' RUSTAM S. SIDHWA, J.---This is an appeal by the Cantonment Board, Kharian Cantt: appellant, against the decision of a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court dated 5-5-1987, dismissing its revision petition.
2. The brief facts of the case are that Muhammad Shafi, respondent, was employed as a clerk with the Cantonment Board, Kharian, District Gujrat, appellant, when he was removed from service. He challenged the order passed in this behalf, by means of a suit, which was decreed on 28-10-1974.
On 29-10-1974 the appellant applied for the certified copy of the judgment and decree of the trial Court. It appears that the said certified copies were ready on 27-2-1975, but delivery thereof was not taken until 16-5-1975. On 9-6-1975 the appellant filed its appeal before the District Judge, Gujrat, but the same was dismissed on 10-6-1979 on the ground of limitation. Feeling aggrieved by the appellate judgment, the appellant filed a revision petition in the High Court, which was also dismissed on 5-5-1987. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the appellant petitioned this Court for leave to appeal, which was granted to consider: First, whether the days spent between the date of the preparation of the copies of the impugned judgment and decree and the date of their delivery, were to be necessarily treated as subject of condonation under section 5 of the Limitation Act or that of exclusion as of right, under section .12 thereof. Second, as to what was absolutely essential for a party to establish to seek either of them. And thirdly, whether in the instant case, the appeal should have been dismissed as time-barred or further enquiry should have been held under section 3 of the Limitation Act.
3. On behalf of the appellant it is submitted that when the application for obtaining the certified copies of the judgment and decree was filed on 29-10-1974, no date for the delivery of the said copies was given by the Copying Branch on receipt of the application for supply of the said copies.
It is submitted that the official concerned of the Cantonment Board deputed to collect the copies had not been visiting the Copying Branch, but neither any specific date nor any intimation was given to him for collecting the copies. It is submitted that the record maintained by the Cantonment Board also indicated that the Deputy Commissioner had also been approached, due to delay in the preparation of the copies. It is submitted that the copies were made available by the Copying Branch on 16-5-1975, but the same indicated the date of preparation as 27-2-1975. It is contended that after completing the necessary formalities and seeking the necessary instructions, the appeal was filed by the appellant before the learned District Judge, Gujrat, on 9-6-1975. At the hearing of the appeal the counsel for the appellant attempted to meet the objection of limitation by citing Muhammad Afzal Khan Lodhi v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1968 Lah. 1205, but the learned appellate Court dismissed the appeal as barred by time on 10-6-1979. It is further contended that the appellant preferred a revision petition before the Lahore High Court, where it was averred that the Copying Branch of the trial Court having not given any specific date for preparation or collection of the copies, the time taken from the date of preparation till delivery was "time requisite" within the meaning of section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, and hence the appeal was within time. An affidavit of the Tax Superintendent of the Cantonment Board was also filed in support of the revision petition. In this connection Hatim Ali v. Mst. Zulekha Bibi and others PLD 1964 (W.P.) Kar.339, Syed Jalilur Rehman and others v. Mst. Rashida Begum and others PLD 1976 Kar. 105 and Fateh Muhammad and others v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh 1975 SCMR 157 are referred.
4. On behalf of the respondent it is submitted that the appellant neither explained before the first appellate Court the reasons for the delay in the time taken between the date of preparation of the certified copies and the date of their receipt, nor filed any application for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act and therefore the judgment of all the lower Courts is legal and proper and the present appeal should be dismissed.
5. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent and have perused the record. When the appeal was filed by the appellant before the District Judge, Gujrat, no application was made for the condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act or any cause shown why the certified copies were not received on 27-2-1975, when they were ready, or why they were received so late as 16-5-1975.
6. As held by this Court in Fateh Muhammad v. Malik Qadir Baksh 1975 SCMR 157 and Mst. Jameela Khatoon v. Mst. Tajunnisa PLD 1984 SC 208, "time requisite" for obtaining certified copies of the necessary documents required to be filed with an appeal is that consumed between the date the application for certified copies is made and the date the same are ready for delivery by the Copying Branch.
7. Where the rules of the Court or Copying Branch provide that a date shall be communicated to the applicant when the certified copy will be ready, the "time requisite" for obtaining the certified copy, which can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act, would be the time which is taken between the date of application and the last date which is communicated to the applicant by the official of the Copying Branch for taking delivery of the certified copy. The Lahore High Court Rules and Orders, Vol I, Chapter XIV-D, para 2, clause (ii), sub-clause (d), provided that "the date on which a copy is ready for delivery will be deemed, for the purpose of such calculation, to be the day on which it is given". This sub-clause (d) was replaced by a Correction Pamphlet No,39 dated 3-6- 1959, which was later replaced by Correction Pamphlet No,41 dated 3-9-1960, which reads as follows:-- "Applicants for copies shall be given a date on which delivery of the copy is to be taken. If the copy is not then completed, such date shall be extended from time to time, under intimation to the applicant, until the copy is ready for delivery. The final date so intimated shall, for the purpose of the calculation required by this rule, be deemed to be the day on which the copy is given."
' In these circumstances, where a number of dates are given to the applicant for taking delivery of the certified copy by the Copying Branch, "time requisite" could be calculated up to this last date, if this be later than that on which the certified copy was ready for delivery.
8. In Gul Muhammad v. Allah Ditta PLD 1960 Lah. 443, the Lahore High Court held that the "time requisite" could be extended if further delay took place by reason of the 'carelessness of the Copying Branch in giving wrong information to the applicant as to the date on which the copies would be ready, or in giving no information at all. The Court treated the Correction Pamphlet of 3- 6-1959 as containing an implied obligation on the part of the Copying Branch to inform the applicant of the date of delivery of the certified copy and as evidence of a general feeling that it would be unreasonable for an applicant to call for a copy morning and evening every day, so as to ascertain whether it was ready. This rule was followed in Muhammad Afzal v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan PLD 1968 Lah. 1205 and West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation v. Aziz Qureshi PLD 1973 SC 222, but was not noted in Fateh Muhammad v. Malik Qadir Bakhsh 1975 SCMR 157, which was also a Punjab case, where it was held that the time between the date on which the copy was ready for delivery and the date on which the applicant chose to take delivery thereof, was not a portion of the "time requisite" for obtaining the same. In this case too it was pleaded that the petitioner was not informed of the date when the copy would be ready, but the Supreme Court held, following two Privy Council decisions, that even during the interval between the date of application for supply of copy and the date when it was ready for delivery, due diligence was required on the part of the applicant and no delay unless such as was caused by circumstances over which he had no control and which he could not by due diligence have avoided, could form part of the "time requisite" for obtaining the copy. In the last two cases the Supreme Court held that each day's delay had to be satisfactorily explained and where it was so, the same could be condoned. The principle stated in Fateh Muhammad's case was followed in Mst. Jameela Khatoon v. Mst. Tajunnisa PLD 1984 SC 208.
9. Following the rule stated in the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation's case and Fateh Muhammad's case, the rule that sufficient grounds should be shown in the case for securing condonation now stands almost established and even where "time requisite" is sought to be stretched, sufficient grounds have to be satisfactorily shown to justify each day's delay in order to seek condonation of delay. In this connection Syed Faiz Ali Shah v. Chief Administrator of Auqaf 1974 SCMR 33 = PLD 1974 SC 17, Rahim Baksh v. Mst. Pothani PLD 1985 SC 324, Ahmad Nawaz v.
Muhammad Ayub PLD 1988 SC 258 and Fazal Rahman v. Karim Gul 1988 SCMR 1256 may also be referred.
10. The position therefore that emerges is: First, that "time requisite" for obtaining the certified copy, which can be excluded under section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1908, would be the time which is taken from the date the application for obtaining the copy is made to the date when the copy is ready for delivery. However, where a rule of the Court or the Copying Branch provides that a date has to be communicated to the applicant for taking delivery of the copy, the said rule, according to its exact tenor, can be availed to extend the time under section 12. In the Punjab, in view of the Correction Pamphlet No, 41 dated 3-9-1960 appended to the High Court Rules and Orders Vol I, where a date is communicated by an official of the Copying Branch to the applicant for taking delivery of the copy, or by carelessness of the said official a wrong date for delivery is given, the period upto the said date can be excluded under section 12. However, it will have to be shown to the satisfaction of the Court the various dates that were given on the slip to the applicant to collect the copy and what steps the applicant took to collect the copy. Second, time can further be extended if further delay has taken place through circumstances over which the applicant has had no control or over which he could not by due diligence have avoided, provided sufficient cause is shown for each day's delay and application for condonation is filed. And third and last, it is of no consequence for an applicant to merely allege and prove that he was not given any date by the official of the Copying Branch when the copy would be ready. In order to seek condonation, he should take the receipt slip from the Copying Branch, showing the date on which the copy is to be taken, for that is his right, and if he does not do so, he cannot capitalise on his mistake. In such a situation he must allege and satisfactorily show that he did visit the Copying Branch regularly at reasonable intervals to secure the certified copy, so that sufficient grounds exist on which the said delay may be condoned.
11. In the instant case the appellant did not establish before the learned Additional District Judge that he was given any wrong information as to the date on which the certified copies would be ready. He therefore could not make out any case for exclusion of time. Further, he did not establish before the said Court that he was not given any information about the date when the certified copies would be ready, but that otherwise he had been attending the Copying Branch regularly, such as every two to three days if not each day, and he did not get the copies till 16-5-1975. On the other hand the copies were ready for delivery on 27-2-1975, but were collected on 16-5-1975, showing that he had not gone to the Copying Branch to collect them for months. The appellant did not even file an application seeking condonation of delay, duly supported by his affidavit along with the appeal. He therefore could not make out any case for condonation of delay under section 5 of the Limitation Act before the Additional District Judge. Thus the appellant's appeal was rightly dismissed as barred by time by a learned Additional District Judge and though an affidavit was filed along with the revision before the High Court, the learned Single Judge of the High Court rightly declined to interfere because the appellant did not make out any case for condonation of delay, having failed to explain why he had not been attending the Copying Branch for months, even though no date had been given to him for collecting the Copies, nor explained what steps were taken by him to collect them during more than two and a half months, after they were ready for delivery.
' There being no merit in this appeal, the same is dismissed. There shall be no order as to casts.