' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---As the above entitled appeals arise out of a consolidated judgment of the Shariat Court, we propose to dispose of the same by this single Judge.
2. The brief facts giving rise to the above entitled appeals are that F.I.R. Was lodged at Police Station, Mirpur, on 29-5-1989 at 8-20 a.m. By Abdul Aziz, complainant, alleging that the land which is in the ownership of his father is situated contiguous to the land of Abdul Hamid son of Nek Alam, accused-respondent. About six months prior to the occurrence, Abdul Hamid, accused- respondent, wanted to construct a boundary wall between his land and the land of the father of the complainant which was objected to by Ghulam Nabi, the father of the complainant. However, the dispute was amicably settled by the intervention of Imam Din and Nazar Muhammad, the respectables of the locality and Abdul Hameed, accused-respondent, constructed the said wall.
According to the F.I.R., Abdul Hamid son of Nek Alam, Muhammad Lal son of Muhammad Alam and Javed son of Abdul Hamid, accused, became inimical to the complainant. Consequently, on 29-5- 1989, at 6-00 a.m., Muhammad Lal son of Muhammad Alam, Abdul Hamid son of Nek Alam and Javed son of Abdul Hamid arrived at the spot armed; Muhammad Lal, accused, had 32-bore revolver, Javed son of Abdul Hamid had 12-Bore gun while Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, had a 'Ranbi' with which he started to dig a pit adjacent to the southern wall of the house of the father of the complainant so as to damage the same. Muhammad Siddique, deceased, who was related as uncle of the complainant, forbade Abdul Hamid, accused, from digging the pit, on which he shouted 'Lalkara' that 'you would not go back alive'. It is further alleged in the F.I.R. That on hearing this shout, Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid son of Muhammad Shafi were also attracted to the place of occurrence whereupon Abdul Hamid, accused, again shouted a 'Lalkara' instigating Muhammad Lal and Javed, accused, that the complainant party should not be left alive on that day. On this, Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, fired with 32-bore revolver at Muhammad Siddique, the uncle of the complainant, which hit him at his chest and he died at the spot, whereas Javed, the absconding accused, fired with 12-bore gun at Abdul Aziz, complainant, which caused two pellets injuries on his leg; Abdul Hamid, accused, inflicted injuries to Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid son of Muhammad Shall, P.W., with 'Ranbi' with the intention to kill them. The prosecution, after completion of the investigation, challaned Muhammad Lal, Abdul Hamid and Javed in the District Criminal Court for facing trial under sections 5 and 15 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act and section 307 read with section 34, A.P.C., for committing murder of Muhammad Siddique and causing injuries to Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid son of Muhammad Shati, P.W.
The trial Court convicted and sentenced Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, under section 3 read with section 24 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act to 15 years simple imprisonment and Rs,2,91,666 as 'diyyat'; whereas Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, was awarded ten years simple imprisonment and fine of Rs,50,000 for causing injuries to Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid, P.W.; in case of failure to pay the tine, he had to undergo three years' simple imprisonment. Javed son of Abdul Hamid absconded during the trial and his case was kept pending till his arrest.
3. An appeal was filed by Muhammad Lal and Abdul Hamid, accused, against their convictions and sentences to the Shariat Court whereas Abdul Aziz, complainant, filed an appeal seeking enhancement of sentences awarded to Muhammad Lal, Abdul Hamid, accused. The Shariat Court disposed of both the appeals by consolidating the same whereby the appeal tiled by Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, was accepted and he was acquitted; so far as Muhammad Lal, accused- appellant, was concerned, his sentence of simple imprisonment of 15 years was set aside and only the sentence of 'diyyat' passed against him was maintained. The above entitled appeals have been filed by Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, against his sentence of 'diyyat' while Abdul Aziz, complainant, has filed cross-appeal fer enhancement of the sentence of Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, praying that he should be awarded the punishment of 'qisas' and for setting aside the acquittal of Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, and awarding him punishment of 'qisas' for the murder of Muhammad Siddique and for causing injuries to Abdul Hamid, P.W. And Abdul Aziz, complainant.
4. We have heard the arguments. It has been argued by Ch. Muhammad Azam Khan, the learned counsel for Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, and Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, that the learned Judge in the Shariat Court has committed an error in awarding the punishment of 'diyyat' to Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant. He has argued that the complainant party was aggressor and caused injuries to Muhammad Lal, Abdul Hamid son of Nek Alam and Nek Alam, the father of Abdul Hamid, accused, which were initially suppressed by the prosecution and no reasonable explanation was given even at the trial. The learned counsel has maintained that the injuries inflicted to the accused persons would be deemed to have been caused by the complainant party in the incident. He has contended that there are as many as six injuries on the person of Muhammad Lal, out of which two are lacerated wounds, three abrasions and one bruise; on X-ray, it was found that there was fracture as a result of injury No,3; similarly, Abdul Hamid son of Nek Alam sustained five injuries, out of them four are bruises and one is abrasion; and Nek Alam, the father of Abdul Hamid, sustained three bruises on his person The learned counsel has submitted that the accused persons were digging the land which was in their ownership and Muhammad Siddique, deceased, or any other member of the complainant party had no justification to forbid them from doing so. The learned counsel has argued that in fact the complainant party was aggressor and it was for this reason that they suppressed the injuries caused to the accused persons in the F.I.R. And later on they came with a false explanation that said injuries were caused to the accused party as a result of stone throwing by the complainant party after they were attacked by them with revolver, 12-bore gun and 'Ranbi' by the accused persons. The learned counsel for the accused-appellant has further submitted that all the prosecution witnesses are admittedly closely related to the deceased as has been held by the Courts below. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the conviction could not be based upon their uncorroborated testimony, especially so when the parties were inimical to each other due to the construction of wall on the boundary line of the lands of father of Abdul Aziz, complainant, and that of Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent. The learned counsel has submitted that in the instant case, the revolver and the empty were allegedly recovered at the instance of Muhammad Lal but the empty was found not to have been fired from the said revolver. Thus, the learned counsel has submitted that uncorroborated testimony of the related and interested witnesses could not be made basis for awarding the sentence of 'diyyat' by the Shariat Court, especially so when the prosecution witnesses were also not found 'Adil' in the purgation conducted by the trial Court. The learned counsel has cited following authorities in support of his contention:--- ' In a case reported as Abdul Rahman v. The Pakistan State (PLD 1959 Peshawar 74), it has been observed that as the deceased was injured during the tight it would be assumed that the deceased was injured at hands of accused.
' In a case reported as Safdar Ali v. The Crown (PLD 1953 FC 93), it has been held that if an accused pleads exception and he succeeds to create a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case with regard to the exception pleaded he is entitled to the benefit of the same irrespective of onus of proof under section 105 of the Evidence Act.
' In a case reported a Muhammad Khalil v. The State (1992 SCR 249) it has been held that if on the critical examination of the entire evidence the plea of self-defence is not substantiated, the mere fact that the injuries on the person of an accused were not explained would not bring his case within the ambit of self-defence. It was further held that mere fact that the witnesses are related to the deceased is not sufficient to discard their testimony.
' In a case reported as Thoba v. Tl.e State (PLD 1963 SC 40), it has been held that in case of capital punishment, the evidence must come from unimpeachable source or the same must be supported by strong evidence of independent witnesses; the Court disbelieved ocular evidence of the interested and partisan witnesses which was not corroborated.
' In a case reported as Hassan Muhammad v. The State 1996 SCR 95, it,has been held that even if the plea of self-defence is not taken on behalf of an accused, the benefit of the same can be given to him if the circumstances appear in the prosecution case in that regard.
' In a case reported as Shafique Ahmad v. Muhammad Ramzan (1995 SCR 855) acquittal appeal was dismissed observing that judgment of the High Court was neither artificial nor ridiculous; it was further observed that injuries on the accused person were not explained and acquittal of five co- accused by the trial Court was not challenged by the complainant in the revision petition filed to the High Court. Thus, the Supreme Court refused to disturb the order of acquittal.
' In a case reported as Ghulam Jaffar v. Allah Dad (1995 SCMR 173), it has been held that the order of acquittal passed by the High Court was supported by the evidence, and the mere fact that different view was possible on the appreciation of evidence did not justify to set aside the order of acquittal passed by the High Court.
' In a case reported as Nusrat v. Zulfiqar PLD 1991 SC 158, it has been held that there is difference between the 'sudden fight' and 'free fight. In case of sudden fight there is absence of premeditation to cause, death or injuries due to absence of time or for reflection; whereas in free fight the opposing party from very start intend to and prepare themselves for actual battle. Thus, the presence of intention or common object is one of the distinguishing features of 'free fight'. In case of 'free fight', the members of both the groups would be equally responsible for total acts of their respective assemblies.
5. In reply, Mr. Muhammad Abdul Khaliq Ansari, the learned counsel for Abdul Aziz, complainant, has controverted the arguments advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant. He has taken us through the impugned judgment of the Shariat Court to support his contention that this is no judgment in the eye of law, especially so, because it is based on misreading of the record. The learned counsel has cited a number of instances to show that the Shariat Court has misread the record and attributed certain facts to the prosecution witnesses which they did not state. Thus, the learned counsel has argued that it is abundantly clear that the learned Judge in the Shariat Court has delivered the impugned judgment without going through the evidence on the record. The learned counsel has submitted that the trial Court has believed the prosecution story to be correct but despite that has drawn a wrong conclusion therefrom and failed to award appropriate sentence to the accused persons, i.e,, punishment of death for committing murder of Muhammad Siddique, and for causing injuries to the complainant and Abdul Hamid, P.W. The learned counsel has argued that it is amazing that the trial Court deemed it fit to award 'simple imprisonment' in a murder case without any reasonable ground. He has contended that the course adopted by the Courts below is patently violative of law. The learned counsel has also submitted that it is on the record that both, the complainant and the accused, parties are closely related and, thus, the eyewitnesses are related to both the parties in equal degree. He has contended that on the day of occurrence, the accused party came at the spot for wreaking the vengeance on the complainant party because four days prior to the occurrence, the complainant had levelled some raised surface of his land and spread the earth on lower surface; consequently, the base of the boundary wall became exposed and naked which infuriated the accused persons. The learned counsel has argued that it is evident from the statements of the prosecution witnesses that the dispute regarding the wall was amicably settled six months prior to the occurrence by two respectables of the locality, namely, Imam Din and Nazar Muhammad. Thus, there was no occasion for the accused persons to come to the spot and start digging a pit adjacent to the southern wall of the house of the father of the complainant so as to make it fall. The learned counsel has referred to the statements of the prosecution witnesses and the site plan in support of his contention that a pit measuring 3' X 6' feet was dug for which no explanation has been given by the accused persons as to why the same was dug and for what purpose. Thus, according to the learned counsel for the complainant, the accused party came pre-planned to dig out a pit so that they could have an occasion to initiate quarrel and then to commit murder. According to the learned counsel for the complainant, if this was an innocent act of digging of the said pit, why the accused party came at the spot armed with lethal weapons, especially so when according to the accused only Abdul Hamid, accused, started digging pit and Muhammad Lal and Javed stood there armed. When Muhammad Siddique, deceased, forbade Abdul Hamid from digging the pit, he (Muhammad Siddique) was shot at by Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant; Javed fired at Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hameed, accused attacked Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid son of Muhammad Shafi, P.W. The learned counsel has argued that the injuries on the body of the accused persons were the result of stone throwing which were resorted to after the incident when the accused party was running away after committing murder. The learned counsel has submitted that the F.I.R. Is not a detailed document and it was not necessary for the complainant to mention all details in it as to how the accused persons were injured. The learned counsel has contended that the fact that the prosecution got medically examined the accused persons coupled with the statements of the eyewitnesses recorded under section 161, Cr.P.C. Amply shows that the injuries inflicted to the accused persons were the result of stone pelting and the same were not concealed by the prosecution. The learned counsel has argued that if the complainant party was armed and they were aggressor, why no fire-arm injury was found on the person of any of the accused. The learned counsel has submitted that the so-called fracture of Muhammad Lal beneath injury No,3, if at all there was any, was due to the injury caused with the stone. The learned counsel has referred to the description of the said injury given in the medical repot and has submitted that such an injury can be caused only by the stone and by stick or any other weapon. The learned counsel has further argued that this is well-settled principle of law that the statements of the prosecution witnesses cannot be discarded merely because they were related to the deceased; he has submitted that it is evident from the statements of prosecution witnesses that the parties are interrelated and that there was no previous enmity between them prior to the occurrence in question. He has maintained that the contention of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant that the parties were inimical to each other because of construction of wall is farfetched and incorrect in view of the fact that the dispute regarding the construction of wall had been settled by the respectables of the village six months prior to the occurrence. He has also submitted that even if the fact that the empty recovered at the instance of the accused, Muhammad Lal, was not found to have been fired from the revolver, the weapon of offence, that would not make any difference because there is hardly any doubt that the injury sustained by Muhammad Siddique was the result of the revolver fire which was made by Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant. The learned counsel has further submitted that this was a cold-blooded murder with pre-planning and, thus, the Courts below have committed a grave injustice in not awarding capital punishment to the accused- respondents. The learned counsel has strenuously argued that even if it timed for the sake of argument, as has been opined by the Shariat Court, that this was a 'free fight', the accused persons should have been awarded the capital punishment because is case of 'free fight', there is no question of self-defence. The learned counsel has submitted that present incident cannot be said to be a sudden fight because the accused party came prepared with the plan first to pick up a quarrel and thereafter to go to any extent for avenging themselves. Thus, even if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that it was a free fight, there is no question of giving any benefit to the accused persons on the ground that they acted in self-defence as has been stated earlier; in a free fight an accused is responsible for his offence, irrespective of the question of self-defence. The learned counsel has submitted following autnoi ities in support of his contentions:-- ' In a case reported as State v. Naseer Ahmad (PLD 1986 SC (AJ&K) 35), it has been held that mere relationship of the witnesses with the deceased was no ground to discard their testimony. The Shariat Court acquitted the accused holding that the witnesses were not only related to the complainant party but had deep-rooted enmity with the accused and thus, passed the order of acquittal. The order of the acquittal was set aside in the circumstances of the case and conviction and sentence passed against the accused by the trial Court were restored.
' In a case reported as Kifayatullah v. The State (PLD 1975 Pesh. 131), the ocular evidence of the eye- witnesses was relied upon without insisting upon its corroboration observing that the presence of witnesses at the time of occurrence was proved and their statements were upright.
' In a case reported as Muhammad Ramzan v. The State (1996 PCr.LJ 1076), it has been held that if a portion of the statement of a witness in cross-examination is not challenged the same would be deemed to have been admitted.
' In a case reported as Muhammad Sharif v. The State (PLD 1978 SC (AJ&K) 146), the conviction under section 302, A.P.C, was maintained observing that evidence of the witnesses was corroborated by the medical evidence and recovery of blood from the place of occurrence. The Court also discussed the nature and quantum of corroboration, if same is required in the circumstances of a case. It was further observed that if main portion of the evidence of witnesses is found to be true, same should not be discarded merely because he was found not truthful on some of the minor points.
' In a case reported as Mehtab Khan v. The State (PLD 1979 SC (AJ&K) 23), it has been held that relationship of the witnesses with the deceased is no ground to discard their testimony. It was further observed that a partisan witness is one who has motive to falsely implicate an accused person in a crime and to get him convicted. It has been further observed that as to how much corroboration is necessary in a particular case would depend upon the facts of such case.
' In a case reported as Qazi Sirajud Din v. Misbahul Islam (PLD 1977 SC 14), it has been observed that even if it was assumed for the sake of arguments that it was a sudden fight the benefit of Exception 4 of section 300, P.P.C., is not available to the accused because the deceased was unarmed and was not on equal footing with the accused when he was shot at and killed.
' In a case reported as Muhammad Iqbal v. The State (PLD 1993 SC 1), it has been held that in case of 'free fight' there is no question of giving benefit of self-defence; in such cases the accused person from each faction would be responsible for their criminal act. It was further observed that in a 'free fight' it would be reasonable to infer that while entering upon a conflict each rival party knew and deliberately took upon itself the risk of the encounter. Thus, each member would be responsible for his act which he committed in the encounter. The Court has also drawn a distinction between the 'free fight' and 'sudden fight'. It was observed that in case of 'free fight' which falls under Exception 4 of section 300, P.P.C., the conviction and sentence would be under section 302, P.P.C., while in case of sudden fight where case falls within the ambit of said Exception, the conviction would be under section 304, Part I, P.P.C.
' In a case reported as Misri v. The State (1998 SCR 337), it has been held that if prescribed number of the witnesses is not available as required under the Islami Tazeerati Qawanin Nifaz Act, the conviction and sentence of death can be awarded under section 3 of the said Act as 'Tazeer'.
' In a case reported as Muhammad Khalil v. The State (1992 SCR 249), it has been held that if the self-defence is not substantiated by the evidence, mere fact that the injuries on the person of accused were not explained would not bring his case within the ambit of self-defence. It was further held that mere fact that witnesses are related to the deceased is not sufficient to disbelieve their testimony.
' In a case reported as Zahir Hussain Shah v. Shah Nawaz Khan (2000 SCR 123), it has been held that mere fact that the eye-witnesses were not found 'Adil' in purgation, would not justify to rule out of consideration their testimony; their testimony can still be relied upon if their presence at the spot is proved or admitted. However, it was Observed that in such cases Court should be cautious while appraising their evidence.
' In a case reported as Shabbir Ahmad v. The State (1997 PCr.LJ 1539), it has been held that mere fat that injuries on the person of an accused were not explained would not bring his case within the ambit of self-defence.
6. Ch. Muhammad Mushtaq, Additional Advocate-General, has supported the arguments advanced by Mr. Muhammad Abdul Khaliq Ansari, the learned counsel for the complainant.
7. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The contention of the learned counsel for accused that the convict-accused, Muhammad Lal, and Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, who has been acquitted by the Shariat Court, acted in self-defence because they were attacked by the complainant party, was repelled by both the Courts below. It may be stated that the eye-witnesses are related to Muhammad Siddique, deceased, but at the same time the complainant party and the accused persons are themselves closely related to each other; for instance, Muhammad Lal, appellant, is son of the sister of the father of the complainant and the sister of the complainant is also married to Muhammad Lal; the perusal of the record shows that there was no deep-rooted enmity between the parties; only a minor dispute at the time of construction of the boundary wall arose which was amicably settled by the respectables of the village, namely, Imam Din and Nazar Muhammad. However, four days prior to the occurrence, the father of Abdul Aziz, complainant, erased some earth from his field and spread it over the lower level of the same. This exposed the base of the boundary wall. Consequently, the accused were infuriated and, thus, they resolved to give befitting reply to the complainant party by digging a pit which endangered the southern wall of the house of father of the complainant. It appears from the circumstances of the case that initially the accused persons did not come with the intention that they would commit outright murder of any of the members of the complainant party but all the same they came with determination that if any resistance was made to them while digging the pit, they would go to any extent for completing their mission. No explanation has been given by the defence as to what was the necessity for digging the pit measuring 3' X 6' adjacent to the house of the complainant's father. We are of the view that they did so to retaliate the annoyance which was caused to them due to the exposure of the base of the boundary wall due to the levelling of surface of his field by the father of the complainant. Even during the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the accused could not satisfy us as to why the accused party chose to dig out a pit which possibly could have caused damage to the house of the complainant or his father, he could not give any reply, except that the accused, Abdul Hamid, dug his own land; for what purpose, no explanation was offered by the learned counsel for the accused. Thus, the contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the accused party was attacked by the complainant party with tire-arms has no substance, especially so when none of the members of the accused party was injured by any fire-arm weapon. The injuries on Muhammad Lal and Abdul Hamid, accused, were caused with blunt weapons and not by fire-arms.
8. Similarly, the contention of Mr. Muhammad Abdul Khaliq Ansari, the learned counsel for the complainant, that the accused persons camedetermined and with a pre-plan to put the lives of the complainant party to an end, is not sustainable; the accused party came at the place of occurrence for avenging themselves with the determination that if they were obstructed while they would dig the pit, they would give appropriate reply to the complainant party. It may be stated here that both the Courts below have repelled the contention of the accused that they acted in self-defence in causing death to Muhammad Siddique, deceased, and injuries to Abdul Aziz, complainant, and Abdul Hamid son of Muhammad Shaft.
9. The contention of the learned counsel for the accused-appellant, that it has not been proved by the prosecution that the death of Muhammad Siddique was caused by the revolver fire attributed to Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, because the empty of cartridge was not found to have been fired with the revolver recovered at the instance of the said appellant by the Fire-arms Expert is not tenable, because there is sufficient material on the record in form of ocular evidence that the injury with the revolver was caused to Muhammad Siddique, deceased, by Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, from close range which resulted in his death. The concurrent findings of the Courts below do not suffer from any legal infirmity.
10. The contention of the learned counsel for the accused that the evidence of the eye-witnesses cannot be believed because they are related to the deceased is also without any substance for the simple reason that it is well-settled principle of law that the evidence of a witness cannot be discarded merely on the ground of relationship; if the evidence of a related witness rings true, he cannot be disbelieved simply because he is related to the concerned party. Even otherwise, in the instant case, as has been indicated above, both the rival factions are closely related and there was no deep-rooted enmity which could justify the inference that the eye-witnesses are partisan. Even a related and inimical witness is not to be necessarily disbelieved as being partisan; a partisan witness is one who has motive to falsely implicate an accused person in the offence of murder.
Thus, in the circumstances, of the case in hand, it cannot be said that the statements of the prosecution witnesses could not be relied upon' without independent corroboration.
11. The learned counsel for the accused has strenuously argued that the injury on the leg of Abdul Aziz, complainant, alleged to have been caused by fire of 12-bore gun attributed to Javed, the absconding accused, has been belied by the medical evidence, does not help the case of the accused; we refrain from making any further comments because Javed's case has been kept in abeyance by the trial Court in view of his abscondence.
12. The next question which falls for determination is as to whether the Shariat Court was justified in partly accepting the appeal filed by Muhammad Lal and awarding him only the punishment of 'diyyat' and acquitting Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent. It may be stated that no reason whatsoever has been given by the Shariat Court as to why Muhammad Lal was not awarded capital punishment either as 'qisas' or as 'tazeer' under section 3 read with section 24 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act. It may be observed here that this Court has held in a case reported as Abdul Rashid v. Abdul Ghaffar (2001 PCr.LJ 524) that even if it is not deemed desirable to award the punishment of 'qisas' in a murder case to an accused person, he is liable to be awarded capital punishment as 'tazeer'; similarly, the learned Judge in the Shariat Court did not record any reason for the acquittal of Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent. The learned Judge merely observed that this was not a pre-planned case of murder but it was a free fight. It may be stated that if it was a free fight, then it is well-settled principle of law, as is evident from some of the authorities discussed above, that in such a fight each accused is responsible for his own act and there is no question of self-defence in such a case. It has been proved by the prosecution that Muhammad Lal, accused- appellant, caused death of Muhammad Siddique by firing a revolver shot when he was unarmed.
There was no other ground to award him only the punishment of 'diyyat' for committing Qatal-e- Amad'. Thus, if this was a free fight and plea of self-defence, if any, is not available to the accused, how Abdul Hamid, respondent, was acquitted while Muhammad Lal, appellant, the other accused was shown leniency by awarding him punishment of 'diyyat' only. It may also be observed here that the learned counsel for the accused could not give any plausible reason as to how the District Criminal Court alongwith the punishment of 'diyyat' awarded sentence of 'simple imprisonment' of 17 years to Muhammad Lal, appellant, and not the rigorous imprisonment. The learned counsel for the accused could not give any reply whatsoever that how in a case of 'Qatal-e-Amad', the accused person is awarded only sentence of 'simple imprisonment' instead of rigorous imprisonment.
' In the light of what has been stated above, we dismiss the appeal filed by Muhammad Lal, accused-appellant, and accept the one filed by Abdul Aziz, complainant, for enhancement of the punishment awarded to Muhammad Lal, accused, and also set aside the order of acquittal of Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent. However, in the circumstances of the case, especially the fact that Muhammad Lal was also injured in the incident, we do not award him the punishment of 'qisas' or death. He is awarded twenty years rigorous imprisonment under section 3 read with section 24 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act; he shall also be entitled to the benefit under section 382-HB, Cr.P.C.
We set aside the acquittal of Abdul Hamid, accused-respondent, and convict and sentence him to 'Hakoomat-e-Adal' under section 15 of the Islamic Penal Laws Act to the tune of Rs,60,000 for causing injuries to Abdul Aziz, Complainant, and Abdul Hamid, P.W. The aforesaid amount shall be deposited in the trial Court in three equal instalments. First instalment shall be deposited on or before 1st July, 2001; second on or before 1st July, 2002 and third on or before 1st July, 2003. On deposit of each of the instalment, the amount shall be paid to the aforesaid two injured . Witnesses in equal shares. In case of default of payment of any of the instalment, Abdul Hamid, convict- accused, shall be confined to jail till he deposits outstanding amount in the trial Court. revisions by the competent authorities. Therefore, it is advisable to consult the official sources or legal professionals for the most up-to-date and accurate information.