' MUHAMMAD BASHIR JEHANGIRI, J.---The petitioner, who is occupant of disputed house situated in Raja Bakalzai, Tehsil Muslim Bagh in Balochistan, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Balochistan dated 14-9-1998 whereby Revision Petition No,301 of 1997 challenging an order of dismissal of an application filed by the respondent/landlord for the eviction of the petitioner which had been dismissed was accepted and the petitioner was ordered to be evicted.
2. Nasrullah respondent filed an application under Article 7(1)(a)(b) and (g) of the British Balochistan Rent Control Regulation (No,II of 1944) (hereinafter called as the Regulation), for the ejectment of Dr. Ghulam Siddique petitioner from the house in dispute on the ground that the petitioner has not paid and is not ready and willing to pay the rent due for over five years and that the respondent bona fide required it for his personal use and occupation.
3. This application was resisted by the petitioner in the written statement. Both the grounds raised by the respondent for the eviction of the petitioner were traversed.
4. On the pleadings of the parties, it appears, as many as six issues were framed but for the purpose of this petition, the following issues are relevant:--
(1) Whether there exists landlord-tenant relationship between the applicant and the respondent with regard to the house described in para. No,1 of eviction application?
(2) Whether the applicant is in bona fide need of house in question?
(3) Whether the respondent is liable to be evicted from the house in question?
5. The learned Civil Judge exercising the powers of the Rent Controller, Loralai, took Issues Nos.1 and 2 together and held that there existed relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties, inasmuch as the respondent was the owner/landlord of the disputed house. On Issue No,3, he found that the respondent did not bona fide require the disputed house either for his own use or of his brother. On Issue No,4, the Rent Controller held that the assertion of the respondent as to the default in payment of rent due by the petitioner for the last six years was not substantiated by any evidence. As a cumulative effect of these findings, the Rent Controller rejected the application on 31-10-1997. The respondent/landlord filed a revision petition before the learned High Court of Balochistan under the Regulation which was accepted by a learned Judge in Chambers. In this context, the learned Single Judge observed as under:- ' "A careful scrutiny of the evidence as led by the respondent would reveal as follows:--
(a) Admission (of the petitioner) regarding ownership (of the respondent).
(b) Admission regarding execution of agreement/rent deed (Mark AW-2/A).
(c) Specific amount incurred on the house could not be mentioned.
(d) Factum of default has been admitted.
(e) Admission regarding service of notice for eviction of the house."
6. On the basis of the evidence led by the respondent, the inference drawn by the learned Single Judge was that 'the has substantiated his claim by producing cogent and concrete evidence". It was further held that the house in dispute was bona fide required for the use of not only the petitioner but also of his brother, particularly when the petitioner had admitted the factum of default in payment of rent. The learned Single Judge was no doubt conscious of the fact that the petitioner had deposited the rent on 30-4-1998 for the year 1996 but as the ground of default had been agitated in the revision petition, therefore, there was no option left to the petitioner but to deposit the rent so as to avoid the consequences of default by depositing the rent during the pendency of the revision petition before the High Court. The learned Single Judge took notice of the fact that the revision was filed on 15-12-1997 whereas the arrears of rent for the year, 1996 were deposited during the pendency of the revision petition on 30-4-1998, therefore, under Article 7(1)(a) of the Regulation, the petitioner was defaulter in payment of rent, and that under Article 7(1)(g) of the Regulation, there was no bar for the landlord to get the house vacated for personal bona fide use of either respondent or of his brother. As a result of these findings, the revision petition was accepted and the impugned order passed by the Rent Controller was set aside and the petitioner was directed to be evicted from the disputed house with the direction to him to put the respondents in vacant possession of the disputed house within a period of three months.
7. Mr. Muhammad Aslam Chishti, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court, in support of this petition, contended, firstly, that under Article 7(1)(b) of the Regulation, if the tenant was not ready and willing to pay the rent of the premises for any period during which he may continue to be in possession only then the eviction could be ordered and, secondly, that under Article 7(1)(g) of the Regulation, it is a sine qua non for passing the order of the eviction of the tenant if "the premises were reasonably or bona fide required by the landlord either for the erection of buildings or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held provided that a month's notice to quit has been served on the tenant"; but in the instant case, the respondent's claim is not for his own occupation of the house but it is for the occupation of his brother who was unemployed which is not covered by the phraseology employed in clause (g)
(ibid), namely, "for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held". While elaborating the phrase 'for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held', the learned counsel had urged that this phraseology employed in clause (g) contemplated an attorney of the landlord or guardian ad litem of a minor landlord for whose benefit the premises are held and did not warrant order of eviction for the occupation of the son, brother or parents of a landlord in contradiction to what has been provided for under either the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) or the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (No,XI of 1963).
8. The learned counsel for the petitioner had also challenged the propriety of the assertion of the respondent/landlord that the petitioner was a defaulter in payment of rent within the purview of Article 7(1)(b) inasmuch as it had not been proved by the respondent that the petitioner was not only ready but was unwilling to pay the standard rent of the premises for any period thereafter. The learned counsel interpreted this clause to mean that the landlord had to discharge the onus by adducing credible evidence that the petitioner was not ready and willing to pay the standard rent of the premises for any period thereafter during which he may continue to be in possession.
9. As against this, Mr. Basharatullah, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court representing the respondent, contended that it was established on the record of the case that the petitioner had not only admitted that he had failed to pay the rent for the year 1996 as a whole but even after the dismissal of the application for this eviction by the Rent Controller, he did not deem it necessary to make the payment of the arrears of the rent at least for the year 1996 and onward. According to the learned counsel, even after the dismissal of the application for eviction and during the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court, which was admitted to regular hearing on 15-12-1997, the petitioner had neither offered to pay the defaulted rent nor deposited it till 30-4-1998. Mr. Basharatullah also brought to our notice that after the deposit of the rent on 30-4-1998, for the period ending April, 1998, no further rent was deposited; further that was only after he moved an application for suspension of the execution application filed in the executing Court after the acceptance of the revision petition by the High Court, that a learned Judge of this Court in Chamber, ordered the suspension of the High Court's order of eviction subject to deposit of rent".
(Underlining is ours for providing emphasis). Notwithstanding this direction, according to Mr. Basharatullah, the petitioner remained adamant to deposit the rent and, therefore, he was clearly a defaulter within contemplation of Article 7(1)(b) (ibid). Likewise, he had submitted that the phraseology "the premises are reasonably or bona fide required by landlord for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held "included that bona fide requirement of the house by the nearest relative, namely, the son or the brother of the landlord.
10. We have not been impressed by the first contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that if the tenant was not ready and willing to pay the rent of the premises for any period during which he may continue to be in possession implied that the eviction of the tenant cannot be ordered and that after only demand of the landlord if the tenant was proved to be neither ready nor willing to pay the arrears of rent only then an order of eviction could be passed against the tenant. The bare reading of Article 7(1)(a) and (b) of the Regulation would show that in these two clauses two different periods of default in payment of rent by a tenant have been envisaged. In a situation as visualized in clause (a) (ibid) if the tenant has not paid and is also not ready and willing to pay the rent in respect of the period before the application for eviction the default referred to one that was committed prior to the filing the application .For eviction whereas in clause (b). (ibid) the visualized default was for "any period thereafter during which the tenant may continue to be in possession" which envisages the period after filing of the application for eviction. It would thus be noticed that the period of default has been divided into two classifications: firstly, the period before filing of the application and, secondly, any period thereafter i.e,, after filing of the application. It would thus be noticed that these two clauses of Article 7 (ibid) are exhaustive enough which are to be read conjunctively catering for the two separate periods of default in payment of rent. The construction placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the words "is not ready and willing to pay the rent due ...." occurring in clauses (a) and (b) (ibid) is that these words visualized a notice of demand to be served upon the tenant fixing the period for payment of rent due and that without any such notice, the landlord was not entitled to seek his eviction even if the tenant was proved to have defaulted in payment of rent and would not be liable to eviction. We regret that we have not been convinced with this construction placed on two clauses. In this context, we may point out that under the general rules of literal construction of the statute nothing is to be added to or to be taken from a statute unless there are similar adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statutes that a clause not provided for in the statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted, as the omission appears to have been unintentional. The plain reading of the clauses (a) and (b) of Article 7 (ibid) provide for a situation in which the tenant has not only not paid but is also not ready or willing to pay the rent which contemplated habitual defaulter in payment of rent for a sufficient length of time in contradiction to a defaulter in payment of rent for a month or so only once or twice in a given period.
11. The conduct attributed to the petitioner which the learned Judge in Chambers- of the High Court was justified to have noticed as to the habitual nature of the petitioner to be a defaulter is unexceptionable. The learned Judge has, therefore, rightly adjudged the petitioner to be a defaulter within the meaning of Article 7(1)(a) and (b) with particular reference to his failure to deposit the rent for the period during which the application for eviction remained pending. The learned counsel for the respondent has rightly brought to our notice the default in payment of rent by the petitioner even after the first deposit of the rent during the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court because notwithstanding the order of the learned Single Judge of this Court, the petitioner ignored to deposit the rent due after the first deposit of the defaulted rent during the pendency of the revision petition in the High Court. The conduct of the petitioner throughout has been that he has not only failed to pay the rent but was not ready and willing to pay the rent due within the contemplation of Article 7(a) and (b) both. We have, therefore, no hesitation to uphold the findings of the learned Judge in Chambers of the High Court who has also been justified in setting aside the findings of the Rent Controlller/Civil Judge who had completely ignored the conduct of the petitioner manifested on the record of the case as a habitual defaulter in payment of rent in respect of the period not only before the application for eviction but also for the period thereafter during which he had been in possession of the premises.
12. Nonetheless we agree with the construction put by the learned counsel for the petitioner on Article 7(g) that unfortunately this clause of the Regulation does not visualize the inclusion of the bona fide requirement of the premises of the landlord/respondent by his son, daughter or brother because the phraseology "for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held" implies only the person for whose benefit the premises are held by the landlord which may include the principal for which the landlord is holding a power of attorney or a minor whose guardian ad litem the landlord may become and does not include any relative of the kind within the contemplation of the West Pakistan Rent Restriction Ordinance (VI of 1959) or the Cantonments Rent Restriction Act (No,XI of 1963).
13. Mr. Muhammad Aslam Chishti, learned Advocate Supreme Court appearing on behalf of the tenant/petitioner, lastly expressed his doubt as to the competence of the civil revision filed in the High Court inasmuch as according to him, no right of revision has been conferred on either of the parties who has not been successful in his claim before the Rent Controller. What the learned counsel for the petitioner had attempted to argue was that the civil revision filed by the landlords/respondent in the High Court was not competent as there was nothing in the Regulation which conferred such a right on an aggrieved party. In response to this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Basharatullah, learned Senior Advocate Supreme Court has referred to the case-law from the Quetta jurisdiction itself, namely, (i) Haji Sheikh Meraj-ud-Din and another v. Haji Seth Abdul Ghafoor Rishi '(PLD 1979 Quetta 118), (ii) Khudai Rahim and others v. Mst. Noor Jamal and 2 others (PLD 1989 Quetta 54) and (iii) Syed Din Muhammad v. Mst. Amina Bibi and 7 others (PLD 1994 Quetta 42). In the precedent of Sheikh Meraj-ud-Din (supra) a learned Single Judge had rightly repelled the contention that right of appeal to an aggrieved party in the proceedings under the British Balochistan Rent Control Regulation No,II of 1944 was conferred on it, and rightly so. But according to the learned Single Judge a revision to the High Court under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be filed in all cases "emanating from the Regulation for the reason that supervisory jurisdiction of this Court extends to all the decisions made by the Courts below and the High Court is, therefore, competent to fall for the record of any case decided by a Court subordinate to it for the purposes covered by section 115 of the Code". The reasoning that found favour with the learned Single Judge in this above well-considered judgment in this behalf was that since no right of appeal was available under the ,Regulation against the order of eviction, it was all the more necessary that the provisions of section 115 of the Code were made attracted to such cases. The view of the learned Single Judge expressed above to the extent that a revision to the learned District Judge was also available was dissented from in the latter two judgments cited above. While according the affirmance to the revisional jurisdiction available to the High Court against the order of the Rent Controller/Civil Judge exercising the powers under the Regulation, a learned Division Bench of the High Court of Balochistan in the case of Khudai Rahim (supra) while affirming the principle enunciated in the case of Meraj-ud-Din (supra) as to the availability of right of revision to the High Court in the cases emanating from the proceedings under the Regulation dissented to the extent that "since the Law Reforms Ordinance having not been extended to the Tribal Areas of Balochistan, the revisional jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Would only be exercised by the High Court and not by the District Judge". This principle was later on reiterated in the case of Din Muhammad (supra) by a learned Single Judge of High Court of Balochistan wherein he had observed that the provisions of section 2 of the Law Reforms Ordinance, 1972, having not been extended to the Tribal Areas of Balochistan, the revision jurisdiction under section 115, C.P.C. Would only lie to the High Court and not to the District Judge.
14. In the light of the case-law cited at the Bar from the Quetta jurisdiction, we have examined the proposition with care and are inclined to approve the principle enunciated in the three precedent cases from Quetta jurisdiction that the revisional jurisdiction in the peculiar circumstances of the cases emanating from the proceedings under the Regulation was available to the High Court. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on this score is without any substance and stands repelled.
15. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any substance in this petition for leave to appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs throughout. In consequence, the petitioner is directed to put the respondent/landlord in vacant possession of the demised premises within three months.