' NAZIM HUSSAIN SIDDIQUI, J.---This appeal by leave of this Court is directed against the judgment, dated 8-10-1995 passed by learned Judge in Chamber, Lahore High Court, whereby S.A.O. No,18 of 1995, was allowed.
2. Leave to appeal was granted to consider if the landlady required the premises in good faith for her own use and for the use of her son.
3. Respondent Sultan Mahmood is a son and legal representative of deceased Mst. Khurshid Begum, who had filed an eviction application in respect of a shop constructed on Plot No,SE-6R- 65-III, Allama Iqbal Road, Garhi Shahu, Lahore, hereinafter referred to as "the premises" against the appellants, under section 13 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, hereinafter called "the Ordinance, 1959" for their eviction from the premises on two grounds namely, personal need and damage to the property. It was contested by the appellants. The application was allowed by learned Rent Controller vide order, dated 7-6-1993, holding that the premises were required by her for her own use, for the use of her son and also for her grandson.
4. In appeal the order of Rent Controller was set aside by Additional District Judge on 31-10-1994, with the findings that though the need of grandson of landlady stood proved, but in law a tenant could not be evicted for the need of grandson. Above order of learned Additional District Judge was impugned before High Court successfully and the appeal was allowed.
' The order of learned. Additional District Judge, dated 31-10-1994 was set aside and the appellants were directed to hand over the possession of the premises to the respondents within 4 months from the date of said order.
5. High Court, while allowing the appeal, observed that learned Additional District Judge failed to note that in the eviction application the landlady pleaded for own use in addition to the need of her grandson. Relying upon the case reported as Muhammad Anwar and another v. Muhammad Saeed and another (1991 SCM R 2337), wherein it was held that, even, if in the eviction application the requirement of any children of landlord is not pleaded, yet, their need could be spelt out from evidence adduced by the parties, High Court took the view that, though the landlady had not specifically pleaded that the premises were required for her son, but that omission by itself was not sufficient for non-suiting her, as it was established from the testimony of 3 witnesses namely, Muhammad Hassan, A.W.1, Attaullah Nisar, A.W.2 and Suhail Shahzad Mahmood, her attorney, A.W.3, that Sultan Mahmood (son of the landlady) had retired from service and wanted to establish his own business in the premises. It was also established that grandson of the landlady was jobless and intended to run a medical store in the premises, being a Pharamacist.
6. Above finding of the High Court is in consonance with the evidence brought on record and there is nothing wrong in the conclusion drawn by the High Court on the basis of testimony of the witnesses named above. On this ground alone the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
7. Unfortunately learned counsel for the appellants has not rendered any help to the Court, when he argued the matter. In fact, he was not even fully aware with the facts of the case and was not able to give reply to any question put to him during the course of arguments nor he cited any case-law.
8. In the memo. Of appeal a ground has been taken that whether the eviction could be ordered for bona fide need of grandson. This point was raised before the High Court also, but was not resolved, saying that the bona tide need for the son of landlady was clearly established, therefore, it was of no use to dilate upon it.
9. Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) of the Ordinance, 1959 is as follows:- ' "He requires it in good faith for his own use or for the use of any of his male children."
10. In the case reported as Muhammad Fareed Khan v. Haji Mir Zaman Khan (PLD 1982 SC 278) leave to appeal was granted to consider whether the need of the grandson was covered by the expression "for the use of any of his male children". This point, however, was not decided and the matter was disposed of on other grounds with an observation that the controversy in regard to the interpretation of the word "children" had no efficacy in said matter.
' In the case reported as Muhammad Zahir Khan v. Ch. Shah Muhammad (PLD 1980 Lahore 125), learned Single Judge, while interpreting above-quoted clause of section 13, took the view that term "child, the sons and daughters" of the landlord ordinarily means children in first degree and that there was nothing to suggest that said term was intended to apply to the entire progeny of the landlord. He also observed that a landlord could ask for his needs and the first generation of his off springs, and not for grandchildren or other descendants beyond the first generation as it was the headache of their respective parents to take care of their needs. For the purpose of interpretation of said clause, he dissented from the Shorter Oxford Dictionary, 3rd Edition, page 301 according to which, the term "child includes descendant also".
' Just above-quoted case was cited, in the case reported as Mian Abdul Hafeez v. Mst. Faridunnisa (1985 SCM R 939), wherein the following was observed:-- ' "It was then contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the view of the High Court that section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance extends to the requirement of a child who is no longer dependent on the landlord was erroneous and untenable. We see no force in this submission, and are unable to give such a restricted meaning to the plain words of the clause in question which seems to extend the ground of personal requirement to the use of the landlord's children, no matter whether they are dependent on him or not. It was also argued on the basis of Muhammad Zahir Khan v. Ch. Shah Muhammad. PLD 1980 Lah. 28 that the word 'children' denotes sons and daughters of the landlord and not descendants beyond the first generation, like grandchildren. Counsel sought to refer to the evidence on record to show that the case of the respondent was that the premises were not only required for the use of respondent's daughter but also to children of the latter. Since we propose to uphold the order of the High Court remanding the case for fresh decision to the Controller on the merits of the case. It will be for the Rent Controller to determine this question whether the requirement of the premises for the use of respondent's daughter alongwith her children is bona fide or not. We would only refer here to a decision of this Court in Abdus Salam v. Najam Parvez 1976 SCM R 52, in which this Court held that the personal need for the use of a brother of the landlord who was dependent on him, would be included in the words 'own occupation' and these orders cannot be confined to the personal requirement of the individual landlord alone. On a parity of reasoning if it is established by landlord that the premises are required for the bona fide use of a child, then the use for the purpose of those dependent on such child would also be covered by the provision, if the premises are required for the use of such child alongwith his or her dependents."
In the case Mst. Faukhar-un-Nisa v. Safdar Ahmed and 6 others (PLD 1985 Karachi 639), while dealing with the expression "children" it was held that this included independent and married children.
' Likewise, in the case Mian Abdul Hafeez referred to earlier, it was held that the expression "children" includes married daughter.
11. Adverting to the facts of the case in hand, it is noted whether the expression "his own use" can be restricted to use of an individual only or its scope can be enlarged. If restricted meanings are assigned, then even in certain cases individual/landlord may not be entitled to above benefit due to his old age and infirmity etc., as a plea may be raised that physically he was not able to run any business, therefore, the case would not fall within the scope of expression "his own use". This could not be the intention of the Legislature and such, restricted meaning could not be assigned. If premises are used by landlord through the assistance of .Others, still it would fall within the ambit of above expression.
12. In our social system oftently for various reasons the grandchildren are brought up, looked after and educated by their grandparents. In case the grandparents reside with their grandchildren, the need of both of them become one and inseparable. Need of the children in first degree is linked with the need of their own children (grand children). It would be very harsh to deny a benefit to grandchildren, which is available to their parents. After the property devolves upon their parents, the grandchildren automatically move in the category of first generation. In other words their status is changed from grandchildren to children, for the purpose of clause (3)(a)(ii)(a) of section 13, quoted above.
13. We are of the view that words "in good faith for his own use" appearing in above-quoted section need liberal interpretation. It is not the words of any statute but its spirit that makes the law meaningful. The Ordinance, 1959 looks after interest of both landlord and tenant. The Court shall carry out real purpose rather than to defeat it. Even otherwise, a construction, which promotes improvement in the administration of justice and removal of defects, should be favoured over one, which protects wrong.
14. We do not subscribe to the view taken in the case of Muhammad Zahir Khan and overrule it.
Accordingly, we hold that the words "in good faith for his own use" are to be interpreted to include the requirements of grandchildren also.
15. In consequence, the appeal is dismissed. Three months' time is granted to the appellants to hand over vacant possession of the premises to the respondents. In case of non-compliance of above order, the Writ of Possession shall be issued without notice to the appellants with police aid, if necessary.