' SHAHID ANWAR BAJWA, J.--- One hundred sixty-six workers/applicants approached respondent No,2 with grievance petition under section 46 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 2002. They claimed that they were permanent employees of the petitioners for last so many years and they were verbally terminated from the service. Contention of petitioner was that the applicants before the Labour Court are employees of the present respondent No,3. Learned Labour Court allowed grievance petition vide order dated October 22, 2011. It held the applicants to be employees of petitioner and ordered their reinstatement in service with 75% back-benefits. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the Labour Court an appeal under section 54(3) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 was filed before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal. Along with the appeal an application under section 55(9) was also filed. Appeal came up for the first time before the Tribunal on 15-11-2011. On the application for stay the following order was passed:- "2. Order on stay application. --- Operation of the impugned order dated 22-10-2011 passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Sindh Labour Court No,II, Karachi, is suspended as per law."
2. On 23-12-2011 following order was passed:--- "Today it hai been pointed out to this Tribunal that Ch. Muhammad Latif Saghar learned Advocate had not filed his vakalatnama to represent the appellant management M/s. Dalda Foods Limited, while he had advanced his arguments on the last date of hearing viz: 5-6-2012 without any authority/ vakalatnama, whereas actually this case was filed by Syed Sardar Hussain Shah learned Advocate and till todate no appearance has been made by Mr. Sardar Hussain Shah, therefore, Looking to the circumstances of the proceedings of the present case, it is necessary to comply with the order/direction of the Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Sindh Karachi, passed in Constitutional Petition No,D-1512 of 2012. It is hereby ordered to the appellant Messrs Dalda Foods Limited to deposit back-benefits in the shape of bank guarantee and current salaries of the respondent workers (160 in numbers) before this Tribunal within 30 days from the date of this order."
3. Meanwhile a complaint was filed by the workmen in this Court and on that complaint learned Chairman, Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal was directed to decide application through well reasoned order. The matter came up before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal on 26-6-2012, on which learned Chairman passed the following order:--- "26-6-2012 (Summer Vacation)
Today Mr. Muhammad lqbal Advocate/ Associate of Chaudhry Muhammad Latif Saghar is present for the appellant Messrs Dalda Foods Limited and Mr. Rafiullah learned Counsel for respondent No,1/Haq Engineering and Packing Services Limited is present. Mr. Saghar and Mr. Rafiullah had completed their arguments on the last hearing. Mr. Bacha Fazal Mannan learned Counsel for the respondent workers (Ameer Amanullah Khan and 159 others) is also present. At this stage Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi learned Advocate filed his vakalatnama on before of the workers namely Ameer Amanullah Khan and 159 otheRs, Messrs Muhammad lqbal Advocate and Rafiullah learned Counsel have filed statement which is signed by Mr. Adnan Habib Manager for Dalda Foods, wherein it is stated that both learned Counsel have argued and concluded their arguments on 5-6-2012.
Mr. Bacha Fazal Mannan learned counsel for workers has raised the objection that vakalatnama of Mr. Muhammad Latif Saghar is not on the record, but one Syed Sardar Hussain Shah learned Advocate had filed his vakalatnama and had never appeared in the Court and therefore, Mr. Bacha Fazal Mannan states that the arguments from Mr. Latif Saghar were not in this case, therefore, the same be heard if the Court wishes after receiving his vakalatnama.
Further objections from Mr. Bacha Fazal Mannan are that they will start their arguments when the appellant side closes their arguments. Some workers have moved an application today complaining that they have no confidence upon the Tribunal/Justice (R) All Muhammad Balch to do justice in this case. Orders however, on the Miscellaneous Application dated 23-12-2011 disposing it of as under:- "Today it has been pointed out to this Tribunal that Ch. Muhammad Latif Saghar learned Advocate had not filed his vakalatnama to represent the appellant management Messrs Dalda Foods Limited, while he had advanced his arguments on the last date of hearing viz: 5-6-2012 without any authority/ vakalatnama, whereas actually this case was filed by Syed Sardar Hussain Shah learned Advocate and till todate no appearance has been made by Mr. Sardar Hussain Shah, therefore, Looking to the circumstances of the proceedings of the present case, it is necessary to comply with the order/direction of the Hon'ble Division Bench of High Court of Sindh Karachi, passed in Constitutional Petition No,D-1512 of 2012. It is hereby ordered to the appellant Messrs Dalda Foods Limited to deposit back' benefits in the shape of bank guarantee and current salaries of the respondent workers (160 in numbers) before this Tribunal within 30 days from the date of this order."
Looking to the circumstances of the case and arguments on behalf of the' workers and their Counsel today in Court, I, decided to send a reference to the Hon'ble Chief Justice, High Court of Sindh on the point of "No Confidence upon this Tribunal."
To come up on 1-10-2012."
4. This constitutional petition has been filed with the following prayers:--- "(a) declare, the order passed by the, respondent No,1 dated 26-6-2012 in Appeal No,KAR-273 of 2012 to be completely ultra vires to the Constitution, unlawful, without jurisdiction, illegal, void ab initio and of no legal effect.
(b) permanently and pending disposal of the main petition suspend the operation of the impugned order dated 26-6-2012 passed in the Appeal No,KAR-273 of 2011 and KAR-445 to 603 of 2011 before it without any further loss of time since as per applicable law the respondent No,1 has to decide all the pending appeals within 20 days."
5. Learned counsel for petitioner submitted that provision contained in section 55(9) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 is to be read as directory and not as mandatory because if it is read as mandatory it would be ultra vires of the principle of natural justice and the Constitution. Learned counsel in this regard relied upon Jehanzeb v. General Tyre and Rubber Company, of Pakistan and another (2001 PLC 492), Karachi Sh ipyard and Engineering Works Ltd. Karachi v. Additional Collector, Customs, Excise and Sa les Tax (Adjudication-III), Government of Pakistan, Karachi and 2 others (2006 PTD 2207), Adeem Hosiery Dyeing v.
Assistant Collector, Collectorate of Sa les Tax, Faisalabad and another (2002 PTD 1616), Z.N.
Exports (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Collector of Sa les Tax (2003 PTD 1746), Messrs WAK Limited through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Ministry of Finance, Islamabad and 5 others (2006 PTD 332), Messrs Pearl Continental Hotel, Lahore through Director Finance and another v.
Customs, Excise and Sa les Tax Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and another (2005 PTD 1368), Messrs Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.) Ltd., Faisalabad through Chief Executive v. Federation of Pakistan through Secretary, Revenue Division, F.B.R. And 4 others (2009 PTD 1220), Su nrise Bottling Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Federation of Pakistan and 4 others (2006 PTD 535), Chenab Cement Product (Pvt.) Ltd. And others v. Banking Tribunal, Lahore and others (PLD 1996 Lahore 672) and Narang Overseas (P) Ltd. v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (2007) 295 ITR (Bombay).
6. Learned counsel further submi tted that proviso must be read down so as to be made applicable only in cases where the employer held to be at fault. He relied upon Messrs Maple Leaf Cement Factory Ltd. v. The Collector of Central Excise and Sa les Tax (Appeals), Lahore and 2 others (1993 MLD 1645), Rauf Bakhsh Kadri v. The State and others (2003 MLD 777). Learned counsel submitted that in Sy ed Match Company Ltd. Through Managing Director v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others (2003 PLC 395) and Mughal Su rgical (Pvt.) and others v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court (2005 PLC 364) questions of validity or vires of the corresponding provision under the Payment of Wages Act was not raised. Learned counsel submitted that provision like proviso to subsection (9) of section 55 in sub-constitutional legislation is to be treated as directory otherwise it would be ultra vires of the Constitution.
While concluding, learned counsel submitted that the Labour Appellate Tribunal be directed to decide appeals on merits within a short time.
' Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi learned counsel for private respondents relied upon Umarzeb v.
Pakistan Beverages (2000 PLC 583) and submitted that the interim order stood vacated, in view of the proviso to subsection (9) of -section 55 of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008, after expiry of 20 days. He submitted that case-law cited by the learned counsel for petitioner does not relate to Labour Laws. Learned Counsel further submitted that petitioner has never applied to the Labour Appellate Tribunal for extention of stay order. Learned counsel next submitted that the Labour Laws are beneficial legislation and, therefore, have to be interpreted in favour of labour. He relied upon Marker Employees' Union v. Malkaloids Ltd. And others (1976 SCMR 82), Divisional Su perintendent PWR, Karachi v. Bashir Ahmed (PLD 1973 SC 589), Mughal Su rgical (Pvt.) and others v. Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No,7 and others (2005 PLC 364), Sy ed Match Company (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Authority under Payment of Wages Act and others (2003 SCMR 1493) and Karachi Chamber of Comme rce and Industry, Karachi v. Sindh Labour Court No,V, Karachi and others (2011 SCMR 1709).
' Learned counsel further submitted that even in the cases falling under C.P.C., under Order XLI, Rule 5 security can be required. Learned counsel submitted that no part of statute can be treated as redundant and in this regard he relied upon Ghulam Muhammad Memon v. Sh abir Ahmed, Presiding Officer, III-Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and others (1993 PLC 349). Regarding vires of subsection (9) of section 55 learned counsel submitted that vires have not been challenged in this petition. Learned counsel further submitted that petition has been filed by an Attorney on the basis of a resolution which is general in nature without specifying the present matter. Learned counsel submitted that in view of this position, this petition is not maintainable. He relied upon Sirajuddain Paracha and 12 others v. Mehboob Elahi and 3 others (PLD 1997 Karachi 276).
' While exercising his right of reply learned counsel for petitioner relied upon the case of Sa iyyid Abul Ala Moudoodi and others v. Government of West Pakistan and others (PLD 1964 SC 673).
Learned Standing Counsel and Additional Advocate General stated that they do not have any submission to make in respect of question raised by the learned counsel.
10. We have considered submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record as well as case-law cited at the bar.
11. Section 55(9) of the Industrial Relations Act, 2008 provides:--- "(9) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (3) if in an appeal preferred to it against the order of a Labour Court directing the reinstatement of a workman, the Tribunal makes an order staying the operation of the order of the Labour Court, the Tribunal shall decide such appeal within twenty days of its being preferred: Provided that, if such appeal is not decided within the period aforesaid, the order of the Tribunal shall stand vacated on the expiration of that period."
12. Emphasis of Dr. Farogh Naseem was on the proviso which States that if Tribunal passes an order staying reinstatement of a workman it must decide appeal within a period of 20 days.
Proviso provides that if appeal is not so decided within the period aforesaid, interim order of Tribunal shall stand vacated on expiry of that period. Contention of Dr. Farogh Naseem was that this proviso must be read as directory. Learned counsel referred to section 46 of the Sa les Tax Act, 1990 wherein in subsection (4) it has been provided as under:--- "(4) The Appellate Tribunal, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard may pass such orders in relation to the matter before it as it thinks fit.
[Provided that when any such order amounts to an interim order staying the recovery of tax, such order shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of six months following the day on which it is made unless the case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn by the Tribunal earlier.
[Provided further that such interim order or orders, as the case may be, shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a total period of six months following the day on which the first interim order is made, unless the case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn by the Appellate Tribunal earlier.] "
13. In Jehanzeb's case (supra) facts were that the petitioner was dismissed from service and on his grievance petition he was ordered to be reinstated in service. Appeal was filed before the Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and it suspended order of the Labour Court subject to furnishing guarantee within one mo nth. This order was challenged by the workman before the High Court. A Division Bench of this Court firstly observed that the proviso is only confined to reinstatement and has no applicability to order of any other nature. It also held that suspension of back-benefit is not hit by the proviso. While concluding learned Bench observed as under:--- "15. It may be observed that law favours adjudication of disputes on merits rather than on enforcement of such technicalities observance of which some times may result in giving benefit to a defaulting party. In any case to avoid enforcement of such technicalities and to meet the ends of justice in appropriate case exercise of jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution, which is completely discretionary in nature, can be declined. If some case-law is needed to fortify this legal position following cases may be referred.
(1) Syed Wajih-ul-Hassan Zaidi v. Government of Punjab and others 1997 SCMR 1901.
(2) Messrs Airport Support Services v. The Airport Manager, Quaide-Azam International Airport, Karachi and others 1998 SCMR 2268.
(3) Export Promotion Bureau and others v. Qiser Shafiullah 1994 SCMR 859.
16. In the facts and circumstances discussed above we deem it just equitable fair and proper to dispose of this petition in the following terms.
' The respondent No,2 shall hear and finally decide the pending appeal filed by the respondent No,1 being Appeal No, KAR-322 of 1999, within two weeks from the receipt of this order and till then the impugned order shall remain in operation. Au rase any of the parties fails to appear or proceed with the appeal before the respondent No,2 the Tribunal shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law."
14. In Sh ipyard and Engineering Works' case (supra) a Division Bench of this Court in matter relating to Sa les Tax ordered that no adverse action shall be taken against petitioner on the basis of impugned order and no recovery notice till the appeal is taken up for hearing. In Adeem Hosiery Dyeing's case (supra) after noting circumstances that appeal was pending and was not decided within the period prescribed in section 46 of the Sa les Act it was held as under:--- "3. It is, in the above circumstances, contended by learned counsel that an order directing the stay of the above-referred amounts, can be passed by the High Court in exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction because of the circumstances narrated abbve which show that the remedy before the learned Appellate Tribunal is no longer available to the petitioner as far as interim relief is concerned.
(4) The aforesaid contention appears to be well-founded. This petition is, therefore, allowed and it is directed that the amounts impugned by the petitioner, in its appeal before the learned Appellate Tribunal, shall not be recovered from the petitioner during the pendency of the aforesaid appeal. This order, however, shall be subject to the provisions of Article 199 of the Constitution."
15. In Z.N. Exports (Pvt.) Ltd.'s case (supra) it was held that Tribunal as a forum of first appeal having not disposed of the appeal, the petitioner cannot be blamed on that account. It was further observed that in all fairness, equity and justice, an assessee should not be forced to pay a demand created by a Revenue Authority unless the order creating such demand has undergone scrutiny by at least one independent forum. Sa me principle was followed in Messrs WAK Limited's case (supra). In Messrs Pearl Continental Hotel's case (supra) it was observed that during the pendency of such an appeal and for effectiveness of right to maintain the appeal, petitioners were entitled to protection against coercive measures for effective dispensation of justice and law. It was observed that the petitioners could make an application before Appellate Tribunal for seeking early hearing of appeal. Authorities were restrained from adopting coercive measures. To the same effect there are judgments in the cases of Dawood Textile Printing Industries (Pvt.), Ltd. And Su nrise Bottling Company (Pvt.) Ltd. (supra).
16. In Chenab Cement Product's case (supra) it was held that right of appeal vests independently under Islamic dispensation natural justice and cannot be taken away and law must provide at least one appeal. Question whether appeal can be made subject to the condition of deposit was held to be negation of right of appeal and in this regard judgment of the Su preme Court in Messrs Eastern Rice Sy ndicate v. Central Board of Revenue, Finance Ministry Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1959 SC 364) was relied upon. Learned counsel also relied upon Narang Overseas' case (supra). There is provision under the Income Tax Act of India brought with effect from 1st June, 2007 which stated that if the matter is to be decided within a period of 4 years stay order is passed in relation to appeal, and where if appeal is not disposed of within a period of 180 days, the Tribunal on the application of the applicant may extend it for another period of 180 days and if appeal is not decided during first period, as the case may be, extended period of order of stay shall stand vacated. A Single Judge of Bombay High Court observed as under: "12. We are of the respectful view that the law as enunciated in Kumar Cotton Mills (P) Ltd.
(supra) should also apply to the construction of the third proviso as introduced in section 254(2A) by the Finance Act, 2007. The power to grant stay or interim relief being inherent or incidental is not defeated by.The provisos to the subsection. The third proviso has to be read as a limitation on the power of the Tribunal to continue interim relief in case where the hearing of the appeal has been delayed ---facts attributable to the assesse. It cannot mean that a construction be given that the power to grant interim relief is denuded even if the acts attributable are not of the assesse but of the revenue or of the Tribunal itself. The power of the Tribunal, therefore, to continue interim relief is not overridden by the language of the third proviso to section 254(2A). This would be in consonance with the view taken in Kumar Cotton Mills (P) Ltd. (supra). There would be power in the Tribunal to extend the period of stay on good cause being shown and on the Tribunal being satisfied that the matter could not be heard and disposed of for reasons not attributable to the assesse.
13. As we have held that the Tribunal still retains the power to continue the interim relief, it is not necessary to decide whether the amendment is with prospective or retrospective effect."
17. On the other hand Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi learned counsel for respondents Nos.4 to 163 relied upon Umarzeb's case (supra). Petitioner in that case was employee of respondent No,1 and he was ordered to be reinstated in service with back benefit by the Labour Court. Labour Appellate Tribunal suspended operation of order of the Labour Court. Su ch order of Labour Appellate Tribunal was challenged in the High Court. Learned counsel for petitioner also sought verdict that he continue to remain in employment. Petition was allowed by Division Bench of this Court. Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi also relied upon Marker Employees' Union's case (supra) where it was observed that Industrial Relations Ordinance is designed to promote harmony between the workers and employeRs, It was observed that the provision of section 26 of the I.R.O. 1969 wherein period of 10 days was stated was intended to infuse sense of urgency and it is not to be strictly construed. Learned counsel next relied upon Bashir Ahmed's case (supra). It was a case under the Payment of Wages Act and it was held that Act being remedial in nature should be construed in manner so as to advance the remedy and suppress the mischief.
Learned counsel next relied upon Mughal Su rgical (Pvt.)'s case (supra). It was a case relating to appeal under the Payment of Wages Act. It maybe pointed out that under the Payment of Wages Act, section 17 thereof appeal is provided against an order of Authority under the Payment of Wages Act by which order Authority has ordered for payment's delayed or illegally deducted wages. If employer goes appeal the appeal must be accompanied with certificate of deposit of amount ordered impugned order by the Authority. Su preme Court observed as under:--- "10. Reliance had been rightly placed by the learned Judge in Chamber on the case of Syed Match Company Limited 2003 SCMR 1493 by distinguishing the same from other cases decided by this Court on the ground that the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 was a law which had been enacted for the benefit of the workmen and had to be interpreted and applied in the spirit which had led to the enactment of the said law. The judgments cited by the learned Advocate Supreme Court were the judgments arising out of enactments other than the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, and were no precedent for deciding the present case. It may be added that the right of appeal is not a natural or an inherent right of litigants but is a statutory right granted by different laws under different enactments and such a right had to be considered and examined in the light of the conditions prescribed by the law granting the said right. Needless to add that under the enactment in the C. P. C. Or the Cr. P. C. Every order and decision is not appealable and we know that even under the C. P. C. There are provisions which prohibit grant of interim relief unless the decretal amount was deposited."
18. Learned counsel next relied upon Sy ed Match Company Ltd's case (supra). It was also a case under the Payment of Wages Act and the Su preme Court observed as under:--- "8. These are not the cases of lack of complete jurisdiction nor could be termed as mala fide.
First appeal is a continuation of suit/ application and factual controversy can only be resolved after sifting the evidence brought on record. It is not the discretion of a party to ignore the provisions of appeal and file Constitutional petition instead. Even, if it is assumed for the sake of arguments that the claim of the respondents was on higher side, yet, for this reason alone it could not be asserted that the respondent No,1 had no jurisdiction in the matter. In various cases, this Court has discouraged the tendency to bypass the remedy provided under the relevant statute and to press into service Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court. It is, however, true that in certain cases resort to Constitutional jurisdiction of High Court instead of availing remedy provided under the statute, may be just, but no such material is available on record for ignoring the remedy provided under section 17 of the Act. It is noted that Payment of Wages Act is primarily a beneficial legislation and has been enacted to provide relief to the workers, as such, it could not be construed otherwise. Such construction could not be placed upon its provisions, which directly or indirectly nullify the object of its legislation. Remedial statutes shall always be construed in a manner to advance the remedy, as provided in the statute and not in a manner to defeat the legislative intendment. The writ petitions in these cases were filed to defeat the proviso (a) of subjection (1) OF SECTION 17 OF THE Act quoted above."
19. Last case relied upon by the learned counsel is Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry's case (supra). In this case Su preme Court upheld judgment of this Court by holding that Karachi Chamber of Commerce falls within definition of industry.
20. A perusal of the above case-law indicates the position, to be as under :---
(i) Sy ed Match Company and Mughal Su rgical cases are not relevant because they are on the point of maintainability of appeal without complying with requirement of deposit of amount ordered by the Authority under. The Payment of Wages Act: No such question is involved in this petition. In this petition question of maintainability of appeal is not involved but question regarding power of Tribunal to stay operation of order of the Labour Court challenged before it is agitated.
(ii) Appeal is continuation of original proceedings and, therefore, I Appellate Court has all the powers which are available to the trial Court.
(iii) As has been held by the Su preme Court in Marker Employees' Union's case (supra) case, though observations are in respect of section 26 of I.R.O. 1969, period is prescribed in order to infuse sense of urgency and, therefore, period prescribed under IB the proviso is directory in nature.
(iv) If matter is delayed in the Labour Appellate Tribunal due to any act on the part of Tribunal or even its office, principle that act of the Court prejudices no one will be applicable. Just as workman cannot be burdened due to delay on the part of the Tribunal, Employer should not also be burdened if the matter is delayed by the Tribunal.
(v) Employer cannot be allowed to obtain stay order and thereafter prolong the matter and thus prolong agony of the workman. D Similarly, workman should not be allowed to prolong the matter before the Labour Appellate Tribunal.
21. Therefore, in our view, following guidelines would be appropriate for guidance of the Tribunal in such like cases:---
(a) Since the period of 20 days is prescribed for disposal of the appeal, the Tribunal shall not adjourn the matter for more than' 20 dates at any time.
(b)
If on the date fixed employer seeks adjournment it will be available to Tribunal to consider question of recalling interim order or to impose cost on the employer or to refuse adjournment.
(c) If on the other hand workman seeks adjournment, the Tribunal shall extend interim order till next date of hearing.
Su ch guidelines can be given by the High Court. Reference may be made to Ghulam Murtaza and another v. The State (PLD 2009 Lahore 362) which has been upheld by the Su preme Court in Ameer Zeb v. The State (PLD 2012 SC 380).
22. Mr. Ashraf Hussain Rizvi learned counsel for respondents referred to Ghulam Muhammad Memon's case (supra) for his contention that no part of statute is to be treated as redundant.
There cannot be any cavil with this proposition. We are not holding any part of section 55(9) or proviso thereof as redundant. All that we have held is that the proviso is directory in nature and the Labour Appellate Tribunal is duty bound to watch conduct of the parties and if it comes to the conclusion on any date that employer is seeking adjournment and delaying the matter it has right to impose cost or recall interim order or to refuse adjournment.
23. Here we may also refer to one contention of Mr. Rizvi regarding Order XLI, Rule 5, C.P.C. It is of course within jurisdiction of the Labour Appellate Tribunal to demand security or guarantee or even deposit of the amount concerned from the employer if it grants interim relief to the employer. This would be a matter of discretion of Labour Appellate Tribunal if it decides to pass order and grant interim relief. Mr. Rizvi contended that vires of provision of subsection (9) of section 59 has not been challenged, therefore, such question cannot be raised.
' Contention is misconceived because Mr. Farogh Naseem has not challenged vires of the above quoted proviso but his contention all along has been that above quoted proviso is directory in nature and not mandatory in nature.
24.. This constitutional petition was filed on the basis of resolution passed by the Board of Directors, certified copy of which is available at Page 313 of the petition. The said resolution authorizes officer concerned to "sign, verify, institute and file a writ petition 'or other appropriate legal proceedings on behalf of the company" before this Court or other appropriate forum/Court. Mr. Rizvi stated that by this resolution general power and not specific power has been conferred upon the attorney for filing of this particular petition. In support of his contention he relied upon Sirajuddain Paracha's case (supra). As noticed in Para 6 of this judgment the resolution passed authorized the officer to look after, manage and administer affairs of the company but it did not specifically authorized him to filed suit in respect of property in suit for which passing of special resolution authorizing any Director was absolutely necessary. Learned Single Judge also noted that resolution authorized attorney to file all kind of proceedings and to take other necessary steps for and on behalf of company. In this view of the position learned Judge observed that there was no specific resolution was obtained. We have not been able to persuade ourselves to agree with reasoning adopted by Single Judge. It cannot be said that for each matter the Board of Directors be summoned to pass a separate resolutions. In this present case a person was authorized to file Writ petition or other appropriate proceedings on behalf of company before this Court or before any appropriate forum. It cannot be therefore said that a particular case filed by the attorney has been filed without any authority. Contention of learned Counsel is therefore, repelled.
25. All that the. Tribunal has done in the impugned .Order is that it has ordered the petitioner company to deposit back benefit in shape of bank guarantee and current salaries of the respondent workers. This exercise of discretion cannot be said to be beyond the power of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. It is discretion which has been exercised by the Labour Appellate Tribunal to secure interest of workers and we do not think any interference is called for with order of the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Consequently, subject to above observation this constitutional petition is dismissed. However, Labour Appellate Tribunal is directed to expeditiously decide the appeal and if it adjourns the matter the adjournment should be keeping in view the observations made herein above.