The facts framing the background of the case may briefly be narrated as under;
1. Both the first petitioner, a tenant of the respondent, and the 2nd petitioner a sub-lettee in house No. 1285 situated in Loralai Town were sought to be ejected by the respondent vide application dated 13th July 1970 on the grounds of subletting and bona fide personal use. In their written statements the petitioners strongly repudiated both the averments and further urged that since no mandatory notice as required to be served under section 7(l) (g) of the British Baluchistan Rent Regulation II of 1945 (hereinafter referred to as the "Regulation") in case the ejectment was sought on the ground of bona fide personal use had been served upon the first petitioner, the case was liable to fail to that extent. Necessary issues were framed by the Civil Judge, Loralai on all the points requiring determination in the case but surprisingly he failed to frame an issue on the point of service of notice and also did not give any finding on this point although a copy of the notice as well as the acknowledgement card showing its service upon the first respondent were placed on record by the respondent as is evident from the order of the District Judge, Quetta impugned in this petition. However, he allowed the application accepting the ground of bona fide personal use on 28th November 1973. The plea of subletting was turned down for want of satisfactory proof.
2. The petitioners feeling aggrieved by the above-mentioned order filed an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the "Code") in the Court of District Judge, Quetta who vide order dated 30th May 1974 dismissed the same treating it a revision petition on the ground that no appeal was competent in cases of orders of eviction passed under the Regulation.
It is now against the order of the Civil Judge, Loralai dated 28th November 1973 and the last mentioned order of the District Judge, Quetta that this revision application has been preferred under section 115 of the Code.
3. Since in a large number of cases the question as to whether within the framework of the Regulation filing of an appeal making use of section 96 of the Code could be considered legal and valid was involved, I requested Messrs S. H. Jafri, I. H. B. Hanafi, Mohd. Moquim Ansari, Azizullah Memon and Munawar Ahmad Mirza, Advocates almost all of whom are appearing in cases emanating from the Regulation raising the same or similar points to assist the Court. Mr. Basharatullah appeared for the respondents.
4. In this case two questions require decision; of which the question of basic importance is whether an appeal lies against the decision of the Civil Judge passed in eviction cases in the areas forming part of British Baluchistan and other areas to which the Regulation applies. It is so because the decision of this question will not only provide a guideline for future cases, but the fate of several pending cases also depends upon the decision of this question. Here it may be mentioned that this question has arisen only because the Regulation is conspicuously silent about appeal or Revision against the orders of eviction passed on various grounds. This situation created utter confusion which exists since long and the aggrieved parties have some times resorted to appeals to the District Judge and some times to revisions and such courses were pressed into service on mere assumption that since the proceedings under the Regulation are essentially of Civil nature therefore provisions of section 96 or 115 of the Code would be applicable. In the light of this situation I would humbly try to settle the question as to what remedy, if any, was open to an aggrieved person under the Regulation against an order of the Civil Judge. The other question that requires consideration strictly pertains to the case in hand and arises out of the contention raised by Mr. Nawaz that since no issue had been framed to determine the question of service of notice upon the petitioner, the decision of Civil Judge, Loralai whereby he ordered petitioners eviction on the ground of bona fide personal use was absolutely illegal.
5. Before I discuss the provisions of the Regulation in order to decide the controversy with regard to availability or otherwise of appeal against the orders of eviction it would be pertinent to refer that unlike other Provinces of Pakistan Baluchistan had four different assortmeuts of territory, namely (1)
The British Baluchistan, Chief Commissioner's Province consisting of the Disti icts of Pishin and Sibi and Duki Tehsil of Loralai District; (2) the tribal areas comprising the districts of Kohlu and Murri Bughti, Loralai, Zhob and Dalbandin, including Western Sinjawi country being subject to treaties and agreements between the British Government on the one hand and the Sardars and Maliks on the other; (3) the - leased areas, consisting of districts of Quetta and Bolan, the Nushki Tehsil and Nasirabad Sub-division all these being part of Kalat State, acquired in 1883 and later by an agreement with the then Khan of Kalat; and (4) the States of Kalat, Mekran, Las Bela and Kharan. In 1952 these 4 States were merged into the Baluchistan States Union and thus comprised of a compact unit and evicted so until the province of West Pakistan had come into being. In the field of law as well as in executive field the agent to the Governor-General of India acted in three different capacities that is besides his capacity of Agent to the Governor-General for all the territories under British control, with regard to British Baluchistan he was Chief Commissioner and with regard to the Baluchistan States he was a resident. It may be mentioned here that in all these four different assortments of territories no uniformity of law ever existed until today and different areas are governed by different legal systems such as Frontier Crimes Regulation, Ordinances I and II of 1968, the Regular laws and Dasur-ul-Amal Diwani in Kalat Division. I need not go into any larger details of various laws enforced in different areas as that would not be necessary for the purposes of deciding this case. Adverting to the Regulation it is an undisputed fact that it was enacted by the then Governor. General of India in exercise of powers conferred upon him by subsection (3) of section 5 of the Government of India Act,, 1935 on 8th day of February 1945 for the purposes of control of rents and generally to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants. As it implies by its nomenclature the regulation was meant for and actually extended to the whole of British Baluchistan with effect from the dates notifications were issued in this behalf by the Chief Commissioner of Baluchistan as shall be seen from section 2 thereof. By dint of section 3, the Chief Commissioner was authorised to extend it through a notification in any part of British Baluchistan as and when he deemed proper. Here it may be referred that Mr. Basharatullah had at the very inception of his arguments contended that decidedly Loralai being a tribal area as shall also be seen in the case of Sher Mohd. And 2 others v. The State ('PLD 1956'Lah. 1056), the regulation did not extend to it, hence all other questions raised for consideration of the Court were absolutely redundant. Undoubtedly Loralai with the exception of Dukbi Tehsil forms part of tribal areas as is evident from the reference made to different areas of the Province earlier, and it could be said that Loralai was excluded from the operation of the Regulation but Mr. Muhammad' Nawaz Ahmed placed before me the Notification No. 2408-G/45, dated 3 April 1945 issued by the Agent to the Governor-General whereby theRegulation was extended to Loralai Town. Accordingly Mr. Basharatulla's contention is wholly devoid of substance.
5. Referring to scheme of the Regulation, it shall be seen that it provides for the fixation of standard rent and eviction of tenants on the grounds of non-payment of rent, subletting, raising of unauthorised structure, misconduct and annoyance caused to the neighbours, causing of danger to the building, bona fide personal use etc. (section 7) only. By mean of section 4 it invests with powers to decide cases covered by it to such Courts which would normally have jurisdiction to hear and decide suits for eviction of tenant. By such Court is meant a Court of civil jurisdiction created under the Code which Courts did exist in Loralai. As such, the Courts under the Code were also notified to function as Courts under the Regulation. This is as far as the scope of the Regulation and the com--petency of the Courts functioning under it is concerned and this discussion would provide ample answer to the argument advanced by the learned counsel that in fact a civil Court created by the Code and not a Court created by the Regulation decided cases falling under the Regulation and therefore the Code was fully applicable insofar as appeal and revisions, etc. Were concerned. Evidently it is not so. The fact of the matter is that Courts created by the Code are also the Courts created by the Regulation. I shall, however deal with this proposition in still larger detail at the appropriate place.
6. Before proceeding further ix would be pertinent to remark that the Regulation as it originally existed neither made provisions for appeal nor for revision against any order whatsoever passed under it, but in the year 1954 vide Regulation No. V, subsections (7), (8) and (9) were inserted in section 7 of the Regulation which deal with the determination of disputes regarding rent. In order to appreciate and determine the scope of these subsections I am reproducing them below:- "Section 3. Determination of disputes regarding rent.-(I) If any dispute arises regarding the standard rent payable in respect of any premises, it shall be determined by the Court.
(2)------------- (3)------------- (4)------------- (5)----------- (6)------------- (7)--- Any person considering himself aggrieved by an order passed under the provisions of this section from which no appeal has been preferred may within third day of the passing of the order apply for review to the Court which made the order and the provisions of Order XLVII in First Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall apply to such review.rd
(8) An appeal from an order by the Court determining standard rent made under the provisions of this section may be made to the District Judge within thirty days of the passing of the order.
(9) The Court of Judicial Commissioner of Baluchistan may revise any order determining standard rent passed under the provisions of this section, whether on appeal or otherwise, and the provisions of section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 shall so far as may be apply to such revision."
The position that emerged after the insertion of subsections (7), (8) and (9) was that reviews, appeals, and revisions become available in cases in which determination of standard rent was involved. It would be of great interest to note here that with regard to such remedies the procedure of the Code was made specifically applicable. As far as the cases of eviction of tenants were concerned no provision of appeal, review or revision was made even at this stage and, therefore, the question arose whether the aggrieved parties were left with no remedy at all by way of appeal, review or revision in case of orders passed in eviction cases and if so, whether or not it was derogatory to the general principles governing the administration of justice which unfailingly provide right of at least one appeal in almost all the statutes against the order passed on the original side. This question can well be answered if we keep in view some of the laws still enforced in Baluchistan. For instance in Frontier Crimes Regulation which governs entire tribal areas of Baluchistan no appeal has been provided and only a revision and that too on very limited grounds is available although the canvas of F. C. R. Is very wide both on the Civil and Criminal side as it applies to all kinds of cases of however high pecuniary value or howsoever high sentence of punishment they may be involving. However strange the position may seem but it is a fact that the law-makers in Baluchistan tried to introduce peculiar systems of administration of justice best suited to their interest as colonial powers and it was done regardless of the fact that act aggrieved person was being deprived by them of a vested right in the form of appeal. It is pointles3 to discuss or criticise the policy of the law-givers of this part for we have to follow the course open to us within the framework of a law which is an existing and valid law, how--ever harsh it may appear to be, for we can not add or subtract anything from it. All what can be done is that it should be so interpreted that it may become more and more beneficial to the public at large. Beyond that we cannot proceed. Keeping these limitations in view we have to remain within the four corners of the legislation while interpreting the Regula--tion, as well, and so, it would not be justified by any stretch of imagination to presume that the Legislature while enacting the Regulation was not cognizant of the fact that it was depriving the aggrieved persons of the right of the appeal. On the other hand from the fact that the rights of review, appeal and revision were introduced vide Regulation V of 1954 in case of determination of disputes regarding rent alone, it becomes all the more clear that not only at the initial stage when the Regulation was introduced but in the later years when it was reviewed the Legislature was fully cogni--zant of the fact that the right of appeal, review and revision had not been provided in the Regulation yet it considered it expedient to provide such right to a very limited 'extent, i.e. In cases emanating from the disputes regarding rent whereas in respect of eviction matters it again considered it expedient not to make such right available. Accordingly it would not be fair and logical; much less lawful to ' introduce such right within the scheme of the Regulation, through long drawn presumption and conjectures. The law is conspicuously silent about it and it has to be read in its real shape and spirit. Mr. Nawaz Ahmed the learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that 'since the cases falling within the purview of the Regulation were admittedly decided by a civil Court and the word `decree' bad been used for the final orders passed in eviction cases, therefore, the intention of the law-makers was that the procedure of the Code would become automatically applicable and this is the sole reason for not providing a specific provision in this regard. He further submitted that by virtue of section 141 of the Code also the procedure of the Code would apply to the proceedings under the Regulation and every order passed under it would be appealable. He further contended that since the Regulation had not specifically barred the exercise of right of appeal, therefore, also this right which is a vested right of an aggrieved person to its nature should be considered available in case of eviction. Besides this he referred to section 12 of the Regulation which reads as under and argued that by virtue of subsection (3) of this section entire procedure of the Code from the inception of the proceedings till the passing of the decree and thereafter up to the filing of the appeals and execution of the final orders was available in all cases decided under the Regulation :- Section 12.-(1) The Chief Commissioner may, by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Regulation.
(2) Rules made under this section shall be subject to the condition of previous publication.
(3) Subject to any rules that may be made from time to time under subsections (1) and (2) and unless otherwise is declared by the Chief Commissioner, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908) shall, so far as is consistent with the provisions of this Regulation and of the British Baluchistan Courts Regulations (Regulation VII of 1939) apply in regards to the institution and determination of plaints and applications, appeals and applications for revision or review, and giving effect to any orders passed under this Regulation."
Now I will take up all the contentions raised by Mr. Nawaz one by one in order to examine whether by virtue of all these contentions the right of appeal would be deemed available despite fact that the Regulation itself is silent on this point. The first limb of Mr. Nawaz's argument is that since civil Courts decided the eviction cases, therefore, the right of appeal would automatically become available. The argument does not appear to be sound on the face of it because firstly it is not necessary that a civil Court on the original side or a High Court in the hierarchy of civil Courts constituted under the Code while acting under any special law providing different procedure would still be bound to follow the procedure of the Code. Rather the factual, position is that such Courts would be bound by the procedure of the Special law under which they are functioning regardless of the fact that such Courts were originally found under the Code. It would thus be fallacious to argue that simply because a Court is a creation of the Code it would be justified in making deviations from the procedure by which it is bound and to revert to' the whole or any part of the procedure laid down in the Code It would further beerroneous to presume that since a Court was created under the provisions of the Code, therefore, automatically the Code would be available to fill in the gaps left out by the special laws or by virtue of this fact the procedure of the Code whether in respect of appeals or in any other context would become automatically available.
Furthermore there being no right to the procedure a Court shall be bound to confine its authority within the limits provided by the law under which it has assumed jurisdiction4nd it would be unjustified for it to transgress Such limits and pre into service the provisions of any other law which has not been provided to it to make use of. Accordingly by virtue of the fact that the Courts deciding cases under the Regulation are not only Courts under the Regulation but are also Courts under the Code are not supposed to follow the procedure laid down in the Code beyond the permissible limits provided by the Regulation nor an appellate Court in the hierarchy of such Courts can assume appellate jurisdiction under section 96 or 100 of the Code on such reasonings.
Further the language of section 4 of the Regulation makes it crystal clear that Courts created by the Code had not been invested with the powers to decide cases in accordance with the procedure of the Code. All what has been said is that such civil Courts which are normally raised of the jurisdiction to decide civil suits for eviction shall try the cases under the Regulation. In fact in the light of the scheme of section 4 of the Regulation it can be said that a Court while deciding a case under the Regulation is not only bound by the procedure laid down in the Regulation but it is also a Court created under the Regulation and it is a mere coincidence that such Courts are creation of two different statutes, i.e. The Code and the Regulation.
The second limb of the arguments of Mr. Nawaz was that since the word decree has been used in the Regulation for the final order therefore the legal incident that would follow from it would be that this word shall have to be construed in the same sense as in the Code and since decrees passed in cases to which the procedure of the. Code applies were subject to appeal, review and revision, the same would be the position in cases decided under the Regulation also. The word "decree" had been defined by section 2 of the Code as under :-
(2) " `Decree' means the formal expression of an adjudication which, so far as regards the Courts expressing it, conclusively determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of the matters in controversy in the suit and may be either preliminary or final. It shall be deemed to include the rejection of a plaint (the determination of any question within section 144 and an order under the Rule 60, 98, 99, 101 or 103 or Order XXI) but shall not include-
(a) any adjudication from which an appeal lies as an appeal from an order, or
(b) any order of dismissal for default.
Explanation.-A decree is preliminary when further proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely disposed of. It is final when such adjudication completely disposed of the suit. It may be partly preliminary and partly final."
From the definition of the word decree it is evident that it means formal expression of a Court with regard to the adjudication of a civil dispute or final or partial adjudication of a dispute or conclusive or partial determination of rights of the parties in any matte- in controversy in suit.
Keeping in view the definition of word "decree" we can neither say that the word decree by virtue of its "definition as found in the Code is capable of giving' right of appeal within the scheme of the Code as has' been argued by Mr. Nawaz nor can it be said that the word decree has been G used in the Regulation to mean a decree on the same footings as it stands in the Code. In fact right of appeal in the Code itself does not flow from section 2 of the Code which is merely definition of the word decree.
The right of appeal has been independently provided by means of sections 96 and 100, etc. Of the Code. It cannot therefore be said that if a decree happens to be appealable in the scheme of the Code same should be the consequences in other laws whether or not they make a specific provision of appeal like the one in the Code. Even if it is admitted for the sake of argument that since every decree passed finder the Code is appealable therefor wherever this word is used. It will entail same or similar consequences, the fact remains that we would be omitting to appreciate that the words used in different laws are necessarily to be given such meanings as may be suitable logical expedient within the framework of that law. In the Concise Oxford Dictionary (Sixth Edition) the word "decree" has been defined to mean" Ordinance or edict set forth by authority, judgment in Court of equity, admiralty, probate, or divorce". Looking to the plain dictionary meaning of the word "decree" all what can be said is that the decree follows at the stage of culmination of certain proceedings before a Court of law and constitutes formal expression of decision of such Court with regard to a dispute brought before it. Accordingly in my view the word decree has been used in the Regulation in its plain dictionary meaning and by virtue of the use of this word it cannot be presumed that appeal would become automatically available against orders of eviction passed under the Regulation only because such orders have been termed as decrees.
Mr. Nawaz next argued that by virtue of section 141 of the Code the provisions with regard to appeal would come into play in the proceedings under the Regulation as these proceedings are necessarily of civil nature. Section 141 is reproduced below for convenience of reference :- "Section 141. Miscellaneous proceedings.-The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be mad applicable proceedings, in any Court of Civil jurisdiction."
This provision of law is permissive and not directive in nature. It would be of help only in such cases where no procedure of its own is available for the trial of a case under the law governing it or in such cases where some, lacunas are to be found in such procedural law which cannot be filled in order to make it logical and reasonable without making use of an of the provisions found in the Code. It does not at all mean that notwithstanding the fact that a definite procedure has been laid down by a special law for the trial of case to which such law applies the Code shall be necessarily followed in supersession of that special procedure Such a view if taken, would be highly illogical and unreasonable. In the instant case it is evident that the Regulation is independent in many fields but wherever the law-makers have considered it expedient, to be benefited from the provisions of the Code they have made their intention quite clear by express introducing specific provisions in this regard. This fact is evident from the subsequent insertion of subsections (7), (8) and (9) in section 3 as well as by section 1.2 with which we shall be dealing later. It is thus quite clear that the law-makers were conscious of the fact that a comprehensive procedure for the trial of cases of civil nature was available in the Code but they preferred to enact a special law for the cases governed by the Regulation made use of the provisions of the Code wherever they considered is necessary. This is nothing unprecedented either. In many a fields of litigation special procedure has been provided for trial of cases and the Code has also been applied to certain extent. Such instances are numerous and need not be cited. Accordingly the argument of Mr. Nawaz in this context is unacceptable.
8. Mr. Nawaz next argued that since the Regulation had not specifically barred the filing of the appeals therefore in the interest of justice it would be expedient to hold that appeals could be filed in all eviction matters. In this connection he placed reliance on Durga Charan v. Markande Misir and another (AIR 1939 All. 322). In this case it was held that in cases of civil nature ordinary procedure including right of appeal will apply. He next placed before me the case of Thakar Tribhuwan Bahadur Singh v. Baij Nath (AIR 1940 Oudh 196), but the fact as well as the dictum laid down in this case is absolutely irrelevant to the proposition in hand. The next case cited by him was Digambar Ponda and.Another v. Satlsh Chandra (AIR 1939 Cal. 717). In this case it was held that proceedings under section 20-G of Bengal Tanancy Act started by an application and not by a plaint and therefore the order passed under this section was not an order in a suit, as such, it was not appealable, This case also does not help him much for the question under consideration in the precedent case was whether appeal against an order was competent like an appeal against a decree. Mr. Nawaz next placed before me the case of L21a Mahadeo Prasad v. Bhdiya Lal Bakhsh Sing (AIR 1937 Oudh 12), in which case with reference to U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act it was held that since decisions in cases under this Act culminated into the passing of a decree, therefore, right of appeal under section 96 of the Code was available and it shall be presumed that the law was silent on this point only because a decree was to be passed in such cases. He next produced Hem Singh and others v. Basant Das and another (AIR 1936PC93). .In this case section 34 of Punjab Sikh Gurdwaras Act under which decrees were granted by the High Court was considered and it was held that the High Court did not exercise any special jurisdiction in cases governed by this law, as such, right of appeal to Privy Council was available. The question involved in this case is distinguishable from the one which- is under consideration in the present case. In fact even if some remote benefit can be derived from the authorities of the Courts of Indian Judicature to support the argument that as far as possible right of appeal should be made available remaining within the four corners of law in all suitable cases where proceedings culminated into the pa sing of a decree, such trend of authorities cannot be followed by us without consulting the view taken by our own Courts in similar circumstances. I would therefore discuss the case-law on the point available in Pakistan to form a conclusive view in the matter.
In Hussain Bux v. Settlement Commissioner, Rawalpindi and others (PLD1970SC1), it was held the right of review of any decision of a Court of law like the right of appeal is a substantive right and not mere matter of procedure. Accordingly right of review is not available unless it has been conferred by law.
In Muhammad Aslam v. The State (PLD 1959 SC (Pak.) 119) the nature of this right was considered and it was held that an appeal was the creation of statute andwas essentially in the nature of a right.
In Pir Mohd. Farad Jan v. Colonisation Ofcer, Sukkur Barrage, Hyderabad anti others (PLD 1965 SC 339), it was held that :- "As an appeal is the creature of statute and must be confined within the limits imposed by the relevant statute.
In the Essential Industries v. Central Board of Revenue (PLD 1969 Lah. 24), it was held that the right of appeal was not merely a matter of procedure but substantive right. In this case the question with regard existence of right of appeal on a particular day under the relevant statute was involved and it was held with regard to the extinction of such right that it could only be taken away through an enactment.
In Ghazi and others v. The State and another (PLD 1962 Lah. 662), also it was held that the right of appeal was not a matter of procedure but was a substantive right and that there was no vested right in the procedure.
From the law discussed in the above-mentioned authorities it is evident that the right of appeal was in the nature of a vested right in contradiction to a mere procedure matter and that a person would not be at liberty to invoke this right unless it is specifically provided in the statute governing his case. The importance of this right need not be emphasised for it is so well known but at the same time it cannot be ignored that vested right is always to be provided for by the relevant statute and it cannot come into existence by imaginations conjectures or far-fetched presumptions. With reference to the Regulation I may once again remark that right of appeal, review and revision had not been provided against any kind of decision made under it when enacted but subsequently in the year 1954 such rights were made available only in cases concerning disputes regarding rent and shall have to be considered confined to the findings which the legislators intended it to cover. Accordingly I am of the view that absence of specific bar does not come to the rescue of the petitioner, for, the entire scheme of the Regulation is such that despite absence of specific for right of appeal cannot be read into the Regulation by any stretch of interpretation favourable to the parties interest and also akin to establish judicial norms.
9. Mr. Nawaz lastly argued that by virtue of section 12 of the Regulation which deals with the Rule- making powers of the Chief Commissioner and also refers to the applicability of the Code to certain extent in the matters governed by the Regulation, the right of appeal will be deemed available, in the Regulation. I have already reproduced this provision of law and to provide an answer to the contention of the learned counsel suffice it to say that the procedure of the Code would apply in the matters enumerated in subsection (3) which includes appeals also. But only for the fact that the procedure of the Code has been made applicable to the appeals, wherever provided, it cannot be said that the right of appeal comes into existence in all cases. All what this provision of law says is that in whichever case an appeal has been provided for the same shall be decided following the procedure of the Code. Admittedly the necessity of introducing this provision was felt realising that if at all at any future stage right of appeal was considered necessary to be introduced a provision should exist in the law with regard to procedure that should be followed for the decision of such appeals. But as this section does not create right of appeal, therefore, it would be a fallacy to hold that it caters for the situation as argued by Mr. Nawaz Ahmed. He also placed before me an unreported decision of a Single Judge of erstwhile High Court of West Pakistan in Second Appeal No.37/1964 whereby it was held that since rules had not been framed under section 12 of the Regulation the right of first as well as second appeal was available to aggrieved parties but I record my regrets for being unable to agree with this view:
10. Mr. Jafre, while supporting the arguments of Mr. Nawaz Ahmed further added that the Code was applicable to the cases falling under the Regulation by reference and that the provisions of the Regulation with regard to procedure should be read together with that of the Code so as to sort out the difficulty, if any, or meet an anamolous situation as well as to discover the intention of the law- makers specially with regard to the availability of a provision of appeal. I am unable to agree with him for the sole reason that the Legislature could easily provide appeal, review or revision in case of eviction also the way if did in cases of determination of standard rent. Their silence in the matters is meaning-full and clearly speaks of their intention, therefore, to say that the Code applied by reference is far from being logical. Mr. Hanafi and Mr. Mohd. Moquim Anaari, while adopting the arguments of Mr. Nawaz argued in favour of the existence of right of appeal in cases under the Regulation almost on the same grounds hence, their submissions hardly need a specific reference. On the other hand learned Advocate-General, Mr. Basharatullah, Mr. Azizullah Menton and Mr. Munawar Ahmad Mirza, argued that such right was not available in the light of the scheme of the Regulation. Since my conclusions are also the same it goes without saying that I entirely agree with them.
The upshot of the discussion is that there exists no right of appeal in eviction cases decided under the Regulation. However a revision to this Court or to the District Judge, as the case may be under section 115 of the Code can be filed in all cases emanating from the Regulation for the reason that supervisory jurisdiction of this Court extends to all the decisions made by the Courts below and this Court is therefore competent to call for the record of any case decided by a Court subordinate to it for the purposes covered by section 115 of the Code. Since; no appeal is available under the Regulation against the orders of eviction therefore it is all the more reason that the provisions of section 115 of the Code are attracted to such cases.. The learned Advocate-General also fully contributes to this view.
Accordingly I am of the view that the appeal filed in this case was rightly refused to be entertained by the District Judge and he committed no error in law to treat it as a revision petition under section 115 of the Code and decided it as such.
The second contention of the learned counsel was that no notice as envisaged by section 7(1)(g) of the Regulation had been served upon the first petitioner in this case and that the trial Court had also not framed an issue to adjudicate this point, therefore, the eviction of the petitioner could not be ordered on the ground of bona fide personal use. In this connection it would be sufficient to say that it was not only mentioned in the application for eviction that a notice as required under the 'al had been served upon the petitioner but a copy of the same together with the postal acknowledgement card was also produced before the trial Court as A/1 and Exh. A/2. In view of this evidence the Civil Judge as well as the District Judge were justified in recording their conclusions that mandatory provision of section 7(1)(g) of the Regulation had been fully complied with in this case. 'This fading of fact is even otherwise incapable of a re-opening within the purview of section 115 of the Code. I there--fore hold that the impugned order do not suffer from any legal infirmity.
For the foregoing reasons I do not find any substance in this revision petition which is hereby dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case there shall be no order as to costs.
9. Before I part with this case I consider it most appropriate to record my appreciation for the learned counsel who very ably assisted me in this case.