' MUHAMMAD YUNUS SURAKHVI, J.---This appeal, by way of leave of the Court, has been directed against the judgment passed by the High Court on 8-3-2000, whereby the writ petition tiled by respondent No,1 was accepted and a direction was given that the land in dispute comprising Survey No,996, measuring 3 Kanals and 4 Marlas, situate in village Pang-Piran, Tehsil Kotli, which was earlier de-awarded by the Government shall not be acquired again for the purposes described by the Municipal Committee, Kotli.
2. The necessary facts, giving rise to the present appeal, are that land comprising Survey Nos.996 and 996-Min, situate in village Pang-Piran. Tehsil Kotli, was acquired by the Collector Land Acquisition through awards, dated 17-5-1984 and 13-3-1989 for the construction of District Headquarters Hospital Kotli approach Road and for Housing Scheme alongwith some other land.
Respondent No,1 moved an application to the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government stating therein that his land had been acquired for Housing Scheme but he is in possession of the land measuring 3 Kanals and 4 Marlas, comprising Survey No,996, as such the land be de-awarded. The Prime Minister on the said application ordered for de-awarding the land.
A notification to this effect was issued on 25-7-1993. When this fact came in the knowledge of the Works Department it approached the Government and explained that the land has been awarded for the Housing Scheme, District Headquarters Hospital Kotli, approach Road and that after the award the Scheme has been implemented. The Hospital approach Road and other roads have been completed. The sewerage lines have been laid under the roads and in some land the plots have been allotted. The notification was withdrawn on 14-11-1993. Respondent No,1 filed a writ petition in the High Court on 27-10-1993. The writ petition was accepted on 24-4-1998 and Notification, dated 14-11-1993 was declared as unlawful. The Chairman Municipal Committee Kotli and one Muhammad Mansha filed an appeal before the Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed. However, this Court observed as follows:-- "After reaching the aforesaid conclusion that the land under dispute had been validly de-awarded the conclusion which follows is that the land could only be acquired Through de-novo acquisition proceedings as has been held by the high Court. "
' The appellants subsequently moved the Collector District Kotli for the acquisition of land measuring 3 Kanals and 4 Marlas, comprising Survey No,996, situate in village Pang-Piran, Tehsil Kotli, for the purpose of District Headquarters Hospital approach Road, sewerage line and allotment of plots through requisitions, dated 26-12-1998 and 11-3-1999. The Collector Land Acquisition issued notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act on 3-3-1999 and a notice under section 5-A of the said Act was also issued to respondent No,1 on 1-5-1999, whereby he was asked to file objections till 10-5-1999. Respondent No,1 on 12-5-1999 again filed a writ .Petition in the High Court. A learned Judge in the High Court vide his impugned order, dated 8-3-2000 accepted the writ petition tiled by respondent No,1 and a direction was given that the land in dispute which was earlier dc-awarded by Government shall not be acquired again.
3. It was observed by the High Court. That action of Municipal Committee, Kotli in the aforesaid circumstances of the case is a mala fide and further actions by Collector District, Kotli as well as by the Collector Land Acquisition suffer from same defects and cannot be treated to be bona fide.
4. In support of appeal it was vehemently contended by Ch. Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned counsel for the appellants, that the proceedings of acquisition initiated by the Collector Land Acquisition cannot be stopped by anybody if the land has been acquired for public purposes. Since the land in dispute was initially acquired in 1984 which was de-awarded due to the political influence of respondent No,1 and on the intervention of the then Prime Minister a notification was issued for de-awarding the land in dispute. However, on the litigation initiated by respondent No,1 the High Court as well as the Supreme Court observed that acquisition proceedings of the land in dispute could have been initiated by de-novo acquisition proceedings. In continuation of the previous Housing Scheme and widening of District Headquarters Hospital approach Road and for the sewerage of the Housing Scheme, the land in dispute was once again acquired but again the influence of respondent No,1 prevailed and on his application the Prime Minister again ordered that the land in dispute may be de-awarded. However, no formal notification for de-awarding the disputed land was issued. The respondent apprehending the acquisition proceedings again approached the High Court by filing the writ petition which, as stated earlier, was accepted. The learned counsel contended that the High Court erroneously observed that the Collector of the District or the Collector Land Acquisition . Initiated the acquisition proceedings with their mala fide intents and purposes. In the writ petition, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, neither any particulars nor details of any mala fide were mentioned by the respondent. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the appellants, a bare allegations of mala tide was not sufficient in the eye of law to accept the writ petition and to declare the acquisition proceedings by the Collector Land Acquisition as being violative of law. The learned counsel thus contended that the High Court fell in error in accepting the writ petition filed by respondent No, 1 . The learned counsel in support of his contentions relied upon Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Revenue E.A.C. And 7 others (1980 CLC 1504), Abdul Razaq v. Collector Lasbella District (PLD 1986 Quetta 86) and Government of Pakistan v. Sikandar Khan and others (PLD 1987 Peshawar 68).
5. Controverting the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. Ch. Muhammad Riaz Alam, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, contended that the respondent has specifically taken the plea of mala fide in para No,10 of his writ petition which reads as follows:--- "That the whole proceedings taken against the petitioner (respondent No,1 herein) up to this time are mala tide and for the satisfaction of personal revenge of respondents 4 and 5, therefore, the whole proceedings are illegal and without jurisdiction for the following among other reasons.,"
' The learned counsel for respondent contended that even that High Court has recorded a positive finding in favour of respondent that the whole proceedings of acquisition have been initiated by the appellants on the basis of mala fide. The learned counsel also pressed into service the submission that on the application moved by respondent, the Prime Minister of Azad Jammu and Kashmir Government has ordered for de-awarding the land in dispute and this order has not been withdrawn so far by any competent authority. Therefore, the proceedings of acquisition were nothing but a mala tide act on the part of appellants the learned counsel contended that on the disputed land the houses and shops of respondent were constructed and in case the land is acquired, he will suffer irreparable loss.
6. After hearing the respective contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, the point which needs resolution is as to whether the acquisition proceedings initiated by the appellants against respondent No,1 are based on mala fides of the appellants. It was alleged by respondent No,1 before the High Court that the whole proceedings initiated by the Collector Land Acquisition and the Municipal Committee Kotli are based on mala fide. However, the particulars or details of mala tide have not been alleged by respondent. By now the law stands settled that a person who challenges the bona fidely of a public functionary who contends that the public functionary acted mala fide he is under an obligation to establish his case on convincing and cogent legal evidence.
In a case reported as Ajit Kumar Das v. Province of East Pakistan (PLD 1959 Dacca 586) it was observed that it lies heavily on the persop who challenges the bona fide of a public authority or who contends that authority has acted mala fidely to establish his case on cogent legal evidence.
He cannot succeed by leaving the matter in the air and to the ingenuity of his counsel in creating a mere atmosphere of suspicion which falls far short of legal proof. It was further observed that it is well-settled that where an Act or Regulation commits to an executive authority the decision as to what is necessary and expedient and that authority makes the decision, it is not competent to the Courts to investigate the grounds or the reasonableness of the decision in the absence of bad faith.
In a case reported as Sree Raja Kandregula Srinivsasa Jagannadha Rao Pantula Bahaddur v. State of Andhra Kurnool and another (AIR 1960 Andhra Pradesh 343) it was observed that when the land acquisition proceedings are attacked by a petition under Article 226 on the ground of mala fides, the Court is concerned only with the conduct of the Government which is acquiring authority. The existence of mala fides on the part of Government cannot be a matter of inference but must be established affirmatively. Where no want of bona tides is attributed to the Government, the motives of person who urged the Government to start proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are not quite relevant.
' In a case reported as Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Revenue E.A.C. And 7 others (1980 CLC 1504) it was observed that onus to prove mala fides lies entirely on the person alleging mala fides because to start with, there is a presumption of regularity attached with all official acts, and until that presumption is rebutted the action cannot be challenged merely upon vague allegation of mala fides. Just in this context we see that no personal motive has been alleged by the petitioner (therein) against the acquiring authority.
' In as case reported as Walayat Khan and 2 others v. Muhammad Azam and 12 others (PLD 1996 SC (AJ&K) 18) it was observed that material on record clearly indicated that proceedings for acquisition had been initiated with mala fide intents. The jurisdiction of High Court in entertaining the Constitutional petition was not prohibited by law.
7. From the survey of the case-law, referred to above, we have reached the 'conclusion that the respondent who alleged the mala fides on the part of appellants failed not only to allege the same specifically but also failed to prove the same. Thus the notification issued by the Collector Land Acquisition under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act could not be cancelled by the Prime Minister by passing an order on the application of respondent that the land may be de-awarded. In a case reported as Government of Punjab v. Sikandar Khan and others (PLD 1987 Peshawar 68) it was observed that in acquisition cases notification issued under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act could be cancelled only by a notification as contemplated by section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Thus, the mere order on the application submitted by the respondent to Prime Minister that the land may be de-awarded is not sufficient in the eye of law to stop the acquisition proceeding!, initiated by the Collector Land Acquisition .
8. Even the question of public purpose cannot determined by the High Court in exercise writ jurisdiction because it is always the Collector Land Acquisition who determines under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act as to whether a purpose is a public purpose or not. In a case reported as Muhammad Ashraf Khan v. Revenue E.A.C. And 7 others (1980 CLC 1504) it was observed that public purpose broadly speaking means any purpose aiming at promotion of general welfare. Whether a purpose amounts to public purpose is a matter for Government and not for the High Court to decide.
' Since the respondent has failed to allege with clarity any mala fide on the part of the appellants and to prove the same against them, therefore, we accept the appeal by setting aside the impugned order of the High Court. We therefore, order the dismissal of writ petition filed by respondent No,1 in the High Court. In the circumstances of the case, we pass no order as to costs.