given relief by invoking the inherent powers. The Courts of law are not the Courts of equity. Justice is administered according to law. Inherent powers can only be invoked to supplement the law on the statute book and not to decide the case irrespective of the statutory provision in that regard.
8. In the light of what has been stated above, finding, no force in this appeal, the same stands dismissed with no order as to costs.