' I intend to decide Writ Petitions Nos. 2951 of 1990, 2952 of 1990, 2953 of 1990 and W.P. No,2954 of 1990 by one consolidated judgment having similar facts and law.
2. The brief facts out of which the present writ petitions arise are that private respondents in the writ petitions got appointment in Dubai Bank Faisalabad Branch. The Dubai Bank was stopped to function by the order of the State Bank dated 1-1-1986. Dubai Bank was merged in Union Bank of the Middle East. There were twenty one employees of the Dubai Bank, out of which eleven were absorbed in the Union Bank of the Middle East and the services of the remaining were retrenched on 30-12-1985. The respondents were paid benefits in lump sum including ex-gratia payment. The respondents received the aforesaid payments. Dubai Bank filed application under Order 11-A of West Pakistan Standing Orders, 1968 before the Labour Court Faisalabad for permission to close down the establishment. The Punjab Labour Court rejected the application of the Dubai Bank vide order dated 1-4-1987. The Dubai Bank being aggrieved filed appeal before the Punjab Appellate Court who accepted the same vide order dated 10-10-1987. The services of the respondents were terminated by the petitioners bank vide orders dated 26-12-1985 with effect from 30-12-1985. The respondents in the month of March, 1-986 sent grievance notice to the officers of the Dubai Bank.
Thereafter, respondents filed petitions under section 25-A of L.R.O. Before Punjab Labour Court No, 4 Faisalabad in month of April, 1986. The petition were accepted by the learned Labour Court vide order dated 1-4-1987. The petitioners being aggrieved filed appeals before the Punjab Appellate Tribunal who dismissed the appeals vide orders dated 26-5-1987, hence these writ petitions.
3. The learned counsel of the petitioners submits that grievance notices were sent by the respondents to the officers of the Dubai Bank after the prescribed period by both the tribunals below were erred in law to entertain the petitions filed by the respondents and did not advert to this aspect of the case. He further submits that Dubai Bank was closed on 1-1-1986 with the permission of State Bank and services of the respondents were terminated on 26-12-1985 and the respondents received the benefits from the Dubai Bank, therefore, respondents are estopped to send grievance notices as well as filed petitions under section 25-A of I.R.O. Of 1969 before the Labour Court on the well-known principle of estoppel and waiver. He further submits that respondents did not implead the Union Bank of Middle East as respondents. Both the Tribunals were erred in law to direct the Union Bank of Middle East to reinstate the respondents through the impugned orders. The impugned orders are not sustainable in the eyes of law as per principle laid down by this Court in (1987 PLC 703) Union Bank of Middle East v. Rehana Naheed and another, He further submits that the impugned orders of the Tribunals below were set aside by this Court in the aforesaid judgment to the extent of direction to Union Bank of Middle East to reinstate the respondents. He further submits that notices were not sent by the respondents to the Dubai Bank and notices were sent to the individual officers of the Dubai Bank but these facts were not considered by the tribunals below, therefore, judgment of both the tribunals below are result of misreading and non-reading of the record. He further submits that petitioners claimed reliefs do not available to them under any law, award or settlement. Therefore, judgments of both the tribunals below are not in accordance with law laid down by the Superior Courts. In support of his contention he relied upon 1981 SCMR 542 (Muhammad Javed Khan's case). He summed up his arguments that petitions filed by the respondents before the Labour Court were incompetent and time-barred.
4. All the private respondents in all the aforesaid petitions engaged Mr. Lal Khan Baluch, Advocate.
List of old cases were sent to the respective members of the bar in advance with the following note: "Old cases will not be adjourned. Adjournment, however, may be solicited in highly exceptional circumstances with the consent of the opposite counsel through an application to the D.R. Latest by seven days."
' Learned counsel for the private respondents did not get the case adjusted in terms of the aforesaid note. The case was taken up quarter to.
10.00 a.m some body entered appearance on behalf of the respondents and informed the Reader of this Court that learned counsel for the respondents was stated to be busy before another Bench.
He was directed to intimate the learned counsel for the respondents that he should appear before this Court as the learned counsel for the petitioners had stated his arguments. Learned counsel for the petitioners concluded his arguments at 12.00 a.m. Learned counsel for the respondents did not enter appearance. The cases were repeatedly called but nobody entered appearance on each and every call exccept before interval on behalf of the respondents. Lastly the cases were called at 1-45 p.m but nobody entered appearance on behalf of the respondents. The Reader of the Court was directed as and when the learned counsel for the respondents came he should send the learned counsel for the respondent in Chamber so that he should be able to argue the cases on behalf of the respondents. Learned counsel for the respondents did not turn up till 4.30 p.m. It is pertinent to mention here that the name of the learned counsel for the respondents is mentioned in the cause list. Officer also sent P.C. Cards to the respondents on 18-10-2000 for 15-11-2000. In view of these circumstances, I have no other alternative except to decide the cases ex parte against the respondents.
5. I have given my anxious consideration to the contentions cif the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record myself. It is better and appropriate to reproduce the operative part of the impugned order of the Labour Court in this Constitutional petition to resolve the controversy between the parties: "For various reasons stated above all the petitions are accepted, the impugned orders are set aside and the petitioners are reinstated in service in the same of equivalent capacity in which they were serving at the time the impugned orders were passed. They shall be absorbed in the staff of Union Bank of Middle East operating in Pakistan or in the staff of Dubai Bank Ltd. Which, according to Telex No, DBFS-136, dated 4-4-1985 (Exh. P/7) is still operating as subsidiary of the Union Bank of Middle East Ltd."
' The aforesaid operative part of the impugned order reveals that Union Bank of the Middle East was directed to absorb the private respondents in the staff of Union Bank of Middle East or in the staff of Dubai Bank Ltd. Which according to Telex dated 4-4-1985 is still operating as subsidiary of the Union Bank of Middle East Ltd. The aforesaid judgments of the Labour Court and the Punjab Appellate Tribunal were challenged by the Union Bank of the Middle East through Constitutional petitions which were accepted by this Court vide judgment, dated 2nd June, 1987 reported as 1987 PLC 703. The impugned Order in so far as it embodied a direction requiring the Union Bank of Middle East to absorb the respondents was declared to have been made without lawful authority and have no legal effect. Writ petitions were admitted for regular hearing by this Court on 8-5- 1999. Operation of the impugned orders regarding the reinstatement and payment of the back benefits were stayed. It appears that the respondents did not challenge the aforesaid judgments of this Court before any higher forum (Union Bank of the Middle East 1987 PLC 703). It is also admitted fact that the service of the private respondents were terminated by the petitioners vide order dated 26-12-1985. Private respondents sent grievance notice to the petitioners in the month of March 1986. Thereafter, petitioners filed petitions before the Labour Court on 3-4-1996. The present petitioners filed written statement. It is conditioned precedent that respondents had to sent grievance notice to the petitioners within three months as is envisaged by section 25-A of the I.R.O., 1960. It is settled principle of law that a Judge Must wear all the laws of the Country on the sleeve of his robe and failure of the counsel to properly advise him is not complete excuse in the matter as per principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Sarwar's case PLD 1969 SC 278. It is pertinent to mention here that both the tribunals have not considered this aspect of the case. It is also settled principle of law that the party approaching Court of competent jurisdiction for redress of his grievance beyond specific period of limitation is bound to explain each day delay to the satisfaction of respective forum because a valuable right accrues to the other. In this behalf reference can be made to the observation in the following judgments:- ' PLD 1995 SC 396 = 1995 SCMR 546 (Muhammad Salim's case) 1968 SCMR 975 (Rehmatullah's case) 1989 SCMR 864 (Ghulam Sarwar's case)
' It may be seen that procedure and period for agitating grievance where right guaranteed to employee has been violated is specified and regulated by section 25-A, I.R.O. It is obligatory for the aggrieved person to satisfy the forum of competent jurisdiction that his claim does not suffer from any legal defect. The above provision of the Ordinance came up for consideration before the superior Courts in the following judgments and it was held that it was necessary for the respondents worker to explain each day delay: ' PLD 1979 Karachi 692 (National and Grandlays Bank Ltd, 's case)
' PLD 1976 Karachi 200 (Pakistan Barma Shell Oil's case)
' PLD 1973 Kai chi 1 (Salim Sons Ltd.'s case)
' PLD 1974 Karachi 80 (Nasim Malik Mill's case).
' PLD 1974 Karachi 716 (Karachi Development Authority's case).
' PLD 1976 Lahore 1085 (Pakistan National Center's case). 1980 PLC 426 (District Council Sargodha's case).
' The ratio of the aforesaid judgments shows that it is the pre-requisite for invocation of jurisdiction of the Labour Court. The worker has to first bring his grievance to the notice of his. Employer in writing within three months from the cause of grievance and unless this procedure is observed. The finding of the tribunals below that services of the respondents were terminated by the petitioners and close their business without permission of the Labour Court by virtue of Order 11-A of West Pakistan Standing Orders 11-A is not in accordance with the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in South British Insurance Employees Union's case (1975 SCMR 49) and the relevant observation is as follows:-- "Thus, the Labour Court's permission might indeed be the last step in the process of closing down, or an application in this behalf may be made by the employer simultaneously with any other step that he may have to take to wind up his business and close down his establishment. The Standing Order does not appear to us to spell out any sequence in which the various steps for closing down an establishment have to be taken by an employer, and, therefore, no question arises of the respondent having committed any illegality in this behalf."
' The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the respondents received the benefits from the petitioners and, therefore, stopped by virtue of their conduct to file petitions before the Labour Court under section 25-A of I.R.O. 1969 has no force as per principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in NLR 1993 Tribunal decision (Labour 217 (sic) ) General Manager National Radio Telecommunication's case. Similarly the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that petitioners are well within their right to terminate the services of the 50% of the staff of their own choice has no force as per principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in PLD 1981 SC 81 (Islamabad Club's case). In view of what has been discussed above, the writ petitions are accepted and impugned orders of both the tribunals are set aside and cases are remanded to the trial Court to decide the cases afresh keeping in view the mandatory provision of section 25-A of I.R.O., 1969 whether the petitions filed by the respondents are within time or not and then decide the controversy between the parties in accordance with law without being influenced by the aforesaid observations. Parties are directed to appear before the Punjab Labour Court No,4 Faisalabad on 24 11-2000.