' S.A. RABBANI, J.---Recaptulation of the facts of case of the parties is not necessary. For the present purpose, it is sufficient to mention that the petitioner was an employee of respondent No,1 and obtained an order for his reinstatement in service with back benefits from the Labour Court. In the appeal from that order. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, on an application of respondent No,1 who filed the appeal,. Suspended operation of the order of the Labour Court subject to bank guarantee by the appellant. This order of the Appellate Tribunal has been called in question through the present petition. However, in addition to a declaration about this order, the petitioner further seeks setting aside of a subsequent order. The petitioner has also prayed for a verdict that he continues to remain in the employment of respondent No,1 without any break and is entitled to all consequential benefits, as directed by the Labour Court:
2. Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the impugned order, passed on 13-8-1999, is without jurisdiction in view of the proviso to section 38(8) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.
3. Mr. Nasir Mehmood, appearing on behalf of respondent No,1 viz. The employer, contended that the impugned order is not covered by section 38(8) of Industrial Relations Ordinance because it is not an order staying the operation of the order of the Labour Court but, as it has been worded, the operation of the impugned order has been kept in abeyance.
4. The argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No,1 is without force because keeping in abeyance means nothing but stay of the operation and, in case it is not so, an order to keep the order of the Labour Court in abeyance, as such, would not be covered by the powers given to the Appellate Tribunal under section 38 of the Ordinance and, therefore, in that case, the order of the Appellate Tribunal would be without jurisdiction and beyond the powers of the Tribunal.
5. The order is practically for staying the operation of the order of the Labour Court and such an order can be passed only within a period of twenty days from the date of filing of the appeal. This is logical inference emerging from section 38(8) of the Ordinance, which provides that if the Tribunal makes an order staying the operation of the order of the Labour Court, it shall decide such appeal within twenty days of its being preferred. Thus, the period during which such a stay order can be made and remain alive is twenty days starting from the date of filing of appeal. In the present case, the appeal was filed in May, 1999 and the impugned order was passed on 13-8-1999 i,e, beyond the period of twenty days after the appeal was preferred. The proviso to section 38(8) of the Ordinance provides that a stay order passed by the Appellate Tribunal shall stand vacated on the expiration of twenty days if the appeal is not decided within that period. Thus, by virtue of the proviso the impugned order already stands vacated. Despite this fact, the impugned order was without jurisdiction because the powers of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to pass an order staying operation of order of the Labour Court can only be exercised within twenty days from the day the appeal is preferred. This is the import of section 38(8) of the Ordinance that can be gathered by a plain reading of the provision.
6. The prayer of the petitioner for the relief about his continuance in employment is misconceived because this is a petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution and not an appeal. It has been held in the case of Shahjehan v. Syed Amjad Ali (2000 SCM R 88) that when the High Court exercises Constitutional jurisdiction, its powers are not analogous to those of Appellate. Court and although it can strike down an order passed by a subordinate Court or a Tribunal on the ground of being without lawful authority and of no legal effect, it cannot substitute its own judgment for that of the subordinate Court or the Tribunal.
7. Consequently, the Petition is allowed to the extent of declaration that the impugned order, dated 13-8-1999 passed by the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, Karachi in Appeal No,102 of 1999, was without jurisdiction and of no legal effect. It stands disposed of accordingly.