' MIAN NAZIR AKHTAR, J.--This Constitutional petition is directed against the order dated 1-7-1991 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Lahore on a revision petition filed by respondent No,4 challenging the order dated 27-5-1991 passed by the trial Court allowing the petitioner's application for additional evidence.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner filed two suits, one for possession through partition and the other for cancellation of gift deed dated 10-10-1983. Another suit was filed by respondent No,4 for permanent injunction. All the suits were consolidated and were being tried in the Court of the Civil Judge, Lahore. The contesting parties produced their evidence before the Court and thereafter the petitioner filed an application on 21-5-1991 for permission to produce evidence in rebuttal or by way of additional evidence. This application was contested by respondent No, 4 but was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 27-5-1991. However, the said order was set aside by the learned Additional District Judge on a revision petition filed by respondent No,4.
3. The petitioner's learned counsel contends that the revision petition was not competent before the District Judge because the order dated 27-5-1991 passed by the trial Court did not amount to a case decided. He submits that the order passed by the trial Court was not going to cause any prejudice to respondent No,4 because she was also allowed to produce evidence in rebuttal. He further submits that the provisions relating to production of evidence arc procedural in nature and should not be allowed to become a stumbling block in the way of the parties. He adds that the documents sought to be produced, were public documents and their authenticity was not in doubt. In support of his contentions he produced the following judgments:--
(1) Muhammad Asghar v. District Judge, Sialkot and 3 others 1984 SCM R 1225.
(2) Nawabzada Malik Habib Ullah Khan v. Pak. Cement Industries Limited and others 1969 SCM R 965.
(3) Nawabzada Malik Habib Ullah Khan v. Pakistan Cement Industries Ltd. And others 1968 SCM R 864.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No, 4 submits that revisional order was passed by a competent Court and was not open to challenge in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. He submits that the order passed by the trial Court amounts to a case decided and could be assailed in revision under section 115 of the C.P.C. He adds that the onus of issues No,1 and 2 was on the petitioner and he was given full opportunity to produce his evidence. He could not be permitted to produce evidence in rebuttal to the evidence produced by respondent No,4. He submits that there was no good cause to allow production of documents even if the same were unquestionable. He places reliance on the following judgments:--
(1) Noor Muhammad v. Sarwar Khan and 2 others (PLD 1985,SC 131).
(2) Ghulam Hussain and another v. Malik Shahbaz Khan and another (1985 SCM R 1925).
(3) Muhammad Zahoor and another v. Lal Muhammad and 2 others (1988 SCM R 322).
(4) Hassan Din v. Hafiz Abdus Salam and others (PLD 1991 SC 65).
(5) Riaz Hussain v. Board of Revenue and others (1991 SCM R 2307).
(6) Bahadur Shah and 2 others v. Sharaf and 9 others (PLD 1973 Lahore 513).
5. The impugned order dated 27-5-1991 whereby, respondent No, 4 was allowed to produce additional evidence was a case decided within the meaning of section 115 of the C.P.C. The expression "case decided" used in section 115, C.P.C. Is intended to embrace any state of facts juridically considered and decided by a Court and not necessarily the entire lis. This view finds support from the recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Messrs National Security Insurance Company Limited and others v. Messrs Hoechst Pakistan Limited and others 1992 SCM R 718. It was held that the expression case decided did not necessarily mean the decision of the entire suit and that it might relate to a decision of an interlocutary matter requiring application of judicial mind. Obviously when a Court allows or disallows an application for production of additional evidence, it considers certain facts, applies its judicial mind and then accepts or rejects the application in the light of the provisions of Order 41, Rule 27 of the C.P.C. Such a decision is definitely a case decided and amenable to revisional jurisdiction under section 115 of the C.P.C. As held in the case of Rehman and another v. Major Raja Sajawal Khan 1976 SCM R 350.
The same view was expressed by this Court in the case of Bahadur Shah, relied upon by the respondent's learned counsel. True, a different view was expressed in the cases of Nawabzada Malik Habib Ullah Khan 1968 SCM R 864 and 1969 SCM R 965 and in view of conflict of judgments leave to appeal was granted in the case of Muhammad Asghar relied upon by the petitioner's learned counsel. However, the legal controversy involved could not be finally decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Muhammad Asghar's case because the appeal was dismissed due to compromise between the parties on 12-2-1991.
6. On merits it appears that the trial Court had rightly exercised the discretion in allowing the petitioner to produce additional evidence. The documents sought to be produced by the petitioner are certified copies of the public record and appear to be essential for the just decision of the case.
It may be explained that the petitioner wanted to produce 4 documents out of which the sale-deed dated 19-7-1984 was already on the record and the original record could be summoned to verify the correctness of the contents of the relevant entries made therein. The record from the office of the Revenue Officer WAPDA is also relevant. It contained an affidavit of Fazal Din, deceased who had died in the year 1985 but his affidavit sworn in 1986 was placed on the record. Similarly the record of birth of Mst. Bashiran is relevant to prove her parentage. She is shown to be daughter of Ali Muhammad and not that of Fazal Din in the birth register. The last document is personal file of Shiran Zada, who had stated that he always remained at Lahore and had never gone to Karachi.
The correct position can be verified from the said file. Thus, it is evident that the above-referred documents are essential for resolving the controversy between the parties in a just and fair manner. The application for permission to produce additional evidence can be filed at any stage.
The order passed by the trial Court did not suffer from any jurisdictional defect or material irregularity so as to justify interference in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction. The mere fact that the appellate Court holds a different view regarding the necessity of additional evidence or that the impugned order is liable to correction is no ground to set aside the order passed by the trial Court. It is in the interest of justice that the petitioner be allowed to bring on record the documents which are otherwise of unimpeachable authenticity, for resolving the controversy. This would also obviate the possibility of remand of the case by the appellate/revisional Court. I am fortified in my view by the recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Khurshid All and others v. Shah Nazar PLD 1992 SC 822
7. Now I may advert to the judgment relied upon by the respondent's learned counsel. The judgments in the cases of Noor Muhammad and Ghulam Hussain proceed on their own distinguishable facts and do not create an absolute bar in the exercise of Constitutional jurisdiction in suitable cases. In the former case, the impugned orders were neither found to be illegal nor without lawful authority, while in the latter, the order of the High Court dismissing a writ petition against a revisional order passed by the Additional District Judge was maintained, with the observation that a revisional order would not be a bar to the regular remedy by way of an appeal against the dismissal of the suit or the rejection of the plaint. In Muhammad Zahoor's case some observations were made to discourage vexatious and incompetent Constitutional petitions against final orders passed by the Civil Courts. However, it was observed, "we are, therefore, not in a position to lay down the wide proposition that the Constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court is not at all invokable in respect of an order passed by a Civil Court". In Riaz Hussain's case it was held that a Court having jurisdiction could decide the matter rightly or wrongly and the mere fact the decision was incorrect would not ended it as without jurisdiction. It was further held that where a judicial tribunal had relied on in admissible evidence or failed to properly apply its mind to questions of law and facts resulting in error apparent on the fact of the record, High Court in exercise of powers under Article 199 of the Constitution could quash such decisions.
8. For the foregoing discussion I accept this petition declare the impugned order to be without lawful authority and of no legal effect and restore the order dated 27-5-1991 passed by the trial Court leaving the parties to bear their own costs.