ZULFIQAR AHMAD KHAN, J.---This constitutional petition under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, has been filed by the petitioner against concurrent findings of the Courts below in rent proceedings.
2. Precisely, facts of the case are that the petitioner is undisputedly one of the owner of House No,A/1535 situated near Khoja Jamat Khana, Tando Wali Muhammad, Hyderabad, rented out to respondent No,1 at the rate of Rs,600/- per month payable up to 5th of each Calendar through writing down an agreement dated 10.08.1999 and respondent No,1 who was always found defaulting in payment of rent, thus, on the surety of respondent No,1 's brother Zahid Hussain, another agreement was executed for regular payment of monthly rent at the rate of Rs,700/- per month while outstanding rent of Rs,10,050/- was to be paid within two months but it was not paid. It was further case of the petitioner that due to increase of his family size and since their current did not meet the requirement, he needed the demised premises on account of bona fide use. Being faced by these situations the petitioner eventually filed the Rent Application No,21 of 2011.
3. Respondent No,1 contested the above rent application and the Rent Controller after hearing the parties, turned down the said rent application vide order dated 25.05.2012. Petitioner assailed the said order by filing First Rent Appeal bearing No,36 of 2012, which was also dismissed vide judgment dated 11.10.2013, which aggrieved the petitioner to file the instant petition.
4. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the demised premises has long been required for personal bona fide use of the petitioner's family members and he adduced sufficient evidence in support of this claim but both the Courts below did not consider the very personal needs and in a hasty manner turned down his prayers. Counsel further submitted that both the Court failed to consider the fact that respondent No,1 always defaulted in payment of rent and despite giving several chances, he did not return to pay the rent in time, hence, orders of both the Courts below are illegal on that account too thus, call for interference of this Court as suffering from patent illegality and material irregularity. In support of his contention, counsel for the petitioner, relied upon case laws reported at 2002 SCMR 241, 2001 CLC 834, 1999 YLR 1234, 1991 SCMR 1421, PLD 2008 Karachi 189 and 1995 SCMR 323.
5. To the contrary, counsel for respondent No,1 submitted that the petitioner could not prove the ground of eviction being personal bona fide use and default in payment of rent, therefore, both the Courts below rightly dismissed the claim of the petitioner Counsel further submitted that case premises is not required by the petitioner for personal bona fide use and he filed the application in order to put pressure to increase the rent amount. Counsel for respondent No,1 placed reliance on case laws reported at 2002 MLD 1266, 1996 SCMR 1178, 1992 SCMR 1296 and PLD 2000 Karachi 41.
6. Learned A.A.G. fully supports the orders of the Courts below and submitted that prayer of the petitioner in the Constitution jurisdiction having limited scope is liable to be dismissed.
7. This Constitutional Petition is filed against the concurrent findings of the Courts below in a rent matter and I am fully aware of the fact that very limited scope is permitted in the Constitutional Jurisdiction to interfere in the rent matters but I am also cognizant of this Court's responsibility to protect property rights envisaged by Articles 23 and 24 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It appears that very reasons for the Rent Controller declining claim of bona fide use of the petitioner was on account that the petitioner failed to, mention particular name(s) of any person from his family or co-sharer for whom the said premises were needed, while the learned Rent Controller has acknowledged that during cross examination, the petitioner submitted that the premises is needed for the marriage of his son. The learned Rent Controller treated it as a variance between his need and need of another family member PW Kousar and chose to disallow the application on these grounds. The appellate Court also upheld the said reasons of not naming the person(s) for whom the premises was required. In my humble view, none of those two Courts was competent to pierce through the family needs seeking pin-pointation of the person for whom the property was needed as long as need was coming from within the family, which evidently is the case. In this regard guidance could be sought from judgments of the apex Court reported at and 2001 SCMR 550, where apex Court held that need of a family member of the landlord is to be treated as need of the landlord himself. Taking lead from Section 2(g) of the Sindh Rented Premises Ordinance, 1979, which defines personal use, to mean "the use of the premises by the owner thereof or his wife (or husband), son or daughter" and seeking help from the text of Clause-vii of Subsection (2) of Section 15 of SRPO which provides that the Rent Controller shall make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the premises within such period as may be specified in his order, if he is satisfied that the landlord requires the premises in good faith for "his own occupation or use or for the occupation or use of his mouse or any of his children". A collective reading of Section 2(g) and Section 15(2)(vii) makes it very clear that SRPO treats the landlord and his spouse or his family member as 'one unit' and becomes satisfied to handover the possession to the landlord under Section 15(2)(vii) to an; of those. There is no requirement to breakdown the solidarity and integrity of this family-unit and put in the witness box landlord's wife or his children or other family members for whom the landlord needs the tenanted property. If that would have been the intention of the legislature, it would have been so specifically spelt-out therein, which is not the case at hand, therefore, it is up to the landlord to satisfy to the Rent Controller that the tenanted property is needed by him, his wife or children making no exposure to his wife or children for them to come in the witness box and be examined or cross-examined individually. This veil of family- integration is not allowed to be ruptured and a tenant cannot object to the internal arrangement worked out by the family amongst themselves in this regard. In the case of Mustafa Haji v. Umbichi [reported as 2004 (2) KLT 1110], the Court in the similar situation held that non-examination of son of the landlord was not fatal to a petition for the use and occupation of the rented out property by the landlord for his son. Also in the case of Gulraj Singh v. Dr. Harbans Singh (reported as AIR 1993 (sic)
1574, 1993 SCR(1) 149, Court held that non-examination of the son was not fatal to the petition for eviction.
8. Also keep in sight are findings of the apex Court in circumstances where a person once inducted into a premises as a tenant and later disclaiming his relationship with landlord, the apex Court in a case law reported at 1978 SCMR 14 held that such tenant is disentitled for seeking equitable relief in ejectment petitions. This is also the case of present tenant, who having been inducted into the ancestral property of the petitioner is now claiming that no landlord / tenant relationship exists between the parties. In my humble view this conduct itself disentitles the tenant from any equitable relief.
9. Now I come to the case laws cited by the counsel for respondent No,1 being 2002 MLD 1266, 1996 SCMR 1178, 1992 SCMR 1296 and PLD 2000 Karachi 41. It is noted that all of these cases relate to commercial properties, which pose different challenges and have different dynamics away from the personal bona fide needs for the properties solely needed for residential purpose, thus, not applicable in the present case.
10. In the given circumstances, I find that the judgment/order of the Courts below are devoid of any merit, suffering from gross illegality and material irregularity, which are hereby set-aside by allowing this petition, resultantly respondent No,1 is directed to handover the vacant physical possession of the case premises to the petitioner within a period of not more than 30 days.