MUHAMMAD ISLAM BHATTI, J. -- In a suit brought by the petitioners against respondents Nos. 3 to 12 for a declaration with a consequential relief regarding certain land in village Ichhar Tehsil Shahpur District Sargodha, both the parties produced their evidence on the issues framed therein whereafter the case was fixed for the evidence of the petitioners in rebuttal. The petitioners, however, requested for permission to produce additional evidence through an application dated 28.2.1996 which was contested by the respondents and finally dismissed by the learned Civil Judge, seized of the matter, on 23.3.1996 holding that these documents the production of which would be affirmative evidence, could not be allowed to be produced in rebuttal.
2. The petitioners filed a revision petition against this order which was dismissed by the learned Addl. District Judge, Sargodha on 20.11.1996 after observing that the revision petition was incompetent because the impugned order did not amount to "case decided".
I3. The petitioners have assailed the vires of both these orders dated 23.4.1996 and 20.11.1996, rendered by the learned Civil Judge and learned Addl. District Judge respectively through this writ petition alleging inter alia that the order passed by the learned Trial Court refusing to permit the additional evidence on the basis of sheer technicality was incompetent because the technicalities could not be allowed to stand in the way of justice and if the documents, the production of which was sought through application dated 28.2.1996, were otherwise relevant, they should have been allowed to be brought on record. The petitioners have also maintained that the term "case decided" was erroneously interpreted by the learned revisional Court in total disregard of the relevant law on the subject.
4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and considered the case-law relied on by them.
PLD 1973 SC 507) it was laid down that the phrase "case decided" included decision of Court in respect of any state of facts after judicially considering the same and such decision need not have necessarily disposed of whole matter or suit. Similarly in Rehman Dad and another vs. Major. Raja Sajawal Khan etc. (1976 SCMR 350), it was held by the apex. Court that order finally deciding question whether a party is entitled to produce evidence, amounted to a "case decided".
PLD 1993 Lahore 492), besides holding that order of Cou allowing any party to produce additional evidence was a "case decided' within the meaning of Section 115, C.P. Code, it was also laid down, after taking ,into consideration a large number of cases cited at the Bar decide by Hon'ble Supreme Court, that when copies of documents of public recor. .Appeared to be essential for the just decision of the case, application fo permission to produce them as additional evidence could be filed at an time/stage. As in the instant case, the contesting parties in Mst. Haja Nawab Bibi's case, also produced their evidence before the Court and was thereafter that the petitioners filed an application for permission t produce evidence in rebuttal or by way of additional evidence. Thi application was contested by one of the respondents but was allowed by th Trial Court. This order, was however, set aside by the learned Add District Judge on a revision petition filed by the said respondent and it w. In this background that it was observed that the impugned order whereb the respondent was allowed to produce additional evidence was a "cas decided" within the meaning of Section 115 of the C.P. Code.
774), the order passed by the revisional Court to the effect that allowing or declining to allow production of evidence did not amount to "case decided" within the contemplation of Section 115 of C.P. Code, was set aside. Earlier in M/s. National Security Insurance Company Limited and others Vs. M/s. Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others (1992 SCMR 718), it has been concluded that expression "case decided" did not necessarily mean the decision of the entire suit and it could relate to a decision of an interlocutory matter, requiring a judicial mind.
5. Learned counsel for the respondents' Nos. 3 to 12, however, tried to meet the contentions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on Nawabzada Malik Habibullah Khan vs. Pakistan Cement Industries (1968 SCMR 864) and Nawabzada ,Malik Habibullah Khan vs. Pakistan Cement Industries (1969 SCMR 965) and claiming that they were the direct authorities on the point in question with regard to bringing on record documents or refusing to do so and as such the impugned order was not covered under the phrase "case decided". I am sorry, I am at all impressed by this assertion of the learned counsel for the respondents for the simple reason that these judgments were also referred to in Hajan Nawab Bibi's case and it was observed that in view of the conflict of judgments leave to appeal was granted in the case of Muhammad Asghar (1984 SCMR 1225) but the legal controversy could not be finally decided because the appeal was dismissed due to compromise between the parties. The view taken in Nawabzada Malik Habibullah's case was, therefore, not followed. 1p fact the controversy as to the meaning of the phrase "case decided" has since long been set at rest in Zafar Ahmad Vs. Abdul Khaliq (PLD 1964 Karachi 149) referred to in Feroze Din's case.
It is thus abundantly clear that the view taken by the learned Addl. District Judge was totally erroneous and his order is liable to be set aside.
6. Adverting to the question of permission to produce additional evidence, reference can be made with advantage to what has been laid down in Muhammad Hanif Vs. Mst. Parasan Bihi and others (1996 MLD 1158) where it was held that the object of Order XIII, Rule 2, CPC was to exclude forged documents and to expedite trial and not to exclude genuine documents. Reception of documents after closing of evidence has been made dependent on leave of Court. Where document was authentic and delaying effects were negligible, there should be no objection to its being produced.
As observed in Hajan Nawah Bihi's case, the application for permission to produce additional evidence can be filed at any stage.
7. I have gone through the contents of the relevant application moved by the writ petitioners/plaintiffs for additional evidence. It has been claimed by them that the documents are certified copies of the statements/documents in the previous litigation and abstracts from the revenue record. The learned Civil Judge should have looked into these documents and if their genuineness was not doubtful, their production in evidence in rebuttal or as additional evidence should not have been refused. It, however, appears that the learned Civil Judge dis-allowed the application holding that the plaintiffs/applicants should have produced the same at the time of producing their affirmative evidence which was completed on 21.6.1995 and could not be allowed to produce them in rebuttal at a later stage. This view was obviously mistaken and in direct conflict with the pronouncements of the superior Courts. The order passed by learned Civil Judge is, therefore, also liable to be set aside.
8. In view of what has been discussed above, I accept this writ petition and declare both the impugned orders without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The case is sent back to the learned Civil Judge with a direction to dispose of the ,application afresh in the light of the above observations. No order as to costs.