KARAM ELAHEE CHAUHAN, J.--Muhammad Javed Khan (respondent) was employed as a Junior Clerk in the National Bank of Pakistan, vide appointment Letter No. ZO-Estt/569, dated 17-1-1973. He claimed that he was eligible to (a) "ad hoc relief" and (b) "special pay benefits" on the basis of certain circulars, etc. Mentioned in detail in his application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance XXIII of 1969. However, as the above-mentioned "reliefs and benefits" were denied to him, he, therefore, filed the aforesaid application in the Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, which was allowed on 5-11-1976.
2. The Department i.e. The Senior Vice-President (General Manager) National Bank of Pakistan, Zonal Office, Lahore, hereinafter called the petitioner, filed an appeal which was accepted by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, on 10-8-1977, on the ground that the grievance notice issued by the employee under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was barred by time and hence his application in the Punjab Labour Court No. 1, Lahore, was not maintainable. The Tribunal, it may be mentioned, in view of its aforesaid finding did not advert to the merits of the case or the claim of the employee and recorded no finding in that respect.
3. The respondent employee then filed a constitutional petition being Writ Petition No. 3553/77 which was accepted by the Lahore High Court vide its judgment and order dated 14-1-1979 whereby the order of the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal was declared as to be without lawful authority. The High Court held that the petition had been filed by the employee within the requisite period of limitation on the subject. The petitioner, i.e. The Bank, has come up in a petition for special leave to appeal against the same to this Court.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioner/Bank has argued that the petition of the employee was time- barred and the finding to the contrary as recorded by the High Court was not correct. Developing the argument he referred to section 25-A of the Ordinance which so far as relevant reads, as follows :---- Learned counsel argued that a decision of the head office was communicated to the Zonal Office in Lahore vide letter dated 10/18-12-1974, whereby such employees as the respondent herein were held as not eligible for the above--mentioned claims. The aforesaid letter duly answered representation which on the subject had been made by the employee on 9-4-1974. At that stage the employee sent a "grievance notice" dated 18-7-1975, under section 25-A of the Ordinance. He was informed on 1-8-1975 that the matter was under consideration and will be attended to in due course. The aforesaid letter dated 1-8-1975 reads as follows :- "With reference to his application dated 18-7-1975, Mr. Muhammad Javid Khan, Junior Clerk, NBP/Z O., Lahore, is advised that his case is under our consideration and we shall advise him as soon as the decision is taken."
On 25-8-1975 the employee filed a petition in the Labour Court. It was argued that it was filed after lapse of a period of 1 year and 8 months from the original refusal dated 10-12-1974 andwas therefore time-barred when examined in the light of subsection (4) of section 25-A of the Ordinance. The contention has no merit. The cause for approaching the Labour Court arose on 1-8- 1973 and the employee could file an application therein within a period of two months there from as stated in subsection (4) of section 25-A. In this case his application filed on 25.8-1975 was thus well within time. When confronted with this situation learned counsel submitted that what he really meant was that the "grievance notice" sent on -18-7-1975 was itself time-barred inasmuch as it should have been sent within 2 months from 18-12-1974 when the representation of the employee dated 9-4-1974 was turned down. This plea also has no substance inasmuch as "grievance notice" has to be sent "within three 'months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises. In the instant case the letter dated 18-12-1974 (sometimes also described as 10-12-1974), it appears, was a sort of general advice by the Head Office to the Zonal Office (and not any direct communication addressed to the employee). It is only when he learnt that his claim was not being accepted just op. a general plea, he sent the requisite grievance notice which has not been shown to be time- barred. Here it may be stated that in reply to the final "grievance notice" sent by the employee he was never informed that it was being rejected as it was out of date. Rather he was told that the matter was (still) under consideration. In the circumstances the plea regarding any defect in the relevant "grievance notice" on the ground of limitation cannot be accepted. The High Court held that it was a recurring cause of action and from that point of view notice was not time-barred. We need not decide that aspect of the matter and leave it open for consideration in some appropriate case and for the purpose of the present order it will be sufficient to hold that on the facts and in the circumstances above-mentioned the grievance notice was not time barred with reference to the date mentioned above in detail.
5. The next point argued by the learned counsel was that the rights or reliefs claimed by the employee were not such which were guaranteed o secured to him by any law award or settlement.
For this purpose he referred to subsection (l) of section 25-A which to excuse repetition lays down that "A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his shop steward or Collective Bargaining Agent within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises." A grievance he argued which did not fall under the aforesaid subsection could not have been accepted by a Labour Court. He further submitted that none of the Courts below has addressed itself to this matter even though it was specifically and formally raised in the grounds of appeal in the Appellant Tribunal and in written statement before the High Court, with the result that even if the High Court was pleased to accept the writ petition by upsetting the finding of the Appellate Tribunal on the point of limitation, the proper course the reader was to remand the case to the Tribunal for disposal of the petitioner's appeal on merits particularly the plea just above--mentioned. The contention seems to have force.
All that the High Court in this respect observed in para. 6 of its judgment was as follows:---- "It is quite clear from the portions of two circulars reproduced above that the petitioner was entitled to the benefits and that the same had been unlawfully refused to him by the respondent. He was, therefore, lawfully entitled to receive the same and the decision of the Labour Court did not suffer from any defect on its merit."
The aforesaid portion, it is evident, does not meet the precise objection of the petitioner which according to him was being raised with reference to subsection (1) of section 25-A. We do not want to go into this matter ourselves and we are of the opinion that the ends of justice will be met if the case is remanded to the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore for decision of the above-mentioned plea in accordance with law after giving due hearing to both sides. Consequently we grant leave to appeal and converting this petition into appeal, accept the same and send the case to the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal Lahore, for disposal of the appeal of the Bank on merits as above mentioned. There shall be no order as to costs. The Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal should decide the appeal within a period of two months.