' The Constitutional jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked to call in question the judgment dated 28-2-1987 passed by respondent No,1, whereby, the order, dated 2-11-1985 passed by Civil Judge, Rahimyar Khan allowing the application under Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. Filed by Yar Muhammad etc., was set aside.
2. The facts giving rise to the present writ petition are that Ghulam Ali and others/plaintiffs- respondents Nos.2 to 21 had instituted a suit for declaration challenging the validity of Mutation No,264 in favour of Ataullah Khan predecessor-in-interest of the defendants Nos.4 to 24. During the trial of he suit Nasrullah and others defendants of 'le suit (petitioners) filed an application under Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. For permission to produce the documents Exh.P.1 to Exh.P.33. The trial Court obtained reply from the plaintiffs-respondents and after hearing the arguments accepted the application and allowed the petitioners to produce the documents Exh.P.1 to Exh.P.33 in evidence vide its order dated 2-11-1985. Feeling aggrieved the revision petition was filed by Ghulam Ali and etc./respondents and the Additional District Judge, Rahimyar Khan vide the impugned judgment accepted the revision petition and set aside the order of the trial Court.
3. At the very outset, the learned counsel for the respondents has objected that the order/judgment impugned has been passed in exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the lower Court, thus, the Constitutional petition against the revisional order of the Court is not competent and liable to be dismissed on this sole ground. He relies on the case of Muhammad Khan and 6 others v. Mst. Ghulam Fatima and 12 others (1991 SCMR 970). In this case the High Court dismissed the writ petition against the revisional order of the revisional Court observing that the Constitutional petition challenging the revisional order of the Court arising out of civil litigation is not competent.
He further argued that where a Court or Tribunal set up under ordinary law has jurisdiction to decide a particualr matter, it has jurisdiction to decide it rightly or wrongly, would not render the decision without jurisdiction' In this context he relies on the cases of Mst. Fazal Begum v. Bahadur Khan and another (PLD 1983 Lahore 365), Muhammad Yousaf and others v. District Judge, Gujranwala and another (PLD 1982 Lahore 690) and Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others (PLD 1985 SC 131).
4. On the other hand learned counsel for the petitioners vehemently opposed the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondents Nos.2 to 21 contending that the impugned judgment has been passed without jurisdiction. The allowing of the application of the petitioner by the trial Court to admit in evidence the documents of the petitioner is not a case decided. Thus, in such-like case Constitutional petition is maintainable. He relies on the case of Nawabzada Malik Habibullah Khan v. The Pak. Cement Industries Limited and others (1969 SCMR 965) and Hassan Din v. Hafiz Abdus Salam and others (PLD 1991 SC 65).
5. I have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The trial Court while allowing the application filed by the petitioner under Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C., has observed that documents sought be produced in evidence by the petitioners pertained to the years 1911, 1916, 1893 and 1891 and the documents in question are copies of public record and authenticity is prima facie attached to the said documents and the plaintiffs/respondents would have the right to rebut these documents. Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. Contemplated that no documentary evidence in possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with rule 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production thereof; and the Court receiving any such document shall record the reasons for doing so. The object of the rule is that where genuineness of the documents is beyond doubt it ought not to shut out of evidence if produced at a late Stage. The documents which were to be produced by the petitioners were copies of the public documents. It was not maintained or kept by the parties or that these documents were not private documents. These documents were thirty years old documents and prima facie, presumption of truth is attached to such documents.
6. From the plain reading of provisions of Order XIII, rule 2, C.P.C. It reveals that it is the discretion of the trial Court to allow the documents to be produced in evidence, after the good cause is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production of the same. The Court was satisfied, therefore, allowed the petitioners to produce document these evidence.
7. Section 115, C.P.C., is attracted only when the case has been decided by any Court, subordinate to the High Court to the District Courts. The order permitting admission of documents not included in the list of reliance or not filed before the framing of issues does not amount to case decided.
Reliance in this respect can be placed on case of Mst. Fazal Begum v. Bahadur Khan and another (PLD 1983 Lahore 365) and Nawabzada Malik Habibullah Khan v. The Pak. Cement Industries and others (1969 SCMR 965) where in the latter case the Honourable Judges of the Supreme Court have observed that an order admitting of declining to admit evidence oral or documentary does not amount to a case decided within the purview of section 115, C.P.C. And the High Court would not interfere with the order of the trial Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. This above legal aspect of the case has not been adverted to by the revisional Court and interfered in its revisional jurisdiction, illegally. The revision before the Additional District Judge was not competent and the jurisdictional error is made out. Thus, in this case the High Court in its Constitutional jurisdiction can interfere. This argument is further strengthened by the dictum laid down in case of Muhammad Sharif and another v. Muhammad Afzal Sohail, etc. (PLD 1981 SC 246). In the instant case as observed above revision before the Additional District Judge was not maintainable and the revisional Court has passed the impugned judgment without jurisdiction. Therefore, the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Hassan Din v. Hafiz Abdus Salam and others (PLD 1991 SC 65) has observed that Supreme Court judgment in Noor Muhammad's case reported in (PLD 1985 SC 131) was not that a Constitutional petition was in no case permissible whatever' the nature of the defect in the proceedings before the District Judge under section 115. C.P.C. Where the District Judge exercised jurisdiction which he did not possess in the matter, Constitutional petition in such-like cases would be competent. In the instant case there is a glaring jurisdictional defect in the case and the Additional District Judge has entertained a revision petition which was not competent.
Thus, the judgment of the revisional Court is not sustainable in law and calls for interference. The cases referred to by the learned counsel for the respondents are not applicable to the present case.
' For the foregoing reasons and in agreement with the dictum laid down in the case referred by the learned counsel for the petitioners, I am constrained to hold that the impugned judgment dated 28-2-1987 passed by the revisional Court has been passed without lawful authority and of no legal effect. Resultantly, this writ petition is accepted, the impugned judgment of the revisional Court is set aside and that of the trial Court is restored.