' IFTIKHAR MUHAMMAD CHAUDHRY, J.---This appeal is by the leave of the Court against the judgment, dated 17th December, 1995 passed by Lahore High Court, Lahore whereby Writ Petition No,10667 of 1991 filed by the appellant has been dismissed.
2. Facts necessary for disposal of instant appeal are that appellant terminated services of respondent Muhammad Idrees son of Mubarak Ali, Chowkidar on 31-3-1991 as he was found guilty of misconduct during his service. The respondent questioned termination of his service by filing a grievance petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (hereinafter referred ~to as the "I.R.O.") read with. Standing Order No,12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the "Ordinance") in the Court of Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court II, Lahore. The appellant resisted the application inter alia on the ground that application is not maintainable as appellant's Organization is a educational institution, therefore, it does not fall within the definition of Industry under section 2(xiv) of I.R.O. The objection so raised prevailed with trial Court, as a consequence whereof grievance petition filed by the respondent was dismissed vide order dated 24th August, 1991. Against this order respondent filed an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, which was allowed on 15th October, 1991. The appellant invoked Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court by filing a writ petition but without any success, as it was dismissed vide impugned order, dated 17th December 1995. As such instant appeal by leave of the Court has been filed.
3. Mr. Umar Mehmood Kasuri, Advocate Supreme Court appeared on behalf of appellant whereas respondents Nos.1 and 2 were proceeded against ex parte. Respondent No,3 also did not opt to defend the appeal.
4. Learned counsel contended that appelant organization is an educational institution, therefore, it does not fall within the definition of Industry or Industrial Establishment in terms of section 2 (xiv) of I.R.O. And section 2(f) of the Ordinance nor its employees fall within the definition of worker or workman for the purposes of any proceedings under I.R.O. In relation to an industrial dispute, therefore, learned Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court, was not justified in maintaining the judgment order of Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, dated 15th October 1991 in pursuance whereof the case was remanded to Presiding Officer Labour Court for decision of the controversies existing between the parties after giving proper opportunity to the parties to lead evidence on the questions of facts. In support of his contention he relied on AIR 1963 SC 1873, PLD 1976 Lahore 1097 and 1994 SCMR 2213.
5. As per section 2 (f) of the Ordinance Industrial Establishment means:-- "(f) 'Industrial establishment' means--
(i) an industrial establishment as defined in clause (ii) of section 2 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (IV of 1936); or
(ii) a factory as defined in clause (j) of section 2 of the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of 1934); or
(iii) a railway as defined in clause (4) of section 3 of the Railways Act, 1890 (IX of 1890); or
(iv) the establishment of a contractor who, directly or indirectly, employs workmen in connection with the execution of a contract to which he is a party, and includes the premises in which, or the site at which, any process connected with such execution is carried on; or
(v) the establishment of a person who, directly or indirectly, employs workmen in connecton with any construction industry; ' Explanation.--"Contractor" includes a sub-contractor, headman or agent."
' Section 2 (xiv) of I.R.O. Defines industry as under:- "(xiv) 'Industry' means any business, trade: manufacture, calling, service, employment or occupation."
' Whereas section 2(i) of the Ordinance provides definition of workman according to which any person employed in any industrial or commercial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled, manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Standing Order 12(3) of the Ordinance provides that the services of workman shall not be terminated nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service except by an order in writing which shall explicitly state the reason for the action taken. In case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance. At this stage it is equally significant to note that under section 25-A of I.R.O. Forums for the redressal of individual grievance has been provided firstly by registering his grievance by bringing it in the notice of his employer either himself or through his shop steward or collective bargaining agent within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises and if his grievance petition has not been redressed under subsection (4) of section 25-A of I.R.O. The worker or shop steward has been empowered to take the matter to his collective bargaining agent or the Labour Court as the case may be. The collective bargaining agent may take the matter to the Labour Court and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were in an industrial dispute. (Emphasis provided).
7. A careful study of the provisions referred to hereinbefore persuades us to hold that to invoke the jurisdiction of Presiding Officer under section 25-A, I.R.O. It is essential for an employee to satisfy that he is worker or workman either under the provisions of the Ordinance or the I.R.O. and his grievance relates to an industrial dispute meaning thereby that an industrial dispute can arise only when such aggrieved person is connected with an industry or industrial establishment, therefore, both expressions industry or industrial establishment require interpretation in their origin and true sense to ascertain as to whether institution imparting education falls within the definition of industry or industrial establishment. This Court in the case of Ahmad Sadiq v. Chief Settlement Commissioner (PLD 1974 SC 368) has interpreted the word "industry" as follows:-- "The basic concept of 'industry' or its derviative 'industrial undertaking' is that there must be joint economic endeavour of the employer and the employee, to produce wealth or render services. In other words, what comes out of an 'industry' must be the result of combined effort of both the capital and the workmen and must be distinguished from what is commonly known as business or trade. In the case of industry, the relationship of employer and employee is not that of a mere master and servant."
Taking into consideration the above definition of word "industry" without any fear of doubt it can safely be held that the institutions responsible for imparting education like the appellant's organization does not fall within the definition of industry. At this stage reference advantageously can also be made to The University of Dehli and another v. Ram Nath and others (AIR 1963 SC 1873) wherein with reference to the definition of industry qua educational institution under Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 it was held that educational institutions does not fall within the definition of an industry. Relevant para. For convenience therefrom is reproduced hereinbelow:-- "(8) It is true that like all educational institutions the University of Dehli employs subordinate staff and this subordinate staff does the work assigned to but in the main scheme of imparting education, this subordinate staff plays such a minor, subordinate and insignificant part that it would be unreasonable to allow this work to lend its industrial colour to the principal activity of the University which is imparting education. The work of promoting education is carried on by the University and its teachers and if the teachers are excluded from the purview of the Act, it would be unreasonable to regard the work of imparting education as industry only because its minor, subsidiary and incidental work may seem to partake of the character of service which may fall under section 2(j)."
' The above judgment alongwith number of other case-law were surveyed by a learned Single Judge in Chambers of Lahore High Court in the case of K.D. Old, Principal, Christian Technical Training Centre, Gujranwala v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court, Northern Zone and 6 others (PLD 1976 Lahore 1097). Relevant paras. Therefrom are reproduced as under:-- "48. The moment the expression 'industrial unit' comes up for interpretation we are reminded of the aggregate or the group or the genre of which it is a part. It is not sufficient that there should be an industrial unit. What is required in addition is that it should exist for industry and not for any other non-industrial purpose. Thus, a scheme for rehabilitation of destitute women, or disabled and infirm men, or the blind may have as its integral part workshops, or industrial units but as its existence would not be for industry it would not fall within the definition of industry. There is a whole range of case-law on this. The sale of milk and manure was held to be not industry (Madras Pinjara Pole v. Labour Court (1961 PLC 414)) where the main object and purpose of the undertaking was to afford shelter, food and medical treatment to unserviceable cows, including dry cows till the end of their lives. Such sales being incidental to the main object, notwithstanding having a business tinge about them."
"51. It is, therefore, not sufficient that there be an industrial unit. What is required is that such industrial unit, office, firm, shop must be for industry and for no other purpose. Here the word 'industry' will have the same meaning as in the definition. Such a construction imputes no redundancy or surplusage to the Legislature. On the contrary it explains the fullest significance of the expression 'industrial unit and industry'.
"52. The upshot of the entire discussion is that the use of the expressions 'Business' Trade, Manufacture, Calling, Service, Employment or Occupation' in the definition of Industrial Relations Ordinance is not in its ordinary dictionary meaning but in its popular and conventional meaning. In the context of industrial and labour laws, these expressions apply to any enterprise which is organized and is systematic depending substantially, if not entirely, on the cooperation between labour and capital, and having as its object production, distribution and consumption of wealth, or the production or provision of material service. The enterprise as a whole has to be looked at to find out its raison d'etre, and any part of its which is incidental, ancillary or an adjunct cannot determine the character of the whole."
' With reference to the facts of the case of K.G. Old (supra) it may be noted that said institution was engaged in offering technical education in the field of woodwork, sheet mental welding, electrician etc., and it had its own workshop but despite of that it was held that it is an educational institution and training establishment and if it is maintaining an industrial unit (workshop) rendering services on payment, adverting its products, it is as an incidence of vocational education and of training programme designed to ensure job opportunities to the trainees. Therefore, what is incidental to the main purpose cannot detract in any manner, from its being an educational institution. Applying this test on the facts in hand we feel no difficulty in concluding that appellant's organization is neither an industry nor it falls within the definition of industrial establishment, therefore, its employees cannot be considered to be worker or workman either under I.R.O. Or Ordinance.
8. On having concluded so the next question for consideration would be as to whether the employees of an educational institution can invoke the jurisdiction of Presiding Officer Labour Court under section 25-A, I.R.O. Answer to this proposition has been given by this Court in the case of Trustees of the Port of Karachi v. Muhammad Saleem (1994 SCMR 2213). Relevant paras. Therefrom thus read:- "22. Turning to the facts of this case, the parties were agreed that the respondent was, while he was still in the employment of the appellant, a worker for the purposes of section 25-A read with clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance. There is also no question that the right conferred by section 25-A is not a common law right; it is a statutory right expressly conferred by section 25-A of the Ordinance. As in the case of any other statutory right, so here, in order to avail himself of that right, a person must fulfil the necessary conditions precedent to the exercise of that right. One such condition here is that the person who claims that right must be a worker. By clause (xxvii) of section .2 of the Ordinance a worker is a person--
(a) who does not fall within the definition of employer;
(b) who is employed in an establishment or industry for hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be express or implied; ' and includes for the purpose of any proceedings under the Ordinance in relation to industrial dispute a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched,'Iaid-off or otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay-off, or removal has led to that dispute. Thus a person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched, laid-off or otherwise removed from employment is not a worker unless his dismissal, discharge etc., had connection with or was in consequence of an industrial dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, etc, had led to such a dispute. The words 'for the purpose of any proceedings under this Ordinance' show also that the definition of the expression ' worker' as contained in clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance applies also to the proceedings under section 25-A of the Ordinance.
23. Here, it was not the case of the respondent before the Labour Court, before Labour Appellate Tribunal or before this Court that his dismissal, discharge etc. Was in any way related to an industrial dispute. This was, therefore, a case of individual dispute unrelated to an industrial dispute. We hold, therefore, that the respondent was not a worker for the purposes of section 25-A read with clause (xxviii) of section 2 of the Ordinance. It must follow inevitably that he was not entitled to the remedy provided by section 25-A of the Ordinance and that the Labour Court and Appellate Labour Tribunal were, therefore, right in their view that remedy was not available to him."
9. In view of law laid down in above judgment we are inclined to hold that respondent No,3 does not fall within the definition of worker or workmen as defined under section 2 (xxviii) of I.R.O. Or under section 2(i) of the Ordinance nor he was a member engaged in an industry or industrial establishment, as such he has no entitlement to invoke the jurisdiction of Presiding Officer Labour Court under section 25-A, I.R.O. Because question of termination of his service was not relatable to an industrial dispute.
' Thus, for the foregoing reasons appeal is allowed and as a result whereof impugned judgment, dated 17th December, 1995 passed by Lahore High Court in Writ Petition No,10667 of 1991 is set aside.
No order as to costs.