' SARDAR SAID MUHAMMAD KHAN, C.J.---This appeal has been directed against the order of the High Court, dated 5-11-1998, whereby the writ petition filed by Naseer Ahmad Khan, respondent, was accepted and the order of the Collector passed in favour of respondent No,1 was restored and that of the Additional Commissioner Revenue and the Board of Revenue were set aside.
2. The brief facts of the case are that land measuring one Kanal, comprising Survey Nos.277 and 169/158, situate in village Mallote, Tehsil Dherkot, District Bagh, was sanctioned in favour of Naseer Ahmad Khan, respondent, by Collector, 13agh, for residential purposes under the rules known as the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Grant of Khalsa Land (Ground, Rent and Lease) Rules, 1985 (hereinafter shall be called the Khalsa Land Rules). One Zafar Iqbal in the capacity of representative of the villagers filed a revision petition against the said sanction to the Additional Commissioner Revenue who accepted the same and set aside the sanction order made in favour of Naseer Ahmad Khan, respondent, as being violative of relevant rules. Respondent No,1 challenged the order of Additional Commissioner Revenue by filing a .Revision petition before the Board of Revenue but the same was also dismissed. Thereafter, respondent No,1 filed a writ petition in the High Court which was accepted and the orders of the Additional Commissioner Revenue as well as that of the Board of Revenue were set aside. It is against the aforesaid order of the High Court that present appeal has been preferred.
3. Sardar Rafique Mahmood Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for the appellants, has contended that the High Court has committed an error in holding that the land sought on lease was not required for common purpose of the village or for that matter the same was not required by the villagers for grazing or other easement rights. The learned counsel has argued that the High Court has not properly interpreted the relevant rules. He has further argued that the appellants herein, being inhabitants of the village in which the suit land is situated, applied for being impleaded as respondents in the High Court but their application was rejected and, thus, the appellants had no option but to file a petition for leave to appeal to this Court which was granted. The learned counsel has maintained that the judgment of the Additional Revenue reveals that the Assistant Commissioner, who was duty bound under rule 8 of the aforesaid rules to visit the spot and make a report, apart from other matters, about the fact that the land in dispute was not needed for the common public purposes such as for grazing etc. The learned counsel has contended that in the Revenue Record, the land in dispute is entered as 'Chrand Ghair-Mumkin', which does not fall within the definition of words 'Khalsa land' as defined under rule 2(c) of the Khalsa Land Rules. The learned counsel has maintained that according to the judgment of the Additional Commissioner Revenue, the report of the Assistant Commissioner was only to the effect that the land in dispute was not required for public purposes and did not show that the same was not required by the inhabitants of the village for grazing purpose or other easement rights. The learned counsel has argued that the High Court did not consider the said findings of the Additional Commissioner and without recording any reason observed that the reports of the Revenue Officers show that the land was not required for the use of the villagers. According to the learned counsel, the observations of the High Court are not supported by the record and are not sustainable. The learned counsel has also submitted that the Additional Commissioner whose order was upheld by the Board of Revenue was also necessary party in the writ petition but he was not impleaded as such. He has referred to a case reported as Raja Muhammad Ashraf Khan Kayani v. Azad Government (1998 PLC (C.S.) 110), wherein it has been held that the authority whose order is challenged is a necessary party to be impleaded in the writ proceedings.
4. In reply, Raja Muhammad Hanif Khan, Advocate, the learned counsel for respondent No,1, has argued that the appellants had no locus standi to file the present appeal because they did not challenge the order of the Collector passed in favour of respondent No,1 before the Additional Commissioner. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the respondent, they have no locus standi to file an appeal against the order of the High Court passed in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
The learned counsel has submitted that as the Board of Revenue was impleaded as a party before the High Court in the writ petition, it was not necessary to implead the Additional Commissioner Revenue as party because the order of the Additional Commissioner was upheld by the Board of Revenue and, thus, the same stood merged in the appellate order of the Board. On merits, the learned counsel has referred to paragraphs 6 and 7 of the judgment of the High Court and has argued that it is evident from the said paragraphs that according to the reports made by the Revenue Authorities, the land in dispute was not required for common use of the villagers.
5. We have given due consideration to the arguments raised at the Bar. The findings of the Additional Commissioner Revenue are that there was no report of the Assistant Commissioner showing that the land was not required for the benefit of village community, rather the report of Assistant Commissioner says that the land was not required for public purposes or for that matter by the State. The High Court has not expressed the view in the impugned judgment that the aforesaid observations of the Additional Commissioner Revenue which were upheld by the Board of Revenue are not correct; no such report has been brought on the record of the High Court in support of the contention that said observations made by the Additional Commissioner Revenue were against the facts. The High Court has also lost sight of the fact that in the Revenue Record the land is entered as 'Chrand Ghair-Mumkin which clearly implies that it is reserved or demarcated for grazing purposes of the village community. The High Court has also not considered the definition of expression 'khalsa land' given in rule 2(c) of the Khalsa Land Rules and section 2 (v) of the Azad Jammu and Kashmir Regularization of Nautors and Grant of Khalsa Land Ordinance, 1974, according to which the land demarcated for village common purposes is not included in the 'Khalsa land'. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court that the land in dispute was not required for village common purpose or for that matter of grazing purpose, despite, the fact that the same was entered as 'Charand Ghair-Mumkin' in the Revenue Record is not sustainable. It may also be observed here that for annulling a judgment or order of a special tribunal in exercise of writ .Jurisdiction, there must exist sufficient grounds for coming to the conclusion that the view taken by the special tribunal was patently against the relevant law.
6. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the appeal is not competent because the appellants have not challenged the order of sanction of 'khalsa in favour of the respondent before the Additional Commissioner Revenue is concerned, that is not factually correct because the copy of the judgment of the Additional Commissioner shows that Zafar Iqbal filed the said revision petition on behalf of all the villagers. Therefore, it cannot be said that the appellants are not aggrieved persons and, thus, were not competent to file the appeal.
7. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the Additional Commissioner Revenue should have been impleaded as a party in the petition is concerned, it may be observed that in the instant case the Board of Revenue was impleaded as party and, thus, the question as to whether when the order of Additional Commissioner was upheld by the Board of Revenue, he was still a necessary party in the writ petition needs deep consideration. However, we leave this question to be decided in some other cases because the present appeal can be conveniently disposed of on other points discussed above.
' In the light of what has been stated above, we accept the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and restore that of the Additional Commissioner Revenue: