KH. MUHAMMAD NASIM, J.---The titled petition for leave to appeal has been directed against the judgment of the High Court dated 10.09.2021, whereby the writ petition filed by the petitioner , herein, has been dismissed.
2. The brief facts for disposal of the instant petition for leave to appeal are that the petitioner , herein, filed a writ petition in the High Court, whereby he challenged the vires of the notification dated 02.06.2021, on the ground that vide notification dated 23.07.2018, the Government awarded crown land on lease in favour of the private respondents from Survey No.922/01/01, measuring 08 marla, situated at Hullar , subject to some conditions..
Condition No.8 of the said notification was that the private respondents/lessee shall not destroy or disturb the Police Check Post or bridge constructe d by Pakistan Army , adjacent to the proposed land and no one shall interfere into the said land. The petitioner claimed that the notification dated 02.06.2021 has been issued in violation of the earlier notification dated 23.07.2018, as in para 8 of the said notification an avenue for parking has been provided to the lease holders, without considering the interest of the. State citizens and the security of the Government institutions, hence the said notification is liable to be set aside. The private respondents Nos.6 and 7 contested the writ petition by filing the written statement, wherein, the claim of the petitioner was refuted in toto.
After necessary proceedings, the learned High Court has dismissed the writ petition, through the impugned judgment, hence this petition for leave to appeal. An application for interim relief has also been filed.
3. Mr. Fayyaz Ahmed Janjua, the learned Advocate, representing the petitioner argued that the impugned judgment passed by the learned High Court is against law and the record of the case, hence the same is not sustainable in the eye of law. He forcefully argued that in the writ petition the petitioner raised important legal questions relating to the fundamental' rights of the State citizens but the learned High Court failed to consider and resolve the same in a legal manner . He argued that the crown land measuring 08 marla comprising survey No.922/1/1, situated at Hullar was awarded to the private respondents on lease vide notification dated 23.07.2018, subject to the condition that the private respondents/leasee shall not destroy or disturb the Police Check Post or bridge constructed by Pakistan Army but through the notification dated 02.06.2021, an avenue has been provided for parking of the Hotel, without considering the interests of the public at large as well as the importance of the security of the Police and the Pakistan Army . He contended that the petitioner bonafidely challenged the act of the official respondents, hence the writ petition has to be decided on merit instead of technical grounds. The learned High Court failed to consider the important aspect of the matter and dismissed the writ petition on flimsy ground, hence the interference by this Court is warranted under law and grant of leave is justified. In support of his version the learned Advocate, referred to the cases reported as Administration Municipal Committee Kotli and another v. Muhammad Abdullah and 3 others 2001 YLR 3367 and Mst. W alayat Begum v . Revising Authority MDA and 3 others 1999 MLD 1549 .
In the case reported as Administration Municipal Committee Kotli and another v. Muhammad Abdullah and 3 others 2001 YLR 3367 , it was observed by this Court that by now the law stands settled that a person who challenges the bona fide of a public functionary who contends that the public functionary acted mala fide he is under an obligation to establish his case on convincing and cogent legal evidence.
In the case reported as Mst. Walayat Begum v. Revising Authority MDA and 3 others [1998 MLD 1549 ], it has been observed by this Court that such places which are used by public at large such as water tanks, gardens, public parks, grave yards and places of worship etc., are not open to any allotment. Obviously , making the allotments out of this area was even otherwise beyond the jurisdiction of the Chairman M.D.A. or the Allotment Committee."
4. Conversely , Sardar M.R. Khan, the learned Advocate, representing the private respondents forcefully opposed die arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that the impugned judgment is perfectly legal which is not open for interference by this Court. He submitted that the petitioner filed the writ petition before the High Court in representative capacity , without the permission of the Advocate-G eneral or the Court, hence the same has rightly been dismissed by the learned High Court. He added that the petitioner does not fall within the ambit of an aggrieved person and has been indulged in the proxy litigation, which is not permissible under law. In support of his version the learned Advocate referred to and relied upon the cases reported as Raja Tahir Majeed Khan and 7 others v. Azad Government and 6 others [2014 SCR 272] and Muhammad Yagoob v. Zaman Ali and 6 others 2017 CLC Note 124, p.135 and requested for dismissal of the petition for leave to appeal.
In the case reported as Raja Tahir Majeed Khan and 7 others v. Azad Government and 6 others [2014 SCR 272], it has been observed by this Court that "the issue relates to the immovable proper ty/land which vests with the Government and is under the use of Forest Department. The Government (owner of property) has itself taken decision regarding this property whereas the department has no grievance in this regard as on behalf of the Department, Secretary and head of the department, has stated that no action in this regard has been proposed by the department that owner or user of the property has any grievance. No other can be treated as an aggrieved party or be more loyal than the king. Therefore, in my considered opinion, the petitioners have got no legal grievance to file the petition for leave to appeal or even the writ petition. The proceedings initiated on their behalf is without any locus standi and amounts to misuse of the process of law and the Courts."
In the case reported as Muhammad Yagoob v. Zaman Ali and 6 others 2017 CLC Note 124, p.135, it has been observed by this Court that "law does not recognize proxy litigation and in pre-em ption suit where vendee comes forward to protect the rights of rival pre-emptor , inference can be drawn that such pre-emptor has filed suit in collusion with the vendee.
5. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned Advocates representing the parties and gone through the record made available along with the impugned judgment. The perusal of the record reveals that vide notification, dated 23.07.2018, the crown land A comprising survey No.92/1/1, measuring 8 marla, situated at village Hullar , was sanctioned on lease in favour of respondents Nos.6 and 7, herein. Later on, under the recommendations of the Committee, the Government issued the Notification dated 02.06.2021. The petitioner , herein, challenged the above notification through a writ petition in the High Court. The learned High Court after hearing the learned counsel for the parties dismissed the writ petition in the following manner:- "A bare reading of the writ petition show s that the petitioner has filed the instan t writ petition in representative capacity , however , requirements of Order I, Rule 8 of C.P.C. have also not been fulfilled because he did not seek permission of the Court for filing the same. Thus, if writ petition is treated in repres entative capacity even than the writ petition is liable to be dismissed being violative of Order I, Rule 8 of C.P .C."
6. It is revealed from the record that the petitioner , herein, filed the writ petition before the High Court in the representative capacity under Article 44 of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Interim Constitution, 1974. As the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable to the writ proceedings before the High Court, therefore, for filing the writ petition in the representative capacity the permission of the Advocate-General as visualized by section 91 of the Civil Procedure Code or the permission of the Court, provided under Order I, Rule 8 of the C.P.C., was necessary for filing of the writ petition. Without obtaining the permission of the Advocate-General or the Court, the writ petition in the representative capacity is not competent. Reference may be made to the case reported as Raja Ali Shan v . Messer Essem Hotel Limited and others [ 2007 SCMR 741 ], wherein it was observed as under: "8. Mere reading of the aforesaid paragraphs of the plaint, it is crystal clear that petitioner solely is not owner of the land in question nor his ancestors as the land in question is situated in Shamlaat Deh which is owned by each and every owner of the village for establishing the graveyard. It is a settled law that the following conditions must be fulfilled in order to institute a representative suit.
(a) Person interested in the suit must be numerous.
(b) They all must have the same interest in the suit.
(c) Permission of Court under Rule shall be obtained.
(d) Notice must be given to all the persons whom it is sought to represent.
(e) Indian Supreme Court while interpretin g Order I, Rule 8, C.P.C. in the State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gundugola Venkata Suryanarayana Garu AIR 1965 SC 1 1 laid down the following principle:- "To enable a person to file a suit in a representative capacity for and on behalf of numerous persons where they have the same interest, he only condition is the permission of the Court.."
In the case reported as Mir Adam and 2 others v. Sahibzada and 7 others [2007 SCMR 1157], it was observed as under:- "The perusal of the above-mentioned provisions of law indicates that appellants were required firstly to obtain sanction of the Advocate-General before filing the suit which apparently they did not do so. Appellants filed the suit in their personal capacity although the relief sought was in respect of the entire community and thus it was necessary that the suit should have been filed in representative capacity ."
Similarly , in the case reported as Islamuddin and others v. Ghulam Muhammad and others [PLD 2004 SC 633], it was observed as under:- "We have heard parties counsel and have also gone through the available record thoroughly . It is to be noted that before initiating legal proceedings the respondents/plaintif fs sought permission from Advocate-General of the Province as required under section 91, C.P.C. to institute a suit. This provision of law envisages that either the Advocate General can himself file a suit or he can consent in writing for institution of a suit on the application of two or more persons. It is to be noted that satisfaction of the Advocate-General to give consent for filing of a suit to private persons to whom no special damage has been caused, prima facie, indicates that a case of public nuisance exists. Although an individual in whose favour a right exists, independently can file a suit for declaration/injunction on the stated allegation of causing public nuisance but obtaining the consent of the Advocate-General strengthens the cause of a person who wants to institute a suit for declaration/injunction in respect of alleged public nuisance and institution of such suit of public nuisance would be deemed to be a representation on behalf of people residing in the vicinity where the commission of public nuisance is being alleged."
The learned High Court has rightly dismissed the writ petition as under law writ petition is only competent where there is any violation of law or any statutory provision has been violated, whereas, no such eventuality is available in the instant case. The case law referred to and relied upon the learned Advocate, representing the petitioner having distinguishable facts, is not applicable in the case in hand.
Since, no legal question of law of public importance is involved in the case, which is pre-requisite for grant of leave to appeal, therefore, leave cannot be granted in routine for the purpose of fruitless litigation. This petition for leave to appeal being devoid of any force is hereby dismissed. Consequently , the application for interim relief is also dismissed. No order as to costs.