ORDER CH. MUHAMMAD TAJ, J.-- The above captioned two appeals arise out of a consolidated order, as such, are disposed of by this common order.
2. The facts as stated are that the plaintiff-respondent, the WAPDA, tiled a recovery suit against the plaintiff-appellant, for Rs.50,330/-, while the plaintiff-appellant also tiled suit against the respondents for the recovery of Rs. 1,58.000/-, in the Court of District Judge, Mirpur. Both the suits were consolidated. The Trial Court after receiving evidence and hearing the parties, decreed the suit of the plaintiff- respondent, while dismissed that of plaintiff-appellant. Two appeals challenging the aforesaid consolidated judgment and decree, were tiled by the plaintiff-appellant.
3. A preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents in respect of appeals having been tiled after the limitation provided therefor, is firstly to be attended.
4. Mr. M.S. Tariq, the learned Counsel tor the appellant maintained that the appeals were within time as, according to him, the appellant applied for the certified copies of the judgments and decrees but he was not given any date and thereafter no notice was issued to. Him to the effect that the copies were prepared and ready for delivery, as such, after deducting the period between the tiling of application and delivery of copies, the appeals were within time. The learned counsel referred to PLD 1973 S.C. (Pak) 222, 1973 S.C.M.R. 555, PLD 1977 Lahore 376, PLD 1978 Lahore 31,1992 C.L.C. 25 and 1994 C.L.C. 1302, in support of his assertions.
5. Haji Muhammad Afzal, the learned Counsel representing the respondents, while controverting the arguments addressed on behalf of the appeals were time-barred and were filed after a long delay. It was argued by him that the appellant applied for the certified copies of the judgments and decrees which were prepared by the concerned office, but the appellant neither filed the requisite i.e nor received those copies after their preparation. Those were received by the appellant after consuming It of time. The time spent between the filing of the application and the preparation of the copies could be excluded while the time spent after the preparation of the copies and their receipt, could not be excluded, for the gross negligence and carelessness of the appellant. The learned Counsel referred to an unreported case titled ' Income Tax Officer and others v. Ch. Muhammad Bashir" decided by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 23-11-1993, 1975 S.C.M.R. 156, PLD 1983 Peshawar 143, and P.L.D. 1991 S.C. (Pak) 400, in support of his contentions.
6. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and also gone through the record as well as the case-law cited by them, It would be necessary to survey the relevant law and the authorities referred to. The relevant provision of law dealing with the proposition is contained in Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act which is reproduced as under:- "12(2). In computing the period of limitation prescribed for an i. Ppeal an application for leave to appeal and an application for a review of judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced, and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be reviewed, shall be excluded.
(3) .. .................................................... " (4) ....................... ............................ "
The appellant relied upon PLD 1973 S.C (Pak) 222. Therein the following observation was made at page 225 :- In the case under report, it has been held that the time "requisite" for obtaining copies which can be excluded under Section 12. Limitation Act. Is the time which is taken between the date of application and the date when the copies are ready, but it can be further extended if further delay takes place by reason of the carelessness of the offence in giving wrong information to the applicant as to the date on which the copies would be ready, or in giving no information at all. In any event, in my opinion, the delay has been satisfactorily explained and 1 would, accordingly condone the delay--."
Another case referred to be the learned Counsel for the appellant, 1973 S.C.M.R. 555, is the same reported as PLD 1973 S.C. (Pak) 222, referred to above. The other authority relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant is PLD 1977 Lahore 376 wherein the following verdict was given. --The District Judge decided the appeal, on the 29th of January, 1964. The appellants applied for the copies of the judgment and decree of the District judge on the 7th of March, 1964. The copies were ready on the 7th of April, 1974. On these facts, the appeal was barred, by 70 days. Learned Counsel for the appellants contended that the appellants were entitled to the deduction of time not up to 7th of April, 1964 when the copies were ready but up to 25th of April. 1964 when they copies were ready but up to 25th of April. 1964 when they were delivered for the reason that they had not been given any date by the Copying Agency for their delivery. Learned Counsel for the respondent has not controverted this position. The appellants are, therefore, entitled to deduct the period up to 25th of April, 1964 as held in Gul Muhammad v. Allah Ditta.-"
The next authority, PLD 1978 Lahore 31, relied upon, gave the following verdict :- It is clear from these authorities that it is the duty of the office to intimate to the applicant about the date on which the copy would be prepared. If such date is not given to the applicant about preparation, the applicant would be entitled to compute under Section 12 of the Limitation Act, time spent up to the date of delivery of the copy. I am of the view that the posting of the notices on the notice board about such preparation would be of no avail since that cannot be deemed to be an intimation to the applicant. This intimation should be sent to him personally. Rule 7.22. Chapter 'C, Volume I of the High Court Rules' and Orders also provides that a date in writing must be given to the applicant.--"
In Karim Haider Shah's case (1992 C.L.C. 25), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, the learned Chief Justice of this Court resolved the proposition in the following manner: S. 5-Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) S. 96--Time-barred Appeal-Condonation of delay-Formal application under S.5, Limitation Act, 1908. Would be necessary for condonation of delay--In exceptional circumstances, when no formal application was moved but delay was sought to be condoned for reasons described in memorandum of appeal, such explanation amounting to sufficient cause for purposes of condonation of delay could be considered -Object of rules of procedure.-"
In Mrs. Saghera Bano's case ( 1994 C. L. C. 1302) of Karachi jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Salahuddin Mirza.
J., observed as under :- "-Art. 87- Limitation Act (IX of 1908). S. 12-Appeal- Limitation-Certified copy of judgment and decree-Application tor obtaining such copy of judgment and decree-Duty of Copying Agency-Law does not require any party to pursue the matter in the Copying Agency, therefore, applicant was under no obligation to pursue the matter with it-Copying Agency was required to issue notice to the person applying for the certified copy and to intimate that the record had been received and costs had been estimated-Costs having been estimated on 13-10-1991, same were paid in the vary next day and copy was supplied on 16-10-1991-Appeal tiled on 13-11-1991, was thus, within time having been tiled within thirty days.-"
7. Haji Muhammad Afzal. The learned Counsel representing the respondents, relied upon the following authorities where the following observations were made "- In the case, 'Income Tax Officer and others Kv. Ch. Muhammad Bashir', decided by the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir on 23- 11-1991, it was held at page 4. As under "- In our view, provisions of Section 12 (2) and (3) of the Limitation Act ate clear. According to these provisions, "time requisite for obtaining a copy" has to be excluded. In the present case, the application for obtaining copy was tiled on 20th and the copy was made available on 27th. Thus, eight days were spent in taking out the copy which have to be excluded from 67 days. The calculation comes to 59 days.--"
In 1975 S.C. M.R. 156, it was laid down as under:- "-It is well-settled that the time requisite for obtaining copy of order within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908 means only the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it is ready for delivery. Even during this interval, due diligence on the part of the litigant is required by law. And no delay, unless such as was caused by circumstances over which he had no control and which he could not by due diligence he avoided, can form part of time "requisite" for obtaining the copy. The time between the date on which the copy is ready for delivery and the date on which the applicant chooses to take delivery thereof is not a portion of the time "requisite" for obtaining a copy .-"
In PLD 1983 Peshawar 143. The learned Judges in a Division Bench case, resolved the proposition in the following manner "-S. 12 & 5- Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894), S. 54 and Civil Procedure Code (V of 1908) , S. 96- Limitation-Appellant not vigilant in efforts to get copies of orders and guilty of extreme negligence and lack of responsibility disentitling him to extension of period of limitation up to date of delivery- Period of limitation already expired but appellant taking delivery of copies and tiling appeal after about, more than two months therefore and furnishing no explanation for declaim of bona tides and not entitled to condonation of delay.--"
In PLD 1991 S.C. 400. The learned Judges of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, at page 404, in para 6 of the judgment, observed as below :- As held by this Court in Fateh Muhammad Kv. Malik Qadir Bakhsh, (1975 SCMR 156) and Mst.
Jameela Khatoon Va-. Mst. Tajunnisd. (P.L.D 1984 S.C. 208), "time requisite" for obtaining certified copies of the necessary documents required to be tiled with an appeal is that consumed between the date the application for certified copies is made and the date the same are ready for delivery by the Copying Branch.-"
8. After analysing the law cited by the Counsel for the parties, in view of the consensus of the authorities and particularly the authorities of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir jurisdiction for which this Court is bound, it can be held that the^time spent between the application and preparation of the copies, has to be deducted while computing the limitation for riling an appeal provided the application was not moved when the limitation had already run out. A delay in receiving the copies or depositing the i.e after preparation thereof on behalf of the applicant, is not to be deducted, constituting negligence and carelessness. It will not be out of place to mention that the authorities relied upon by the learned Counsel for the appellant, are form different jurisdictions of Pakistan and lay down the principles keeping in view the rules and regulations framed by the respective High Courts or the Supreme Court,. None of the rules where corresponding provision may be enacted, was referred to by the learned Counsel for the appellant. It will also be important to mention that the facts of citations referred to by the appellant were also different. The citations referred to by the respondent's Counsel, particularly the dictum of the Supreme Court of Azad Jammu and Kashmir, were direct and relevant to the facts involved in the present case. This Court, as said earlier, is bound by the authority.
9. In the present case, the District Judge. Mirpur recorded the judgment and decree on 31-10-1993.
The application for obtaining certified copies was moved on 16-12-1993. The copies were prepared on 23-1-1994 but those were received by the applicant on 31-3-1994 when the copying i.e was also deposited on the said date. Therefore, it can safely he held that the period from 16-12-1993 to 23-1- 1994 when the copies were prepared, is permissible to be deducted while computing the limitation for the purpose of these appeals. However, further period til! 31-3-1994 when the copies were received by the applicant after depositing the i.e, cannot be deducted being wilful negligence and carelessness on the part of the appellant whose duty was to follow his application. No reasonable explanation has been offered for such delay justifying its condonation.
10. In view of the above discussion, the appeals on behalf of the appellant, are held to be time- barred as such, are dismissed with no order as to costs.